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Category: ACE Research

  • The Vienna Talks: Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal

    The Vienna Talks: Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal

    Background

    As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden pledged to reenter the Iran nuclear deal that the Obama administration brokered in 2015. The deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), offered international sanctions relief in exchange for limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, which the Iranian government insists is for peaceful purposes. In 2018, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and implemented  a “maximum pressure” campaign consisting of harsher sanctions, new designations of terrorist organizations, and travel restrictions, among other measures. In response, Iran committed significant breaches of the JCPOA including enriching uranium to higher concentrations, exceeding uranium stockpile limits, developing advanced centrifuges, and restricting international monitoring. 

    In an op-ed written in September 2020, President Biden expressed his desire to “strengthen and expand” the deal to include provisions addressing Iran’s regional activities and ballistic missile program, among other concerns expressed by critics of the original deal. A month into his presidency, Biden made three preliminary moves to jump-start negotiations with Iran. First, the U.S. accepted an invitation from the EU to attend a meeting with the other JCPOA signatories, the P5+1–Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany–and Iran to discuss a path forward. The Biden administration also reversed former President Trump’s decision to reinvoke all United Nations sanctions when Iran initially violated the terms of the agreement (known as “snapback sanction”). Finally, Biden removed travel restrictions on Iranian diplomats based at the United Nations in New York. Despite such overtures, Tehran rejected the invitation to meet and diplomacy initially stalled over disagreements about which country should make the next move. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif refused to engage directly with the U.S. until Biden agreed to lift all sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. However, after weeks of discreet negotiations, Tehran committed to indirect talks with the P5+1. 

    “On the Right Track” 

    The first round of negotiations began in Vienna on April 6, 2021. European envoys acted as intermediaries, shuttling between the Iranian and U.S. delegations. In initial meetings, the Joint Commission formed two expert working groups: one charting Washington’s timetable for lifting sanctions, the other discussing Iran’s plan for reversing nuclear breaches inconsistent with JCPOA guidelines. At the third round of talks, another working group formed to address the sequencing of measures necessary to bring the U.S. and Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA. Enrique Mora, the EU coordinator for the talks, reported  “good progress,” a phrase echoed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov. However, after the sixth round of talks concluded on June 20, 2021, negotiations reached an impasse. 

    Challenges 

    Two events aroused suspicion during the talks, although it is unclear to what extent these events impacted negotiations. After the first round of talks in Vienna, an explosion hit Natanz, Iran’s key uranium enrichment facility. Iran blamed the act of “nuclear terrorism” on Israel, and in retaliation, increased its uranium encirchment level from 20 to 60%, a step closer to weapons-grade (90%). Although some JCPOA signatories expressed “grave concern” about Iran’s enrichment activities, Foreign Minister Zarif emphasized that Iran “will not allow this act of sabotage to affect the nuclear talks.” Shortly after the explosion at Natanz, a taped interview with Zarif was leaked to the press. In the recording, Zarif, who helped negotiate the original deal in 2015, alleged that Russian officials conspired with Iranian General Suleimani to sabotage the JCPOA before it was brokered in 2015, suggesting that Moscow sought to prevent Tehran from normalizing relations with the West. Iran’s Foreign Ministry characterized the leak as “illegal” and the Russian Foreign Ministry refused requests for comments. Despite skepticism from outside observers and JCPOA signatories, negotiations continued seemingly unaffected by the revelations, although the explosion in Natanz pressured the delegations to expedite the negotiation process.  

    Aside from external controversies, Iran’s domestic politics played a substantial role in delaying negotiations. Throughout the talks, Iran’s outgoing president Hassan Rouhani faced pressure from a hardline parliament hostile to the JCPOA.  Rouhani blamed a law passed by the Iranian parliament and Guardian Council in December 2020 for hindering diplomatic success. The law, which required the Atomic Energy Association of Iran to accelerate its nuclear development if certain sanctions were not lifted, raised concern from other JCPOA participants and cast doubt regarding Iran’s commitment to the deal. Additionally, some observers including Ali Raibee, a spokesperson for the Rouhani government, contended that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sought to postpone a final agreement until Iranian elections in June, which promised a hardline victory. After a controversial vote on June 18, the new hardline president Ebrahim Raisi requested time to consolidate a new government before continuing negotiations in Vienna. Raisi’s decision was no shock, as Zarif and other JCPOA signatories previously expressed a desire to reach an agreement before Raisi’s election. Since Raisi’s election, no date has been set to resume talks in Vienna.

    Future Prospects 

    Despite speculation, the Biden administration stated that the new Iranian government would not significantly alter Tehran’s negotiating position. However, President Raisi has held firm that regional and missile issues are “non-negotiable,” complicating Biden’s plan to open discussions related to these matters. Although the Biden administration and the other JCPOA signatories have confirmed their willingness to resume negotiations after Raisi forms a new government, White House officials have warned that the option will not remain open “indefinitely.” Aside from disagreements over the lifting of U.S. sanctions, members of the JCPOA are concerned that Tehran’s nuclear escalation resulting from the 2020 law has shortened Iran’s breakout window—the time it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb. If Iran’s recent nuclear developments are irreversible, the one-year breakout period envisioned in the 2015 accord may be null and JCPOA signatories may be less willing to restore the 2015 deal as it stands if the intended nonproliferation benefits are weakened. 

    Although the U.S. and its JCPOA partners have expressed a desire to resume talks in Vienna immediately, Iranian officials have requested bilateral meetings with EU officials in Brussels to find “practical solutions to the current deadlock in Vienna.” The Biden administration views this step as unnecessary and recently announced its willingness to explore a “Plan B” with Israel. The current path forward remains unclear, as questions regarding U.S. sanctions relief and Iran’s breakout time complicate the prospect of future diplomatic negotiations. Presently, Tehran is not ready to resume a seventh round of talks in Vienna, and the Biden administration’s current rhetoric indicates increasing impatience over the deadlock.

