ACE

Author: Kristen Morris

  • Intro to the Houthi Movement in Yemen

    Intro to the Houthi Movement in Yemen

    History of Conflict in Yemen

    Modern Yemen formed in 1990 through the unification of two regions: The Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. Soon after the union, a military officer, Ali Abdullah Saleh, became the country’s leader. Though Yemen is a majority-Sunni country, the north region is Shia-dominant, which poses religious tensions.

    The U.S. supported Saleh in the early 2000s in the fight against growing terrorist organizations in the country and region. The U.S. also lent support to the country during the chaos of the Arab Spring, when Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also became more active. The U.S. continued its involvement in Yemen when further political tensions emerged.

    In 2011, Saleh was ousted due to accusations of corruption, and former Vice President Abdrahbbuh Mansour Hadi took over. Hadi’s interim government is backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S., and the UN sees Hadi as Yemen’s rightful leader. However, Hadi’s leadership has been challenged by jihadists, a separatist movement in south Yemen, former government loyalists, and factors such as corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity.

    The Houthis saw an opportunity during the period of weak leadership, government transition, and many actors vying for power to attempt to gain military power in the north. The Houthis didn’t have faith in Hadi’s interim government and wanted to ensure their own security and take control of their homeland in northern Yemen. The Houthis also oppose Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for backing Hadi’s government. At the same time, Saleh allied with the Houthis against his former political ally, Hadi, and sought to regain the presidency. In 2015, the Houthis and Saleh loyalists ousted Hadi, and he fled to Saudi Arabia.

    The Houthis had initially opposed Saleh because he supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Despite this disagreement, the Houthis later allied with Saleh against Hadi’s UN-backed government. However, in 2017, Saleh withdrew his support from the Houthi coalition and was killed by Houthis. 

    Who are the Houthis?

    The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), is a group of Zaidi Muslim who were a sect of Shia Islam, and believed to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad’s family. Hussein al-Houthi formed Ansar Allah to revive the Zaidi Shia tradition and gain more power for the group in Yemen. Because Zaidi ancestors were seen as a threat by leaders of modern-day Yemen, they suffered discrimination. This caused the Houthis to question Yemeni government authority and demand more respect and control of their homeland.

    The Houthis challenged Saleh’s legitimacy by claiming he was a weak leader and was a puppet of the U.S. Because of their stance, the Houthis gained support from anti-Saleh Yemenis around the country. The Houthis wish to install an interim government friendlier to their goals of:

    • Maintaining regional autonomy
    • Respecting diversity
    • Strengthening a democratic state
    • Lowering fuel prices
    • Securing military control in the north
    • Controlling much of the country, specifically the oil-rich eastern region
    • Gaining political power and international recognition

    Gulf states and the U.S. view Hadi as Yemen’s rightful leader and view the Houthis as an insurgent group.

    Regional and International Impact

    In 2015, Saudi Arabia, other majority-Sunni Arab states, the United States, United Kingdom, and France feared a rise in Houthi support from Shia-majority Iran. In response, the Saudi-led coalition targeted Houthis in air strikes with the goal of stopping Houthi advances and returning Hadi to power. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the UAE pushed the Houthis and their allies out of southern Yemen and out of the city of Aden. This made way for Hadi to establish a temporary government in Aden. The government was unable to provide basic services and security to the city and surrounding areas, and Hadi himself was still primarily living in Saudi Arabia.

    In response, the Houthis have committed drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in recent years, including air strikes on Saudi Arabian oil fields that affected oil production in the country in September of 2019.

    In August 2019, the Saudi-backed Hadi forces and UAE-backed southern separatists clashed. The southern separatists took over Aden and demanded a power sharing deal with the Saudi-led coalition. The UN hoped this would lead to peace, but in January 2020, more conflict erupted between Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. In April of 2020, southern separatists broke a peace deal with the Saudi-led coalition and wanted to govern Aden and southern Yemen themselves.

    Internal conflict, divided political loyalty in southern Yemen, and divided military loyalty throughout the country all contribute to tensions in the region on religious, political, and geographical grounds. These tensions make countries vulnerable to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In Yemen, AQAP and a local branch of the Islamic State have capitalized on the instability and attempted to gain ground in the south. 

