Author: Andrew Keefe

  • Russian Foreign Agent Laws: Protecting Civil Society, or Preventing It?

    Russian Foreign Agent Laws: Protecting Civil Society, or Preventing It?

    Amidst the variety of international criticism expressed about Vladimir Putin’s administration, we frequently hear about the Russian state’s suppression of political dissent, most often through the shutting down of oppositional media organizations or cracking down on protests. Most recently, the issue of Russia’s “foreign agent” law has come to the forefront of this criticism, with a plethora of international groups deriding its use as retaliatory, oppressive, and a means of censorship. The Russian government and adjacent media, on the other hand, view the law as necessary for the protection of the political process, and compare it to other countries’ restrictions on individuals acting in the interest of foreign governments. While there are instances where the law has legitimate standing, it is often utilized as a tool to suppress political goals that are against the administration’s wishes. 

    What is the Russian law on foreign agents?

    Under the law, nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive any funding from foreign sources must report said foreign funding, and also be included on a registry of agents acting in the interests of foreign entities. These organizations can still publish materials if they report their funding properly, but must do so under the stipulation that they explicitly indicate “[the materials] are published … by a foreign agent.” In late 2017, a law was passed that allowed foreign agent laws to extend beyond NGOs, by also including media organizations on their own foreign agent register. 

    Failing to report funding from foreign sources can result in heavy fines for an organization. Creating or working for an organization which receives international funding can have consequences too, especially if the organization is perceived to be encouraging citizens to “refuse to perform civil duties or commit other illegal acts.” An individual who fails to report their foreign agent status, or proliferates propaganda in service of a foreign agent, may: be fined up to one year of salary or wage,  do “corrective labor” for up to two years, or serve jail time for up to two years. Article 3 offers more details on punishment.

    Examples of foreign agents on the registry, and the debate around them

    The law has been applied to several obvious “foreign agent” mass media, such as Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. These two organizations aim to promote Western and American ideals abroad and receive most, if not all, of their funding from non-Russian sources. 

    More contentious examples have involved Russian NGOs focusing on election processes, such as Golos, which has twice been branded a foreign agent, and the Levada Center, a sociological research center that surveys public opinion. Golos was designated as a foreign agent leading up to the 2021 State Duma election, because the local vote-monitoring organization received a donation of 200 roubles from an Armenian citizen. The Levada Center was designated a foreign agent in 2016 after the Ministry of Justice claimed to have found hidden sources of foreign funding, a claim which the director disputed

    Supporters of the foreign agent law cite the need to prevent foreign influence and protect Russian sovereignty. When the law was passed in 2012, Pravda described it as “… not prohibitive—as some critics would like to interpret it,” claiming that “thousands” of foreign agents operate in Russia through uncontrollable cash payments. In 2013, President Putin outlined his beliefs to officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service, alluding to some NGOs as “structures financed from abroad and serving foreign interests.” This law, then, is framed as an attempt to regulate these foreign agents, as well as uncontrollable money, in an effort to prevent interference in Russian affairs. 

    Opponents of the law have decried the discriminatory effects a foreign agent designation holds. The director of the Levada Center emphasized that the term itself, inostrannie agent, has a historical connotation “synonymous with ‘spy’ or ‘saboteur.’” Therefore, citizens are less likely to trust organizations labeled as foreign agents. While Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has stated that “the department must follow the spirit and letter of the law” in response to criticism about Golos’ registration, opposition figures argue that the stigma of being a foreign agent is a disproportionate response to, in this case, a $3 donation. 

    IMAGE BELOW: Press secretary Dmitry Peskov with President Putin. Only one day before classifying Golos as a foreign agent, Putin said he would review the “fuzzy criteria” surrounding the law. 

    After its addition to the registry, the Levada Center conducted a poll on the term “foreign agent.” Among the 1,800 Russian adults surveyed, notable results were as follows:

    • Out of the 25% of surveyed adults who had heard of the law, 56% view the law as an attempt to limit Western influence, while 26% see it as an attempt to “clamp down on independent social organizations”.
    • 45% associate the term with espionage, “infiltrators”, and double agents; an additional 7% associate the term with an “enemy of Russia”.
    • 66% believe an organization who receives foreign money will work in the interests of their foreign sponsor.

    By including certain political opposition and media dissidents on the Foreign Agent Registry, the government has found a way to mitigate the proliferation of these organizations’ ideas by legally invalidating their conclusions as the products of foreign sponsorship. By labeling an organization like Golos as a foreign agent, the Russian government delegitimizes their vote-monitoring capabilities to a large chunk of Russians citizens. If, for example, Golos claimed to have evidence of election tampering done by the ruling party, their conclusion would be met with skepticism. The government sees this law as a buttress for Russian unity and stability, while dissidents see it as yet another tool in preventing a civil society outside of the government’s parameters. 

