Author: Kathryn Brouillette

U.S. Response

U.S. involvement in Yemen is multifaceted. Primarily, Washington has been engaged in counterterrorism efforts in Yemen since the early 2000s, fighting AQAP, the Islamic State, and affiliate groups. Since 2002, the U.S. has launched nearly 400 air strikes associated with counterterrorism efforts in Yemen. Policymakers fear that the instability in Yemen will embolden transnational terrorist groups and thus are interested in supporting a government that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 

Regarding the conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, Washington’s support for the coalition is tied to the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership and concerns that the war threatens Saudi Arabia’s position vis-a-vis Iran. Additionally, the U.S. is interested in maintaining access to the Bab al Mandeb strait through which many of the world’s oil shipments pass. 

Both the Obama and Trump administrations provided logistical and intelligence support–weapons, military advice, and a coordinated planning cell–to the Saudi-led coalition. Both presidents scaled down support for the coalition as the humanitarian situation in Yemen worsened and human rights groups alleged the Saudi-led coalition of indiscriminately bombing civilians and critical infrastructure. 

In February 2021, President Joe Biden introduced a new initiative to end the conflict in Yemen, signaling a renewed focus on advancing diplomatic efforts and resolving the humanitarian crisis. The plan included ending U.S support for Saudi-led offensive operations in Yemen and appointing a special envoy for Yemen, career diplomat Timothy Lenderking. A week later, the State Department revoked the Trump administration’s designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). However, the Biden administration has sanctioned some Houthi leaders under Yemen-specific authorities. Despite his decision to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition, President Biden reiterated the United States’ commitment to helping Saudi Arabia defend itself from Houthi attacks. 

A small number of U.S. military personnel are stationed in Yemen to conduct operations against AQAP and the Islamic State. Amidst Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Biden administration authorized additional deployments of U.S. military personnel and equipment to the UAE in February 2022.

Perspectives on Washington’s Yemen Policy 

Although Congress has been divided on Washington’s Yemen policy since 2015, many lawmakers supported Biden’s Yemen plan due to increasing concerns that U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition has enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law and contributed to Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. However, some lawmakers and human rights organizations find Biden’s distinction between weapons systems used for offensive operations in Yemen and arms supplied for Saudi Arabia’s territorial defense vague. Some assert that the U.S. still enables coalition air strikes by providing spare parts and maintenance for the Saudi air force. This concern was echoed by 50 members of Congress who proposed a bipartisan War Powers Resolution in June 2022 to end U.S. involvement in the war entirely. The House has adopted the provision for three consecutive years, but the legislation has not been enacted.

Additionally, lawmakers and aid organizations supported the Biden administration’s reversal of the FTO designation. Many claimed that the FTO designation of the Houthis prevented the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid. However, critics of revoking the FTO designation claim that the decision fails to incentivize the Houthis to end attacks on coalition targets, halt advances, or participate in peace talks.

Recent Developments 

On April 1, 2022, the Houthis and the internationally recognized government in Yemen agreed to a two-month UN-mediated truce, which the parties renewed in June for an additional two months. The parties agreed to halt all military operations, open ports to fuel ships, and allow flights to and from the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport. Shortly after the parties reached an agreement, interim President Hadi stepped down and ceded his powers to an eight-member presidential council. According to some reports, Saudi officials arranged Hadi’s resignation. In August 2022, the parties agreed to renew the truce for another two months, although significant barriers to lasting peace remain. 

. 

Additional Policy Considerations  

Washington’s current priority in Yemen is to use the leverage from the current truce to advance a more permanent political settlement and improve the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Several experts and members of Congress have suggested that the Biden administration propose a plan to Saudi Arabia to further ease port restrictions at Hodeida or lift the air and naval blockade altogether. The current blockade prevents some delivery of fuel and supplies to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port, which threatens the delivery of aid, food, and water to Yemenis in areas under the Sanaa-based authorities’ control. Although the current truce has allowed more fuel ships to enter the port and opened flights from the Sanaa airport, President Biden’s Yemen team could push the Saudis to expand upon the current agreement. 

Some analysts are skeptical of lifting the blockade, which the Houthis have historically identified as a prerequisite for peace talks. Some believe such action will allow Iranian weapons to reach the Houthis and provide them with more funds and aid, which the Houthis have withheld or diverted in the past. If the truce breaks down and hostilities continue, some fear that Ansar Allah could use newly acquired resources from port revenues to fund their offensive further. However, a United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects imports for illicit weapons, is already in place; the Saudi and Yemeni government-enforced vessel clearance process is a secondary measure. A possible solution to the anti-Houthi camps’ fears about port revenues is to allow the UNVIM to manage and direct port revenues while the parties negotiate a broader political settlement. 

