Author: Catherine Devaney

  • Introduction to Post-Brexit Britain

    Introduction to Post-Brexit Britain

    Overview of UK–European Union Relations

    The United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) have a long and turbulent history of engagement. The origins of the EU date back to 1945 as a means to bring European nations together to avoid the destruction of World War II from happening again. UK Prime Minister (PM) Winston Churchill endorsed this ideal, calling it “a kind of United States of Europe”. However, the UK declined the invitation to join the European Economic Community (EEC; former name for the EU) in 1957. In 1961, the UK applied to join, and was vetoed twice by French President Charles de Gaulle, who felt the UK was a selfish actor who had prioritized relations with the U.S. over supporting the new union with European relations. In 1973, under PM Edward Heath, the UK successfully entered into the EEC, supported by a 1975 EEC Membership referendum vote with 67% in favor

    A major point of contention between the UK and the EU during its membership was a perceived infringement on UK sovereignty. In the 1980s, the EU was moving towards a more “federal” Europe, with a single currency (the Euro) and universal social policies. This was rejected by PM Margaret Thatcher, who saw these actions as “a European super-state exercising a new dominance”. PM John Major, Thatcher’s successor, opted into the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which gave increased power to the EU. However, he opted out of both the single currency and many social policies. Under PM Tony Blair, the UK sought to repair some of the strained UK-EU relations by signing the Social Chapter in 1997, which involved progressive social changes long supported by the Labor Party he led. This aligned the UK with EU social policies of the time which prioritized improving equal opportunity in the workplace, social security, workers rights, and improving working conditions by revolutionizing health and safety standards. 

    Following the 2008 financial crisis 2008 and 2011 Euro crisis, the EU sought to create new budgetary policies through treaties. The crisis of the Euro, also known as the European Debt Crisis, began in 2009 when EU member Greece was grappling with high debt levels and a struggling economy, and other EU members provided loans as a bailout. The Greek economy continued to struggle, and the stability of European financial institutions was threatened. PM David Cameron vetoed UK involvement in the pact that sought to address the financial issues, which deviated the UK from EU policies and emboldened euro-skeptics in the UK. Growing discontent in the UK and an uncompromising EU catalyzed the 2016 UK Referendum on EU membership. With a 51.9% majority, the UK voted to leave the EU, beginning what is known as “Brexit.” This vote was divisive, with England and Wales voting to “Leave”, and Scotland and Northern Ireland voting to “Remain”. The UK decision to leave the EU, officially completed in January 2020, put immense strain on UK–EU relations, and UK relations with other allies. 

    Ramifications of Brexit

    1. Trade: the UK no longer has barrier-free access to the EU’s single-market, and the two parties are negotiating a trade agreement. The UK had a vision of a more “Global Britain” free from the constraints of EU membership. However, few trade deals have been signed by a post-Brexit UK. The U.S. is hesitant to engage in trade talks until the final terms of UK–EU relations have been determined, and requires that peace will be maintained between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland before an agreement is finalized. 
    2. Relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Brexit strained the long standing peace on the isle of Ireland, established by the Good Friday Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement ended decades of conflict over governance in Northern Ireland, between two populations making up Northern Ireland, ‘Unionists’ (also known as Loyalists, predominantly Protestants, who were in favor of Northern Ireland being part of the UK) and ‘Nationalists’ (also known as Republicans, predominantly Catholic, who wanted Northern Ireland to be independent from the UK instead joining the Republic of Ireland). The U.S. played a large role in brokering the agreement, which established shared governance between parties in Northern Ireland and recognition of its status as part of the UK. 

    As a result of Brexit, tensions over trade across the land border between the Republic of Ireland (an EU member) and Northern Ireland (no longer an EU member) has sparked uncertainty in particular with Unionists, who feared it could cause separation between Northern Ireland and the UK. The 2021 Northern Ireland Protocol mitigated some tensions, but the UK intends to eventually adjust the protocol to facilitate trade. This resurgence of this issue is causing tension in the U.S.-UK relationship.

