ACE

Category: ACE Research

  • Turkey’s Strategy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    Turkey’s Strategy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    Turkey shares complicated relationships and maritime borders with both Russia and Ukraine, and it has taken a dual approach to maintain distance from either neighbor. Turkey’s status as a NATO member and an economic partner with both Russia and Ukraine puts it in a unique position to serve as a place of negotiation and a communicator to the West. As Turkey balances its NATO responsibilities and strategic considerations, Ankara has worked to avoid alienating either side as it attempts to secure its own international and domestic position as a regional decision-maker.

    Early Stages of the Conflict

    In late March of 2022, Turkey served as the host of the first of three-way talks between Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba of Ukraine and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov of Russia, along with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu. During these talks in the town of Antalya in southern Turkey, Cavusoglu described Turkey’s role as more of a “facilitator” than a “host”. As part of the talks, Turkey brought up critical issues to the conflict, including free access to humanitarian corridors and the violence occurring in the city of Mariupol. Although no agreement was reached, Turkey has strengthened its position as a diplomatic actor in dealing with a developing conflict with two of its major economic partners. On a more personal level, President Vladimir Putin himself was reported to have called Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to outline his demands throughout the negotiations process. Finding himself in a difficult position, Erdogan has sought to optimize Turkey’s ability to pivot strategically while maintaining a distance from the current conflict. 

    Initially, Turkey’s position on the current conflict favored the Ukrainian cause. Erdogan criticized the West’s response as weak and joined NATO in condemning Russia by voting for the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine. This isn’t the first time that Turkey has publicly denounced Russia’s actions in the region—Ankara criticized Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and has been outspoken in support of Ukraine’s claim over Crimea and for Crimean Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group that has been persecuted under Russian control. Additionally, Turkey has joined Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives such as the August 2021 Crimea Platform summit.

    Naval Response

    Ankara changed its rhetoric after the beginning of the conflict. Erdogan and other Turkish figures in the government and media have called the invasion “unacceptable,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “courageous,” and the Ukrainians “helpless civilians.” However, when Ankara began describing the conflict as a “war” rather than repeating the Russian term “special operation,” it was able to invoke the articles of the 1936 Montreux Convention, at Zelenskyy’s request. Invoking the Articles of the Montreux Convention allowed Turkey to close the Bosphorus Strait to warships and thus block warring states from accessing the Black Sea (Figure 1). This has effectively limited Russia’s ability to move ships from other fleets into the region. Before the invasion of Ukraine, 16 Russian warships sailed through the strait to conduct military exercises in the Black Sea and now are engaged in the conflict. Due to the closing of the Bosphorus Strait, two of Russia’s Slava-class cruisers, the RTS Marshal Ustinov and the RFS Varyag were unable to move into the Black Sea from other operating areas. This move has earned Ankara praise from NATO and EU allies.

    Figure 1 

    Military and Economic Response

    Turkey has also sent aid to Ukraine in the form of weapons. Turkey sent a number of Bayraktar TB2 armed drones to Ukraine. These weapons have been deployed in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh and have been extremely effective in other conflicts. Although Ukrainian officials have repeatedly underlined this contribution and its success, possibly to publicly pressure Turkey to take a more active pro-Ukrainian stance, Ankara has stopped short of claiming the transaction as a form of military aid. Rather, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Sedat Onal has publicly emphasized that the transfer of Bayraktar TB2 drones was instead an agreement made between the Ukrainian government and a private Turkish company. This attempt to distance the Turkish government from any overt lethal aid to the Ukrainian cause underlines the strategic considerations leading Turkey to avoid alienating Russia. 

    Turkey’s commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity has avoided outright alienating Russia. Erdogan’s response to the current invasion has stopped short of other measures pursued by other NATO members. Ankara has continuously declined to join sanctions on Russia, calling them “useless,” and it has refused to close its airspace to Russian aircraft. Through this, Turkey has become a “haven,” becoming the base of Russia’s connection to the rest of Eurasia. Some oligarchs and citizens have fled there as the effects of Western economic sanctions take hold of the Russian economy, leading to fears that it will undermine the effectiveness of the measures. However, this strategy is risky for Turkey. If the United States and the West decide to ramp up secondary sanctions, Turkish banks and businesses could be greatly affected. 

    Russian-Turkish Security Relationship

    Turkey’s strategic hedging of its actions during the current crisis has much to do with its complex security and economic relationships with Russia. Russia and Turkey are historical competitors in multiple security areas and have fought on opposite sides of multiple regional conflicts, such as Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Geography and politics play a major part in Turkey’s decisions. As both a NATO member and a close neighbor to Russia and Ukraine, with economic ties to both countries, Turkey risks becoming deeply involved in a conflict with both security and economic partners.

    There has been an increasing security relationship between Ankara and Moscow in the past few years. Despite their opposing stances in regional conflicts, Turkey has increasingly viewed Russia as a “counterweight” to the West’s powers and pressures in the international sphere and seeks a deepened relationship with Russia to diversify its security strategy. In regional conflicts such as Syria, the countries cooperate. For example, they arranged a 2020 ceasefire agreement, and mutually brokered a security corridor and joint patrols. Criticism over the human rights abuses and the rule of law in Turkey has increased from the West, leading Erdogan to turn to alternative allies. Putin hasn’t questioned any of Erdogan’s domestic human rights crackdowns, and he extended his support during the 2016 failed coup in Turkey. A shared goal of legitimating their role in the regional order outside of Western-led institutions has provided a platform on which the two nations have begun to cooperate.

