Today, China engages in international trade on an unprecedented scale, rapidly churning out inexpensive exports and housing enumerable manufacturing plants.
The ongoing trade war is one of the most readily identifiable topics surrounding U.S.-China relations. Mass media’s underlying political bias and proclivity to sensationalize topical issues have resulted in politically-skewed coverage. It’s likely many Americans still instinctively relate the trade war with the Trump administration’s incendiary rhetoric and rigid policies. In actuality, the topic, and its potential mitigation strategies, remain a distinctly non-partisan issue. A report from the Pew Research Center claims that, “Republicans and Democrats largely agree in their assessments of how China’s growing economy […] will affect the U.S.” To this point, within the last month, the Senate has passed a $250 billion bipartisan technology and manufacturing bill aimed at combating China’s economic growth.
A trade deficit occurs when the cost of a country’s imports exceeds the cost of its exports. In the late 1990s, China’s economy saw a dramatic growth in manufacturing exports, resulting in an American trade deficit of $34 billion on average. Following China’s admittance into the WTO in 2001, the trade deficit rose to $202 billion in 2005, and then $273 billion in 2020. In 2020, the United States imported $435 billion in goods and services from China and exported approximately $124 billion, leaving an outstanding deficit of approximately $310 billion in goods and services.
Trade Deficit and the Exchange Rates
A fixed or “pegged” exchange rate is when the value of a country’s currency is inseparably tied to the value of another widely-used commodity or currency. China manipulates its currency by deflating its worth by pegging it to a value less than it would trade for in a free market to gain advantages over trading partners. Many analysts proclaim that the nation’s currency is “significantly undervalued vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.” This causes exports to the United States to become inexpensive while United States imports to China are comparably more expensive. China’s “massive and sustained currency manipulation from 2000 to 2010…[widended] the trade deficit to historic levels.”
Impact on the US Economy
There is a current debate among economists about whether the trade deficit with China has led to significant job loss in the United States. A recent EPI report stated that there is a correlation between the ever-growing trade deficit and a substantial loss in manufacturing employment. This report claims that “the growth of the U.S. trade deficit with China between 2001 and 2018 was responsible for the loss of 3.7 U.S. million jobs.” However, many economists have challenged this argument, attributing employment loss to “automation, productivity increases, and demand shifts from goods and services.” Further, economists have outrightly denounced the recent administration’s fixation on the widening trade deficit, claiming that, “the trade deficit is a terrible metric for judging economic policy.”
COVID-19 is a rapidly transmissible virus which has shut down the global economy for the past 15 months. In the past six months, vaccine production and distribution has ramped up, but vaccine nationalism—the hoarding of vaccines by countries for their own populations—is threatening to prolong the pandemic for several years. The COVAX Initiative seeks to close this vaccination gap by distributing vaccines to low and middle income countries who otherwise wouldn’t have access to them—an essential step to end the acute stage of the pandemic.
Wealth inequality is the root of the current global vaccine access disparity. As of March 2020, “High-income countries, representing just a fifth of the global adult population (~20%), have purchased more than half (~54%) of all vaccine doses.”
As shown by this figure from the Kaiser Family Foundation, high income countries have enough doses to fully vaccinate their adult populations twice over, while lower income countries can only vaccinate around a quarter of their population. This poses risks for the spread of globalvariants, as well as a slower global economic recovery.
Countries hoard vaccines because they are prioritizing domestic economic recovery and aim to reach herd immunity (with 70% of their citizens vaccinated) within their borders. However, this ideology could end up hurting them more than helping them as variants mutate among the unvaccinated and spread as countries ease lockdowns. This would hinder public health progress and slow economic recovery. Therefore, the COVAX initiative is essential to combat vaccine nationalism by distributing vaccines to low and middle income countries which do not have the same ability to purchase vaccines in bulk.
The COVAX Initiative
The COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Initiative is an international partnership led by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the World Health Organization (WHO) to close the vaccination gap between high income countries (HICs) and lower-middle income countries (LMICS). It fulfills the vaccine pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, which was created in April 2020 to ensure that all countries, regardless of GDP, would have access to needed COVID-19 response resources.
