Author: Lucas Zhang

  • US Response to Putinist Ideology in Russia

    US Response to Putinist Ideology in Russia

    Introduction

    Amid Russia’s ongoing conflict and occupation of Ukraine, the underlying motives driving the war have become increasingly evident. A significant focal point has emerged around the personal aspirations and geopolitical perspective of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin’s authoritative leadership style has positioned him as a central figure in Russia’s actions and choices, where his personal beliefs and principles influence the direction of the nation he governs. Upon dissecting Putin’s ideology, it becomes apparent that his system is inherently antagonistic toward the United States and its allied nations. This hostility stems from the foundational principles on which his ideology is constructed, as well as the broader objectives it seeks to accomplish beyond the confines of Russia’s borders. 

    Characterizing Putinism:

    Vladimir Putin’s ideology, often referred to as Putinism, does not adhere to a rigid set of traits that dictate all of Russia’s actions. Putin’s nearly quarter of a century rule has seen Russian politics change drastically as the democratic system established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been gradually replaced by an authoritarian system headed by Putin. However, recurring principles in the domestic and international spheres can be identified.

    Domestically, Putinism’s most prominent characteristics are authoritarianism, political illiberalism, and social conservatism. In practice, this manifests as a political system in which Putin leads as a strongman with his party, United Russia—a loyal state security apparatus—and various allied oligarchs wield control over the media, internet, economy, and political process. Civil rights are curtailed while rights of marginalized groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community, are met with open hostility.

    Internationally, Putinism can be categorized by three characteristics:

    These principles are significant because all three characteristics build upon and sustain one another, and they are fundamentally opposed to and hostile towards the United States and its allies. Each of these principles offers a lens through which Russia’s foreign policy can be understood.

    Eurasianism

    Eurasianism is the concept that Russia, as well as the other former members of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, comprise a distinct civilization separate from Europe. This “Eurasian Civilization” has been the result of Russia’s history as a site of conquest for various nomadic empires including the Huns and the Mongols. A core principle of Eurasianism asserts that ideas originating in the West, including those stemming from the Enlightenment, are inherently detrimental to Russia’s Eurasian civilization. As a result, proponents of Eurasianism advocate for the rejection and active opposition to these Western-born concepts. 

    A significant aspect of Russian foreign policy is the Eurasianist perspective regarding the inevitable consolidation of states within the Eurasian civilization into a unified Eurasian state under Russia’s leadership. This viewpoint gained recent prominence, as evidenced by a foreign policy charter released by the Kremlin in March of this year. The charter identified Russia as a “unique country-civilization” and a prominent Eurasian power, asserting its role as the destined leader of the “civilizational community of the Russian world.”

    The Eurasianist component of Putinism contributes to its adversarial stance toward the United States. Through the Eurasianist perspective, opposition to the United States and its allies is seen as crucial to safeguarding the integrity of the Eurasian civilization against the encroachment of Western influence. Consequently, this viewpoint transforms the rhetoric of conflict with NATO from mere propaganda into a genuine ideological belief held by Putin’s Russia.

    Russian Nationalism

    Putin’s nationalism draws heavily from the veneration of two predecessors of the Russian Federation: the historical Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The prestige, power, and legacy of both states are central to Putin’s particular brand of nationalism. 

    Having served as a former officer of the Soviet KGB, Putin holds a distinct reverence for the legacy of the Soviet Union, even describing its collapse as the most significant calamity of the 20th century. This sentiment has left a lasting impression on Putin’s Russia. Notably, the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany remains a pivotal aspect of the new national narrative Putin aims to construct. During Putin’s leadership, this triumph has been integrated into the core identity of contemporary Russia, serving as a cornerstone in framing the nation’s present actions. This was particularly evident in Putin’s initial justification for Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, which he described as an effort to “denazify” the country. By branding adversaries as Nazis or Fascists, support for Russian actions is spurred through an emphasis on Russia’s Soviet legacy. This narrative positions these actions as a continuation of the Soviet struggle against Nazi Germany, thereby generating support for Russia’s activities.

    Russia’s historical antecedents have been leveraged not only for domestic propaganda but also as a rationale for its aggressive actions towards neighboring countries. Notably, Russia’s actions concerning Ukraine and other nations like Georgia can be interpreted as components of a wider aspiration to regain the status and influence once held by the Russian Empire. Putin himself has articulated this sentiment on various occasions, drawing parallels between his leadership and historical figures such as Peter the Great. In these instances, he draws analogies between Peter the Great’s extensive territorial expansion of Russia in the 17th century and his own engagement in the conflict in Ukraine, illustrating a perceived continuum of Russia’s pursuit of power and territorial influence.

