Author: Theodore DeRosa

  • Introduction to US Relations with Estonia

    Introduction to US Relations with Estonia

    Estonia, a small country at the northern end of the Baltic states, has received increased focus from Western media in light of the deepening divide between the West and Russia in Eastern Europe—exemplified by the war in Ukraine. Estonia, a NATO ally of the United States and member of the European Union, spent the Cold War under Soviet rule and two centuries as part of the Russian Empire. Today, Estonia is recognized for incorporating digital innovation with democratic governance and public services, leading some to refer to it as a “digital democracy”. 

    Estonia, located at the northern end of the Baltic states, has gained increased attention from Western media due to the growing divide between the West and Russia in Eastern Europe, particularly highlighted by the war in Ukraine. As a NATO ally of the United States and a member of the European Union, Estonia has a history of Soviet rule during the Cold War and centuries as part of the Russian Empire. Today, Estonia is known for blending digital innovation with democratic governance and public services, earning it the nickname of a “digital democracy.”

    Fact Sheet

    History of US-Estonia Relations

    Following the Russian Civil War and World War I, Estonia declared independence, leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Estonia and the United States in 1922. However, during World War II, Estonia faced occupation by both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, eventually falling under Soviet control. It wasn’t until the end of the Cold War in 1991 that Estonia regained its independence. Throughout the Cold War period, the United States never formally recognized Estonia as part of the Soviet Union. Instead, the U.S. maintained diplomatic relations with Estonia’s separate representatives, reflecting its continued support for Estonia’s independence.

    Estonia’s Tensions with Russia

    Since its independence, Estonia has grappled with tensions with Russia regarding the treatment of its sizable ethnic Russian minority. Many long-term Russian residents in Estonia, including those born there, were not automatically granted Estonian citizenship. Although some eventually obtained citizenship, those lacking proficiency in Estonian faced statelessness. Russia’s President Putin has cited discrimination against Russian minorities to justify actions in Ukraine, raising concerns of potential application of similar arguments against Estonia.

    Estonia’s admission to NATO in 2004, along with the other Baltic states, expanded the Western alliance up to Russia’s borders, contributing to increased tensions between Estonia and Russia. This westward shift is further evidenced by Estonia’s acceptance into the EU in the same year.

    US Strategic Interests

    • Strategy and conflict: Russia’s war in Ukraine has renewed America’s focus on its alliance with the Baltic states, including Estonia. As other Eastern European nations fear that they could be next to face Russian aggression, Estonia’s ambassador to the United States has remarked that the war represents “existential risks” to their nation and allies. The Baltic states are seen as the most strategically vulnerable part of NATO to a Russian invasion. Wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2014 and 2015 found that Russian forces could reach Tallinn and Riga in as few as 60 hours. Due to Estonia’s membership in NATO, a Russian attack on Estonia would likely compel its allies, including the United States, to respond.
    • NATO alliance: Estonia also has a unique role in NATO. Consistent with Estonia’s emphasis on digital innovation, the country hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence from which NATO’s cybersecurity operations are based. 
    • Aligned value system: Since the end of the Cold War, Estonia has exhibited increased alignment with America’s values on the world stage. Previously a communist republic, Estonia now has a free market and has made significant reforms towards liberal democracy, demonstrating a shift away from its historical ties with Russia and towards a Western alignment.
    • Economic ties: Over the same time, Estonia has developed closer economic ties to the United States, with the US moving from Estonia’s fourteenth largest trading partner to its fourth largest from 2017 to 2019. The two countries have also signed several economic agreements over the last few decades. 

    Future

    As concerns about the security of the Baltics increase, the addition of Finland and Sweden into NATO could contribute to enhanced security in the region. Since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Estonia has provided around $400 million in military aid to Ukraine. The Baltic states have been united in their support for Ukraine, and Estonia has called upon its NATO allies to increase their defence spending to 2.5% of their GDP to support Ukraine. The likely goal moving forward for Estonia and NATO is to deter further Russian aggression against its bordering states by preventing their success in Ukraine.