Diverse and actively managed portfolio of vaccines
Vaccines delivered as soon as they are available
End the acute phase of the pandemic
Rebuild economies
COVAX uses international infrastructure to coordinate equitable vaccine distribution and relies on multiple actors in multiple sectors in order to reduce gaps in vaccination coverage. COVAX aims to provide 2 billion COVID-19 vaccines to the most vulnerable citizens in all participating countries through the COVAX Facility, which is a “global risk-sharing mechanism for pooled procurement and equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.” This initiative seeks to combat vaccine nationalism by recognizing that no country or single population will be protected from the virus if populations in low and middle income countries remain unvaccinated.
COVAX and US Policy
Changes in U.S. administrative policies on COVAX reflect different ideologies about the United States’ role on the world stage. The Trump Administration did not join or support the COVAX initiative while in office. However, the Biden Administration is now a vocal supporter of the program and has pledged $4 billion dollars to COVAX. They have also supported waiving intellectual property patents on COVID-19 vaccines. This is consistent with the Administration’s foreign policy strategy of rebuilding alliances and repositioning the U.S. on the world stage as a global leader.
Criticisms and Critiques
While COVAX is certainly an essential step in the right direction, many organizations feel it is not effectively meeting the needs of the moment. The People’s Vaccine Alliance argues that the COVID-19 vaccines must be seen as a public good and readily available to all those in need, and that COVAX is not the right tool to enable this paradigm shift. These concerns reflect a disconnect between the profit motive of vaccine manufacturers and the imperative to vaccinate as many high risk individuals as possible. In addition, some feel that vaccine hoarding is justified because governments must put the lives of their own citizens before those in other countries. While this does not explain hoarding enough vaccines to vaccinate citizens twice over, it is a main reason why not all countries are ready to give away a portion of their domestic vaccine supply.
The World Trade Organization is an international organization dedicated to liberalizing rules of trade between nations. Trade liberalization refers to removing and reducing restrictions to the free movement and trade of goods between countries. Trade liberalization seeks to minimize the role of governments in the resource allocation process to increase economic efficiency globally. The WTO does this by requiring member states to (1) convert all barriers to trade into tariffs (taxes on certain imports or exports) and subsequently reduce these tariffs, and (2) reduce the amount of support and subsidies they offer to exporting industries. It also works to settle trade disputes and promote the economic growth of developing countries. The organization is composed of 164 member states who govern its activities.
Forming the World Trade Organization
The WTO was born out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was initially created in 1947 by the UN. Members of the GATT decided a new trade organization was necessary in 1995 due to the lackluster dispute settlement system of the GATT. The GATT required positive consensus in both the creation of a dispute resolution panel and adopting of the panel’s report. This positive consensus involved all contracting parties to the decision including the parties to the dispute itself and thus required that every party including the party subject to complaint agree to establish the panel and uphold its report. While most parties subject to complaint did not abuse their veto power, it did create a problem where many disputes went unsolved as those with complaints did not petition to create a panel due to the risk of a veto. The creation of the WTO and subsequently, the Appellate Body within the organization would solve these issues, while presenting new ones.
Structure
The Ministerial Conference is the highest decision-making body. Ministerial Conferences involve all member states meeting every 2 years to make decisions concerning multilateral trade agreements. The General Council has representatives of all member states with the authority to act on behalf of the Ministerial Conference. Since the Ministerial Conference only meets once every 2 years, the General Council carries out day to day functions of the WTO. Sometimes the General Council may meet under a different set of rules as the Dispute Settlement Body or as the Trade Policy Review Body to solve specific issues.
The Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, all report to the General Council. Each of these councils covers a broad area of trade and handle WTO agreements within their specific area of trade. These councils have committees below them governing more specific areas of trade—for example, the Goods Council has a committee on agriculture. Agreements among some, but not all, member countries are managed by committees composed of the only members to those agreements. Lastly, informal meetings such as Heads of Delegations meetings are where member states meet and make compromises and agreements. Informal meetings are often where breakthroughs and compromises are made in trade agreements.
