ACE

Author: Nicholas Griffin

  • The Southern Gas Corridor and European Energy

    The Southern Gas Corridor and European Energy

    This brief was originally written by Nick Griffin. Before its publication, it was updated by Arielle Romm.

    As Europe transitions away from fossil fuels and towards green energy, natural gas has filled the gap between what existing fossil fuel generators are permitted to produce and clean energy sources are capable of providing. Natural gas generates about 22% of Europe’s energy supply, of which Russia supplies 33%. Russia’s influence over Europe’s energy supply poses a security threat for the continent. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the West’s ensuing sanctions have disrupted the supply of essential fuel. Many target Russia’s lucrative energy industry, which U.S. President Joe Biden has called “the main artery of Russia’s economy” and the U.S. banned imports of Russian oil, gas, and coal entirely. As Russia becomes more aggressive, European leaders have begun to recognize the necessity of diversifying energy imports and look elsewhere for natural gas supplies. In light of this, Central Asia and the Southern Gas Corridor have become key players as a counterbalance to both Russian energy power and strategic considerations regarding China’s influence in the region. 

    The Invasion of Ukraine and Impact on Energy Supply

    After Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, the United States, Europe, and other allies imposed sanctions to punish the nation for invading and deter further escalation. Though these sanctions aim to target the Russian economy, Europe and the West face steep energy prices as a result and may have to pay exorbitant gas prices if the conflict does not end quickly. Immediately following the invasion, gas prices rose 36% due to fear of sanctions impacting the European markets’ natural gas supply. The ongoing conflict has resulted in the destruction of pipelines and threatens to disrupt the flow of energy to European homes. In March of 2022, Putin set an ultimatum to Western nations that had previously been recipients of Russian gas and resources, requiring payment for gas in Russian rubles, rather than US dollars or euros. In the aftermath of this announcement, gas prices in the West jumped even further, and governments scrambled to find alternatives. Already, Russian energy giant Gazprom has halted the flow of gas to Bulgaria, Poland, and Finland, who refused to capitulate to the demands. Damaged Russia-West relations could impact the energy supply well into the future. Germany has canceled the certification of an important pipeline, Nord Stream 2, and sanctions could persist for years. 

    Building and Expanding the Southern Gas Corridor

    The ongoing war in Ukraine has highlighted the necessity of diversifying, but plans to connect Central Asian energy with Europe have been in the works for more than a decade. In 2012, an agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey resulted in a new, Trans-Anatolian pipeline to transport Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian Sea gas fields to European markets. Construction began in 2015 and was completed in 2018. The existing Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) was expanded to connect with Greece, Italy, and Southeastern Europe. Known as the Southern Gas Corridor, this energy source has become essential in recent weeks and could be the future of European energy. Further expansions are underway; the Gas Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria will connect to the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline in Stara Zagora. When the expansion is complete, Bulgaria is projected to import ⅓ of its natural gas from Azerbaijan.

    Understanding Europe’s Dilemma

    Although plans are currently in the works to fully transition to green energy (eliminating the need for gas pipelines altogether), Germany’s carbon emission reduction goals are currently set to a 65% reduction by 2030 and an 88% reduction in carbon emissions by 2040. The EU, recognizing the urgency of this energy shift, has pledged to spend €210 billion ($222 billion) to wean itself off Russian oil and gas through the REPowerEU plan. works to reduce its consumption of Russia’s gas by 66% before the end of this year, but may only be able to break its dependence completely before 2027 even at the best-case scenario. However, the most ambitious plans still require Europe to import natural gas at least a few more years, if not decades. Continued reliance on Russia is a security risk while changing suppliers to Turkey and Azerbaijan would shift the risk and support two regimes that have been accused of human rights violations. 

    • Azerbaijan, the source of the gas, has been called an authoritarian state by organizations like Freedom House. The leader of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has ruled since a 2003 election that featured accusations of repression and intimidation of opposition candidates and rallies. Azerbaijan has been accused of violating its citizens’ human rights, including those of opposition leaders and journalists by Human Rights Watch. The country is also purported to have committed war crimes during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, including decapitations and mutilations of Armenian soldiers as well as the use of cluster bombs against civilian targets. 
    • Similarly, Turkey has been accused of clamping down on civil rights, limiting the free speech rights of dissidents and journalists, and criminalizing criticism of Turkish President Erdogan. Erdogan’s government has been charged with torturing political dissidents in prison.