    Turkey’s pivot towards Russian partnership is exemplified in the highly controversial 2019 purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which led to a downturn in relations with the United States. The U.S.’s response included a sanctions package against Turkey’s defense industry, Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and the resulting cancellation of a large transaction of U.S. F-35 fighter jets. This is indicative of a larger Turkish policy trend of reducing dependence on NATO and the West, looking to alternative allies. Turkey’s pivot to ​​Russian weapons platforms has led to concerns about its future unity with NATO.

    Domestic Considerations

    Aside from its international strategic considerations, Ankara’s domestic economic considerations are a central determinant in the ongoing conflict. Both Russia and Ukraine are key economic partners to Turkey. Turkey, whose energy needs are import-dependent, especially depends on Russia: Russian natural gas made up 45% of Turkey’s gas purchases last year. Rosatom, a Russian conglomerate, began building a nuclear plant at Akkuyu in southern Turkey. Ankara has a very profitable free trade agreement with Ukraine, which it does not want to lose. As the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, Turkey’s security and defense sectors are tied up with Ukraine’s as well. For example, a new drone manufacturing factory has been planned to co-produce the long-range tactical Bayraktar TB2 system with Ukraine, further promoting the Turkish drone brand and expanding it to other markets. Turkey is also a major importer of sunflower oil and wheat, and in 2021 it imported 64.6 percent of its wheat from Russia and 13.4 percent from Ukraine—78% of a critical import overall. Turkey’s exports to Russia have been measured at 4.5 billion dollars in 2020, and to Ukraine at 2.24 billion dollars, figures that are expected to be disrupted as the crisis continues. Additionally, Ukrainians and Russians make up 23% of Turkey’s tourism sector revenue, a large share of an industry that represents about  4% of Turkey’s overall GDP. 

    Hit hard already by the ripple effects of Western sanctions, Turkey also knows well what a cooling economic relationship with Moscow would look like. In 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet on the Turkish-Syrian border area, the subsequent sanctions and downturn in relations proved devastating to the Turkish economy. The impacts of tensions with Russia caused double-digit inflation, high unemployment, and a rising current account deficit. Russia cracked down on tourism to Turkey, imposed import restrictions on Turkish goods, and even suspended the building of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. The ten-month sanctions eventually ended when Erdogan personally apologized for the downing of the Russian bomber. This example of Russia’s status as a close economic partner to Turkey may explain Ankara’s hesitation to join harsher sanction measures.

    The conflict, as well as Western-imposed sanctions, has already compounded Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis. Since sanctions were introduced, Turkey’s economy has taken a turn for the worse, including surging inflation at a 20-year high of 54%. The tourism industry has taken a hard hit from the loss of Ukrainian and Russian visitors, losing Turkey billions in revenue. As supply chain disruptions affect imports and exports, grains, oil, and gas prices have skyrocketed. With national elections coming in 2023, worries about civic dissatisfaction due to economic losses have been at the forefront of Erdogan’s mind.

    Ankara’s position as a mediator in the talks has so far seemed to work more than any other measure. The only signs of diplomatic progress have emerged from the three-way discussions, as Russia said it would significantly scale back its military activity around Kyiv and northern Ukraine, a confidence-building “de-escalation” step. Whether this step will be carried out, however, is unclear. In this way, Ankara has worked to solidify itself as a key independent international intermediary to both the West and Russia while avoiding endangering either of its critical partnerships.

  • Introduction to the OSCE

    Introduction to the OSCE

    Introduction

    The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is an intergovernmental group made up of 57 European, North American, and Asian nations and 11 “partners for cooperation” in Africa and Oceania. Founded during the Cold War as a neutral forum for discussion between the Western and Eastern blocs, the mandate of the OSCE has evolved from one of discussion between great powers into an organization that defends human rights, oversees elections, and monitors active combat zones.

    Even as the OSCE’s mandate has evolved, the core mission of “promoting stability, peace, and democracy” has remained constant. The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to all conflict in the broader Eurasian area, and the OSCE has been involved in mediating conflicts in recent decades. More recently, the OSCE has been involved in everything from a mission to monitor ceasefire violations in Ukraine to collaborating with its member countries to “strengthen cooperation on environmental issues.”

    History of OSCE

    The OSCE was created in 1975, at the signing of the Helsinki Accords. At the time, the United States and the Soviet Union were in a “détente,” a period of warmer relations between the two historic rivals. The Nixon presidency and the Brezhnev premiership was an era of decreased tension, eventually leading to both powers attending the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the early 1970s. After years of deliberations, the nations represented at the conference agreed to sign a document entitled the Helsinki Final Act, commonly referred to as the Helsinki Accords. This document outlined a set of politico-military, economic, environmental, and human rights commitments. This was the first time the USSR made explicit human rights commitments.

    After the signing of the Accords, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe continued to serve as a forum for meetings and began certifying whether states were meeting the commitments they made in Helsinki. After the end of the Cold War, the group’s name was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its role began to expand beyond its original purpose. The organization has come to play a large part in mediating inter-state disputes, overseeing elections, and even maintain missions in certain regions to prevent conflicts.