    Brexit and U.S.–UK Relations

    President Obama stated the UK would be at the “back of the queue” when it comes to trade should they opt to leave the EU, and he was in favor of the UK maintaining its EU membership. President Trump was in favor of Brexit, and advocated for a tougher stance on the UK’s exit agreement—known as “Hard-Brexit”—which PM Theresa May wanted to avoid. The Biden Administration is navigating a post-Brexit Britain, and he has stressed that relations between the U.S. and the UK are contingent on maintaining peace in Ireland. When the UK announced its intention to change the Northern Ireland Protocol, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi stated that Congress “cannot and will not support a bilateral free trade agreement” should the UK violate the agreement.

    The Brookings Institute found U.S. bilateral relations with European partners are highest with the UK, awarding a score of 6.5/10, in contrast with a 5.7 for U.S.-EU relations. In the absence of EU membership, the UK has reoriented its foreign policy to align closer with the U.S. This can be seen through the 2021 Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) Partnership, the New Atlantic Charter, and the UK’s support for Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. 

    However, the instability of Brexit has reduced the UK’s appeal as a competitive global partner for the U.S., and forced the U.S. to walk the line between supporting a longstanding ally and maintaining relations with a powerful bloc of countries. The UK has more autonomy when making international agreements, in comparison to the EU, but it wields less diplomatic and economic influence. EU agreements require all member states to sign off, but represent a significant, united diplomatic and economic force.

  • Introduction to The New Atlantic Charter

    Introduction to The New Atlantic Charter

    History

    The first Atlantic Charter between the United States and the United Kingdom was signed August 14, 1941 by then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The Charter marked one of the founding agreements of what was to become the United Nations, and connected two countries around shared principles and policies. Since the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. and the UK have maintained strong diplomatic relations—often referred to as the “Special Relationship”. This Special Relationship commenced in 1946 giving rise to one of the most significant international partnerships of the modern day. 

    The U.S. and the UK’s military and security relations have strengthened through cooperation in conflicts such as the Korean War, the Persian Gulf War, the Iraq War, and military operations in Afghanistan, alongside founding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The U.S. and the UK have often supported similar economic policies, including the shift towards privatization and promotion of capitalism during the Reagan Administration and a UK government led by PM Margaret Thatcher. Ultimately, the two countries remain committed to the protection of democratic values and cooperation against adversaries who fail to recognize or adhere to alliances or institutions. Thus, on June 10, 2021, President Biden and Prime Minister Johnson signed The New Atlantic Charter, reaffirming the historic alliance. 

    Outline of The New Atlantic Charter

    The New Atlantic Charter has eight sections:

    1. Defending democracy be it democratic values, ideals, and institutions that contribute and protect to this form of governance. This paragraph also expands into supporting transparency, the protection of civil society and human rights, and the commitment to protecting an independent media. 
    2. Sustaining international co-operation through developing laws, norms, and strengthening existing institutions to face the challenges of today. This component advocates for a “rules-based” approach to facing the good and bad impacts of emerging technologies, economic development while protecting the workers that enable it, and supporting free trade between countries.
    3. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful resolution to disputes, with both the U.S. and UK uniting and standing against interference with these principles. Much of this alludes to opposing the growing issue of disinformation, election interference, and reaffirming the need for debt transparency and debt relief. Moreover, this paragraph concludes with the commitment to defend lawful international “freedom of navigation” be it by air or seas.
    4. Innovation in Science and Technology, seeking to continue to promote development of these areas to support shared security, create employment domestically, foster global development, and create technologies to be deployed for the support of democratic values. 
    5. Collective security and international stability through reaffirming the shared responsibility to protect these principles in the modern world. This component re-emphasizes both the U.S. and the UK commitment to NATO and its allies, particularly with modern day security threats, be it cyberspace, arms control, and the disarmament or proliferation of nuclear weapons. The notable tone of this paragraph is that these threats are a collective issue for both countries and therefore should be tackled through international cooperation.
    6. Building a sustainable global economy that is free, fair, sustainable, climate-friendly and rules-based. Both countries are committed to fighting corruption, encouraging financial stability and transparency, while working towards fair and environmentally mindful global innovation and competition.
    7. Tackling the climate crisis by recognizing the immediate threat this poses and as such, both the U.S. and the UK seek to prioritize this issue in all their respective international actions.
    8. Addressing health crises through collaboration to advance health systems and protections, to strengthen collective defenses against health threats and assist in others striving to do the same.