The Republic of Yemen, a small country of 29 million on the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, has been torn apart by war since 2014. Separate but overlapping violent conflicts, exacerbated by a Saudi-led military intervention, have generated political fragmentation and the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Of the estimated quarter of a million people that have died in Yemen since 2014, over half of those deaths are the result of indirect causes such as hunger and inadequate access to medical services. As of 2022, 16.2 million people, over half the population, face acute hunger, and 4.3 million Yemenis are internally displaced. All parties to the conflict are accused of violating international humanitarian law. As the war in Yemen approaches its eighth year, many are hopeful that the recent UN-mediated truce will finally end Yemen’s crisis. 

Background 

Yemeni politics are complicated by historic divisions across cultural, religious, and geographic lines. The modern state of Yemen was established in 1990 through the unification of two regimes: the Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. Soon after, a military officer named Ali Abdullah Saleh became the country’s leader. Saleh remained president until the 2011 Arab Spring protests, when thousands of Yemenis took to the streets to demand his resignation following accusations of corruption. After his ousting, Saleh’s vice president, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, took over in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

Backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. and recognized as legitimate by the UN, Hadi’s interim government faced challenges from various groups, including a secessionist movement in south Yemen, former government loyalists, and Houthi rebels. Meanwhile, Yemen continued to be plagued by government corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity.

Yemen’s civil war began in September 2014 when the Houthis and Saleh loyalists took control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, demanding a new government and fuel subsidy reforms. Following failed negotiations with Hadi’s government, the Houthis and Saleh’s forces captured the city of Aden and seized the presidential palace, which led Hadi’s government to resign in January 2015. Subsequently, Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia and requested international intervention. In 2015, the Saudis formed a coalition backed by the United States and launched an offensive consisting of air raids and an economic blockade aimed at halting the Houthi advance and returning Hadi to power.

Who is Involved?  

The Houthis: The Houthi movement, named after its founder Hussein al Houthi, emerged in the 1990s as a Zaydi revivalist movement in Yemen’s northern region. Zaydis practice a form of Shi’a Islam and are a minority in Yemen and the global Islamic community. In the early 2000s, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), grew into a political and military movement opposed to then-president Saleh’s government. From 2004 to 2010, Saleh attempted to suppress the group using military force, but the Houthis maintained a presence in the north. 

Since capturing Sanaa in 2014, Ansar Allah has created a coalition–often referred to as the Sanaa-based authorities–with northern political, military, and tribal groups. The alliance, led by the Houthis, has cemented control of Yemen’s north-western highlands and Red Sea coast, where about 70% of Yemen’s population lives. Many Yemenis oppose the Houthis’ de facto governance and criticize the group’s repressive security system and its’ practices of firing missiles into populated areas and shelling cities. The Houthis’ primary goal is to gain international recognition of a Houthi-led government in Yemen. The group has increasingly attacked coalition targets, mainly critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the Houthis also face a web of adversaries inside Yemen, including the Southern Transition Council (STC), al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the Islamist party Islah. In February 2021, the Houthis launched an offensive to capture Marib, the last stronghold of the internationally recognized government. The group faced setbacks due to coalition airstrikes but made territorial gains in the Marib governorate in the final months of 2021. 

Iran: Shi’a-majority Iran has increasingly conducted irregular warfare against its adversaries, primarily through proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Iran is often accused of providing the Houthis arms, technology, training, and other forms of support. Tehran openly supports the Houthis politically but denies providing the Houthis arms or material aid. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the Houthis receive weapons or weapons components from Iran. Local media outlets assert that officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of Iran’s Armed Forces, are stationed in Yemen. However, the extent of coordination between Tehran and the Houthis is debated; some analysts maintain that Tehran’s decision-making power in Yemen is likely limited. 