    How Does the OSCE Work?

    The OSCE maintains a policy of neutrality, so serves a different purpose and operates differently from organizations like NATO and CSTO. Harkening back to its past as a forum for discussion and mediation, much more emphasis is placed on summits: meetings where heads of state and ambassadors from member countries make long-term decisions and set goals for the entire organization. Other representative bodies include the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, made up of representatives from every member state. The Parliamentary Assembly passes resolutions about issues like human rights, democracy, and environmental issues in order to ensure member states are meeting the commitments they made in Helsinki.

    The Permanent Council is the primary OSCE decision-making body. This Council contains delegates from every member state and representatives from each of the OSCE’s Partners for Cooperation. All decisions at the Permanent Council are made by consensus. The OSCE also has multiple executive structures, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and Representative on Freedom of the Media. These institutions are another method the OSCE uses to ensure member states are fulfilling their commitments.

    What Does the OSCE Do?

    The OSCE has an active presence in a dozen countries, mostly former Soviet and Yugoslav states. These field offices “assist host countries in putting their OSCE commitments into practice” and “enable the OSCE to tackle crises as they arise.” The key goals of these missions are to restore trust between former rivals and build lasting peace in regions that have faced conflict and war. Field operations also focus on helping states control crime and terrorism, transition to democracy, clear minefields from past wars, and negotiate settlements of conflicts as they develop on the ground.

    The OSCE maintains a large presence in Ukraine, deploying both a monitoring mission focused on the Donbas region and a coordinator that is helping Ukraine with issues from the transition to democracy to cybercrime and human trafficking. The OSCE’s monitoring mission is an “unarmed, civilian mission” whose task is to “observe and report in an impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine.” This work is integral as tensions escalate in the region and all parties attempt to reach a peaceful settlement.

    OSCE field offices are also active in former Yugoslav republics such as Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo, helping them build resilient institutions and repair the damage of conflicts in the 1990s. The OSCE helps these nations clear land mines, run counter-terrorist operations, and defend their democratic institutions. In states and regions with ongoing conflicts like Moldova and the South Caucasus, the OSCE facilitates discussions between all parties and is working to resolve their respective territorial disputes.

    The OSCE’s primary function is to serve as a forum for discussion. In this capacity, the organization operates forums like the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been the main diplomatic process attempting to bring an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus. The group has published assessments of the situation and hosts infrequent meetings between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to discuss the conflict. The OSCE is also involved in the “5+2” format that is currently mediating the Transnistrian territorial conflict and the Geneva International Discussions, a forum for mediating the crisis in Georgia. OSCE successfully mediated discussions between multiple states in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Peace Accords, resulting in more transparency and arms control between the former rivals.

    The OSCE Minsk group is one of the most visible and prominent examples of OSCE mediation today. The group has been focused on reaching a peaceful settlement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended in 1994. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a region of Azerbaijan populated by Armenians declared independence and sought to join Armenia. Following a bloody war, the Armenians were able to secure de-facto autonomy and an uneasy status quo began. Despite winning the war, the newly established Republic of Artsakh was not recognized by any U.N. member states, including Armenia. For the next few decades, OSCE sponsored a forum for the two sides to come to a permanent solution that would respect the rights of refugees from both sides and the self-determination rights of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh. The group continuously worked to facilitate a settlement, hosting multiple conferences between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders and monitoring the situation on the ground from their offices in Yerevan and Baku.

    Criticisms

    Although the Minsk group was one of the best avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, it also demonstrated some of the structural issues with OSCE and was the subject of criticism. The group moved very slowly—little came of the talks held between the two rivals and frequent border clashes killed dozens of Armenian and Azerbaijani servicemembers. In 2020, a war broke out between the two sides, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of thousands of Armenians and allegations of war crimes by both sides. The Minsk group was unable to facilitate a peaceful settlement and now risks being cast aside by both nations in favor of a more violent solution to the crisis.

    The reasons for the Minsk Group’s apparent failure in Nagorno-Karabakh reflect criticisms of the organization. The ery structure of the organization is focused on neutrality—by definition, OSCE is a pan-European security organization. Multiple post-Soviet nations, including Azerbaijan, have attempted to cripple OSCE’s ability to monitor their compliance with the Helsinki Accords, attacking the organization in the press and even closing down OSCE offices. Much like many other international organizations, OSCE has no way of enforcing resolutions and only operates with the consent of its member states. The Permanent Council is made up of nations with conflicting national interests, making it difficult for the organization to agree on and implement policy. OSCE’s consensus approach to making larger political decisions makes this task even more difficult, as all members must agree on a path forward to resolve disputes between nations that are often at odds with each other and both sit on the council. 

    OSCE also faces financial challenges. The organization’s annual budget is only €138 million, less than 3% of the UN’s. This has left OSCE overstretched and unable to carry out its mandate. As of 2017, OSCE was only able to deploy 6 monitors to the 200-kilometer line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops in Nagorno-Karabakh. For comparison, the United Nations maintains a peacekeeping force of 15,000 in South Sudan, with a budget of $1 billion.

