ACE

Author: Freya Pereira

  • The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

    The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

    This brief was originally written by Mariah Smith on March 2, 2022. It was updated and republished by Freya Pereira.

    Ethiopia began building the Grand Ethiopian Resistance Dam (GERD) in 2011 and it has caused conflict and strained relations in the region ever since. The dam is located on Ethiopia’s stretch of the Nile River, and will impact water flow to the downriver nations including South Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt. Since building the dam commenced, negotiations have focused on assuaging Sudan and Egypt’s concerns over the impact of the decreased water supply but with little progress made. Ethiopia has not ceased construction based on the concerns posed by Sudan and Egypt and therefore GERD construction has remained a critical issue within East African geopolitics. 

    Ethiopia’s Position on GERD

    While the GERD poses a geopolitical threat to the region, it also has tremendous potential to bolster Ethiopia’s economy.  

    • Energy: The GERD is estimated to quadruple Ethiopia’s energy output once completed, which would provide energy access to over 75 million Ethiopians. Currently, less than half of Ethiopia’s population of 110 million receive power from the national energy grid.
    • Agriculture: The water harnessed by the dam will irrigate over one million acres of arable land, propelling Ethiopia’s agriculture-based economy.
    • Jobs: the dam will require a large workforce for its maintenance. Ethiopia is expected to hire over 12,000 workers, creating both high and low skill jobs. 

    Originally, funding for the dam was restricted by the US government due to its potential for political destabilization. Yet, the arrival of Chinese bankers and engineers has revitalized the efforts and led to plans for more than 25 large hydroelectric dams. Ethiopia feels justified in utilizing the Nile because 85% of the water which flows through the Nile is runoff from the Ethiopian highlands. In addition, Ethiopia argues that the dam will not meaningfully restrict water supply although Egypt and Sudan disagree on this point.

    Egypt’s Concerns about GERD

    Egypt’s main argument relies on the 1929 Agreement that allocated all the Nile River’s waters to Egypt and the supplemental 1959 Agreement which included Sudan in water shares of the Nile. The 1929 Agreement was made between Egypt and Great Britain which represented Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), and Sudan at the time and granted Egypt veto power over Nile River projects. The 1959 Agreement supplemented the previous agreement by including Sudan as an official shareholder. Both of these agreements did not give rights to Ethiopia and other upstream states. Ethiopia does not recognize these agreements as legally binding because it was not an independent nation at the time, and the agreements were made by Great Britain representing it as a colonial power. 

    Egypt is entirely reliant on the Nile River for its water supply, and sees the dam as an existential threat. The main issue at hand is what Ethiopia will do if there is a drought. Egypt wants a binding commitment that if there is a drought, Ethiopia will continue releasing water from the dam to maintain the flow downriver. 

    Sudan’s Dilemma about GERD 

    Sudan is caught in the middle between Egypt and Ethiopia. On the one hand, Sudan is also almost entirely dependent on the Nile River for water, and is not comfortable with relying on Ethiopia to moderate the water supply especially if water becomes scarce. On the other hand, the dam is projected to become a cheap energy source in the region, and facilitate other development projects which Sudan could benefit from.

    The US Position on GERD Thus Far

    Former President Trump’s Administration is most notable for taking a “hardball” approach to Ethiopia. The approach entailed temporarily pausing aid to Ethiopia due to “[the Administration’s] concern about Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to begin to fill the dam before an agreement and all necessary dam safety measures were in place.”. Egypt is a close ally of the United States, and one of the biggest receivers of US aid (1.43 billion annually). Egypt also has long standing diplomatic relations with key ally Israel, and has used its regional influence to promote ties between Israel and the rest of the Arab world. For this reason, many felt the US came down firmly on the side of Egypt and Sudan when attempting to mediate the conflict.

    The current Biden Administration has decided to take a more neutral stance. In a recent move, the Biden Administration has delinked the pause in Ethiopian aid from the GERD policies which sends a less severe message to Ethiopia, a US ally, and represents a significant shift in the overall US approach moving forward.