Dispute Resolution
Similar to the original GATT of 1947, the WTO also faces issues with dispute resolution. Currently, there is a crisis with the Appellate Body, as there are not enough members remaining on the body to reach quorum. Without enough members to reach quorum, they are not legally allowed to deliberate on issues. Appellate Body member terms end, and the US has consistently blocked attempts to fill the vacant seats. The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have all blocked recent appointments to the body. The US objects to the operations of the Appellate Body for three reasons:
The US claims that the Appellate Body is engaging in judicial activism by often going beyond resolving a singular dispute. Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which governs the activities of the Appellate Body states, “recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” The Appellate Body is allegedly doing this by clarifying and interpreting provisions found in general WTO agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
The US claims that the Appellate Body creates “binding” precedent that oversteps its role and once again steers into the area of “making law.” The Appellate Body has a system of “persuasive” precedent rather than binding precedent which means that previous reports may be relevant in similar cases, but the Appellate Body is not legally bound to consider previous reports. In a system of binding precedent, the judicial body would be legally obligated to consider a previous report in deciding a current case. The US views this usage of precedent as affecting the rights of member states without the member states themselves able to participate due to precedent.
The US has concerns with case backlog in the Appellate Body as Rule 15 states that former members of the Appellate Body may remain as a member to finish working on an appeal, but this sometimes leads to a delay in issuing a report on an issue longer than 60 days which is forbidden by Article 17.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The US argues that to avoid this, members should rather take no new cases during this time.
Other Controversies
Members of both the Republican and Democratic parties have threatened to withdraw from the WTO over the key issues of China’s trade policy, globalization, and a rapidly changing global economy. Critics of the WTO point out that the Chinese government’s increasing involvement in their economy is creating unfair competition for other WTO members. China uses state subsidies to gain a competitive advantage in multiple industries such as steel and aluminum. Many feel that the WTO has been too slow to address China’s rule violations, as well as regulate and adjust to new global economic trends and markets such as ecommerce. Lastly, many attribute problems caused by globalization to the WTO, such as the loss of manufacturing jobs in the US to overseas manufacturers.
Mexico shares 3,155 kilometers of border with the United States and serves as one of the United States’ most important trading partners. The two countries have shared strategic interests relating to the economy, migration, counternarcotics, and anti-crime policies. Although their relationship has been rocky, it has proven to be crucial to the functioning of both countries.
The 1910 Mexican Revolution was the next challenge in the relationship. The United States was concerned that the revolution would inspire uprisings in the large Mexican population within its borders, and President Wilson placed an embargo on the country and sent the Marine Corps into a crucial port city.
Migration: Mexico remains the largest country of origin of migrants in the United States, driven by high immigration in the 90s and early 2000s. Asylum requests at the U.S.-Mexican border have “doubled each year since 2015, reaching 70,300 in 2019” however asylum seekers are primarily from other Central American countries who transit through Mexico. Under the Trump Administration, immigration policies were characterized by America First Policies, prioritizing security at the border and decreasing immigration numbers through initiatives such as the “Zero-Tolerance Policy” and the Stay In Mexico Policy. Protecting the rights of Mexicans residing within the United States, including undocumented individuals, continues to be one of the top priorities of the Mexican government. Many Mexican border cities have been sheltering tens of thousands of migrants since 2019. The Biden Administration reversed many of these policies, but the future of many Mexican immigrants in the United States remains in question. Drug Trafficking: Mexican drug trafficking organizations are “the greatest criminal threat” to the United States. Drug-trafficking groups import and distribute cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine in the United States. The 2007 Merida Initiative provides aid to the Mexican government to combat organized crime and drug trafficking. Since the implementation of the Merida Initiative, the United States has allocated nearly $3 billion in security and counternarcotics assistance. Despite the implementation of numerous initiatives to fight crime and drug-trafficking, the Merida Initiative has thus far proven to be ineffective in improving security in Mexico because it escalated violence and did not address systemic corruption.
The Belt and Road Initiative is a large-scale infrastructure and economic development project that was launched by China in 2013. Xi Jinping, China’s new president, initially coined the name “One Belt, One Road,” but recently the official translation became “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). The BRI includes two parts, the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” which is meant to encompass much of Central Asia by way of highways, railroads, and economic interconnectivity; and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” which is meant to develop ports and free trade around the Indian Ocean. China’s vision for the completed BRI is a vast network of railways, highways, and ports open to trade—largely built and funded by Chinese companies—that would support economic development and integration across the dynamic Central Asian region. Such a network would also vastly increase the international usage of China’s currency, the Renminbi (RMB).