  • The LGBTQIA+ Community and the Criminal Justice System

    The LGBTQIA+ Community and the Criminal Justice System

    Brief Historical Overview

    During the early years of Colonial America, most states used death as a punishment for individuals who engaged in sodomy, known as a “crime against nature,”. In 1641, the first legal code in New England, the Body of Laws and Liberties, stated that “if any man lyeth with mankinde as he lyeth with a woman” then both of them should be put to death. Going against many of the other states, William Penn’s 1682 legal code in the Pennsylvania Quaker Colony became the first and only non-capital sodomy law, stating that any person convicted of sodomy was to be whipped, to forfeit a portion of their estate, and face imprisonment. However, this legal code did not last and, by 1693, all states deemed sodomy a capital offense. After the American Revolution and Pennsylvania’s reform, the 19th century found the penalty for sodomy reduced to hard labor and/or imprisonment. 

    Supreme Court Rulings

    During the 1900s, the LGBTQ+ community began to question the legality of laws and practices that targeted them. The 1958 Supreme Court case of One, Inc. v. Olesen reversed a circuit court ruling that found the publication of a magazine intended for a homosexual audience obscene and, therefore, not protected under the First Amendment. This case was the first time that the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling regarding homosexuality, ultimately finding that “speech in favor of homosexuals is not inherently obscene.”

    In 1962, the adoption of the Model Penal Code in Illinois decriminalized the federal crime of sodomy, removing consensual sodomy from law. The creation of this code, along with the Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. Wade that held that the 14th Amendment “protected citizens from the government intruding on their sexual privacy within their own homes,” inspired eighteen states to change their sodomy laws. Although many states decriminalized sodomy, the Supreme Court ruled in the 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick that “there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy,” allowing states to continue to target individuals for what they considered indecent acts.

    In 2003, the Supreme Court case of Lawrence v. Texas reversed the above ruling and held that “the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause.” Up until this year, same-sex marriage was not ruled upon federally, so there was a divide between states that allowed same-sex marriage and states that did not. However, the 2013 case of Windsor v. United States found section three of the “Defense of Marriage Act” (DOMA) unconstitutional, holding that the “federal government cannot discriminate against married lesbian and gay couples for the purposes of determining federal benefits and protections.”

    On June 26, 2015, the landmark ruling in Obergefell v Hodges held that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples.” 

    The LGBTQIA+ community within Policing & the Prison System

    On June 28, 1969, the New York City Police Deparment raided Stonewall Inn, a well-known gay club at the time. Before the incident that led to the Stonewall riots, the police were known to raid many gay bars, harrassing LGBTQ+ individuals for displaying public affection. Although sodomy laws and the criminalization/denial of same-sex relations have since been found unconstitutional, the United States still sees a disportotionate amount of individuals within the LGBTQ+ community incarcerated and arrested. 


    In the United States in 2019, LGBTQ+ youth represented 9.5% of the general youth population, but were overrepresented in the juvenile justice system, making up 20% of the entire system. This high rate of representation is continued into adulthood, where it was also found that members of the LGBTQ+ community are 2.25 times as likely to be arrested then their straight counterparts. While gay and bisexual men are 1.35 times as likely to be arrested compared to heterosexual men, bisexual women and lesbians are 4 times as likely be arrested compared to heterosexual women. These numbers may be representative of homeless LGBT youth, who were kicked out by their families, and the lack of safety the individuals may feel within their school system. Furthermore, certain policing practices, such as enforcement of prostitution laws, cause individuals of the LGBTQ+ community to be disproportionately targeted by law enforcement. 

    The LGBTQ+ are also overrepresented in the prison system. While 5.5% of men incarcerated identify as bisexual or gay, 33.3% of women identify as bisexual and lesbian. A study found that people of the LGBTQ+ community are more likely to be sentenced to longer periods of incarceration than straight individuals. Within their experiences in prison, many LGBTQ+ individuals claim to have been subjected to “inhumane” treatment, such as longer prison sentences than their heterosexual counterparts and the higher possibility of being put in solitary confinement. Furthermore, individuals who engage in same-sex activity, compared to heterosexuals inmates, are 10 times more likely to sexually victimized by their peers and 2.6 times as likely by prison staff. 


  • Intro to the Houthi Movement in Yemen

    Intro to the Houthi Movement in Yemen

    History of Conflict in Yemen

    Modern Yemen formed in 1990 through the unification of two regions: The Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. Soon after the union, a military officer, Ali Abdullah Saleh, became the country’s leader. Though Yemen is a majority-Sunni country, the north region is Shia-dominant, which poses religious tensions.

    The U.S. supported Saleh in the early 2000s in the fight against growing terrorist organizations in the country and region. The U.S. also lent support to the country during the chaos of the Arab Spring, when Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also became more active. The U.S. continued its involvement in Yemen when further political tensions emerged.

    In 2011, Saleh was ousted due to accusations of corruption, and former Vice President Abdrahbbuh Mansour Hadi took over. Hadi’s interim government is backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S., and the UN sees Hadi as Yemen’s rightful leader. However, Hadi’s leadership has been challenged by jihadists, a separatist movement in south Yemen, former government loyalists, and factors such as corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity.

    The Houthis saw an opportunity during the period of weak leadership, government transition, and many actors vying for power to attempt to gain military power in the north. The Houthis didn’t have faith in Hadi’s interim government and wanted to ensure their own security and take control of their homeland in northern Yemen. The Houthis also oppose Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for backing Hadi’s government. At the same time, Saleh allied with the Houthis against his former political ally, Hadi, and sought to regain the presidency. In 2015, the Houthis and Saleh loyalists ousted Hadi, and he fled to Saudi Arabia.

    The Houthis had initially opposed Saleh because he supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Despite this disagreement, the Houthis later allied with Saleh against Hadi’s UN-backed government. However, in 2017, Saleh withdrew his support from the Houthi coalition and was killed by Houthis. 

    Who are the Houthis?

    The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), is a group of Zaidi Muslim who were a sect of Shia Islam, and believed to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad’s family. Hussein al-Houthi formed Ansar Allah to revive the Zaidi Shia tradition and gain more power for the group in Yemen. Because Zaidi ancestors were seen as a threat by leaders of modern-day Yemen, they suffered discrimination. This caused the Houthis to question Yemeni government authority and demand more respect and control of their homeland.