    Suter, Margaret.

  • Introduction to U.S.-Egypt Relations

    Introduction to U.S.-Egypt Relations

    Egypt is a key strategic partner of the United States in the Middle East and North Africa. The country is historically influential across the Arab world, and is one of the few in the region to have established  long-lasting peace with Israel. The Egyptian government is also staunchly anti-Islamist extremeism and is part of key counter-terrorism partnerships with the U.S. along with the Arab/U.S. alignment against Iran. As a result of their support of major U.S. regional interests, Egypt has become the second largest recipient of U.S. military and financial aid. However, the Arab Spring in 2011 led to volatility in the country, and the first democratically elected President was assassinated. The subsequent rise to power of President Kalil el-Sisi has paralleled a rise in human rights violations and the suppression of free speech and journalism. These issues have called into question the decision of the United States to continue sending a large volume of military aid to the country.

    Fact Sheet

    Population: 102,334,403 (2020 est.)

    Capital: Cairo

    System of Governance: Republic

    President: Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi (since: 2014)

    Majority Language: Arabic 

    Majority Religion: Sunni Islam

    GDP Per Capita: 12,607.0 (2020 est)

    Freedom House Rating: Not Free

    History of U.S.-Egypt Strategic Relations

    Modern relations with Egypt began in 1922, after Egypt gained independence from the British Empire. In the post-World War II era Egypt grew to be a key strategic partner for the United States. At the time, Egypt was influential in the Arab League through cultural, media and social diffusion across the region. Egypt’s influence was especially important to the U.S.’ efforts towards achieving a Arab-Israeli peace. Egypt and Israel signed a landmark peace agreement in 1979, facilitated by the United States during the Camp David Accords. This established a long-lasting peace between the two nations and solidified Egypt as a vital U.S. ally in the Middle East. Since then, the U.S. has provided over $50 billion dollars in military aid and $30 billion dollars in economic aid to Egypt. Egypt has also become one of the U.S.’ largest export markets. With the assistance of American aid, the Egyptian military has grown to be one of the most powerful institutions in the country and heavily influences the government.

    Though Egypt has remained a partner for U.S. strategic interests, the political conditions of the country have been volatile in the 21st century, including a revolutionary period between 2011 and 2013 during the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring led to political unrest in Egypt with revolutionary forces ousting the former President, Hosni Mubarak. The first democratically-elected President, Mohammed Morsi, represented the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamist organization with peaceful and violent factions. He was soon deposed by the defense minister, Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi. President Sisi, a counterrevolutionary, has since come down hard on civil liberties in Egypt and perpetrated severe human rights violations. The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs estimates that between 70,000-100,000 political prisoners are imprisoned as of March 2021. In addition, Egypt’s rate of executions tripled from 32 to 107 executions between 2019 and 2020 under President Sisi.  

    President Trump worked closely with President Sisi, even calling him his “favorite dictator,” and made policy changes that advantaged Egypt. For instance, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has been a critical geopolitical issue in the region amidst Egypt’s fears that the Ethiopian dam project will negatively impact the flow of water downstream and allow Ethiopia to effectively control Egypt’s water flow. The Trump administration withheld. aid to Ethiopia in an attempt to persuade them to meet Egypt’s demands. Trump also used inflammatory rhetoric when discussing the issue, claiming that Egypt will “end up blowing up the dam.” These actions cumulatively led to damaged relations between Ethiopia and the U.S.

    President Biden did not call President Sisi when he entered office in 2020, despite Egypt being one of America’s closest allies in the region. However, renewed conflict between Israel and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in 2021 brought U.S. attention back to Egypt. President Biden made two calls to President Sisi, and credited Egypt for helping to end the violence. He also stated the U.S. would review the GERD issue with renewed effort but underscored the importance of improving the human rights in Egypt. In February of 2021 the U.S State Department confirmed a $200 million dollar arms sale to Egypt.