    China’s economic presence in Central Asia has grown in recent years. Already, China poses a counterbalance to the West’s efforts to use energy as leverage against Russia. In February of 2022, Russia and China signed a 30-year contract to supply gas to China via a new pipeline, agreeing to do so in euros, and increase their relationship since the 2019 signing of the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline between the two. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, imports of Russian oil have risen by 55% from a year prior, taking Saudi Arabia’s place as China’s biggest oil supplier. This energy alliance is a distinct concern in the face of growing Western sanctions on Russian energy, leading to fears of a so-called “gas pivot” to China. China has also developed energy relationships with both Turkey and Azerbaijan, leading to increased fears of its growing influence in the region. The region is undergoing a geopolitical shift that continues to diminish ties to the Euro-Atlantic states and elevates China’s influence in Central Asia. Beijing and Moscow are the region’s principal economic, political, and security partners, a marker of declining U.S. influence.

    United States Role and Consideration

    The United States has long been concerned about Russia using energy supplies as a political tool to influence other nations. A recent report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations states that U.S. interests lay in “alleviating Russian gas-fueled pressure against NATO allies” and “bolstering bilateral relations in the Caspian Sea region.” U.S. diplomacy was critical in developing this project, and has opened doors for U.S. engagement in Central Asia, strengthening ties with Azerbaijan as an alternative to its relationship with Russia, and opened doors to advancing rule-of-law and climate investment issues. Even in the United States, domestic considerations have come into play as gas prices reach record highs. Although the U.S. does not import large amounts of Russian oil (and has now banned it), the lower supply caused by the conflict has prices rising as Europe seeks to find other sources, raising demand and cost globally.

  • Introduction to the OSCE

    Introduction to the OSCE

    Introduction

    The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is an intergovernmental group made up of 57 European, North American, and Asian nations and 11 “partners for cooperation” in Africa and Oceania. Founded during the Cold War as a neutral forum for discussion between the Western and Eastern blocs, the mandate of the OSCE has evolved from one of discussion between great powers into an organization that defends human rights, oversees elections, and monitors active combat zones.

    Even as the OSCE’s mandate has evolved, the core mission of “promoting stability, peace, and democracy” has remained constant. The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to all conflict in the broader Eurasian area, and the OSCE has been involved in mediating conflicts in recent decades. More recently, the OSCE has been involved in everything from a mission to monitor ceasefire violations in Ukraine to collaborating with its member countries to “strengthen cooperation on environmental issues.”

    History of OSCE

    The OSCE was created in 1975, at the signing of the Helsinki Accords. At the time, the United States and the Soviet Union were in a “détente,” a period of warmer relations between the two historic rivals. The Nixon presidency and the Brezhnev premiership was an era of decreased tension, eventually leading to both powers attending the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the early 1970s. After years of deliberations, the nations represented at the conference agreed to sign a document entitled the Helsinki Final Act, commonly referred to as the Helsinki Accords. This document outlined a set of politico-military, economic, environmental, and human rights commitments. This was the first time the USSR made explicit human rights commitments.

    After the signing of the Accords, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe continued to serve as a forum for meetings and began certifying whether states were meeting the commitments they made in Helsinki. After the end of the Cold War, the group’s name was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its role began to expand beyond its original purpose. The organization has come to play a large part in mediating inter-state disputes, overseeing elections, and even maintain missions in certain regions to prevent conflicts.

    How Does the OSCE Work?

    The OSCE maintains a policy of neutrality, so serves a different purpose and operates differently from organizations like NATO and CSTO. Harkening back to its past as a forum for discussion and mediation, much more emphasis is placed on summits: meetings where heads of state and ambassadors from member countries make long-term decisions and set goals for the entire organization. Other representative bodies include the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, made up of representatives from every member state. The Parliamentary Assembly passes resolutions about issues like human rights, democracy, and environmental issues in order to ensure member states are meeting the commitments they made in Helsinki.

    The Permanent Council is the primary OSCE decision-making body. This Council contains delegates from every member state and representatives from each of the OSCE’s Partners for Cooperation. All decisions at the Permanent Council are made by consensus. The OSCE also has multiple executive structures, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and Representative on Freedom of the Media. These institutions are another method the OSCE uses to ensure member states are fulfilling their commitments.

    What Does the OSCE Do?

    The OSCE has an active presence in a dozen countries, mostly former Soviet and Yugoslav states. These field offices “assist host countries in putting their OSCE commitments into practice” and “enable the OSCE to tackle crises as they arise.” The key goals of these missions are to restore trust between former rivals and build lasting peace in regions that have faced conflict and war. Field operations also focus on helping states control crime and terrorism, transition to democracy, clear minefields from past wars, and negotiate settlements of conflicts as they develop on the ground.