    The Houthis challenged Saleh’s legitimacy by claiming he was a weak leader and was a puppet of the U.S. Because of their stance, the Houthis gained support from anti-Saleh Yemenis around the country. The Houthis wish to install an interim government friendlier to their goals of:

    • Maintaining regional autonomy
    • Respecting diversity
    • Strengthening a democratic state
    • Lowering fuel prices
    • Securing military control in the north
    • Controlling much of the country, specifically the oil-rich eastern region
    • Gaining political power and international recognition

    Gulf states and the U.S. view Hadi as Yemen’s rightful leader and view the Houthis as an insurgent group.

    Regional and International Impact

    In 2015, Saudi Arabia, other majority-Sunni Arab states, the United States, United Kingdom, and France feared a rise in Houthi support from Shia-majority Iran. In response, the Saudi-led coalition targeted Houthis in air strikes with the goal of stopping Houthi advances and returning Hadi to power. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the UAE pushed the Houthis and their allies out of southern Yemen and out of the city of Aden. This made way for Hadi to establish a temporary government in Aden. The government was unable to provide basic services and security to the city and surrounding areas, and Hadi himself was still primarily living in Saudi Arabia.

    In response, the Houthis have committed drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in recent years, including air strikes on Saudi Arabian oil fields that affected oil production in the country in September of 2019.

    In August 2019, the Saudi-backed Hadi forces and UAE-backed southern separatists clashed. The southern separatists took over Aden and demanded a power sharing deal with the Saudi-led coalition. The UN hoped this would lead to peace, but in January 2020, more conflict erupted between Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. In April of 2020, southern separatists broke a peace deal with the Saudi-led coalition and wanted to govern Aden and southern Yemen themselves.

    Internal conflict, divided political loyalty in southern Yemen, and divided military loyalty throughout the country all contribute to tensions in the region on religious, political, and geographical grounds. These tensions make countries vulnerable to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In Yemen, AQAP and a local branch of the Islamic State have capitalized on the instability and attempted to gain ground in the south. 

    Image 1

    The complexity of the internal conflict is deepened by international influence. With continued Sunni-Shia tensions in and between countries, we see Shia-majority Iran backing the Houthis (though Iran denies this) while Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States backing Hadi’s government. This proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia exacerbates the region’s worst issues of ineffective leadership, internal violence, and religious extremism.


    Image 2

    Yemen is strategically located on a strait that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, through which many of the world’s oil shipments pass. In addition the U.S. is interested in securing Saudi Arabia’s borders, having access to free travel for oil through the strait connecting the Arabian and Red Seas, and a Yemeni government that will effectively work with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

    U.S. President Biden’s Response

    U.S. President Biden seems to be a less staunch supporter of the Saudi-led coalition. Biden claims he wishes to end support for the coalition’s military involvement, including selling weapons to Hadi loyalists. Instead of the military approach, Biden plans to appoint a special envoy to Yemen to encourage cooperation through diplomacy. In addition, Biden reversed former President Trump’s categorization of the Houthi Movement as a terrorist organization as this designation threatens the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemenis.

    Future of Conflict in YemenPeace deals between warring groups with international allies on both sides have failed, meaning a stalemate for the conflict. A conflict which Saudi Arabian leadership thought would last a few weeks became years of suffering, tension, and conflict.

  • Homelessness Crisis in Boston’s South End Neighborhood

    Homelessness Crisis in Boston’s South End Neighborhood

    The area around Melnea Cass Boulevard and Massachusetts Avenue, two major roadways that unite Boston’s South End neighborhood with the neighborhood of Roxbury, is known by locals as a tent city. This area of Boston, nicknamed “Methadone Mile,” has long been known for open drug dealing, high levels of addiction, and a severe lack of clean water and proper hygiene.

    In October 2021, Boston’s acting mayor Kim Janey announced an executive order to combat the ongoing humanitarian crisis occurring between Mass and Cass. Though the area has been facing a public health crisis for years, the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated concerns. To keep the spread of disease at bay, Janey imposed the removal of tents, claiming that, “tents are not appropriate for housing…they lack clean water and hygiene facilities.” 

    According to Janey’s memo, if people repeatedly refuse to leave their tents, they may be charged with disorderly conduct. Additionally, if anyone were to pose a serious threat of harm to themselves or others, the Boston Police may petition to involuntarily commit them as a last resort. The prospect of rehabilitation rather than retribution is one that the City of Boston has not implored in their plan, nor in other involvement with the issue at large. 

    Removal of the tent city has been the only option explored by the City of Boston, but others have different suggestions. The South End-Roxbury Community Partnership, an advocacy group that opposes the forced removal of the tent city, have outlined a different plan for the city to take. Their plan starts with pushing Governor Baker to execute his executive power to intervene and treat the opioid crisis as a prevalent and pervasive Public Health Emergency across the state of Massachusetts. The partnership demands that the state create and fund homelessness and addiction services across Massachusetts as soon as possible while also immediately increasing sanitation access and public health services. The partnership also proposes that the Shattuck Hospital in Jamaica Plain, an adjacent neighborhood, be converted into a temporary emergency recovery center with new supportive housing. 

    Since Janey’s executive order in October, the city has elected a new mayor, Michelle Wu. Wu has indicated that the city will may explore other options in relation to the homeless community, specifically in the South End. On the issue, Wu feels that “…the urgent need for clean and safe streets can’t come at the expense of destabilizing treatment for those who need it & destroying property of those who have no home to store things, while just moving people on to somewhere else.” Wu’s plan is to have the area between Mass and Cass cleared out by rehoming affected individuals and connecting them to health services by January 12, 2022.

  • Value-Based Care

    Value-Based Care

    Value-based care is an overarching term for any healthcare delivery model in which payment is based on health outcomes, as opposed to the volume of services provided. The American healthcare system largely operates on a Fee-for-Service system. In this system, providers are paid based on the services they offer. Although this allows for a simpler billing process, and easier communication between providers and insurance organizations, it also has potentially problematic implications regarding the priorities of healthcare providers. Fee-for-Service reimbursement incentivizes billing for a large quantity of services, without taking into consideration the quality of the care or its associated health outcomes. The goal of value-based care is to reconcile the incentives provided by healthcare reimbursements with the overarching goals of healthcare promotion and disease prevention. As such, value-based care models often incentivize proven high-quality measures such as the use of preventive services, coordination of care, and an emphasis on patient satisfaction, with incentives linked to health outcomes rather than services rendered. 