    U.S Strategic Interests

    • Arab and Israel conflict: Egypt was influential in the Arab League, which made them an important ally in the U.S.’ goal to broker peace between the Arab world and Israel. As mentioned above, Egypt mediated a cease fire between Israel and Palestine during the 2021 conflict on the Gaza strip. In the call with President Sisi, President Biden committed to working with Egypt to create lasting peace in the Gaza Strip with Egypt’s help.
    • Counterterrorism: Egypt and the U.S. share an interest in combating Islamic extremism. The Sinai Penninula is home to an active ISIS sect, and all major Egyptian terrorist attacks in 2020 occurred in the region. Egypt joined the U.S. backed coalition against ISIS; however, Egypt only committed to combating ISIS within its own borders. American aid to Egypt is contingent on counterterrorism cooperation. Egypt also coordinates with Somalia and Sudan on counterrorism issues. However, Egypt’s approach to counterterrorism is violent, and the government engages in human rights abuses in the name of stopping Islamic extremism.

    Ongoing policy debates

    Arguments against continuing the U.S.-Egypt partnership:

    1. Egypt is no longer as influential in the Arab league and the current relationship is based on the impression that it maintains that same influence;
    2. The relationship is one-sided: The United States has provided a significant amount of aid with limited return from Egypt. Egypt continues to trade with North Korea, Russia, China and Iran while Egypt’s counterterrorism operations have had limited success in tackling radicalism in the country due to the violence the government uses to try to suppress it;
    3. Human rights: The protection of human rights in the country has rapidly disintegrated since the rise of President Sisi. Numerous reports from human rights groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International  record extreme conditions of torture and violence in Egyptian prisons against political prisoners. Religious freedoms and free press have also been undermined during President Sisi’s time in office.

    Arguments for continuing the U.S.-Egypt partnership/alliance:

    1. The concern that Egypt will turn to Russia for support
    2. Despite the arguments criticizing the U.S. partnership with Egypt, policy advisors are not suggesting pulling out of Egypt. Instead, these policymakers recommend that the U.S. aid package to Egypt should focus on the people rather than strengthening the military and government. 
      1. For instance, Egypt faces a growing water crisis and needs increased investment in its water treatment processes to protect its access to basic necessities. 
    3. Investing in the Egyptian people would promote a message that American attention is focused on human rights concerns in the country and not on bolstering the perpetrators.

    Within academic and policy circles, the below arguments are further discussed as strong motives to continue investing in the U.S.-Egypt relationship:

    1. Egypt still plays a leading role in regional diplomacy despite concerns their influence has weakened as evidenced by their impact during the 2021 Gaza strip conflict.
    2. It is essential to keeping order in the Sinai, Gaza and Egyptian-Israeli border.
    3. If U.S. military action in the region is necessary, Egypt is a possible partner. As they were in the 1990 Gulf War during the UN coalition against Iraq.
    4. Egypt is part of a broad regional alignment countering Iran.

    Promoting human rights and democracy was also a major election promise made by current President Joe Biden; he stated that his intention was to “revitalize our national commitment to advancing human rights and democracy around the world.” However the extent of this promise is yet to be seen. Observers note that there has been a general shift in U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East which deprioritized Egypt in U.S. strategic interests, as is evidenced by Biden’s delayed call to President Sisi, supporting the President’s election promise. However the $200 million arms sale and his praise for Egypt during the Gaza strip conflict indicates that the relationship may also remain largely unchanged. 

    There is vocal opposition against the U.S.-Egypt partnership amongst the Egyptian population. This is likely due to the American support of the Egyptian military, which has been an oppressive force in Egypt. Should the United States decouple from the Egyptian government, it may result in the creation of a power vacuum, enabling the rise of opposition in an attempt to revive the aims of the 2011 Arab Spring.

  • Freya Pereira, Fordham University