China has defined five priorities for the project: policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and connected populations. Beyond these stated goals, China also has many deeper motivations to complete the project. The western regions of China, in particular Xinjiang, remain largely undeveloped and have been sources of popular and occasionally violent separatist movements. China hopes that the BRI will improve infrastructure and economic development in these regions. China has also been plagued in recent years by a production surplus that has harmed Chinese companies’ profits. By exporting its infrastructure and technological capabilities via the BRI, China hopes to create a profitable market for its excess production. Another key goal of the BRI is securing its access to energy resources—the country relies heavily on imports from the Middle East. An important part of the BRI is investments in pipelines and energy flows that, critically, the US Military cannot interfere with.
To date, though the project is still in its early stages, the BRI has more than 60 participant countries, and several more have participated in the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Thus far, the largest BRI-affiliated project is the China-Pakistan Economic corridor, a network of projects designed to link China to Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian sea. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has already cost an estimated $60 billion, and analysts estimate that by 2027 the total expenditure for BRI projects could total $1.3 trillion. However, since around 2018, investments in BRI projects have slowed somewhat amid international criticism and with Chinese officials prioritizing more “solid” investments.
Critics of the initiative have pointed out the dangers in allowing China-led development in a dynamic, high-growth region. Among the largest concerns is China’s “debt-trap diplomacy,” wherein countries and potentially corrupt leaders sign on to predatory loans for infrastructure development, and are later forced to pay with resources, territory, or other economic privileges. Other criticisms leveled against the projects have been their opaque bidding processes and apparently preferential treatment given to Chinese firms. In Malaysia in 2018, the newly elected Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad cancelled $22 billion worth of BRI projects, criticizing both the projects’ costs and the corrupt business practices of his predecessor. Other countries, including Kazakhstan and Kenya, have taken a more cautious approach to BRI projects. However, overall debt to China among BRI countries has soared since 2013, approaching nearly 20% of GDP in some countries.
The U.S. established diplomatic relations with Honduras as early as 1853; however, it was not until the 1980s that Honduras became a critical ally for U.S. policy in Central America. Honduras was encircled by two countries swept by civil wars. Nicaragua, Honduras’ southern neighbor, entered into a violent revolution between the revolutionary Sandinistas and the dictator Antonio Somoza. Similarly, in the southwest, El Salvador experienced clashes between the revolutionary Martí Front for National Liberation, also known as Frente Martí para la Liberación Nacional in Spanish(FMLN), and the U.S.-backed government. As Roberto Suazo Córdova, an outspoken anticommunist, assumed the Honduran presidency, the country became a strategic ally for U.S. policy in Central America. It was in Honduras’ territory where the U.S. trained “the Contra” forces (guerilla fighters), who attempted to oust the left-wing Sandinista government, as well as Salvadoran forces in their effort to dissolve the FMLN insurgency. In 1983, the U.S. military unit known as the Joint Task Force Bravo settled in Honduras, which played a critical role for U.S. counterinsurgency activity during the Cold War. Eventually, this model of military coordination was interrupted in the late 1980s, when Costa Rica mediated peace talks that aimed to quell the armed conflict in Central America by restricting Contra activity and reducing U.S. presence in Honduras.
Since the onset of the twenty-first century, the U.S. has pursued ambitious efforts to promote stability in Honduras, hoping to prevent migration. Honduras was one of the first countries to join the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which provided the government with $215 million in aid to support economic development. A year later, Honduras entered the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Both of these initiatives were designed and funded by the U.S. government as part of a strategy to address migration by promoting economic development and stability.
Drug-trafficking: Honduras is a major transit country for illicit drugs. In 2016, roughly 53% of South American cocaine bound for the U.S. was shipped through Honduras. Honduras has willingly cooperated with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the establishment of anti-narcotic units and has supported aerial interdictions conducted by the U.S. Additionally, since Honduras signed an extradition agreement with the U.S., the Department of Justice has brought at least 25 Honduran narco-traffickers to justice, including President Hernández’s brother, who was accused of “state-sponsored drug trafficking” for allegedly working with Mexican, Colombian, and Honduran cartels.