    These challenges come at a time when Europe is becoming increasingly politically divided, and old divisions between east and west are on the rise. The new situation in Europe requires an organization like OSCE to mediate future disputes, coordinate international responses, and monitor conflicts to ensure peace and stability.       

  • The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant Part 2

    The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant Part 2

    Though climate change and its effects do not recognize state borders, they affect states in the Levant in different ways due to variations in states’ geography, environment, economy, and government response. In Syria, the adverse effects of climate change have caused new and exacerbated existing socioeconomic problems, worsening living conditions for the Syrian people. In the past two decades, environmental conditions in Syria have deteriorated further because of unsustainable, unhelpful government policies. 

    Environmental Effects of Climate Change in Syria 

    • Drought and Desertification: In the years leading up to the Syrian civil war, the country experienced its worst drought on record. The drought began in the winter of 2006-2007 following a reduction in regional rainfall, which is the primary water source for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and their tributaries. Lasting from 2007 to 2010, the drought followed a number of multi-year droughts in the 1980s and 1990s. 
    • Water Scarcity: According to data collected by climatologists, water became much more scarce during the recent Syrian drought with decreased surface moisture and groundwater supplies. Rising temperatures contributed to drier soil and increased evaporation. In the years since the onset of the Syrian conflict, the country has faced rainfall deficits and other worsening environmental conditions. 
    • Crop Failure: This water scarcity has substantially reduced vegetation and agricultural output. The drought caused widespread crop failure throughout the Syrian countryside and left farmers and nomadic herders without needed water sources for irrigation and livestock. According to former Vice President Al Gore, between 2006-2010, the severe drought destroyed 60% of Syrian farms and caused 80% of livestock to perish.
    • Dust Storms: Another interrelated consequence of the Syrian drought has been increased sandstorms throughout the country and region. The sharp decline in Syrian farming caused an increase in the amount of untended soil, which can easily be swept up in a dust storm. 

    Economic and Societal Effects 

    • Food Insecurity: Syria’s reduced agricultural production has caused significant price hikes in imported food products like wheat and rice and greater food insecurity overall. Syria’s reduced irrigation capacity and pasture availability have diminished its cereal production and livestock while wheat production has reached record lows. In 2020, 50.25% of Syrians, were food insecure. 
    • Urbanization and Population Displacement: As drought undermined hundreds of thousands of farmers’ livelihoods, many were forcibly displaced from rural areas to urban centers. While estimates vary, some reports suggest that as many as 1.5 million Syrians were internally displaced because of climate-related factors, meaning they became climate migrants or refugees. Additionally, the influx of more than one million Iraqi refugees by 2010 exacerbated the economic pressures and resource demand caused by internal population displacement in Syria. 
    • Social Upheaval: Syria’s rapid urbanization prior to the civil war increased social unrest in the country’s cities, with greater competition for employment and increasingly scarce resources. As food and economic insecurity and climate migration rose in, the Assad regime violently suppressed protesters and worsened living conditions for the Syrian people.

    Syrian Government Mismanagement 

    • Unsustainable Environmental Policies: While climate change has worsened living conditions in Syria, the country’s government has also contributed to this issue. Even before the 2011 uprising, unsustainable agricultural policies like the overuse of water for water-intensive crops degraded agricultural land in Syria. This policy intensified the climate change effects and related issues on Syrians. Additionally, Syria lacked and still lacks the necessary drought monitoring and management capabilities to respond effectively to droughts and their negative byproducts.
    • Poor Governance: The Assad regime failed to provide subsidies for powering irrigation pumps and transporting produce, exacerbating Syria’s water scarcity and crop failure. While the government had developed a national drought strategy by 2006, it did not implement the plan in time to alleviate the drought’s effects. The regime worsened the drought’s economic fallout by shutting down a micro-finance network of village funds a few years before the uprising. By taking away this network, which functioned as an income security net, the government denied rural Syrian farmers economic relief.
  • Homelessness and COVID-19 in the United States

    Homelessness and COVID-19 in the United States

    The COVID-19 pandemic has created uncertainty for unhoused Americans. Due to their lack of safe housing, homeless individuals often face COVID-19 risk factors in their day-to-day lives. The congregate nature and hygienic challenges of shelter life also create the potential for rapid transmission of COVID-19 to this population. 

    Eviction and Federal Policies

    The ebb and flow of COVID-19 cases has also impacted unhoused communities economically, socially, and physically. Housing policies have shifted during the pandemic, most prominently in the form of rent forgiveness to eviction filings. Rent forgiveness was a form of relief to many, but evictions still occurred, increasing pandemic-related homelessness nationwide. To combat this, a federal order under the Public Health Service Act was passed to halt ongoing evictions to combat worsening COVID-19 prevalence and homelessness in the U.S.

    Homeless Shelters and Covid-19

    “Sheltered homelessness” is a term used to refer to people experiencing homelessness and residing in emergency shelters, transitional housing, or other temporary settings. The U.S. Center for Disease Control has provided interim guidance for shelters, which has continued to be updated since 2019. This guidance recommends pushing for vaccination within shelters, widespread proper personal protection equipment (PPE), and accessible broadcasts of free COVID-19 testing sites. The guide also states, “homeless shelters should not close or exclude people who are having symptoms or test positive for COVID-19 without a plan for where these clients can safely access services and stay.” The guide works to support unhoused individuals while also trying to navigate the uncharted territory of COVID-19.