    The Affordable Care Act, which was passed in 2010, opened the door for many mechanisms that promoted value-based care, and gave both payers and providers the necessary infrastructure to implement it. Some important mechanisms include the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), Bundled Payments, and Accountable Care Organizations.  

    MACRA

    The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), which was passed in January 2015, laid the groundwork for much of the value-based care infrastructure that we see today. MACRA established quality payment programs, which incentivize payers and providers to implement value-based reimbursement models. There are two types of quality payment programs:

    1. An alternative payment model (APMs) is any payment approach that creates incentive for clinicians to deliver high-quality and value care. Advanced APMs are specific types of APMs where this incentive is created by allowing providers to take on more risk. This means that providers take on greater responsibility for their patients’ health outcomes, but they also get the opportunity to share in savings associated with maintaining patient health. In doing so, patient care becomes centered around maintaining patient health rather than just rendering potentially unnecessary services. 
    2. Merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS) dictates how physicians receive reimbursements when treating Medicare patients. Incentives and penalties are built around a weighted average of performance measures, such as quality of care, clinical practice improvement practices, cost of delivery and resource use, and interoperability and meaningful use of electronic health records.

    Bundled Payment

    Bundled payments are an alternative payment model in which the total price for an episode of care is predetermined. An episode of care is the entire continuum of care associated with a specific condition’s treatment. For example, all of the services associated with a joint replacement, from the initial consultation to rehabilitation, would fall under one episode of care. In this model, providers assume additional risk, meaning that they incur a loss if patient care costs more than the initial price point, and make a profit if it costs less. The incentives of bundled payments are completely different from that of fee-for-service care, since providers must implement high-value clinical interventions to save money, rather than simply increase the volume of services they offer.

    Bundled payment models first became prominent after the implementation of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Bundled Payment for Care Initiative (BCPI); this came after the passage of the ACA. This program offered bundled payments for Medicare patients that underwent Acute, Post-Acute, and Prospective Acute care episodes. These initiatives proved effective in reducing the cost of care and incentivizing high value practices, such as preventive care and coordination of care. For example, the cost of joint replacement episodes decreased by 20.8% under the BCPI post-acute care bundle. Seeing the early success of BCPI, CMS and private payers are beginning to implement more bundled payment models, with 17% of healthcare payments having been done under bundled payment in 2021.

    Accountable Care Organizations

    Accountable care organizations are networks of physicians, clinicians, and larger healthcare systems, in which all parties share responsibility for quality, cost, and coordination of care. Providers in this system must coordinate with government agencies and community-based organizations to promote population health in their catchment area. ACOs operate in a shared savings model. This means that spending on specific patients is assigned a total cost of care (TCoC) benchmark based on factors like their pre-existing health conditions and historical spending; members of the ACO share in any savings when the cost of successful care falls under the TCoC. In order for members of the ACO to share in the savings, they need to meet 30 quality measures. As a result, ACOs help ensure the administration of high quality care, while also incentivizing preventive care through their shared savings model.

  • Introduction to United States and Dominican Republic Relations

    Introduction to United States and Dominican Republic Relations

    Fact Sheet

    History of US-DR Relations

    Christopher Columbus first set foot on the island of Hispaniola, which is now the D.R. and Haiti, in 1492. The island was colonized and split into two nations, Haiti in the west and the D.R. in the east, in 1697 by France and Spain, respectively. Haiti gained its independence from France in 1804, and conquered the Dominican Republic in 1822, ruling it for 22 years. In 1844, the Dominican Republic gained its independence from Haiti. In 1858, President Pedro Santana believed that re-annexing the D.R. to Spain would allow the country to thrive. This was a highly unpopular decision and the Dominicans revolted against Spain. From 1863 to 1865, the Dominican Restoration War took place against Spain, and the Dominicans retook the country.

    The United States and the Dominican Republic (D.R.) began an official diplomatic relationship in 1884. At this time, the United States was primarily interested in the Dominican Republic as a stable, democratic trading partner. 

    At this time the D.R.’s economy began to improve, but mainly through European loans, and the country accumulated a heavy debt burden which it was not able to pay back. The United States intervened on behalf of the D.R. because President Franklin D. Roosevelt was focused on maintaining influence in Latin America through the Roosevelt Corollary. He wanted to prevent European influence or occupation in Latin America due to the region’s proximity to the United States. He used what is now known as Big Stick Diplomacy – the idea that negotiating with countries and having a powerful, unspoken threat of military backing would keep European forces out of the region. Under this proposition, Roosevelt sent U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic and other Latin American and Caribbean countries, occupying the D.R. in 1916. This occupation was met with heavy criticism by the citizens of the Dominican Republic, leading the U.S. to leave in 1924.

    From 1930 to 1960, Rafael Trujillo ruled as the Domincan Republic’s dictator and military strongman. His 1961 assassination led to a tumultuous period of military coups and civil unrest. The U.S. became concerned that a communist regime would emerge on the island. In April 1965, the U.S. sent 22,000 troops to the Dominican Republic, leading to the 1965 Dominican Republic civil war.

    Since the end of the civil war, the Dominican Republic has been a relatively stable democracy and developed a stronger relationship with the United States. Although the nation still struggles with poverty and human rights violations, it has made steady progress and proved to be a strong ally of the U.S. in the region.

    U.S. Strategic Interests in the D.R.