Military cooperation: Today, the Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras remains crucial for U.S. intelligence operations in Central America. It is comprised of 500 U.S. military officers and more than 500 American and Honduran civilians. Current operations focus primarily on disrupting drug trafficking, preventing gang violence, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and monitoring military operations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
Security: USAID has designed local programs that focus on crime prevention. According to recent assessments, communities where USAID implemented these programs reported 43% fewer murders.
The United States first established diplomatic relations with El Salvador in 1963. In 1979, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (abbreviated as FMLN according to its Spanish name) emerged as a prominent guerrilla organization and entered a twelve-year long conflict with the government of El Salvador. During the 1980s, the U.S. government spent 4 billion dollars in military aid, funding the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency campaign against the FMLN. The U.S. also trained the Salvadoran military and provided weapons for the war effort.
In similar fashion to the case of Guatemala, it became increasingly clear to the U.S. public that the Salvadoran government was engaging in egregious human rights violations. The most emblematic case was the assassination of four American nuns at the hands of Salvadoran forces. In 1992, the U.S. supported a U.N.-mediated peace treaty, which ended the hostilities between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN; the latter became a political party that still exists today. It is estimated that the civil war led to 75,000 casualties, most of whom were civilians.
Many Salvadorans, overwhelmingly single males, fled the civil war and emigrated to Mexico and the U.S. in the 1980s. Many formed their own criminal organizations in southern California, such as the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 gangs. Years later, the U.S. government deported them, unknowingly expanding these criminal webs to the Northern Triangle. This, coupled with El Salvador’s war-torn economy and poor governance, bred unprecedented violence and crime. These conditions accelerated the migration of Salvadorans to the U.S.; consequently, at least 20% of El Salvador’s population lives abroad.
After decades of military rule and civil conflict, El Salvador managed to establish a relatively stable multi-party democracy. Despite recurring tensions, the U.S. worked with two consecutive FMLN administrations; however, many challenges persist. In 2015, El Salvador recorded a high rate of 105 murders per 100,000 people, the highest in the world at the time. These staggering levels of violence, which continue to prompt millions to migrate to the U.S. every year, have been a main concern for U.S. policy-makers. From 2013 to 2018, the U.S. allocated $496 million dollars to support El Salvador’s security, economic development, and governance. One of the primary goals of U.S. aid is to address the push factors that encourage Salvadorans to migrate north. Besides implementing development projects through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. government has invested in combating poverty and stimulating growth with the Millenium Challenge Corporation, which amounts to $277 million dollars.
Trade: The United States is El Salvador’s main trading partner. El Salvador was the first country to sign the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). In 2019, the United States amassed an $889 million trade surplus with El Salvador.
Migration: Migration has been at the forefront of U.S. relations with El Salvador. As of 2017, some 1.4 million Salvadoran citizens lived in the United States, and roughly half of them were undocumented. In addition, the Temporary Protected Status for Salvadorans is part of the current debate on immigration reform.
Combating Drug-trafficking: Similar to Guatemala, El Salvador is a strategic passage used by narco-traffickers to trade narcotics. In 2019, former President Trump designated El Salvador as a “major drug-transit” country for the ninth consecutive year.
According to the Department of State, relations between Guatemala and the U.S. have been close, but are occasionally strained by human rights and military issues. The United States established diplomatic relations with Guatemala in 1849, after the latter gained its independence from Spain and seceded from the Central American Federation. In 1954, Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz put forward a comprehensive land reform, expropriating a portion of the land owned by the American United Fruit Company. Having close family ties to United Fruit, Allen Dulles, the Head of the CIA, and John Dulles, the then-Secretary of State, devised a plan to destabilize Arbenz’s government, which the Eisenhower administration believed to be a communist influence in the region and, consequently, carried out a successful coup.