  • Policy Options: U.S. Response to Shifts in India-Russia Relations

    Policy Options: U.S. Response to Shifts in India-Russia Relations

    India is at a crossroads between its historical relationship with Russia and its growing relationship with the United States. Shifts in the global security order, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strengthening bond between Russia and China, and India’s cooperation with the U.S. on trade, technology, and security, are changing the dynamics of these relationships. India’s unique position gives the U.S. options in its approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the trajectory of Indo-Pacific affairs.

    India-Russia Relations

    During the Cold War, India and Russia pursued mutually beneficial ties built upon three pillars: arms sales, a preference for the role of the public sector in the economy and the role of Soviet foreign aid towards India, and countering the alignment between the U.S., Pakistan, and China. The enduring aspect of this historical relationship that remains crucial in Russia-India relations today is the sale of arms. Russia continues to be India’s primary source for arms imports, while the other two factors have lost their significance in the post-Cold War era.

    Another key component of the two countries’ economic relationship is oil. More than a third of India’s oil comes from Russia, and this share has increased in the past year. Additionally, starting from April 2023, India has initiated trade talks with Russia, aiming to broaden their economic cooperation beyond defense and oil sectors.

    However, certain geopolitical trends may compel India to reevaluate the nature of its relationship with Russia. Russia increasingly looks to China as its top strategic partner against the West and is seeking opportunities to grow closer to Pakistan on economic and security issues. India has a history of conflict with both neighboring countries, and current tensions persist. As Russia strengthens its ties with these nations, India might consider seeking alliances with other partners. 

    Despite these shifts, India’s relationship with Russia remains strong due to its dependence on arms sales, which would take time to diminish, and an oil trade that India finds advantageous due to Russia’s competitive prices. Russia also continues to place importance on this partnership, considering bilateral collaboration with India and participation in institutions like the SCO and BRICS as integral to its broader Eurasian strategy.

    The Impact of the Ukraine War

    Though India has not taken the same punitive measures toward Russia that the West has, it has not expressed support for Russia’s invasion either. At a summit for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization last year, India’s Prime Minister Modi spoke openly to President Putin, urging him to rely on diplomacy rather than war to resolve the conflict. Modi’s comments, though not a condemnation of the war, indicate a growing frustration with the strain it has caused around the world. 

    In the midst of the war, India’s economic ties with Russia persist. While the West sought to economically isolate Russia at the outset of the war, India’s imports from Russia grew substantially with Russia’s share of India’s oil imports increasing from 1% to 18% in the hundred days after the invasion started. 

    At the same time, the war has strained Russia’s arms trade with India. Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have forced it to delay shipments and suspend contracts with India as it seeks to cover its losses in Ukraine. India has expressed worries about the dependability of the Russian weapons it uses, and the Russian military’s issues in Ukraine only make these concerns worse. India started gradually diversifying its defense exports before the war, and the war could potentially encourage it to expedite this process. 

    The Role of the U.S. 

    While India has maintained some elements of its historical relationship with Russia, it has also strengthened ties with the U.S. As security issues in the Indo-Pacific, including the rise of China, become a priority in U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. and India both seek to develop a stronger partnership. Along with Japan, Australia, and the U.S., India is a member of the Quad, a pact through which these four countries engage in dialogue regarding security concerns in the Indo-Pacific. Though not a formal alliance, the Quad expresses a vision for a rules-based order in the region. Additionally, the formation of AUKUS, a security pact among Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., underscores the U.S.’s heightened attention to the Indo-Pacific region and its alignment with India on key concerns, although India is not included in the pact. The Russian Defense Minister has criticized both initiatives as measures to “contain” Russia’s partner, China.

    These expanding security connections are evident in the enhanced military collaboration between the two nations. A recent instance is the joint military drill conducted by the U.S. and India near India’s disputed border with China. Should India’s rapport with Russia encounter challenges, and considering Russia’s strong alliance with China, alongside India and the U.S.’s shared focus on China, this cooperation indicates that the U.S. could potentially serve as a security ally that India can rely on.

    In turn, as China continues to pursue its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to overtake the U.S.-led order through its Global Security Initiative, the partnership between the U.S. and India—including military cooperation—could provide an alternative for the region. 

    The opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. and India extend to the economic sphere as well. The bilateral initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) between the two countries aims to strengthen cooperation on technological innovation, defense industry, space, and education. The U.S. and India are also pursuing trade ties separate from the iCET arrangement. 