    • Trade: The D.R. and U.S. recently signed the Dominican Republic Central America United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2007. This trade agreement encompasses many countries in the region, including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The goal under this agreement is to eradicate tariffs, allow trade to become more free and open, and give the countries more access to industrial and cultural products. When the agreement was signed in 2007, the D.R. exported 57.4% of its goods to the U.S. and imported 44.9% of its goods from theU.S.. Today, 53.8% of the Dominican Republic’s exports go to the U.S., while the 49.6% of D.R. imports come from the U.S.. The two countries’ proximity allows for cheap, efficient trade. 
    • Security and the War on Drugs: Under the Obama Administration in 2010, the U.S. and the D.R. signed the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The CBSI’s primary goal is to provide funding to Caribbean countries to curb illegal drug trafficking, facilitate citizen safety, and encourage local governments and law enforcement agencies to prevent crime. In June 2021, Congress passed the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act which approved $74.8 million USD to CBSI for each fiscal year between 2022 and 2026. The Dominican Republic is expected to get approximately 23% of that funding, which is the highest amount any country receives under this initiative. In past years, a significant portion of this funding has gone to officer training, public outreach, maritime responses, and other preventative measures within the Dominican Republic. 
  • President Biden’s 2022 Budget Explained

    President Biden’s 2022 Budget Explained

    Introduction

    This past May, President Biden released his proposed budget plan for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY2022). The budget differs from budget plans in previous years in several notable ways. Itt proposes a temporary 15.5% increase in spending on non-emergency, non-defense appropriations—also known as non-defense discretionary (NDD)—which includes a wide array of services such as:

    • Education 
    • Job training
    • Medical care for veterans (the largest program under NDD spending)
    • Scientific and medical research
    • Public health measures, particularly in the context of COVID-19
    • Treatment for substance abuse disorders
    • Housing and other assistance for families in need
    • National parks
    • Weather forecasting
    • The Coast Guard
    • International assistance
    • Air traffic control
    • Rural development 
    • Upgrades to wastewater and drinking water treatment

    This is a proposed increase in the NDD level excluding emergency funding distributed to address the pandemic, such as the American Rescue Plan Act enacted earlier this year. The FY2022 budget plan does not propose any further spending on emergency services. 

    This significant growth in NDD spending follows the recent expiration of the 2011 Budget Control Act, which capped the amounts spent on both NDD and Defense appropriations through FY2021. Due to the act’s stringent legal limits on the levels of both discretionary and non-discretionary spending, the only NDD category that saw an increase in appropriations through this decade was veteran’s medical care. Spending in this particular category was raised because of rising costs of healthcare and pre-existing shortcomings in the quality of healthcare available to veterans. More spending in veteran’s medical care led to tighter constraints for other NDD categories. The act caused 2021 NDD funding to be about 10% below what it was in 2011 once adjusted for inflation and population growth.

    Overall, Biden’s new plan, free from the limit imposed by the Budget Control Act, focuses on using federal funds to begin addressing the racial and wealth inequalities currently present in the U.S. His administration plans to do this through the American Families Plan which substantially increases funding to education, child care, and housing assistance. The budget aims to foster equity in elementary and secondary school education, increase financial aid for college students, strengthen the public health system, meet healthcare obligations to tribal nations, address mental health and substance abuse, and make housing assistance and legal services for low-income people more accessible.

    The budget also reflects significant reinvestment into critical institutions by increasing spending on federal research and development through the Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Health and Human Services. It also raises spending on environmental protection, reversing a decade of environmental funding cuts, particularly from President Trump’s presidency. It increased operating funds awarded to various agencies so that they could manage Social Security benefits, administer tax laws, and enforce laws that protect civil rights, labor standards, and workplace health and safety. 

    Effect on GDP and the Deficit

    The Biden Administration estimates debt will grow to 117%  of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by the end of FY2031. In nominal dollars, this means the current debt of $22 trillion would reach $39 trillion. The increase in debt is due to the higher projected spending percentage of GDP relative to the revenue percentage. At present, the budget plan’s spending is 24.5% of GDP, while revenue is 19.3% of GDP. The percentages are higher than the 50-year averages of 20.6% of GDP for spending and 17.3% of GDP for revenue. Federal deficits would also rise to nearly $1.6 trillion over the next decade. However, Biden’s administration has announced plans to finance this deficit by gradually raising taxes for corporations and individuals with incomes over $400,000. In addition, the administration will continue to allow tax cuts for low to middle income earners that were originally put in place by the Trump administration. 

    Skeptics of the sustainability of Biden’s budget plan also cite his administration’s own low predictions for GDP growth despite tremendous investments in the nation. After accounting for inflation, the administration predicts the economy will grow about 2% a year—equal to  the average rate of growth over the past 20 years. To this, Biden has said that current low interest rates and our unique position post-recession is the ideal time to invest in the nation. If his plan is approved, the government would be spending almost 25% of the U.S. output every year and would be collecting almost 20% of the total economy in tax revenue.  

    Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget and the Tax Foundation Analysis

    The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget is one such skeptic of the proposed budget plan. Their analysis concludes that the budget adds an unsustainable amount of debt over the next ten years while doing nothing to address high and rising debt in the long term. The Tax Foundation’s General Equilibrium Model echoes these concerns and further estimates that the budget plan will reduce GDP by 0.9%, and Gross National Product (GNP) by 1%, and also lead to 165,000 fewer jobs over time. Some of the primary contributors to these estimates are:

    • the increase in corporate income tax from 21% to 28%; 
    • the 15% minimum corporate book income tax—which places a 15% minimum tax on the adjusted financial incomes of large corporations; 
    • raising capital gains rates; 
    • the increasing pass-through business income taxes, which increases taxes for businesses that are not subject to corporate income taxes. 

    The foundation estimates that the fall in GDP caused by the higher corporate taxes will offset any increase in GDP that may result from improved infrastructure and investment. The GNP, which is often used as a measure of American household incomes, is also expected to fall because of increased taxes on savers. However, Biden’s intent to only increase taxes for individuals earning over $400,000 in income and instead expand refundable tax credit programs for low- and middle-income earners indicates this will primarily impact high-income earners and savers. The taxes proposed in the budget support this estimate, and indicate the budget will lead to a 15.9% increase in the after-tax income of the bottom 20% of income earners. The model used by the foundation uses

    1. A tax simulator to produce conventional revenue and distributional estimates, 
    2. A neoclassical production function to estimate capital stock and people’s responses to policy and how it impacts long-run output, 
    3. And a demand function to estimate people’s choices between labor and leisure as well as their choices between saving and consumption. 