  • A Brief Guide to the Domestic Politics of the Russian Federation

    A Brief Guide to the Domestic Politics of the Russian Federation

    The Russian political system is often described as being a “top-down” structure, meaning that power is centralized in the presidency. Occasionally, the Putin regime is described as a dictatorship, evoking associations with Stalin-era Soviet repression and a “cult of personality.” However, to simplify Russian politics down to these terms undercuts the complexities of Russian society, its institutions, and its active voting populace. Despite Putin’s authoritarian-leaning actions related to protest and LGBTQ+ people, he has enjoyed an approval rating consistently over 60%, with an average rating of 74% over the last twenty years. This is not to say Russia is a democracy or to deny the government’s repression of political dissent. However, to better understand US policy towards the Russian Federation, it is important to take into account the nuances of Russian domestic society. 

    Government institutions

    Adopted in December of 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federation established a semi-presidentialist political system. Executive power is shared between the president and a prime minister (premier) who is appointed “by the president with the consent of the State Duma,” the 450-member lower chamber of the Federal Assembly. If the Duma rejects the appointment three times, the president has the power to dissolve the Duma, call for new elections, and appoint the PM anyway. The upper chamber of the Federal Assembly is the Federation Council. Instead of being an elected position, its members are appointed by chief governmental officials in the region they represent, along with several appointed by the president.

    Source: AP Comparative Government Russia 

    1. United Russia Dominance: Russia’s political makeup

    For nearly 20 years, the dominant force in Russian legislative politics has been the big-tent party United Russia. The results of the most recent State Duma election reinforces their primacy. Further, while the Federation Council is officially restricted from joining together by political factions, an overwhelming portion of its members are affiliated with UR. Casting itself as a party of unity and pragmatism, UR has consistently supported the current administration. Thus, with a large swath of control over legislative politics, the Federal Assembly has worked to meet the positions of President Putin.

    President Putin and Russian National Identity

    Voter fraud in Russian elections has been alleged by a variety of sources, including nongovernmental organizations, domestic rivals, and international media. Still, popular support for President Putin and UR should not be understated. In order to retain domestic approval, the current regime remains focused on the restoration of Russian national identity. This restoration revolves around a return to great power status, ensuring the primacy of the Russian language within the nation’s borders, and emphasizing an ethnically diverse Russia.

    The 90s were a tumultuous period for Russia; the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ineffective and embarrassing leadership of Boris Yeltsin, and a financial downturn made citizens of the once great power feel humiliated and ignored in the international system. Recent polls have shown that about half of the Russian population feel ignored by the West, and a majority of Russians have perceived that “developed countries” treat Russia as either a rival or an enemy. Putin and United Russia have been sure to portray his time in power as stable, a sharp contrast to the Yeltsin era. Additionally, they emphasize a desire to restore Russia’s prominence in world affairs. Putin has also repeatedly lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union as a disaster. Appealing to the large percentage of Russians who desire a powerful, stable position on the world stage, as well as older citizens who may feel nostalgic for the Soviet era, bolsters the popularity of Putin and contributes to UR’s big tent. 

    Some political scientists consider language to be fundamental in forming a national identity. Putin has emphasized that “the unity of the country and the peoples of Russia directly depends on the knowledge of the Russian language by young people.” In 2015, the Ministry of Education began tracking the hours of instruction on the Russian language in all schools, ensuring that other regional or minority languages were not taught at the expense of the “state language.” Some have interpreted this as an encroachment on non-Russian ethnic groups, while others have seen this as a unifying idea intended to protect the Russian nation. 
    For President Putin, a fundamental component of Russia’s national identity is multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. On multiple occasions, he has condemned the ultra nationalist slogan “Rossiya dlya russkiy” (lit. “Russia for Russians”). Russkiy has an ethnic connotation, as in ethnic Russianness; Putin has often opted to use the adjective “rossiyskiy” when referring to Russians. This has the connotation of a citizen within the Russian Federation, regardless of ethnicity. This has also allowed Putin to cast a wider net of support for his presidency.

  • Andrew Keefe, University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign

    Andrew Keefe, University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign

    Andrew (Andy, he/him) is a student of International Relations with thematic coursework
    in Russian and eastern European studies. His academic interests relate to foreign policy and
    democratization in the post-Soviet space. Andrew has completed semester-long projects on a
    variety of topics, including the Camp David Accords and the effects of information warfare on
    national security. He joined ACE because he believes that well-sourced, accessible information is
    an important factor in ensuring a quality democracy. In his free time, Andrew enjoys fingerstyle
    guitar, Russian language and literature, and cooking.