    • New York City, where one-fifth of all U.S. sheltered homeless live, issued an emergency declaration to ease crowding in shelters during the summer of 2021. This influx of homeless individuals into midtown Manhattan caused a response from groups that advocate for stricter COVID-19 regulations, such as The Coalition for Homelessness. In response to The Coalition for the Homeless’ demands to reevaluate NYC shelter situations, Mayor Bill DeBlasio said “What we’re seeing so far in Omicron: intense surge but less impact, and we also believe it’ll be for a brief period of time, so that does not suggest doing things the way we did last year.” DeBlasio’s response supported a shift back to pre-pandemic safety measures within homeless shelters.
    • In Boston, Boston Healthcare for the Homeless provided 500 beds at the Boston Convention Center for homeless individuals who contracted COVID-19. Per the 2020 Census data, Boston has a homeless population of 6,203 individuals, and many streets are lined with tents occupied by unhoused individuals. The city has been taking measures to clear the streets while also calling on outreach workers to provide information about available shelter beds in the area. 
    • Los Angeles has faced public opposition to the crowding of shelters due to the surge in the Omicron variant. In the last week of 2021, more than 140 shelters in Los Angeles county had experienced an outbreak of COVID-19. In response, the city is crafting a temporary housing strategy to slow the spread within the homeless population.

    The variance in COVID-19 regulation from city to city shows the uncertainty surrounding the most effective methods for keeping unhoused populations safe. Most recently, many city-wide mask and vaccination mandates have been lifted as case numbers decrease. 

    As the United States makes its way into the third year of the pandemic, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 2021 Annual Homeless Assessment Report found that there was an eight percent decrease in sheltered homelessness throughout the country. The overall Community Vulnerability Index value—which tracks COVID-19 cases across communities of varying vulnerability—has been on a rapid decline over the past two months. While homelessness still persists across the country, the presence of COVID-19 within unhoused communities is generally on the decline, causing public officials to slow, or end the implementation of protective measures.

  • Salmon Conservation in the Pacific Northwest

    Salmon Conservation in the Pacific Northwest

    Introduction: The Importance of Salmon

    Salmon are an integral part of the Pacific Northwest, both in terms of ecosystem and cultural value. They are considered a keystone species, which are species whose presence in an ecosystem has a disproportionate effect on other organisms within the system. As salmon travel to the ocean, more than 50% of their diet is insects; without Pacific salmon, there could be an explosion of insects in these ecosystems since salmon are the main insect predator in aquatic environments. When salmon spawn, their energy-rich bodies and eggs are crucial food sources for a variety of predators, ranging from wolves to bears to scavenging birds. Their carcasses also provide valuable nutrients to streams and rivers, increasing organic matter and nutrients that will enhance the productivity of the surrounding ecosystem and be transferred to all levels of the food chain.

    Salmon have cultural significance in the northwest, especially to indigenous peoples of the region. The cultures, intertribal relations, fishing technologies, and economies have all been influenced by salmon, from ancient Native American trade routes to modern commercial fishing. Salmon plays a role in religious services, such as the celebration of the annual salmon return which facilitates the transfer of traditional values and lifestyles from generation to generation. Fishing continues to remain the preferred livelihood method of many indigenous groups, as salmon has been a primary food source for these people for thousands of years, and remains an essential part of their nutritional health.

    Salmon Decline

    The existence of salmon in the Northwest is in danger. Nineteen populations of wild salmon and steelhead are listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act, and salmon have already gone extinct in 40% of their historical range. Fishery scientists have summarized the human factors implicated in salmon decline as the “four H’s”: harvest, hatcheries, habitat, and hydropower. Overharvesting of adult salmon in the early 20th century decimated populations throughout the Pacific Northwest. Construction and development have encroached along the shoreline of salmon habitats and on beaches where salmon find their food. An increase in pavement contributes to toxic storm water runoff, which threatens the health and safety of the salmon’s aquatic habitat. Dams block the passage of salmon from their spawning habitat as they travel back from the Pacific Ocean. For example, more than 40% of this habitat is permanently blocked by dams in the Columbia River Basin. By creating reservoirs, dams inundate the shoreline and can wipe out historical spawning grounds. Reservoirs also slow the flow of water, which can lead to rising temperature levels that can be lethal to salmon. 

    Policy Interventions

    The United States has a legal obligation to conserve salmon populations through a series of tribal and international treaties. Some treaties dating back to the 1850s granted Native American tribes “the right of taking fish from all usual and accustomed grounds and stations… in common with all citizens.” This right was reaffirmed in a 1974 Supreme Court ruling, known as the Boldt Decision, which validated the tribes’ treaty-reserved fishing rights.

    The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty represents a commitment made by the US and Canada to maintain their salmon fisheries and enhancement programs to prevent overfishing and provides the framework for Pacific salmon conservation and management.

    The Endangered Species Act (ESA), is a national law creating a program for the conservation of threatened and endangered plants and animals. Salmon are protected under the ESA, and conservation efforts like transporting migrating salmon around dams, placing fishing restrictions on vulnerable stocks, and operating hatcheries in order to bolster populations are supported under the ESA. These efforts come at a price, with recent estimates indicating that salmon conservation in the Columbia River Basin costs $788 million per year. While these interventions have slowed the decline of salmon, they have not reversed the decline. As a result, restorationists have started to turn to more drastic steps in recent years, like dam removal, which helps restore stream habitats and natural hydrological connections. However, dam removal is often controversial because it can involve the loss of hydroelectricity and water for irrigation. 