    Anti-Americanism

    While the Soviet Union’s anti-Americanism and broader anti-Western sentiment were rooted in the ideological contest between capitalism and communism during the Cold War, Putin’s Anti-Americanism within Putinism adopts a unique character influenced by the Eurasianist perspective on the West. Under this framework, Western Europe and the United States are perceived as embodying inherent malevolence that demands a defensive posture. It is notable that despite this departure from the Soviet era, Putinism maintains the Soviet anti-imperialist narrative within its Anti-Western standpoint. In practice, Putinism adeptly integrates both Eurasianist rhetoric and anti-imperialist arguments to rationalize Russian actions. By referencing previous interventions in regions like Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, this form of Anti-Americanism portrays Russian actions as a counterforce to American imperialism, positioned to safeguard the interests of the developing world.

    Putinism’s anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism inevitably places Russia on confrontational grounds with the United States and its allies. The centrality of hostility towards the United States and its allies in the ideology of a robust military power which has already demonstrated aggressive action in Ukraine makes the real world implications of Putinism a particularly relevant threat. 

    Charting the Implications for the United State’s and the American Response

    In broad strokes, Putinism aims to dislodge the current world order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the most direct implementation of this aim. However Russia is also seeking to accomplish this goal by sowing internal discontent in the United States and its allies as well as expanding influence in states and regions with animosity towards the United States and the West. West African states which were previously French colonies have been the strongest examples of this method. Amidst coups and increasing hostility towards France, various states in West Africa have become increasingly aligned with Russia. The Wagner Group, a mercenary group with links to the Russian government, has established a presence in countries such as Mali. 

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine has stood out as a prominent realization of Putinism’s objectives. However, the American response to this invasion can be viewed as a notably successful strategy for countering Russia’s ambitions. Specifically, the provision of consistent military assistance to Ukraine before and during the ongoing invasion has yielded favorable outcomes. The resilient resistance put forth by Ukraine has significantly strained Russia’s capacities and triggered a weakening of its military legitimacy. This setback has hindered Putinism’s objectives.

    The persistent pressure stemming from Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Ukraine has introduced substantial challenges to the nation’s stability. Consequently, this strain has impeded Russia’s ability to pursue other avenues for advancing its objectives, including efforts to destabilize regions and cultivate relationships with countries harboring tensions towards the United States or its allies.

    Future Outlook

    Perhaps the most peculiar outcome of Putinism so far is its potential impending self implosion. Failure to secure a swift victory in Ukraine has delegitimized the aims and rhetoric of Putinism internationally. More damningly, the strain which the war has put on Russia internally is perhaps the biggest sign that Putinism is already in decline. The lack of response by Putin to the Wagner Group rebellion in June of this year demonstrated how significantly Putin’s rule, and by extension Putinism, has been weakened by Ukraines steadfast resistance. Thanks in large part to the continuing material support to Ukraine, which enabled Ukraine to fend off Russia’s military, the initial actions necessary to defeat Putinism have perhaps already been put into place by the United States and its allies.

  • Successes and Failures of U.S Sanctions on Russian Oligarchs

    Successes and Failures of U.S Sanctions on Russian Oligarchs

    Introduction

    Following the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the nation’s oligarch class came into the spotlight as the United States and its allies implemented sweeping sanctions on Russia. In the context of Russia, oligarchs refer to individuals with immense wealth and influence in the Russian political system. The interdependent relationship between the oligarchs and the government of Vladimir Putin made the latter a viable target for sanctions against Russia, and a major aspect of the United State’s sanctions strategy.

    Background

    The origins of Russia’s oligarchs begin with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the newly established Russian Federation’s transition from a socialist to capitalist economy. Under President Boris Yeltsin, the Russian government sought a rapid transition to capitalism. In pursuit of this, a policy program known as “Shock Therapy” was introduced to rapidly privatize the Russian economy. Shock Therapy involved two waves of mass privatization in which state owned assets and enterprises were handed over or sold to the newly established private sector. Russia’s oligarchs first emerged within these circumstances. 

    During the first wave of privatization, the Russian government distributed vouchers to citizens which could be used to buy shares of companies being privatized across the country. The individuals who would go on to become part of Russia’s first generation of oligarchs enthusiastically accumulated vouchers, allowing them to secure massive stakes in newly privatized industries. The second wave of privatization began amidst Yeltsin’s bid for reelection in 1995. Facing declining support and a government lacking money, the Yeltsin government made a deal with Russia’s emerging oligarchs. In exchange for billions of dollars in loans and support for Yelstin’s reelection, the oligarchs were given massive stakes in remaining state enterprises. Conducted through fraudulent auctions, vast swathes of essential industry fell under the control of oligarchs, further solidifying their position and power. Yeltsin was successfully reelected.

    Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was elected President in 2000, which marked the beginning of a new era for Russia’s oligarchs. Although he campaigned on promises to uproot the oligarchs, following his inauguration, only oligarchs opposed to Putin were targeted. In their steed, the present class of Russian oligarchs solidified—those loyal to Putin including oligarchs who had emerged under Yeltsin as well as new upstarts who benefitted from their loyalty or personal connections to Putin. 

    In the more than two decades since Putin first became President of Russia, the oligarchs and Putin’s government remain intrinsically linked by their shared history and reliance on one another for support and protection. Prominent oligarchs sit within the Russian government, at the helm of state corporations like Gazprom (a major energy company), and enjoy beneficial government contracts for their companies under the auspices of Putin’s government. 

    Policy Success

    Evaluating the success of sanctions against oligarchs can be gauged on two metrics: 

    • Impact on wealth, assets, and lifestyle
    • Changes in attitudes towards Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Russian government

    The sanctions against the oligarchs can be considered to have yielded successes in both areas. Immediately following the initial implementation of sanctions, several prominent oligarchs with close ties to Putin came out in public opposition to the war despite the repercussions for doing so. Various oligarchs were also reported to have experienced significant losses in wealth, and the seizure and freezing of assets abroad has been estimated to have resulted in $67 billion in losses by the first anniversary of the war for the 23 wealthiest oligarchs in Russia.

    Policy Setbacks

    The primary setbacks in the current sanctions policy against the oligarchs are:

    • Insufficient level of impact on their wealth 
    • Inadequate impact on the relationship between the oligarchs and the Russian government. 

    Despite considerable losses since the initial implementation of sanctions, oligarchs were able to recover some of the losses. As a collective, Russia’s oligarchs lost 13% of their total wealth more than a year after Russia’s invasion began. Impacting the wealth of the oligarchs is further complicated by difficulties with identifying their assets abroad. For example, it is challenging to know with certainty which real estate in the United States is owned by oligarchs. As a result of policies favoring privacy over transparent disclosure of ownership, real estate in the United States has become a particularly effective means for oligarchs to hide their wealth abroad. New legislation and policy revisions have enabled more effective investigation into real estate ownership and other assets, but challenges associated with identifying the assets of oligarchs continue to be a hurdle to maximizing the impact of sanctions on oligarch’s wealth. 

    Some research indicates the sanctions have had a limited impact as instead of dividing the oligarchs, sanctions have instead united Russia’s oligarchs to fend off the external threats to their collective wealth. In turn, the sanctions against oligarchs have struggled to manifest sufficient opposition among the Russian elite to the conflict. The Russian government has responded to any opposition with rapid and intense action. Since the beginning of Russia’s war, critics of Putin as well as multiple oligarchs have died under suspicious circumstances raising the likely possibility that opposition at even the highest levels is being liquidated, further limiting the impact of opposition of oligarchs to the war as a result of sanctions. 

    Future Outlook

    There is one emerging option: targeting the wealth managers of the oligarchs. The wealth managers utilized by the oligarchs represent new viable targets for sanctions for several reasons:

    • Oligarchs can rely on a few elite financial managers who possess the necessary qualifications, making their identification easier.
    • The majority of these wealth managers are located in Europe, making their sanctioning logistically easier.
    • The position, responsibility, and knowledge held by these wealth managers makes them a particularly weak point in the financial networks of the oligarchs.

    Focusing on these individuals could pose a substantial threat to the oligarchs. The United States can ensure that oligarchs are unable to bypass the impacts of sanctions by maintaining and expanding cooperation with foreign partners in Europe and other regions. This can be achieved by implementing sanctions and restrictions to deny them viable safe havens.

    These approaches in tandem would create an evolved approach to the United State’s sanction regiment against Russia’s oligarchs, with the potential to yield greater long term impacts that will contribute to the aims of the sanctions. These strategies may in turn yield the necessary pressure to instigate sufficient high-level opposition to Russia’s war which Putin’s government can not afford to ignore or attempt to silence. 

  • Lucas Zhang, Boston University

    Lucas Zhang, Boston University

    Lucas Zhang is a rising junior at Boston University who is studying International Relations with a focus on security studies and the Asia-Pacific Region. Originally from Center Valley, Pennsylvania, Lucas’s interest in studying Eurasia stems from the region’s gradual return to the center stage of international affairs from the dissolution to the Soviet Union to the current War in Ukraine.  Shaped by an additional fascination with the various historical factors which have served to the define the current state of affairs in the Eurasian region, Lucas aspires to be able to contribute to a better understanding of issues affecting this region as well the often storied history behind those issues.

    Lucas also sits on the Board of the Directors of the International Relations Review at Boston University, a biannual publication on foreign policy issues which is one of the few undergraduate journals retained in the Library of Congress as its Executive Managing Editor.

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