In the 1960s and onwards, rebel activity against the Guatemalan government initiated a thirty-six-year long civil war. The insurgents were inspired by the success of Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba. During the Guatemalan civil war, the U.S. provided military aid and training to the Guatemalan government as it executed a counterinsurgency campaign against the rebels. American military and financial support for anti-communist regimes and proxy wars became more common in Central America as U.S. policy-makers became increasingly concerned with what they perceived as Soviet influence in Latin America. In 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter suspended aid to the Guatemalan government because of its alleged role in human rights violations. Congress became more restrictive with aid, requesting human rights improvements from recipient countries. However, in 1982, President Ronald Reagan decided to continue the transfer of military aid to Guatemala.
In 1993, the United Nations sponsored a truth commission to put an end to the strenuous conflict, but the war left endless devastation. The commission found that the army was responsible for the majority of the human rights abuses, and that indigenous peoples had suffered the most. Historic peace accords were signed in 1996, finally ending the decades-long conflict. Nevertheless, the war-torn Guatemalan economy, coupled with the legacy of violence, pushed many to migrate to the U.S. seeking security and economic opportunities. By 2010, Guatemalans were the 10th largest foreign-born population in the US., and, in 2017, the number of Guatemalans in the U.S. surpassed 1.4 million.
In recent years, U.S. policy towards Guatemala has focused on curbing migration through development aid, economic integration, and anti-corruption initiatives. Since 2001, the U.S. government has provided $2.6 billion in foreign aid to Guatemala, which has been used to fund development and crime prevention projects implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Inter-American Development Bank. The U.S. has opted for economic integration as a strategy to promote economic growth in Guatemala. In 2006, Guatemala joined the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), exponentially strengthening the economic links between the two nations. In terms of governance, the U.S. was a critical supporter of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) (discussed below). Yet, the past two administrations have been involved in corruption scandals and mismanagement, which has undermined the U.S.-funded development programs. Guatemala’s current president, Alejandro Giamattei, has been embroiled in several corruption scandals. He was himself imprisoned as a result of a CICIG investigation into extrajudicial killings. In addition, Giammattei’s approval of budget cuts for healthcare and education fueled violent demonstrations just a few days after the hurricanes Eta and Iota hit the country in December of 2020.
Migration management: Approximately 1.5 million people living in the U.S. claim Guatemalan ethnicity. The migration of Guatemalans to the U.S. accelerated during the civil war and continued in the 2000s fueled by lack of economic opportunity, natural disasters, and family reunification. Guatemalans, unlike their neighbors in El Salvador and Honduras, have not been granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS). In response to the 2014 record surges in immigration from Guatemala and the rest of Northern Triangle countries, the U.S. began to fund ambitious development projects that aimed to reduce emigration to the U.S. During his administration, President Donald Trump prioritized security over the United States’ traditional development agenda by pressuring the Guatemalan government to deter Guatemalans from migrating to the U.S. and to accept repatriation flights. The current American Vice President, Kamala Harris, visited Guatemala this past June, promising to combat corruption in order to tackle migration and told Guatemalans publicly not to come to the U.S.
Anti-corruption and governance: Since 2001, the U.S. has worked to support Guatemala’s post-conflict democracy. The U.S. was a key sponsor of the U.N.-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), providing crucial diplomatic and financial support ($44 million) to this initiative since its inception in 2007. This anti-corruption commission was highly successful, contributing to the conviction of several high-ranking officials, including former President and dictator Efraín Ríos Montt for the crime of genocide commmitted against the Mayan peoples during the civil war. Guatemala became the first country to ever convict a former leader of genocide. The CICIG also brought corruption charges against former President Jimmy Morales, who responded with attempts to curtail the corruption investigations multiple times. The CICIG operated for twelve years until its collapse in 2019, when the Trump administration withdrew U.S. support in exchange for tougher migration restrictions, and Jimmy Morales refused to renew the commission’s mandate.
Human rights: The U.S. and U.N.-backed CICIG investigated human rights violations that took place during the civil war, including sexual violence committed by the military. The commission also revealed that the military was involved in multiple disappearances during the armed conflict. More recently, U.S. embassy officials have voiced concerns about the Guatemalan government’s refusal to work with specific sectors of civil society, in particular human rights activists, protectors of human trafficking victims, and advocates for the LGBTQ+ community and the indigenous peoples of Guatemala. In 2018 alone, over 200 attacks against human rights defenders were reported.