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    The complexity of the internal conflict is deepened by international influence. With continued Sunni-Shia tensions in and between countries, we see Shia-majority Iran backing the Houthis (though Iran denies this) while Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States backing Hadi’s government. This proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia exacerbates the region’s worst issues of ineffective leadership, internal violence, and religious extremism.


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    Yemen is strategically located on a strait that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, through which many of the world’s oil shipments pass. In addition the U.S. is interested in securing Saudi Arabia’s borders, having access to free travel for oil through the strait connecting the Arabian and Red Seas, and a Yemeni government that will effectively work with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

    U.S. President Biden’s Response

    U.S. President Biden seems to be a less staunch supporter of the Saudi-led coalition. Biden claims he wishes to end support for the coalition’s military involvement, including selling weapons to Hadi loyalists. Instead of the military approach, Biden plans to appoint a special envoy to Yemen to encourage cooperation through diplomacy. In addition, Biden reversed former President Trump’s categorization of the Houthi Movement as a terrorist organization as this designation threatens the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemenis.

    Future of Conflict in YemenPeace deals between warring groups with international allies on both sides have failed, meaning a stalemate for the conflict. A conflict which Saudi Arabian leadership thought would last a few weeks became years of suffering, tension, and conflict.

  • Intro to 2018 U.S. Sanctions on Iran

    Intro to 2018 U.S. Sanctions on Iran

    History

    Sanctions have been the core of U.S.-Iran foreign policy since the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the U.S. government imposed sanctions as part of its strategy to prevent the Iranian government from supporting terrorist groups and destabilizing the Middle East. In the mid-2000s, U.S.-imposed sanctions expanded to curb Iran’s nuclear weapon production and reduce the country’s missile arsenal. Financial sanctions weighed heavily on Iran’s economy for decades, and led to the Iranian government agreeing to the 2015 J.C.P.O.A. 

    The Iran Nuclear Deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.), was supported by permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Germany, the European Union, and Iran. It committed to alleviating U.S., E.U., and U.N. sanctions if Iran complied with a list of demands, including restrictions on nuclear production. Though many economic sanctions were lifted under the J.C.P.O.A., some U.S. sanctions, including on direct trade with Iran and on Iran’s support of regional armed groups, remained in place.

    In 2018, the Trump Administration claimed Iran was not obeying the Iran Nuclear Deal rules, which sought to place limits on the country’s nuclear arms program, among other guidelines. In response, the Trump Administration removed the United States from the J.C.P.O.A. and introduced a “maximum pressure” campaign. At this time, sanctions that were eased under the 2015 nuclear agreement were reimposed with greater intensity.

    Benefits for the U.S.

    According to the Trump Administration, Iran’s nuclear program threatened  U.S. interests, and the J.C.P.O.A. didn’t curb inappropriate actions committed by the Iranian government. In a 2019 report by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the reintroduction of sanctions sought to prevent the Iranian government from proceeding further with the following actions:

    1. Repressing the Iranian people
    2. Diverting humanitarian aid from low income Iranians to government interests
    3. Growing the country’s weapons arsenal
    4. Contributing to destabilization in the Middle East and promoting terrorism around the world

    In order to stop Iran’s “unacceptable actions” in the Middle East, sanctions were designed to cripple Iran’s main industries (oil, shipping, and banking) and weaken the country’s currency and purchasing power. These “unacceptable actions” referred to Iran’s support of terrorist organizations in Syria, Yemen, and other countries.

    Impacts on Iran

    Political Impact

    Sanctions can make counties more authoritarian and give more power to corrupt governments that hoard resources and use their power to control their people. While the entire country loses wealth, the government and financial elites lose less wealth than average citizens. In this way, U.S. sanctions on Iran have slowed the movement for democracy and civil rights in the country. Since the reimposition of sanctions, the Iranian government has continued to arrest activists for demonstrations and for promoting equal rights. However, it is not clear that these actions are directly related to the reimposition of sanctions.

