Author: Swini Adikari

Introduction 

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a Sunni jihadi group that seeks to establish a global caliphate and claim religious authority over all Muslims. The Islamic State has taken advantage of the instability and violence under the Assad regime in Syria and continues to mount attacks in the region despite the defeat of the caliphate in 2018. Apart from carrying out attacks in the region, the militant group exploits refugee conditions in Syria to radicalize and recruit individuals for its resurgence. Counter-terrorism and deradicalization efforts essential steps to combat the resurgence of the Islamic State in Syria. 

Rise of the Islamic State 

The Islamic State, also known as the Daesh, emerged from the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a local affiliate of Al Qaeda under the leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. With the start of the Arab Spring and the growing instability and violence in Syria, AQI grew to carry out attacks and bolster its strength and expand its caliphate to Syria to establish a fundamentalist Sunni Muslim state in Greater Syria. In June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi changed the group’s name to ISIS and formally declared the ISIS caliphate.

The militant group’s ideology stems from Salafism and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia (Islamic Law). The group developed a global jihad network by expanding to different geographic areas and establishing affiliates in Libya, the Sinai Province, Afghanistan, West Africa, and the Greater Sahara. They have further expanded affiliates into Congo, Mozambique, Philippines and Bangladesh. The primary targets of the Islamic State include the West and regimes in the Arab world which it does not view as upholding Islamic values. The Islamic State’s primary strategy includes territorial control and expanding its position in the world. 

The Islamic State’s preferred attack types are a reflection of the tactics evolved from the civil wars in Syria and Iraq. In the height of their strength, the militant group deployed artillery, massed forces, and tanks to expand territorial holdings. In the territories that they do hold, they have carried out public executions, rape, and symbolic crucifixions to terrorize the populations into submission. 

Islamic State’s Current Presence in Syria 

Presently, the Islamic State continues to be active in the regime-controlled territory in the Syrian desert and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF)-controlled northeast. Attacks include small-arm assaults, ambushes, roadside bombings, kidnappings, and acts of sabotage. According to the United Nations, there are presently approximately 10,000 Islamic State fighters across Iraq and Syria. The militant group faces a more challenging operating environment than before in light of Assad’s resurgence as well as the presence of international forces. 

One of the most significant concerns is the radicalization occurring within the al Hol detention facilities in SDF-controlled territory. The camp holds approximately 60,000 men, women, and children that have links with the Islamic State, and remains a site of recruitment and radicalization. Recently, the Islamic State mounted an attack on a prison in Northeastern Syria that held Islamic State fighters. U.S.-backed SDF forces fought the Islamic State fighters for 10 days, eventually retaking the prison—but not before the escape of approximately 100 Islamic State prisoners. 

In February 2022, the U.S. carried out a covert operation in February that resulted in the death of the former leader of the Islamic State, al Qurayshi. This special operation demonstrated a high degree of sophistication in U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism operations. While it was a significant blow to the terrorist organization, it is unlikely to change the Islamic State’s current trajectory. 

Past U.S. Policies to Combat the Islamic State in Syria

In 2014, the U.S. The Department of Defense (DoD) established the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF – OIR) to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The aim of this operation was to advise, assist, and enable partnered forces in the defeat of the Islamic State. 

Under CJTF-OIR the U.S. adopted a limited liability and limited risk strategy to defeat the Islamic State. This included air power, which played a crucial role in the defeat of the global caliphate in 2018. The U.S. and partner nations used precision strikes which eventually affected the militant group’s ability to control resources through its oil business in Syria. Airpower also played a critical role in gathering intelligence on the group’s whereabouts and resources. Overall, airpower played an essential role in blunting the Islamic State’s momentum in Syria, targeting its cash resources, and countering vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks in Mosul. Combined, these operations eliminated the militant group’s hold on large swaths of territory in Syria which was crucial to the caliphate’s survival. 

Under CJTF-OIR, the DoD also focused on training, equipping, and advising local forces in Syria—namely, the U.S. backed Syrian Democratic Forces which played a significant role in the defeat of the Islamic State in Kobani and Raqqa. In 2019, the U.S.-backed SDF forces besieged the Islamic State in Baghouz which was the Islamic state’s last territorial enclave, ending the Islamic State’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria. 

Continued U.S. Policies to Counter the Islamic State in Syria 

The U.S. is likely to continue its multilateral counter-terrorism efforts to diminish any resurgence of the Islamic State. Developing a comprehensive security plan to reassess ISIS’s threat capabilities in the Northeast of Syria is vital to counteract any resurgence. This includes gathering cross border intelligence-sharing between the colaution, SDF and Iraqi authorities. In addition, the U.S. can provide more security personnel and technical equipment to secure prison systems that house former jihadi fighters. These measures can cause significant  blows to the resurgence of the Islamic State and prevent former jihadi fighters from re-joining the Islamic State. 

