Author: Mia Park

The presence of the American military in South Korea began at the end of WWII, when American and Soviet forces entered the peninsula to facilitate the removal of Japanese forces. The American military was positioned south of the 38th parallel whereas Soviet forces moved north. When North Korean forces invaded South Korea in 1950, triggering the Korean War (1950-1953), the US supported South Korea to oppose the communist regime. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 1.8 million Americans served in the war. The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, which ended hostilities and established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The Korean Peninsula remained divided at the 38th parallel in a perpetual state of war as the armistice agreement was not a permanent peace treaty. The Truman administration prioritized stability over reunification, and America and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. The American military has remained in South Korea ever since. 

Financing the US Military Presence

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) establishes the obligations of the US and South Korea in maintaining American forces. The US is responsible for the maintenance of US troops in South Korea, and South Korea fund the facilities. The financial contribution of South Korea comes in the form of Special Measure Agreements (SMA’s). Eleven SMAs have been signed since 1991, with the 11th signed in 2021. 

The Trump administration raised concerns over South Korean contributions. In the SMA signed in 2014, which was supposed to last until 2018, South Korea paid 920 billion won, or approximately $866.86 million USD. This was a 5.8 percent increase from the previous agreement. The increase was theorized to be from the decision to send more tanks and soldiers. In the 2019 SMA, South Korea paid 1.04 trillion won, or $921.5 million USD, which was an 8.2 percent increase from the previous agreement. The 2019 agreement was only for one year, while the agreements usually last for 3-5 years. In the negotiations for a 2020 SMA, President Trump rejected the South Korean offer of a 13 percent increase and requested a 5 billion dollar contribution. The delays that resulted from the disagreements resulted in furloughs for the first time since the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and increased tensions with South Korea. 

The Biden administration signed the 11th SMA in 2021, and it will last until 2025. South Korea paid 1.1833 trillion Korean Won in 2021, and the amount will rise according to the contribution of the previous year by the ROK defense budget increase rate. The 2021 defense budget increase rate will be used for the 2022 contribution, the 2022 rate for 2023, and so on. The renewal rate was partially driven by the rift that had been created by the Trump administration, and Biden’s attempts to repair this. 

Operation Control (OPCON)

Operational control can be defined as “authority to perform functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission” and does not involve “authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.” In 1994, peacetime opcon was transferred to Korea, but wartime opcon is still maintained by the United States Forces Korea (USFK), under combined command of both the US and SK. The peacetime transfer means that the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff controls the operations during peacetime, and Combined Forces Command will control operations during wartime. 

The controversy mainly lies in the transfer of wartime OPCON. Wartime OPCON was initially supposed to transfer to South Korea in 1996, but the discussion was postponed when North Korea threatened a nuclear attack. President Roh Moo hyun agreed with President Bush, in 2007, that wartime OPCON would be transferred over to South Korea by 2012. President Roh politicized the issue, and framed it as South Korea needing to retake sovereignty. The following president, Lee Myung bak postponed the discussion to 2015 because of the “evolving security environment”, most likely referencing the North Korean Cheonan incident in 2010. In the following presidential administration, Park Geun hye rejected the 2015 deadline, citing that it was too soon considering the increased nuclear threats and testing from North Korea, and President Obama agreed that it could be reconsidered. In the 46th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Joint Communique, article 11 details an implementation of a conditions-based approach in the transfer of wartime OPCON to Korea:

• ROK will assume wartime OPCON when ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured (meaning the ROK military capabilities will need to be able to counter North Korean missiles, and confidently lead the combined defense posture) 
• The security environment on the Korean peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable transition 

This would delay the transfer to sometime in the 2020’s, but it was not clear precisely when. The following president, Moon Jae In, conversed with the Trump administration in order to speed up the process of transfer, and the Alliance Guiding Principles were drafted at the 50th SCM. Post-transition, the CFC would be a “separate standing entity” (therefore, not dissolved), and the ROK would appoint a General or Admiral to serve as Commander of the CFC, with a US General or Admiral as deputy commander. The current CFC command has a four star US general as Commander, and a four star ROK general as deputy commander. The Moon administration wished to undertake a Full Operational Capability (FOC) exam in 2021, but the Trump administration said neither side was ready. 