    Case Study: Klamath Water Wars

    The Klamath Water Wars began with a 2001 drought, when the federal government cut off water deliveries to irrigators in order to maintain the habitat for salmon and other fish protected under the Endangered Species Act. This decision enraged farmers, and in an act of civil disobedience they formed a “bucket brigade” to manually put water back into the irrigation canals. The following year, the Bush Administration resumed normal water deliveries which significantly decreased the water flow in the rivers resulting in tens of thousands of fish in the lower river washing up dead. The Karuk and Yurok tribes of California were devastated by these deaths, as they traditionally depend on the salmon harvest. These opposing opinions created a controversy framed as farmers versus fish, demonstrating a common dichotomy that environmental and human interests are not aligned.

    While the conflict was framed as fish vs farmers, it was really about water resources. Droughts in the western US are projected to grow more serious, exacerbated by climate change. This is likely to increase the urgency of issues related to water scarcity as policymakers seek to supply water to both people and animals.

    In the Klamath Basin, leaders sought to address these challenges through collaborative negotiations with a wide range of stakeholders. In 2010, the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA) and the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA) were announced as the results of the multi-year negotiations amongst California and Oregon governments, as well as many interest groups. The KBRA helps restore Klamath and provides water deliveries to both wildlife refuges and federal project irrigators. The KHSA details the process that leads to the removal of the four privately owned dams spanning across Southern Oregon and Northern California on the Klamath River, which would be one of the largest and most complex removals ever undertaken. Though the agreements have not been enacted in Congress, recent reports say that these four dam removals are still proceeding and are scheduled to begin in 2023.

  • Russian Foreign Agent Laws: Protecting Civil Society, or Preventing It?

    Russian Foreign Agent Laws: Protecting Civil Society, or Preventing It?

    Amidst the variety of international criticism expressed about Vladimir Putin’s administration, we frequently hear about the Russian state’s suppression of political dissent, most often through the shutting down of oppositional media organizations or cracking down on protests. Most recently, the issue of Russia’s “foreign agent” law has come to the forefront of this criticism, with a plethora of international groups deriding its use as retaliatory, oppressive, and a means of censorship. The Russian government and adjacent media, on the other hand, view the law as necessary for the protection of the political process, and compare it to other countries’ restrictions on individuals acting in the interest of foreign governments. While there are instances where the law has legitimate standing, it is often utilized as a tool to suppress political goals that are against the administration’s wishes. 

    What is the Russian law on foreign agents?

    Under the law, nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive any funding from foreign sources must report said foreign funding, and also be included on a registry of agents acting in the interests of foreign entities. These organizations can still publish materials if they report their funding properly, but must do so under the stipulation that they explicitly indicate “[the materials] are published … by a foreign agent.” In late 2017, a law was passed that allowed foreign agent laws to extend beyond NGOs, by also including media organizations on their own foreign agent register. 

    Failing to report funding from foreign sources can result in heavy fines for an organization. Creating or working for an organization which receives international funding can have consequences too, especially if the organization is perceived to be encouraging citizens to “refuse to perform civil duties or commit other illegal acts.” An individual who fails to report their foreign agent status, or proliferates propaganda in service of a foreign agent, may: be fined up to one year of salary or wage,  do “corrective labor” for up to two years, or serve jail time for up to two years. Article 3 offers more details on punishment.

    Examples of foreign agents on the registry, and the debate around them

    The law has been applied to several obvious “foreign agent” mass media, such as Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. These two organizations aim to promote Western and American ideals abroad and receive most, if not all, of their funding from non-Russian sources. 

    More contentious examples have involved Russian NGOs focusing on election processes, such as Golos, which has twice been branded a foreign agent, and the Levada Center, a sociological research center that surveys public opinion. Golos was designated as a foreign agent leading up to the 2021 State Duma election, because the local vote-monitoring organization received a donation of 200 roubles from an Armenian citizen. The Levada Center was designated a foreign agent in 2016 after the Ministry of Justice claimed to have found hidden sources of foreign funding, a claim which the director disputed. 

    Supporters of the foreign agent law cite the need to prevent foreign influence and protect Russian sovereignty. When the law was passed in 2012, Pravda described it as “… not prohibitive—as some critics would like to interpret it,” claiming that “thousands” of foreign agents operate in Russia through uncontrollable cash payments. In 2013, President Putin outlined his beliefs to officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service, alluding to some NGOs as “structures financed from abroad and serving foreign interests.” This law, then, is framed as an attempt to regulate these foreign agents, as well as uncontrollable money, in an effort to prevent interference in Russian affairs. 

    Opponents of the law have decried the discriminatory effects a foreign agent designation holds. The director of the Levada Center emphasized that the term itself, inostrannie agent, has a historical connotation “synonymous with ‘spy’ or ‘saboteur.’” Therefore, citizens are less likely to trust organizations labeled as foreign agents. While Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has stated that “the department must follow the spirit and letter of the law” in response to criticism about Golos’ registration, opposition figures argue that the stigma of being a foreign agent is a disproportionate response to, in this case, a $3 donation. 