    All together, the three components produce revenue estimates of tax policy and estimates how policy can impact GDP, wages, employment, and other indicators of economic performance. Similar to the Tax Foundation’s General Equilibrium model, the University of Pennsylvania’s Penn Wharton Budget Model looks more at the long-run effects up to 2050. This model predicts that the budget plan will result in a 7.3% decrease of public debt from what it is today. Overall, however, it estimates a 1.1% fall in GDP between now and 2050. 

    The Economic Policy Institute Analysis

    The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) offers an alternative analysis, stating that Biden’s budget plan would have a host of positive effects if spending proposals not funded by increased taxes could be financed with debt. Their analysis indicates that the budget would result in an unemployment rate of 4.1% or lower over the 10 year period, reduced inequality through higher corporate taxes and better distribution of the benefits of economic growth, and a historically low public debt burden. This impact on equity is more difficult to measure and often is not easily translated into economic measures of success, which the EPI takes into consideration with their analysis. They further state that the Federal Reserve is not able to recover from recessions as quickly or efficiently as policymakers believe. A factor in this observation is the almost zero interest rate, which means it wouldn’t be sustainable to cut interest rates further, and subsequently indicating that fiscal policy can and should be a key contributor to economic recovery. Particularly given that this budget increases government spending and progressive taxes, it has the potential to be expansionary. The potential comes from its plan to make the budget deficit-increasing in the short term and deficit-decreasing in the long term. In addition, the budget entails a large growth in capital income taxes, which can reduce commuting time and increase quality of education when redistributed, ultimately making the economic growth more equitable. Finally, the EPI asserts that using the ratio of public debt to GDP is not an effective measure of fiscal burden because it is entirely retrospective and it divides a static stock measure—debt in a snapshot of time—by an income flow (meaning GDP) . It provides information about past budget deficits and does not take current policy into account. Using this retrospective measure as an indicator of budget success does not show the impact on equity.    

    Conclusion

    Biden’s many goals coupled with the expiration of the 2011 Budget Control Act have resulted in unique deviances from past budget plans, including an increase in NDD spending relative to defense spending. His budget plan has also begun to center equity and reparations through education, public health, and housing assistance. However, the increase in funding required to further these goals have been called unsustainable by some and necessary by others.

  • The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant

    The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant

    With each passing year, the detrimental effects of climate change are becoming ever more apparent, especially in regions like the Levant. As conditions worsen, they lead to social and economic crises in countries throughout the Levant which have struggled to adapt. Ultimately, climate change threatens U.S. interests in the Levant because it exacerbates instability, heightens social and economic problems, and weakens states’ ability to implement an effective response. 

    Background 

    The Climate of the Levant Region 

    The Levant is a geographic region along the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean and includes Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, and Palestine. Located in a transitional climate zone between North-Atlantic-influenced climate systems and monsoonal-influenced climate systems, the region has an arid to semi-arid climate, meaning it receives relatively little precipitation. Despite this dry climate, the Levant has historically been known as the Fertile Crescent for its rich soil and relatively high access to water, which comes from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. 

    These factors have allowed for high agricultural output in the Levant, which has helped many civilizations flourish over thousands of years. Climate change threatens this agricultural productivity and the humans who depend on it. 

    Climate Change 

    Climate change refers to long-term shifts in regional or global climate and weather patterns. Though these changes can result from natural processes, today, climate change is primarily driven by human activity. The IPCC notes that there is strong evidence for anthropogenic drivers of climate change, meaning man-made drivers. These include the burning of fossil fuels and other human actions—such as deforestation, increased livestock farming, and the use of fluorinated gasses—that have caused the Earth to warm. Global warming refers to the overall heating of the Earth due to the greenhouse effect, which occurs when greenhouse gasses, such as carbon dioxide, trap heat from the Sun in the Earth’s atmosphere. 

    Since the Industrial Revolution, humans have exponentially increased the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to the extent that the Earth is warming at an unprecedented and accelerated rate. As the Earth’s temperature increases on a global level, regional climate systems are affected differently, meaning the climate is changing rather than simply warming.

    Man-made global climate change is having and will continue to have many harmful effects. These include sea level rise; more frequent and extreme natural disasters; biodiversity loss; longer, hotter heatwaves and droughts; and changes in precipitation patterns, among others. As the Earth warms, these effects will exacerbate existing economic, social, and political problems. For this reason, climate change is widely considered a threat multiplier—it increases political instability and social upheaval and therefore poses a security risk to humans and governments around the world. 

    The Physical Effects of Climate Change in the Levant 

    In the Levant, the worst effects of climate change include longer and more severe droughts, desertification, hotter temperatures, decreased rainfall, and more frequent dust storms. These effects are occurring simultaneously today and will only get worse in the future. 

    • Drought: According to a NASA study 1998-2012, the Levant region experienced its most severe drought of the past 900 years. During this recent drought, the Levant was 50% drier than at any other point in the past 500 years and 10-20% drier than the driest period during the last nine centuries. Because of climate change, droughts in the Levant and elsewhere globally are expected to be more intense, last longer, and set in quicker. 
    • Desertification: The Levant’s dryland ecosystem is extremely susceptible to overexploitation and improper land use. These practices contribute to the region’s desertification—land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas caused by human activities and climatic variations. This process causes reduced crop and livestock productivity, changes in the composition of plant species, and reduced biological diversity. Thus, in the Levant, it will cause a reduction in the amount of land suitable for agriculture. 
    • Hotter Temperatures and Worse Heatwaves: Because of climate change, the Levant is expected to experience both increased average temperatures and more intense and longer heatwaves. Climate models predict that temperatures in the Levant will continue to rise, and the region will become increasingly hotter and drier. These climate change effects are already visible throughout the region as countries experience record-breaking heat. When combined with high humidity, extreme heat poses health risks, especially to the elderly and children. 
    • Decreased Rainfall and Changing Patterns: Climate change is projected to decrease the average amount of rainfall in the Levant, a region that already does not receive much precipitation. This effect not only poses a problem for regional agriculture, which often relies on rainfall but is also connected to the other environmental problems the region faces. In the past, the Levant’s climate has been characterized by dry summers and more temperate, rainy winters. However, as the climate changes, rainfall patterns are shifting, which has meant drier winters. This shift in rainfall patterns, likely due to an atmospheric shift bringing drier air to the region, is important because rain-fed farming systems like many in the region are especially vulnerable to changes in rainfall patterns. 
    • Sand and Dust Storms: Another major climate-related concern for the Levant is the increase and worsening of dust storms. These storms are remarkable for their intensity and the large size of their dust particles. The particles from the massive sandstorm that occurred in the region in September 2015 were bigger than any that had been recorded since 1995. The sandstorm created a thick layer of dust spanning Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Cyprus. Dust storms cause significant air pollution, which is a hazard for people’s health in itself, and these storms also increase aircraft and traffic accidents. 