    Economic Impact

    Financial sanctions have contributed to the following consequences for the Iranian economy:

    1. Currency Decline and Inflation: Iran’s currency value declined from 35,000 rials to the U.S. dollar under the J.C.P.O.A. to 265,000 rials to the U.S. dollar in late 2020. This contributed to major inflation – 45% in 2021 –  after the U.S.’s 2018 reimposition of sanctions.
    2. Lack of International Financial System Involvement: Additional sanctions in 2018 were placed on Iranian banks that were owned privately or by the government. Any financial institution who enters transactions with these sanctioned banks could face prosecution in the U.S. In 2019, international firms feared retaliation from the U.S. if they were caught in any form of transaction with Iran, including humanitarian imports into Iran. This threat prevented many firms from any interaction with Iran-based banks or organizations. Years of similar sanctions have inhibited Iran’s role in international trade, which ultimately affects the country’s wealth, imports of necessary items, and the number of reliable trading partners abroad.
    3. Oil Sales Reduction and Recession: Oil exports and petroleum production are the main industries in Iran. Reimposed and additional sanctions on banks involved in Iranian exports caused a decrease in oil sales and the inability of Iran to fully participate in the international financial system. In turn, this made Iran’s economy fall into a recession.

    Social Impact

    In recent years, Iran has experienced an increase in food insecurity due to inflation and a decrease in value of the rial. In addition, reports suggest a rise in domestic violence and suicide due to stressful economic conditions. Further, street fights have broken out in lines at food markets and currency exchanges over tense financial conditions exacerbated by economic sanctions on Iran.

    According to the Iranian National Bank in 2020, the poverty rate in Iran was close to 20%. However, other reports claim the rate to be as high as 35-40%. There are reports that generational poverty is more growing under the financial sanctions, which make it harder for employed Iranians born into poverty to climb the ladder to higher socio-economic classes.

    Though the U.S. government claimed sanctions would not impact the entry of humanitarian aid into the country, Human Rights Watch claims that sanctions have limited the purchasing power of Iranian healthcare facilities to acquire medicines for Iranians. Depreciation of Iranian currency, limits on banks who can finance sales with Iran, and threats to companies importing goods into the country prevent many Iranians from obtaining goods. 

    Future of U.S.-Iran Relations

    Election of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi

    The reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 2018 suggested to Iranians that working with the U.S. through diplomatic channels would not equate to a healthy relationship between the countries. Since sanctions were imposed, Iran saw “hardliners” win a majority of parliamentary elections in February of 2020. Additionally, many strong candidates running for president of Iran in 2021 considered themselves on the conservative and uncompromising side of politics. This categorization included the newly elected president, Ebrahim Raisi. 

    Raisi was elected president of Iran in June, 2021 with less than 50% voter turnout. Raisi is supported by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and has a record of human rights abuses. With Khamenei and Raisi on the same page, reports suggest Iran will become more conservative. This will likely include the Iranian government acting without the voice of the urban middle class, who support social reforms.

    J.C.P.O.A. (Iran Nuclear Deal)In early 2021, the Biden Administration said it welcomed a return to the J.C.P.O.A., with modifications, and a removal of harsh sanctions if Iran is willing to comply. On the other hand, the Iranian government wants the U.S. to remove the economic sanctions before an agreement is made and promise longevity for the future agreement. Further, Raisi suggested he would agree to a similar deal to the 2015 agreement but promised to push harder in talks related to Iran’s weapons capabilities. However, Raisi brings more conservative and unwavering views to the table, suggesting an unclear path to a deal between the countries. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain, and Israel believe they have a right to enter talks regarding an updated nuclear deal with Iran, but Iranian leadership has qualms about the involvement of these countries.

  • Kristen Morris, Rhodes College

    Kristen Morris, Rhodes College

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    Kristen Morris graduated from Rhodes College in 2020 with an International Studies degree. While interning with World Relief Memphis, she was introduced to the complexities of refugee resettlement and the U.S. migration system as well as the root causes of migration. Wanting to gain a view of pre-resettlement migration, she interned with an organization in Morocco where she worked with sub-Saharan African migrants and underprivileged Moroccans. Both of these experiences have inspired her to pursue graduate studies in Spring 2022 in intelligence, security, and post-conflict development. Through ACE, she is excited to conduct research focused on the Middle East, specifically causes of conflicts, government structures, and social services. In her free time, she enjoys kayaking, bartending, and exercising.