The current president, Yoon Suk yeol, believest South Korea lacked sufficient readiness to operate intelligence assets, which suggests that the OPCON transfer may not happen in the immediate future. President Yoon maintains that he wishes for a speedy transfer, but only if it does not undermine the combined defense posture of SK and US. At the 53rd SCM, the joint communique lists the reaffirmation “that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before the wartime OPCON is transitioned to the F-CFC [Future-Combined Forces Command]”. They also pledged to do a FOC exam in 2022. There are speculations that the war in Ukraine and tension between the US and China may lead the Biden administration to hesitate to transfer wartime OPCON, but the 2023 54th SCM may yield more clear answers.

History of the 38th parallel split

Prior to World War II, the Korean peninsula was a Japanese colony. When Japan surrendered following WWII, the US and USSR agreed to split the peninsula at the 38th parallel to oversee the removal of Japanese forces. The USSR occupied the northern region, while the US occupied the south. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People’s Army invaded South Korea at the 38th parallel to install a communist regime. The US, abiding by the containment policy and influenced by Cold War tensions, deployed the American military with United Nations forces to aid defend South Korea. The war ended in 1953 in a stalemate at the 38th parallel. China supported North Korea by supplying troops, aiding in war strategy, and handled the repatriation of ethnic Koreans back to Korea. The Truman Administration gave up on reuniting North and South Korea and instead made stability the priority in East Asia to avoid further conflict. South Korea and the US signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, leading to a more official military partnership, and a number of American forces remained in South Korea. In 1961, North Korea and China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (not to be confused with the Warsaw Pact of the same name).   

When the DPRK and the First Republic of Korea were created in 1948, both governments wished for reunification, but only on their own terms. In this context, reunification is defined as the DPRK and ROK joining as one to be a single, sovereign state. Whether it happens through engaged diplomacy or the sudden collapse of North Korea, the US and China are expected to play a role in the reunification process.

American response to Korean reunification efforts by presidential administrations

At a press conference for US-ROK relations in 2015, Obama stated “President Park has articulated a better vision—a unified Korea free from the fear of war and nuclear weapons—and that’s a vision that we very much support,” which has been the most explicit show of support for reunification thus far. The main US priority is a denuclearized North Korea. Further, America desires a peaceful transition towards a democratic nation with a market-oriented society that avoids state collapse, civil war, or general unrest. The ROK’s membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty limits their own involvement in the denuclearization process, so this role will most likely be upheld by the US, foreign institutions, and other NPT states.

In 2018, President Trump and North Korean Dictator Kim Jong-Un met for the first time at the Singapore Summit to discuss peace on the Korean peninsula, US-NK relations, denuclearization, and recovery of US soldier remains. This summit was only partially successful with 55 bodies repatriated, and 5,300 still remaining. The main failure of the Singapore summit was the lack of agreement over the denuclearization timelines and expectations, where the US and NK both failed to operationalize the agreed upon terms of the joint statement and disagreed on what denuclearization would look like. In 2019, Trump and Kim Jong-Un met at their second summit in Hanoi, which was cut short after the first day without signing a joint statement, as Kim believed sanctions would be lifted in exchange for a halt on nuclear and missile testing and Trump believed that North Korea could be convinced to cut their nuclear programs immediately. The two could not progress past that impasse. This reduced the chances of future repatriation of remaining bodies, but showed North Korea’s desire for a decrease in sanctions while America continues to push for the dismantling of NK’s missile and nuclear development. While reunification was not explicitly discussed at these submits, the reasons why these summits failed could be a signifier of the difficulty of future American efforts of demilitarization and denuclearization during the reunification process.

Under the Biden administration, President Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae In reaffirmed their nations’ strong relations in a 2021 joint statement. Both nations share a commitment to denuclearization efforts, and plan to explore diplomatic efforts with the DPRK to promote peace. When Moon Jae In was elected in 2017, he states that Korea must be the one to lead peace efforts in the peninsula and foster connections with regional neighbors. This shows a commitment to diplomatic efforts, like the inter-Korean summits in 2018, and with South Korea leading the process.

The role of America and foreign nations in the reunification process

The other nations involved will affect how peacefully and easily Korea reunifies, and the main nations the US will take into account are Russia, China, and Japan. Regardless of these nations’ support or enthusiasm of reunification prospects and the future, it is generally agreed that the process cannot happen peacefully without their support and cooperation. The US may be the only state in a position to balance the influence of the other, powerful nations. In the Park Geun Hye administration, South Korea hoped for a three-way dialogue between Korea, US, and Japan/China to enable stronger regional cooperation in the denuclearization process. China may prefer the status quo to the military power a unified Korea may bring, especially with the current South Korea-US military alliance. The US must accept the possibility that a unified Korea may choose neutrality and/or opt out of the current relationship.