    One of the overarching takeaways from the signing of The New Atlantic Charter is the return of diplomacy as the key American tool in international relations, a mechanism long used and endorsed in UK foreign policy actions. Much of the agreement reaffirms prior understandings, but it also attempts to reference the challenges of the twenty-first century, some of which are cited throughout the document.

    The Future

    The New Atlantic Charter signals a new dawn of the U.S.–UK relations at a time when many feel the rules-based world order is at its most vulnerable since World War II. While the charter steers away from naming specific adversaries, each component alludes to the perceived threat China and Russia, and a world that has been permanently changed by COVID-19. Over the past few years, the U.S. and the UK have embodied that vision by expanding their collective presence in the Indo-Pacific Region with the introduction of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) Partnership to counterbalance China, and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty following Russia’s invasion.

    However, recent data indicates many Americans are concerned about how much focus the U.S. places on global affairs, potentially to the detriment of domestic issues. This suggests a growing U.S. skepticism towards the importance or necessity of agreements with international allies, with a majority favoring a focus towards domestic policy rather than global affairs. At the same time, the UK’s influence on the global stage has been declining since the start of the “Special Relationship”. Many who support an outward-facing U.S. presence feel the U.S. needs to expand relations with other countries who can bring more to the table.

  • Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    AUKUS Partnership Outline

    The AUKUS Partnership was one of the first major foreign policy actions of President Biden’s Administration. On September 15, 2021, AUKUS partners released a joint statement announcing the agreement. The goal of the partnership is to promote information and technology sharing, and integrate security and defense measures by increasing cooperation on a variety of capabilities, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific Region.  

    The AUKUS Partnership has three pillars 

    1. Provide Australia with “conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capabilities (SSN)”. Prior to this agreement, this technology was limited to six nuclear capable states (U.S.,UK, France, Russia, China, and India). The U.S. previously shared SSN technology with the UK, and AUKUS now extends this to Australia, a non-nuclear state. As such, this partnership is set to revolutionize Australian naval capabilities, which have struggled to travel longer distances due to limitations of electrically powered submarine fleets. 
    2. Advance military capabilities “to promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region”. The AUKUS partnership outlines objectives to expand and develop technologies, such as: AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS, the development of robotic undersea technologies), AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA, development of quantum technologies), cooperation on Artificial Intelligence (AI), collaboration on hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and the development of cyber capabilities and security measures. 
    3. Commit to information exchange. As of February 8, 2022, The Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA) came into effect, resulting in AUKUS partners sharing nuclear propulsion intel trilaterally, the first agreement to do so with a non-nuclear capable state.

    U.S. Favorability of UK Partnership 

    Prior to the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the UK had limited influence or presence within the Indo-Pacific Region, with the only formal international agreement being their membership in the Five Eyes security alliance. However, this new partnership indicates a significant shift in UK foreign policy , confirming the UK’s intention to align with U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

    Figure showing the Overlap of Defense, Intelligence, and Security Groups in the Indo-Pacific Region.

    The AUKUS Partnership presented significant political fallout in U.S.–Europe relations, because it prioritized the UK security partnership over a broader European security pact.

    France was the most affected by the establishment of the AUKUS partnership as Australia withdrew from a previously agreed Franco-Australian Submarine deal to join AUKUS. This led to an increased strain on the U.S.–France Relations, due to both the loss of a multi-billion Euro agreement and the creation of a new security alliance formed without major European allies. Following the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, the new alliance took significant attention away from the European Union’s (EU) own policy plans for the Indo-Pacific Region. Given the contentious relations between the UK and the EU in a post-Brexit Europe, this partnership highlighted a perceived favoritism of U.S.–UK relations as loyal security partners, over a united Europe. In addition, with the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the agreement has strengthened an EU-independent UK as the only European state with significant security partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region.