The Saudi-led coalition: In 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition to reinstate Hadi’s government and reverse the Houthis’ territorial gains. The coalition includes Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco (until 2019), Qatar (until 2017), Senegal, Sudan, and the UAE; Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti have also lent logistical and military support to the coalition. Saudi officials’ perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy capable of launching cross-border attacks has fueled the coalition’s offensive. According to the Yemen Data Project, the coalition has conducted about 25,054 air raids, resulting in almost 9,000 civilian casualties. Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government also enforce a vessel clearance process on commercial shipments directed to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port. This blockade, intended to prevent the flow of illicit weapons, has impeded or delayed the delivery of fuel and other essential supplies to parts of Yemen and has contributed to Yemen’s economic crisis. 

United Arab Emirates: After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most prominent military role within the coalition. While Saudi Arabia has focused much of its operations in the north, the UAE has deployed ground troops and formed and backed local militias, including the STC, the Support and Backup Brigades, and the Hadrami Elite Forces, in Yemen’s south around key ports and shipping lanes. Some of these forces, notably the STC and affiliates, have come into conflict with the Yemeni government forces, which has weakened the anti-Houthi camp and created a rift within the Saudi-led coalition. Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical ambitions and desire to undermine Islah, a Yemeni Islamist party loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, are two objectives driving the Emirates’ intervention. The UAE scaled down its military involvement in 2019 but still maintains influence in southern Yemen.

Among the myriad groups battling for control of Yemen, the Houthi movement is of particular interest to international policymakers due to its ties to Iran and its destabilizing effect on Yemen since civil war broke out in 2014 resulting in a  humanitarian crisis.

Who are the Houthis?

The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), is a group of Zaydi Shi’as, a minority community in Yemen historically concentrated in the northern region. Shi’a Muslims are a minority in the global Islamic community, and Zaydis are a Shi’a group with beliefs distinct from Shi’as in Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere. The Houthi movement, named after a religious leader of the Houthi clan, emerged in the 1990s as an effort to revive the Zaydi tradition. Some Zaydis, including families that were influential in northern Yemen before unification, felt that their religious and cultural traditions were  threatened by state-funded efforts to establish Salafi leaders in Zaydi areas in the 1980s. Political and religious marginalization led the Houthis to question the Yemeni government’s authority.

The Houthis’ relationship with the Yemeni government

The Houthis became politically active in 2003 when the group’s leader, Hussein Badr al Din al Huthi, opposed then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and openly criticized government corruption. The Houthis gained support from anti-Saleh Yemenis around the country. In response, Saleh initiated a military campaign against the Houthis, and, in 2004, Saleh’s forces killed Hussein al Houthi. Subsequently, the Houthis waged six uprisings against Saleh’s government between 2004 and 2010. Saudi Arabia, which shares a long border with Yemen, aided Saleh’s troops in attempting to suppress the Houthi uprisings. 

During the 2011 Arab uprisings, the Houthis participated in the national protests against President Saleh, who eventually ceded power to his deputy, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi. During the transition, the Houthis criticized Hadi and the UN-sponsored National Dialogue Conference created to address the political future of Yemen. During this period of weak leadership, government transition, and intense political competition, the Houthis seized territory and gained support in the north. In a dramatic reversal, Saleh allied with the Houthis against his former political ally, Hadi, and in 2015, the Houthis and Saleh loyalists ousted Hadi, who subsequently fled to Saudi Arabia. However, in 2017, Saleh withdrew his support for the Houthi coalition, which killed him a few days later. 

The Houthis role in Yemen’s civil war 

Since capturing Yemen’s capital Sanaa in 2014, the Houthis have built an alliance with a network of northern political, military, and tribal groups. The coalition, referred to as the Sanaa-based authorities, have cemented control over state institutions, sidelined political rivals, and steadily gained territory in the north. The alliance, led by the Houthis, currently control almost all of northern Yemen and remain the dominant force in Yemen’s most populated areas. However, the Houthis also face pressure from a web of armed groups within Yemen, including the Islamist party Islah, a southern separatist movement, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Many Yemenis oppose the Houthis’ de facto governance and criticize the group’s practices of shelling cities, firing missiles into populated areas, and allegedly recruiting child soldiers. 

The Houthi-Saudi Conflict 

In 2015, Saudi Arabia feared a rise in Houthi support from Shia-majority Iran. In response, the Saudis assembled a coalition of states—Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco (until 2019), Qatar (until 2017), Senegal, Sudan, and the UAE—with the goal of stopping Houthi advances and returning Hadi to power. The coalition, backed by the United States, enforced a naval blockade and targeted the Houthis with air strikes, which pushed the Houthis and their allies out of southern Yemen and the city of Aden. This made way for Hadi to establish a temporary government in Aden. However, the government was unable to provide basic services and security to the city and surrounding areas, and Hadi himself primarily lived in Saudi Arabia.