    The OSCE maintains a large presence in Ukraine, deploying both a monitoring mission focused on the Donbas region and a coordinator that is helping Ukraine with issues from the transition to democracy to cybercrime and human trafficking. The OSCE’s monitoring mission is an “unarmed, civilian mission” whose task is to “observe and report in an impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine.” This work is integral as tensions escalate in the region and all parties attempt to reach a peaceful settlement.

    OSCE field offices are also active in former Yugoslav republics such as Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo, helping them build resilient institutions and repair the damage of conflicts in the 1990s. The OSCE helps these nations clear land mines, run counter-terrorist operations, and defend their democratic institutions. In states and regions with ongoing conflicts like Moldova and the South Caucasus, the OSCE facilitates discussions between all parties and is working to resolve their respective territorial disputes.

    The OSCE’s primary function is to serve as a forum for discussion. In this capacity, the organization operates forums like the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been the main diplomatic process attempting to bring an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus. The group has published assessments of the situation and hosts infrequent meetings between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to discuss the conflict. The OSCE is also involved in the “5+2” format that is currently mediating the Transnistrian territorial conflict and the Geneva International Discussions, a forum for mediating the crisis in Georgia. OSCE successfully mediated discussions between multiple states in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Peace Accords, resulting in more transparency and arms control between the former rivals.

    The OSCE Minsk group is one of the most visible and prominent examples of OSCE mediation today. The group has been focused on reaching a peaceful settlement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended in 1994. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a region of Azerbaijan populated by Armenians declared independence and sought to join Armenia. Following a bloody war, the Armenians were able to secure de-facto autonomy and an uneasy status quo began. Despite winning the war, the newly established Republic of Artsakh was not recognized by any U.N. member states, including Armenia. For the next few decades, OSCE sponsored a forum for the two sides to come to a permanent solution that would respect the rights of refugees from both sides and the self-determination rights of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh. The group continuously worked to facilitate a settlement, hosting multiple conferences between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders and monitoring the situation on the ground from their offices in Yerevan and Baku.

    Criticisms

    Although the Minsk group was one of the best avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, it also demonstrated some of the structural issues with OSCE and was the subject of criticism. The group moved very slowly—little came of the talks held between the two rivals and frequent border clashes killed dozens of Armenian and Azerbaijani servicemembers. In 2020, a war broke out between the two sides, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of thousands of Armenians and allegations of war crimes by both sides. The Minsk group was unable to facilitate a peaceful settlement and now risks being cast aside by both nations in favor of a more violent solution to the crisis.

    The reasons for the Minsk Group’s apparent failure in Nagorno-Karabakh reflect criticisms of the organization. The ery structure of the organization is focused on neutrality—by definition, OSCE is a pan-European security organization. Multiple post-Soviet nations, including Azerbaijan, have attempted to cripple OSCE’s ability to monitor their compliance with the Helsinki Accords, attacking the organization in the press and even closing down OSCE offices. Much like many other international organizations, OSCE has no way of enforcing resolutions and only operates with the consent of its member states. The Permanent Council is made up of nations with conflicting national interests, making it difficult for the organization to agree on and implement policy. OSCE’s consensus approach to making larger political decisions makes this task even more difficult, as all members must agree on a path forward to resolve disputes between nations that are often at odds with each other and both sit on the council. 

    OSCE also faces financial challenges. The organization’s annual budget is only €138 million, less than 3% of the UN’s. This has left OSCE overstretched and unable to carry out its mandate. As of 2017, OSCE was only able to deploy 6 monitors to the 200-kilometer line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops in Nagorno-Karabakh. For comparison, the United Nations maintains a peacekeeping force of 15,000 in South Sudan, with a budget of $1 billion.

    These challenges come at a time when Europe is becoming increasingly politically divided, and old divisions between east and west are on the rise. The new situation in Europe requires an organization like OSCE to mediate future disputes, coordinate international responses, and monitor conflicts to ensure peace and stability.       

  • Nicholas Griffin, Brown University

    Nicholas Griffin, Brown University

    Nick is an undergraduate student studying International and Public Affairs at Brown University in Providence, RI. He is passionate about foreign policy issues and is interested in learning and writing more about the Post-Soviet space. Nick believes that this region is incredibly important, and that the American people deserve to have easy access to the information necessary to have an informed opinion on the topic. In his free time, he enjoys reading and being in nature.