In 1993, two years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia adopted a new Constitution which outlined a separation of powers between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The legislative branch is the Federal Assembly, which consists of the State Duma and the Federation Council. The judicial branch has a multi-leveled court system and the executive branch is centered around the office of the President. In theory, this constitution allows for multiparty democracy, yet some experts believe that under the administration of President Vladimir Putin, a “managed democracy” has emerged. A “managed democracy” refers to a system where one “party of power” supports the state’s agenda and smaller, state-approved opposition parties work to divide true opposition.
Scholars have noted that Russia does not have a strong political party system, as seen in Western-style democratic systems such as the United States.The political spectrum in Russia differs from the political spectrum that defines the American political party system. Though there are a plethora of distinct Russian political ideologies, most embrace beliefs most akin to an American’s notion of social conservatism in regards to socio-cultural issues, valuing tradition and the traditional Russian sphere of influence. However, key differences emerge between the parties in regards to economic policy, with the economic left supporting collectivism and a return to Soviet-era renationalization of private industry, and the economic right advocating for a free market. Due to Russia’s long cultural and political history of autocracy, many modern Russian political parties tend to favor a more authoritarian government. Figure 1 illustrates the political leanings of the major political parties discussed in this brief.
Figure 1. Political Typologies of Major Russian Political Parties
United Russia
The “party of power” in Russia is United Russia (UR), which was founded in early 2000 after a merger of the Unity, Fatherland, and All Russia parties. It is the largest political party in the Russian Federation, holding 324 seats out of the 450 seats in the State Duma. The party’s leader is Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s former President and the Prime Minister under Putin’s third term as president. United Russia has been referred to as a “big tent party” because it lacks a singular, cohesive party ideology and favors backing specific individuals. It often has ideological leniency when developing and implementing new policies. However, the party’s actions whilst in power suggest it supports economic liberalism, strong state regulation, and Russian conservatism. Furthermore, United Russia has supported legislation expanding public assistance and social programs that include efforts to improve educational opportunities and stimulate the labor market, which reflects the party’s official goals. Party support has been on the decline in recent years, forcing Putin to bring favored politicians into party leadership.
Communist Party of the Russian Federation
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is the far-left successor of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the second largest party. It favors strong state power and collectivism but often agrees with United Russia on social issues, such as the controversial “anti-gay propaganda bill”. Though the party acts as an institutional opposition to United Russia, it still often approves pro-Kremlin legislation. The party’s leader, Gennady Zyuganov, has run for president four times, campaigning chiefly on nostalgia for the Soviet Union, with the CPRF party platform urging for a reversal of the economic liberalization policies instituted following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many argue that Zyuganov can be considered a Russian nationalist due to his frequent attacks against the West and support of the 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) is a far-right political party that opposes both economic liberalization and the Socialist economic policies of the Soviet Union, opting instead to support Russian ethnic nationalism. Though purportedly an oppositional party to United Russia, the LDPR often supports the actions of United Russia, while at the same time calling for more radical action. Its leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is perhaps best known for his brash and nationalistic rhetoric, often campaigning on outlandish promises, most often anti-West, racist, and completely unfeasible, including calling for the annexation of Alaska, the expelling of all Chinese immigrants from Russia’s Far Eastern territories, and the dissolution of all Russian political parties in favor of the establishment of a hereditary monarchy. Zhirinovsky remains a popular politician in the contemporary Russian political system, with LDPR often performing second or third best in nation-wide elections.
A Just Russia
A Just Russia, known also as simply Just Russia, was founded in 2006 as a result of the merger between the Russian Party of Life, Rodina, and the Russian Pensioners Party. The party is center-left and supports socialism, considering itself an alternative to the more radical CPRF. Just Russia acts as another institutional opposition party because it competes against United Russia in elections. However, elected members of Just Russia often support the actions of Putin’s administration, and the party leader, Sergey Mironov, is a long-time ally of Putin. Mironov has advocated for the expansion of social programs, tax reform, increased investment in infrastructure, and protecting Russian interests abroad. While Just Russia is the most moderate of the established Russian political parties, Mironov and other party leaders have vehemently rejected climate change. Recently, Just Russia has announced its plans to merge with “For Truth” and “Patriots of Russia”, creating uncertainty in the future of the faction as the parties vary in their respective positions on domestic policy.