    Government Mismanagement in the Levant 

    While climate change has caused or exacerbated these physical effects, related issues have contributed to the problems the region faces today. Namely, pollution and other consequences of government mismanagement have further worsened environmental and living conditions in the region. Poor governance and corruption make people in the Levant less able to feel relief from extreme heat and other climate change effects, as citizens face water and electricity shortages when they need these resources the most. In other words, there is less water now, and of what water there is, the public cannot access it. 

    The Effects of Climate Change on Humanity in the Levant 

    Between the intensifying impacts of climate change and inadequate government responses to these effects, the people living in the Levant face worsening living conditions due to a number of climate-related problems. These include water scarcity, food insecurity, climate migration, more disease, worsening economic conditions, and social strife. 

    • Water Scarcity: Due to climate change and its drying effects on the Levant region, freshwater resources have become more scarce, in both quantity and quality. Additionally, pollution and the salinization—increased salt concentration in water—of rivers and other water sources worsen water quality. An increasing number of people in the region are facing a lack of access to clean water, which is a public health concern as well. The effects of climate change, such as increased rainfall, flooding, and droughts, can often degrade water quality even as population growth increases its demand. As clean water becomes increasingly inaccessible, the risk of water-borne illnesses like cholera goes up as people are forced to consume contaminated water. For instance, contaminated water in Gaza leaves people more vulnerable to illnesses and infections, including cholera, Salmonella, diarrhea, polio, and viral meningitis. 
    • Food Insecurity: As temperatures continue to rise, water supplies continue to fall, and environment degradation worsens, food insecurity is likely to increase throughout the Levant. Agriculture productivity has and will continue to decrease because of droughts, desertification, and dust storms. The latter is particularly damaging to crops and can remove nutrient-rich topsoil further reducing food production. Food insecurity has serious public health consequences, especially for children, since malnutrition can stunt development physically and intellectually. Moreover, Syria’s food shortage prior to the civil war caused the mass displacement of farmers, who could not remain in their homes after they lost both their source of income and sustenance. Food insecurity in the country has only grown worse since 2011, as millions of Syrians continue to go hungry. 
    • Climate Migration: Another effect of climate change is an increase in forced internal and international migration throughout the Levant. Extreme weather events, like severe flooding, will at least temporarily displace tons of people and destroy tons of acres of crops, taking away people’s livelihoods in the long term. More slow-onset events like desertification will permanently displace people as more and more areas become uninhabitable. Climate change has already caused the mass migration of millions of people in the Levant alone. In Iraq, for example, water scarcity has led to a dramatic increase in forced migration and urbanization. 
    • More Disease and Illness: As the Earth warms, mosquitoes are able to travel outside of their normal regions, increasing the spread of infectious diseases and reaching new populations. Indeed, climate-related effects will result in more disease transmission in the Levant in multiple ways. Malnutrition from lack of access to nutritious food can increase the likelihood of contracting an infectious disease. According to the United Nations, change in land use is the “primary transmission pathway for emerging infectious diseases of humans, over 60% of which are zoonotic.” Other issues are the negative health outcomes that come from extreme temperatures, including dehydration, heat exhaustion, heatstroke, and death. Extreme heat also reduces health systems’ capabilities to address issues and increases the number of accidents and the transmission rate of illnesses. All of these climate factors are present in the Levant.
    • Worsening Economic Conditions: Climate change will exacerbate existing economic issues and deepen poverty in the Levant as well. It has and will continue to increase employment fragility as it threatens economic productivity and many industries like agriculture. It will also increase competition for low-skill jobs as displaced people search for work. The rising costs of climate change put additional pressure on national economies while constraining governments’ capabilities to implement sustainable policies and invest in sustainable infrastructure. On a macro and micro level, climate change poses a great risk to people’s economic fortunes. 
    • Social Strife: In addition to the economic and societal problems described above, global climate change drives social unrest and accelerates armed conflict in the Levant. As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and others have noted, “The climate crisis isn’t coming. It’s already here,” and it brings with it instability and conflict in Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere. Furthermore, resource mismanagement by governments in the Levant exacerbates the climate change effects, thereby worsening living conditions even more.

    Conclusion

    Climate change and its effects have already worsened living conditions in the Levant and will continue to exacerbate problems in the coming years. Furthermore, as the impacts of climate change worsen economic and social conditions, these bad social and economic conditions can cause further climate effects in a devastating feedback loop. For example, scientists believe that the Syrian civil war may have created the conditions for a deadly dust storm across the region. This terrible cycle will intensify as the temperature of the planet continues to rise and as these climate effects wreak more and more havoc on people throughout the Levant.

  • Overview of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests

    Overview of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests

    Hong Kong’s Relationship with China

    Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of China that operates under separate systems and a different constitution than mainland China (see One Country, Two Systems brief). Hong Kong’s constitutional document, called the Basic Law, defines the ‘four pillars’ of success in Hong Kong as a common law system with an independent judiciary, the free flow of information, a level playing field between businesses, and an uncorrupted, respected civil service. 