    IMAGE BELOW: Press secretary Dmitry Peskov with President Putin. Only one day before classifying Golos as a foreign agent, Putin said he would review the “fuzzy criteria” surrounding the law. 

    After its addition to the registry, the Levada Center conducted a poll on the term “foreign agent.” Among the 1,800 Russian adults surveyed, notable results were as follows:

    • Out of the 25% of surveyed adults who had heard of the law, 56% view the law as an attempt to limit Western influence, while 26% see it as an attempt to “clamp down on independent social organizations”.
    • 45% associate the term with espionage, “infiltrators”, and double agents; an additional 7% associate the term with an “enemy of Russia”.
    • 66% believe an organization who receives foreign money will work in the interests of their foreign sponsor.

    By including certain political opposition and media dissidents on the Foreign Agent Registry, the government has found a way to mitigate the proliferation of these organizations’ ideas by legally invalidating their conclusions as the products of foreign sponsorship. By labeling an organization like Golos as a foreign agent, the Russian government delegitimizes their vote-monitoring capabilities to a large chunk of Russians citizens. If, for example, Golos claimed to have evidence of election tampering done by the ruling party, their conclusion would be met with skepticism. The government sees this law as a buttress for Russian unity and stability, while dissidents see it as yet another tool in preventing a civil society outside of the government’s parameters. 

  • Juvenile Justice: A Historic Overview

    Juvenile Justice: A Historic Overview

    18th Century and Earlier

    The earliest criminal laws in colonial America were derived from British common law. They set the precedent for early colonists on how they would address justice and crime, including juvenile delinquency and punishment. In 1646, the Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law declared that male adolescent disobedience was an offense punishable by death. Since children and adolescents were seen just as culpable as adults for breaking the law, they were to be punished like adults. These sentiments persisted through the 18th century, setting the groundwork for children “as young as age seven [to] be tried and sentenced in criminal courts” and sent to serve time in adult facilities. 

    19th Century: Roots of Juvenile Justice

    By the 19th century, a number of child advocates had organized to reform juvenile justice. The Society for the Prevention of Pauperism was founded to oppose housing youth in adult jails. They established the New York House of Refuge in 1825, the nation’s first institution to house only juveniles that were deemed to be on a path to delinquency. This society believed that, with the right support and resources, juveniles could be rehabilitated. Many cities and states adopted the same model, leading to the founding of similar institutions throughout the country in the following years. In 1899, the first juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois, by a group of women known as “child-savers.” It was established “under the British legal doctrine of parens patriae—‘the State as parent’”—meaning it was the state’s duty to both protect the public interest regarding juvenile delinquents, and serve as the guardian of childrens’ interests.

    20th Century to the Present: Due Process and “Tough on Crime” Policies

    The establishment of juvenile courts across the country allowed judges to have discretion over the outcome of juvenile cases without the use of formal trials, birthing wide disparities between cases. This presented an issue for most youth who had few legal protections and constitutional rights. In 1967, the Supreme Court case In re Gault delivered a landmark decision that granted juveniles legal protections under the 14th Amendment, such as the right to due process. This meant that juveniles had the right to legal representation, as well as the right to confront witnesses against them. Throughout the 1970s, additional constitutional rights were extended to juveniles, “including the right to have the charges against them proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the right against double jeopardy.” In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, requiring the separation of juveniles from adults; it also created the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to fund statewide community-based programs as an alternative to youth incarceration.   

    Toward the late 1970s, the United States experienced an upward trend of violent juvenile offenses. This resulted in a political shift, with the government beginning the “tough on crime” era. Some of these approaches manifested into policies that moved juveniles to adult courts for trial and punishment. In 1978, the state of New York lowered “the eligible age for criminal responsibility to thirteen years old for murder and fourteen years old for other violent crimes.” Mandatory minimum sentences and three-strike laws enforced in adult cases were now extended to juveniles. By 1994, “the number of juvenile cases waived into adult criminal court peaked when 11,700 cases were transferred.” Juveniles also faced more punitive sentences, including sentences to death and life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court has since ruled each respective sentence as unconstitutional in Roper v. Simmons (2005) and Miller v. Alabama (2012), respectively. 

    Juvenile arrest rates for all offenses have decreased by 75% between 1996 and 2019. Despite this significant decline, laws birthed out of the “tough on crime” era remain unchanged. Prior to 2019, the maximum age of juvenile jurisdiction in New York and North Carolina was fifteen years old, meaning sixteen and seventeen year olds were automatically tried and incarcerated as adults, regardless of the crime. In 2017, bothstates passed laws to “raise the age of criminal responsibility to 18 years of age.” Most states maintain 18 as the age for criminal responsibility of non-violent crimes, however, in the case of violent crimes, there is more variability for juvenile offenders. For instance, in North Dakota and Kansas, violent offenders as young as 10 years old can be waived and prosecuted as adults. Although there are age mandates that limit juvenile jurisdiction, there are a multitude of waivers that permit juveniles to be tried as adults, much to the discretion of judges and prosecutors.