In response to the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive, the Houthis have launched unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missile attacks into Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including air strikes on Saudi oil fields and storage facilities. The Houthis target critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent, the UAE, to force an end to the coalition’s military operations. In 2021, the Houthis launched an offensive to capture Marib, the last northern stronghold of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. The Saudi-led coalition has responded to Houthi attacks with increased airstrikes, and data from the Yemen Data Project tallies 25,054 airstrikes conducted by the Saudi-led coalition since 2015, resulting in over 8,983 civilian deaths. 

Internal conflict, divided political loyalty in southern Yemen, and divided military loyalty throughout the country all contribute to religious, political, and geographic tensions in Yemen. AQAP and a local branch of the Islamic State have capitalized on the instability and attempted to gain ground in the south. 

International influence and rivalries deepen the complexity of the internal conflict. With continued Sunni-Shia tensions within and between countries, Shia-majority Iran backs the Houthis while the U.S., Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states back Yemen’s internationally recognized government. This Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen is but one dynamic driving conflict in the country.

What do the Houthis want?

The Houthis’ goals have shifted throughout eight years of conflict, but the movement’s primary aim is to gain international recognition of a Houthi-led government in Yemen. Additionally, Ansar Allah seeks to secure military control in the north and the oil rich-eastern region and establish a government that is more favorable to its political and ideological views and goals. In 2021, the Houthis presented a plan to end the war to Saudi officials. The proposal includes a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Yemen, and a transitional period followed by a peace agreement. 

The Houthis’ relationship with Iran

Iran is often accused of providing the Houthis with weapons, training, and funding. Saudi Arabia’s perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy capable of launching cross-border attacks near its southern border has driven the Saudi kingdom’s offensive. The degree of Iranian support to the Houthis is contested although the U.S., United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have provided evidence of Iranian military involvement in Yemen and support from Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed group based in Lebanon. The Saudi naval blockade has intercepted various Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis since 2015, and Iran has trained Houthi fighters within its borders. In January 2021, the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen released a report citing a growing body of evidence confirming that individuals or entities in Iran provide weapons or weapons components to the Houthis; however, it is unclear whether there are direct command-and-control links between Tehran and the Houthis.

Tehran denies providing arms and military training to the Houthis, asserting that Iranian assistance is confined to “advisory and spiritual support”. Iran and Hezbollah openly support the Houthis politically and the Houthis’ television channel, Al Masirah, is broadcast from Beirut with the assistance of Hezbollah. Some analysts characterize Iranian influence on the Houthis as limited and emphasize the Houthis adhere to a different Shi’a tradition than Tehran. Others counter that the Houthis’ formation, ideology and political aspirations are largely influenced by the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic. 

The Houthis’ relationship with the U.S.

After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Houthi movement assumed an anti-American stance, and the group often characterizes its mission as a resistance to Saudi, Israeli, and American influence in the region. 

The U.S. opposes the Houthis’ military campaign, and supports the internationally recognized government, formerly led by President Hadi and now led by a presidential council as of April 2022. The Obama and Trump administrations backed the Saudi-led coalition and provided weapons, military advice, and logistical support to offensive operations in Yemen. However, after criticism from Congress and humanitarian groups over indiscriminate bombing of civilians, both Presidents scaled down support to the coalition. 

In 2021, U.S. President Biden ceased providing support for the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive operations, including relevant arms sales. The Biden administration also appointed U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking to encourage cooperation through diplomacy. In addition, Biden reversed former President Trump’s categorization of the Houthi movement as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) as this designation disrupted humanitarian aid to Yemen.

Recent Developments

On April 1, 2022, the Houthis and the internationally recognized government in Yemen agreed to a two month UN-mediated truce. Shortly after committing to the ceasefire, the Houthis signed an action plan with the UN pledging to end using children as soldiers, attacks on schools and hospitals, and killing children. In June 2022, the parties agreed to renew the truce for another two months, although significant barriers to lasting peace remain.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, home of the two holiest sites in Islam and the world’s second-largest oil reserves, is an important regional power and a long-standing partner of the United States. Abdul Aziz ibn Saud founded the kingdom in 1932 and established an absolute monarchy. King Ibn Saud’s rule drew its legitimacy from an 18th-century pact between the Al Saud family and the founder of Wahhabism, a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam that has dominated the kingdom’s religious establishment. The discovery of vast oil fields in the country in the 1930s and the formation of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) transformed Saudi Arabia’s economy as the kingdom became a major oil exporter. Saudi Arabia is a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and a member of several regional organizations, including the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