In addition, the U.S. may address the sources of Islamic State resilience. This includes countering the radicalization occurring within the refugee camps in al-Hol. This would include a combined effort from the U.S. and allied nations to develop rehabilitation centers to de-radicalize individuals. This measure will address the grievances that factor into radicalization and address the pathways to de-radicalization. However, there are significant challenges to the implementation of this policy. It requires cooperation by the Assad regime to house individuals within rehabilitation centers in Syria, which would mean normalizing relations with a regime responsible for war atrocities. 

Introduction

The United States’ longest war came to an end with the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban’s swift and hostile takeover of Afghanistan’s government following the U.S. withdrawal left the country once again in the hands of the Taliban. The Taliban takeover is a significant development in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and raises questions about the unforseen consequences of the war against terrorism. 

The GWOT is an international, American-led coalition campaign launched in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. Following the attacks, then-President George W. Bush launched a comprehensive plan to eliminate and disrupt all terrorist organizations around the globe. He stated, “Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” 

The U.S. employed every instrument of national power including diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial and military tools to disrupt and defeat not just Al-Qaeda but to extend the fight to other militant groups around the world. Nations around the globe joined the U.S. in the battle against global terror. The GWOT led to the disruption of violent extremist organizations, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, the disruption of terrorist financing, the advancement and transformation of global security, and the elimination of the immediate terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. Simultaneously, the GWOT also fueled radicalization and laid the foundation for the rise of extremist groups with similar ideological sympathies that can spread violence.

Successes of the GWOT

Military and intelligence operations including offensive strategies and covert operations proved successful in the fight against terrorism. These operations have been shown to deter transnational terrorist groups from conducting logistically complex attacks in the face of limited resources as a consequence of U.S. and international led-military forces. U.S. military action succeeded in ousting the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in December 2001. While Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies once controlled 95% of Afghanistan, U.S. military campaigns succeeded in seizing large swaths of Al-Qaeda-held territory including its center of gravity near the Afghan-Pakistan border in Afghanistan and reduced its ability to carry out large-scale terrorist attacks. This impacted Osama Bin Laden’s immediate communications with the organization. This disconnect eventually reduced Al-Qaeda’s ability to plan until 2004 when Osama Bin Laden reconnected with Al-Qaeda after years of hiding. 

Targeted killings proved effective in dismantling terrorist groups that followed a hierarchical bureaucratic structure. However, Al-Qaeda was still able to conduct attacks despite leadership decapitation. Thus, while leadership decapitation was a major blow to the terrorist organization, the bureaucratization of Al-Qaeda allowed the group to formulate contingencies for a leadership turnover. However, the GWOT succeeded in eliminating key terrorist leaders of Al-Qaeda, including Osama Bin Laden. 

Additionally, the U.S. made domestic advancements by developing more efficient technology and law enforcement processes and establishing the Transportation Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security to prevent further attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Failures of the GWOT

According to the Costs of War project at Brown University, nearly 20 years after the 9/11 attacks, the financial costs of the GWOT stand at $8 trillion and the death toll stands at 900,000 people. Casualties include U.S. military members, allied fighters, opposition fighters, journalists, humanitarian aid workers, and civilians. Of the total number killed, 287,000 are categorized as civilians, 207,000 as members of the national military and police forces, and another 301,000 as opposition fighters. 

In the aftermath of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Iraq was destabilized without an effective bureaucratic system to provide basic goods and services to its citizens. The absence of adequate law enforcement and military forces to secure Iraqi borders, and the absence of extensive monitoring led to the country being infiltrated by former jihadist foreign fighters. 

Following the Iraqi invasion, the provisional government led a de-Baathification process to rid the government and military of Ba’ath influence. The Ba’ath political party had previously led the country and top officials perpetrated human rights violations, but many had joined the party because it was the only way to gain many roles in the government sector. The de-Baathification gave rise to grievances that extremist groups started to exploit. Former Iraqi soldiers with no jobs were susceptible to radicalization. Grievances in the Sunni regions remained strong as there was little progress made with regards to reconstruction while security forces targeted former Ba’ath party members through unjust anti-terrorism laws. The use of unjust anti-terrorism laws, lack of security and services, and the length of displacement of these communities all led to an environment that extremist groups such as the Islamic State could exploit. All these conditions fueled radicalization and laid the foundations for the rise of other extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq. 

GWOT moving forward

Moving forward, the U.S. will likely continue to carry out special operations in regions that witness the rise of jihadi groups, to disrupt and eliminate terrorist organizations, disrupt terrorist financing, and prevent radicalization. U.S. military doctrine retains the essential elements to plan and execute successful operations against conventional and irregular opponents. Recently, the U.S. successfully executed a covert operation that killed the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader Abu Ibrahim al–Hashimi al-Qurayshi. This operation demonstrates a high degree of sophistication in U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism efforts. 

Most importantly, the U.S. is incorporating countering violent extremism into the U.S. National Security Strategy to prevent the radicalization of individuals as radicalization and recruitment remain threat multipliers. Thus, preventing radicalization remains essential to countering extremism, especially in internally displaced camps where extremist propaganda is widely being spread.