    However, India and the U.S. are still at odds over India’s arms trade with Russia. India’s decision to purchase S-400 missile systems from Russia could leave the nation open to CAATSA sanctions from the U.S. Although Congress granted authority to the President to waive these sanctions, it is not yet clear whether he will do so. 

    Obstacles to U.S.-India Ties

    India’s unique position between the U.S. and Russia is consistent with its historical preference for non-aligned foreign policy. Dating back to the Cold War, India pursues an independent foreign policy, establishing ties based on maximizing autonomy and protecting strategic interests, and is wary of permanent alliances based on shared ideological values. This allows India to maintain ties with both Russia and the U.S. when the interests of each nation seem contradictory. This could mean that India will be hesitant to sever ties with Russia as long as it deems the arms trade and economic relationship beneficial. 

    Despite India’s concerns about the quality of Russian systems, the majority of its arms imports come from Russia. This is partly because Russia provides favorable terms that support India’s defense industry growth, and moving away from this reliance would be a lengthy process.

    In addition to possibly subjecting India to U.S. sanctions, India’s purchase of S-400 systems from Russia poses an obstacle to increasing military cooperation between the U.S. and India. U.S. officials are concerned that through the S-400, Russia could breach U.S. systems and collect intelligence on the U.S and other allies. 

    For some U.S., policymakers, further alignment with India is not viewed in a positive light. Though India is a democracy, Prime Minister Modi often faces criticism for human rights abuses in the country. Among the reported abuses monitored by the U.S. State Department are suppression of the freedom of the press through arrests of journalists, mistreatment of prisoners (including torture), and policies discriminating against religious minorities. This could lead to hesitancy to strengthen ties with India and compel foreign policy leaders in the U.S. to make requests for reform. 

    Future Options

    As the war in Ukraine forces Russia to halt some of its arms sales to India, the U.S. has an opportunity to sell more defense systems to India to fill the void. This would decrease India’s reliance on Russian arms sales while strengthening ties with the U.S. During his visit to Washington, D.C. in June 2023, Modi emphasized the significance of defense cooperation and innovation U.S.-India relations. He mentioned the idea of uniting the defense industries of both nations. However, the challenge lies in the time required for this initiative. Despite India’s efforts to expand its defense suppliers, it is improbable to completely sever its arms trade with Russia, given its reliance on Russian systems.

    On the issue of the war in Ukraine, U.S. officials have expressed hope that India could use its unique relationship with Russia to pursue a resolution to the conflict. With the U.S. supporting Ukraine and India’s ties with both Russia and the U.S., India is in a position to attempt to negotiate peace between the two sides, and it would be consistent with a non-aligned foreign policy. In the press conference with President Biden, Modi reiterated support for diplomacy as the means to resolve the conflict. If the U.S. is open to the idea and India is willing to undertake the task, this could be an opportunity to resolve the war and strengthen relations. However, Putin seems reluctant to pursue peace, so it is unclear what it would take to bring Russia to the table in this situation. 

    Although India is unlikely to abandon its relationship with Russia, there remain other opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. and India. Tensions with Russia do not necessarily need to be an obstacle to cooperation on trade and technology between the U.S. and India. President Biden elaborated on the importance of trade, technology, and education between the two countries during Modi’s visit. Beyond Russia, there are also other security concerns, such as China, that are of interest to both the U.S. and India in the Indo-Pacific, and will likely lead the countries to continue to cooperate even while India’s relationship with Russia persists. 

  • Theodore DeRosa, Miami University

    Theodore DeRosa, Miami University

    Theodore DeRosa is a rising senior at Miami University in Ohio, studying Diplomacy and Global Politics and Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies with a minor in Comparative Religion. His primary interests are in U.S. foreign policy, specifically in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Russia and its relations with other post-Soviet states, and the role of religion in politics and foreign affairs. While attending Miami, Theodore has studied abroad twice. He went to Oman to study social and economic transitions occurring in the Arab Gulf region, and then to Estonia where he continued his study of the Russian language at Tallinn University. He also completed the Heritage Foundation’s Academy program with a focus on foreign policy, and worked as an intern on J.D. Vance’s campaign for the U.S. Senate in 2022. After graduating next year, Theodore hopes to attend law school and plans on pursuing a career in law or diplomacy. 

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