The kingdom’s financial power, religious significance, and geostrategic position lend Saudi Arabia global influence. However, the Saudi government faces regular criticism for violating human rights and enforcing discriminatory practices toward women and religious minorities. To quell these criticisms, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, has implemented new social reforms. Despite the crown prince’s modernizing ambitions, his increasingly aggressive domestic and foreign policies have undermined these reforms. The kingdom’s leadership transition, MBS’ role in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and a changing regional landscape have prompted the Biden administration to reassess the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship long defined by energy and security interests. 

Factsheet:

• Population: 35,354,380
• Capital: Riyadh
• System of governance: Absolute Monarchy
• Head of state: King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman   
• Majority language: Arabic
• Majority religion: Sunni Islam
• GDP per capita: $44,300 
• Global Freedom Score: 7/100
• GINI Index: 45.9 (2013)

Brief History with the U.S.

The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strategic partnership for almost 80 years despite tensions over Saudi Arabia’s Islamic conservatism and human rights record. The U.S. oil industry has had close ties with Saudi Arabia since the discovery of oil in the kingdom in 1938, and a 1945 meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud solidified government ties. Since then, cooperation in the energy and defense sectors has been the cornerstone of the bilateral partnership. Nevertheless, the oil-for-security pact has been challenged periodically, most notably in 1973 when Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members embargoed oil exports to the United States and Europe in retaliation for their support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The subsequent rise in global oil prices caused fuel shortages and high gas prices in the U.S., and U.S.-Saudi relations deteriorated for a brief period.

Several events in 1979 triggered a drastic shift in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 

1. The Shah of Iran, one of two Twin Pillars that formed the backbone of Washington’s Middle East policy at the time, was ousted. The subsequent creation of an Islamic Republic in Iran sparked a regional competition with Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Islamic community and was a strategic loss to the U.S.
2. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Washington responded by committing to defend the Persian Gulf and its oil fields as a vital U.S. security interest. The war also marked the beginning of Washington and Riyadh’s joint policy of arming and training anti-Soviet forces known as the mujahideen. Many Saudi men traveled to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviets, including Osama bin Laden. 

Defense cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia continued throughout the 1980s and increased in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and 550,000 U.S. troops and coalition forces flooded the region to protect the Kuwait-Saudi border. About 5,000 U.S. troops remained in Saudi Arabia after the war, which prompted criticism from Bin Laden and less extreme Saudi conservatives who opposed Western influence in the region. 

In 2001, after the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks on the U.S., relations between Washington and Riyadh frayed. The attacks sparked anti-Saudi sentiment among Americans because 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi-born and allegedly supported by Saudi officials. Saudi opinions of the U.S. also soured due to the Bush administration’s criticism of Saudi Arabia’s monarchical rule and conservative Wahhabi establishment as well as Washington’s broader regional policy of promoting democratic reforms antithetical to the kingdom’s system of governance. 

The relationship continued to sour during the Obama administration given its resolve to decrease U.S. involvement in the region, which led Riyadh to question Washington’s reliability as a partner. Several instances, including President Obama’s call for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down during the Arab uprisings, Washington’s unwillingness to intervene in Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s exclusion from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) deepened the kingdom’s suspicions.

Riyadh’s concerns about Iran’s regional activities increased in 2014 as civil war broke out in Yemen and the Iranian-backed Houthi forces made territorial gains in the country. Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition to launch offensive operations. The U.S. initially provided logistical and intelligence support for operations in Yemen, but eventually suspended some weapons transfers to the kingdom amidst high civilian casualties from Saudi airstrikes and a growing humanitarian crisis.  

Current Status of Relations 

U.S.-Saudi ties warmed under President Trump, who reinstated the arms sales and withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Issues that previously caused tensions in the partnership, including U.S. support for Israel,  elicited a less forceful response from the kingdom during the Trump presidency. Saudi Arabia tacitly accepted Bahrain and the UAE’s recognition of Israel under the Abraham Accords, despite the kingdom’s commitment to conditioning normalization with Israel on the establishment of a Palestinain state. Saudi Arabia’s military operations in Yemen and MBS’ role in the murder of Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi evoked concerns from Congress and brought the kingdom’s domestic policies to the fore of disucssions about the future of U.S.-Saudi relations. 