    Ramifications of the AUKUS Partnership

    The response to the AUKUS partnership has been mixed. As discussed, the pact strained U.S.-French relations, and distanced the U.S. from Europe in terms of Indo-Pacific cooperation. Some believe this may lead to the EU pursuing its own independent security strategy when dealing with contentious U.S. and China relations, a position that has been publicly supported by French President Emmanuel Macron.

    The AUKUS partnership, however, will have the most on-the-ground impact within the Indo-Pacific region. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reactions have been divided on the new security partnership present in the region. Recent analysis shows that 36.4% of ASEAN respondents say AUKUS would help “balance China’s growing military power”, yet 22.5% say the deal could spark “a regional arms race”. Overall there is a worry of what the broader consequences of agreements such as AUKUS may be, and their effects on the stability of the region.   

    A major concern of the AUKUS Partnership is the potentially dangerous precedent an agreement of this nature could set for nuclear proliferation. While all three partners emphasized their commitment against nuclear proliferation, this agreement is the first to allow a non-nuclear capable state to access nuclear technology. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear states to declare all nuclear material, with the IAEA verifying the material is not being used for weaponry development, thus acting as a deterrence for nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT relies on states to self-monitor naval nuclear reactors because of practical issues with access. Australia is setting a precedent as the first non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear materials the IAEA is not monitoring. It could be dangerous if other countries follow this path, and derail the current global nuclear nonproliferation system. While Australia may not prove to be an exploitive threat to nuclear weapons development through the AUKUS partnership, a future agreement of this nature could serve as the perfect cover for potential would-be-proliferators to advance nuclear development programs under the guise of access to nuclear material through naval reactors, no longer checked by the IAEA. 

    US–UK Relations and Nuclear Proliferation

    A 2020 report by Pew Research demonstrates that nuclear nonproliferation is a major foreign policy issue in the United States; 73% of Americans perceive the “spread of nuclear weapons” as a major threat to the U.S. This position attracts bipartisan support, with both Democrats and Republicans responding in equal measure to the perceived international threat. Moreover, 80% of respondents favor state cooperation with other countries as “very important” when navigating the spread of nuclear weapons.

    The United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK) have a long history of alignment on foreign policy objectives towards nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear war. Much of the existing U.S.–UK agreements on nuclear cooperation between both states derive and build upon the original 1958 “Atomic Energy. Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes” agreement, which bound both countries in a united front against other state development of atomic weapons. As such, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Partnership is yet another foreign policy step the U.S. and the UK have taken to further their allied cooperation to address the international security threats of today.

  • Catherine Devaney, University at Albany (SUNY)

    Catherine Devaney, University at Albany (SUNY)

    Catherine Devaney is an International Student from the United Kingdom, completing her Bachelors of Political Science alongside her Master’s in International Affairs at the University at Albany, State University of New York. Her concentration for both programs is Global Governance and Diplomacy with an interest in Foreign Policy and Human Rights, both here in the United States and in Europe. Some of her research to-date has been on topics such as Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrents through the scope of International Relations, links between Conflict and Foreign Aid Investments, the Rise in Far-right Populism in Europe, and the comparison of LGBTQIA+ Voting Rights in Europe and the United States. Additionally to her studies, Catherine is about to embark on her second term as Chair of the Student Association Elections Commission at the University at Albany, continuing her fierce commitment to facilitating free and fair elections for the student body at large. Alongside this role, Catherine will serve her second term as Vice President of the Democracy Matters University at Albany Chapter, advocating for meaningful election reform and providing non-partisan education on key political issues to her community. In her free time, Catherine is an avid reader, continuing to learn both French and Korean languages, as well as hiking with her two Beagles, Duncan and Finley.

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