    Political Context

    Hong Kong has a strong democratic tradition. Following its transfer of sovereignty on July 1, 1997 from Great Britain to the People’s Republic of China , the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promised that the region could keep its liberal, democratic and capitalist systems for at least 50 years. However, in recent years, as China more aggressively pursues unification, many Hong Kongers and international governments, including the United States, have accused China of attempting to systematically erode Hong Kong’s autonomy. These efforts, perceived as resulting in the “mainlandization” of Hong Kong, have resulted in feverous protests from Hong Kong citizens exemplified by the 2014 Umbrella Movement. The Umbrella Movement was sparked by the CCP introducing education reforms such as compulsory Mandarin classes (Hong Kongers mainly speak Cantonese) and a new “patriotic” curriculum, as well as refusing to allow the native people to directly elect their chief executive as previously promised. These protests ultimately failed to garner concessions from the CCP or the Hong Kong government as they did not significantly damage Hong Kong’s economy. However, they succeeded in setting the stage for the more impactful 2019 protests.

    Lighting the Powder Keg

    While tensions have remained high between a democratic Hong Kong public and an authoritarian CCP over the years, tensions reached a boiling point in 2019 when the government, pressured by the CCP, proposed a new national security law that would allow for extraditions to mainland China. This law is seen as corrosive to Hong Kong’s sovereignty as it gives the CCP the ability to arrest activists, seize assets, fire Hong Kong government workers, detain members of the press, and rewrite school curriculums. These reforms also introduced a new electoral system that requires candidates to be vetted for patriotic character, effectively allowing Beijing to control who takes office. 

    Protests & Goals of the Protestors

    Beginning on June 9, 2019, tens of thousands of Hong Kongers took to the streets to protest what they perceived to be encroachments on their liberties. As the Hong Kong Legislative Council gathered to vote on the bill, protestors surrounded the building, cancelling the session and resulting in a major victory for the protestors. A week later, on June 16, approximately 2 million Hong Kongers marched in protests around the city and were met with violent opposition from the CCP-controlled Hong Kong police. Protestors were beaten, tear gassed, pepper sprayed and shot with water guns and rubber bullets, despite being largely peaceful. This garnered widespread condemnation from the international community, especially the United States, with many politicians voicing public support for the protestors. 

    Conflict peaked on July 1st as anti-government Hong Kong activists broke into the Legislative Council building, occupying it, and vandalizing it with anti-CCP slogans before exiting late that night. Nine days later, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Lam dropped the extradition bill. While the protestors were successful in getting the extradition bill dropped, they did not achieve their other goals:

    • Convincing the CCP and Hong Kong government to stop referring to the protests as riots; 
    • An independent investigation of the use of force on civilians by police; 
    • The unconditional release of everyone arrested at the protests; 
    • And political reform towards universal suffrage. 

    This last goal represents the main tension between Hong Kong and China in the 2010s, first brought to the national spotlight by the 2014 Umbrella Movement. Although China has claimed that democracy was the eventual goal for Hong Kong, actions leading up to the protests proved otherwise in the eyes of many Hong Kongers. 

    Aftermath 

    After pro-democracy landslide victories in Hong Kong’s District Council elections and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the protests began to lose steam. However, tensions mounted again in May 2020 when the CCP pushed the previously defeated National Security Law through Hong Kong’s legislature. Since this law’s passage, many prominent activists and journalists have been arrested, and there has been mass emigration out of the city. Approval ratings for the Hong Kong government are now at their lowest points since the region was transferred to Chinese control in 1997, with approval for Lam at a dismal 19%. Overall, Hong Kongers’ confidence in the impartiality and efficacy of their institutions has dropped substantially in the past ten years.

    Implications for US, China and the International Community The CCP and Hong Kong government have received widespread international condemnation for their actions surrounding the protests. Taiwan, which is in a similar position to Hong Kong, is on high alert for similar provocations from the CCP following the Hong Kong protests. In the United States, then-President Donald Trump and Congress passed a series of acts sanctioning the Hong Kong government and Hong Kong-based businesses, and declared the situation a national emergency. For now, Beijing sees this new security law as substantial enough to prevent national security threats from Hong Kong and is focusing on economic projects which it believes will alleviate the social unrest that spurred the protests. The United States, on the other hand, sees China as having significantly eroded Hong Kong’s sovereignty over the past decade and remains on alert to see just how far China’s ambitions in the region extend. Hong Kong promises to be a flash point in a budding Sino-American rivalry and is poised to be a litmus test for Chinese desire to project regional hegemony and the resolve of the U.S. to resist it.

  • Overview of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement

    Overview of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement

    The Korean War (1950-53) was the first and largest proxy war of the Cold War. The defeat of the Japanese empire after World War II gave the United States control of the southern portion of the Korean peninsula, below the 38th parallel, while the Soviet Union controlled the northern portion. This war never officially ended, with the imperfect solution known as the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA) struggling to keep peace on the peninsula to this day. 

    The KAA is strictly a military document. It ensured a ceasefire long enough to answer the “Korea Question,” outlined in Paragraph 60, which asked how to reunite and bring lasting peace to the divided peninsula. Paragraph 60 called for a meeting to answer this question within three months, but, while the meeting took place, it was unsuccessful in establishing a framework to reunify the peninsula. Even though the armistice was signed on July 27th, 1953, it is considered a living document as Paragraph 62 allows for the KAA to be amended based on the current situation of the peninsula.

    The 1954 Geneva Conference addressed both the ongoing war in Indochina and the Korea Question. The US delegation was mainly focused on the Korea Question, and met with diplomats from the USSR, China, and North Korea. The main demand of North Korea and China was an “equal Korea,” and suggested an “all Korea commission be established.” South Korea declined this and countered with a 14-point plan that was seen as highly risky by the Americans. North Korea in turn declined the South Korean plan, to the relief of the US. The conference concluded with no solution and kept the KAA as the lone document keeping peace on the peninsula. 

    The KAA has seen its fair share of violations and incidents on both sides over the years.

    The fragility of the Korean Armistice Agreement is a critical issue for American foreign policy. South Korea remains a major ally of the U.S. politically, economically, militarily, and geographically given its close proximity to China and Russia. A significant amount of the U.S. military budget goes to maintaining troops and operating bases in South Korea. Between 2016 and 2019, U.S. military activity in South Korea cost $13.4 billion. The majority of this funding went to the U.S. army, with Camp Humphreys costing $9.2 billion alone. A military conflict between North and South Korea would potentially draw in China and Russia, in addition to the United States, creating a global conflict.