On the campaign trail, President Biden pledged to treat the Saudis as the “pariah that they are,”  and since assuming office he has sought to reassess the underpinnings of the U.S.-Saudi partnership in line with his commitment to pursue a human rights-centered foreign policy. In 2021, President Biden ceased U.S. support for offensive operations in Yemen and restarted nuclear negotiations with Iran. The White House also released the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment that MBS approved the operation to kill Jamal Khashoggi, and Biden has refused to deal with the crown prince directly. In return, Saudi Arabia has rejected U.S. requests to increase oil production in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent surging oil prices. In an effort to ease rising oil prices and manage current tensions, Biden broke from his previous policy and met with MBS during a trip to the kingdom in July 2022.

U.S. Strategic Interests:

• Energy: Providing close to half a million barrels of oil per day to the U.S., Saudi Arabia is the third largest source of imported oil to the U.S. Although the United States is the world’s largest producer of oil due to the “shale boom,” Washington and Riyadh continue to cooperate in the energy sector due to Saudi Arabia’s ability to quickly adjust production levels and therefore price and stabilize the energy market. Washington and Riyadh have also explored civil nuclear cooperation for electricity production, but action stalled in 2020 because the kingdom has wavered on its commitment to forego nuclear weapons development. 
• Defense: Saudi Arabia is the largest recipient of U.S. arms, with sales totaling $100 billion. The kingdom’s armed forces have relied on U.S. military training and education assistance for decades. As of May 2022, there are about 700 U.S. military and civilian personnel in Saudi Arabia. Congress has typically supported U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia for the purposes of reducing U.S. troop presence in the region, supporting the U.S. arms industry, and containing Iran. Although Washington and Riyadh maintain long standing defense ties, Saudi Arabia has recently sought to diversify its defense supply lines, and in 2021 signed a defense cooperation agreement with Russia and received ballistic missile production technology from China. Washington has refused to sell Riyadh ballistic missiles due to proliferation concerns.
• Counterterrorism: Since al Qaeda launched a series of attacks inside the kingdom in 2003, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have cooperated closely on counterterrorism efforts. Saudi Arabia faces terrorist threats from the Islamic State (IS), al Qaeda and affiliates, and the Yemen-based Houthi movement. To improve information sharing and reduce cross-border attacks, the kingdom cooperates with regional and international partners like the U.S. Through the Office of the Program Manager-Ministry of Interior Program and the Interior Military Assistance Group, U.S. military advisors assist the Ministry of Interior develop critical security capabilities and train the Saudi Ministry of Interior security forces. Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism strategy focuses on combatting radicalization, recruitment, and terrorist financing within the kingdom through monitoring religious activites, rehabilitating prisoners, and regulating travel to conflict zones.
• Trade and Investment: The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a Trade and Investment Framework in 2003, and the countries enjoy strong financial ties. The kingdom is one of the United States’ top trading partners in the MENA region and a top destination for U.S. exports. Although oil, arms, and machinery have historically defined the U.S.-Saudi trade relationship, the kingdom is working to diversify its economy through its Vision 2030 program, launched in 2016. Under Vision 2030, the kingdom has sought to attract foreign direct investment, mainly through selling shares of Saudi Aramco, but concerns over Saudi Arabia’s political risk and questions about the valuation of Saudi Aramco jeopardize the kingdom’s ability to meet its 2030 goals. Nevertheless, Saudi investment in U.S. companies remains robust. Saudi’s sovereign wealth fund has stakes in U.S. tech companies, including Uber and Tesla, and many American businesses have operations in the kingdom.
• Regional and Geopolitical Competition: The U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the common goal of countering Iran’s regional influence. Washington and Riyadh seek to increase regional stability, curb Iran’s support for aggressive non-state actors, and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. As Washington attempts to wind down commitments in the region, Saudi Arabia remains a strategic partner committed to balancing and countering Iran. In April 2022, Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in the fifth round of talks (which began in 2021) intended to manage tensions and restore diplomatic relations, although the two parties have not reached a formal agreement. To Washington’s consternation, Saudi Arabia has established stronger relations with Russia and China since MBS was appointed crown prince in 2017. The kingdom maintains an OPEC+ agreement with Russia to manage global oil production and has deepened trade and investment ties with China.