Russia of the Future
Russia of the Future, also referred to as Navalny’s Party, strongly opposes Putin’s regime. It advocates for liberal reforms and the decentralization of Russian state power, with party support lying chiefly with younger demographics in the urban centers of St. Petersburg and Moscow. It has not been recognized by the Ministry of Justice as an official political party, due to opposition from the Putin Administration and the party’s purported inability to meet the 5% national threshold of support required. The face of Russia of the Future and its movement, Alexei Navalny, had attempted to run for President but was controversially disqualified from the presidential elections in 2018. He was charged with embezzling several hundred thousand dollars from a lumber company. Navalny has a history of involvement in xenophobic and nationalist circles that have spurred a debate on whether he should considered a liberal or a nationalist. Nevertheless, he is a symbol of opposition and an anti-corruption activist to foreign observers. Prior to his political involvement Navalny founded (FBK), a non-profit committed to exposing corruption amongst key Russian politicians. Recently, Russian courts have recognized FBK as an extremist group, and lawmakers have proposed what has been dubbed as an “anti-FBK law”.
In August of 2020, Navalny allegedly suffered an assassination attempt with orchestrated by the Kremlin and its security services. However, Putin denies these allegations and blames the US for spreading this narrative. Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service asserted that Navalny violated his parole while abroad and receiving medical treatment, claiming Navalny had failed to routinely report to his parole officer at the available Russian consulates, granting them grounds to file a motion for his arrest on his subsequent return to Russia. In early 2021, upon landing in Moscow, Navalny was imprisoned for parole violations connected with his previous charges of embezzlement, motivating a series of internationally-covered protests by his supporters.
Significance
The inter-party actions that define the internal politics of the Russian Federation carry serious implications for how the country interacts with other nations, particularly those in the Western world. Understanding Russia’s political party relations allows for greater insight into how the government determines its domestic and foreign policies, particularly as it pertains to its relationship with the United States.
The “Northern Triangle” compromises the three Central American nations of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Despite their small size, these countries have played an outsized role in U.S. foreign and domestic politics due to their strategic location in the Western Hemisphere. It is estimated that the U.S. has directly or indirectly intervened in Central America nineteen times between 1898 and 1994. Traditionally, the U.S. has had a military presence in the Northern Triangle, particularly during the Cold War, as Washington supported counterinsurgency campaigns in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
In recent years, American involvement in the region has shifted to encompass a wider range of interests such as protecting trade, promoting human rights and economic growth, reducing emigration, combating drug-trafficking and corruption, and containing Chinese influence in the region. As a result, the U.S. has a uniquely intertwined relationship with the Northern Triangle, to the extent that the economic and political conditions in the U.S. have a major impact on the region and vice versa. Increasingly, emigration is shaping this relationship, as Central Americans escape violence and poverty. With more than 3.5 million Central Americans living in the U.S., the Northern Triangle economies heavily rely on remittances from abroad. They make up 21% of the region’s economic output. In addition, the number of Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans who migrate to the U.S. has averaged 311,000 annually in recent years. The recent—and unprecedented—number of Central Americans seeking asylum in the U.S. attests to the reciprocal relationship these countries have, and this interconnectedness will likely intensify in the upcoming years.
The most recent U.S. approach to migration from the Northern Triangle has been a combination of changes in immigration law combined with conditional development aid. The Trump administration placed an emphasis on reducing migration. After a spike in the number of migrants and asylum-seekers, President Trump demanded that the governments of northern Central America deter its citizens from embarking upon their journey to the U.S. and signed “Third Safe Country” agreements that obliged these countries to receive U.S. deportees. He also dramatically reduced aid to the region. Although the Biden administration has rescinded the asylum agreements, it has upheld this deterrence approach while increasing investment to “address the root causes of migration.” President Biden recently approved a $4 billion plan to reduce migration by combating corruption and drug-trafficking and implementing development projects.