  • Growth for the Few: The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa

    Growth for the Few: The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa

    In the aftermath of World War II, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall issued a proposal that would mark the birth of a now-ubiquitous buzzword: international development. The Marshall Plan called for intensive U.S. investment in the reconstruction of Europe, provided that European countries agreed to reduce trade barriers and stabilize currency. After this plan proved effective in bolstering European Gross National Products, the U.S. shifted its focus to globally “underdeveloped areas”, including the African continent. However, like the Marshall Plan for Europe, this international aid to Africa did not come without conditions. African nations fundamentally restructured their economies in order to receive aid; thus, structural adjustment was born.

    Definitions and Context

    Generally, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are macroeconomic policy reforms that nations must implement as a precondition for loans from International Monetary Institutions (IMIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These loan conditionalities are based in neoliberal economic objectives, such as the privatization, stabilization, liberalization, and deregulation of national economies. While these key tenets exist within all SAPs, specific policy conditions vary from nation to nation. SAPs became popular in a wide variety of historically exploited regions—from Latin America to Africa—in the 1980s. This popularity was due in large part to OPEC’s 1970 oil price hikes which decreased sale prices for commodity exports and raised interest rates, making loan repayment more expensive for those nations. 

    While common discourse (both in academic circles and from IMIs themselves) frames SAPs as things of the past that tapered off in the late 1990s, the latest available data shows that 2014 IMF loan conditionalities are very similar to those from the 1980s. SAPs might not pervade modern discourse, but they still exist in practice. 

    History of SAPs in Sub-Saharan Africa

    SAPs are particularly relevant to discourse on Sub-Saharan Africa because the region accounts for the largest proportion of SAPs in the world. 37 out of the 46 Sub-Saharan nations have undergone structural adjustment due to the region’s tumultuous economic history.

    After the Era of Independence in the 1960s, many newly-empowered leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa set their sights on long-term economic plans with strong investment in state-run industry. The wave of independence also placed emphasis on Pan-Africanism and intercontinentally-driven development. This led to the creation of continental institutions such as the African Development Bank, which invested African funds in African-led development projects. However, a mixture of external market factors and internal governance problems in the 1970s caused many Sub-Saharan Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) to dip below pre-independence levels. This economic downturn left many African nations with few choices except turning to IMIs—rather than intracontinental organizations—for funds. Eventually, even the African Development Bank, founded on aspirations of intra-continental economic problem solving, came to mirror the strict structural adjustment lending system of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

    Impact on human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa

    While SAPs included a vast array of macroeconomic policies, they did not originally integrate social policy development or poverty reduction strategies, which were seen as the responsibility of national governments. This lack of consideration for the socioeconomic consequences of adjustment on common people and the imposition of homogenous policy conditionalities on a heterogeneous group of Sub-Saharan countries led to widespread neglect of human rights and social services in African debtor countries. SAPs reduced the power of national governments to fund social welfare programs and to act autonomously in general. In turn, this both delegitimized those governments in the eyes of their people and left poor and marginalized communities without safety nets as governments were cut back on public spending. While some SAPs have successfully achieved a narrow set of neoliberal macroeconomic objectives, there is a general consensus that their negative socioeconomic impacts on social services and human rights far outweigh their benefits in Sub-Saharan Africa.

    While SAPs impacted all genres and levels of human rights across Africa, the following analysis examines their impact on so-called first and second-generation human rights. First-generation rights include physical integrity rights and equity, while second-generation rights include the right to healthcare and education. 

    Physical Integrity Rights

    As SAPs force national governments to privatize institutions, the power and size of governments decrease. Additionally, since governments must adhere strictly to policy guidelines set by IMIs as conditions of the aid, they become less accountable to their people and thus suffer from perceptions of delegitimization. As the size, power, and perceived legitimacy of African governments decrease, national police and military forces obtain more discretion in using force against citizens. SAPs have also been shown to increase protest and ethnic conflict as African populations condemn their decreasing economic prosperity. When combined, increases in protest and military autonomy lead to physical integrity rights violations such as the extrajudicial imprisonment, forced disappearance, and torture of protestors. 

    Gender and Wealth Inequality

    As Sub-Saharan governments introduced austerity measures and privatized industry, national unemployment rates rose disproportionately for poor populations. Moreover, as countries attempt to achieve economic “stabilization,” central banks increased interest rates to combat inflation. This exacerbated preexisting wealth inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa by blocking poor populations out of markets and decreasing small businesses’ access to affordable loans. Even after the IMF employed its PRGF targeting income inequality, the resounding impacts of SAPs in Sub-Saharan wealth gaps remain. Ultimately, women and girls are the “shock absorbers” of adjustment. Since they are typically barred from participation in the formal sector, women make up 70% of informal entrepreneurs—the population least acknowledged or protected in SAP policies. Overall, policies that increase income inequality affect women disproportionately, perpetuating already dire situations of gender inequality in the region. 

    Access to Education and Healthcare

    When governments adopt austerity measures, they limit funding for non-privatized public institutions like schools and health clinics. As governments defund schools, the socioeconomic benefit of completing primary and secondary education decreases; enrollment then dwindles as poor children choose to work instead. Moreover, the declining quality of public education creates an opportunity gap between those children whose parents can afford private school tuition and those whose parents cannot. The push to defund and privatize healthcare has had a similarly detrimental effect. Many healthcare professionals see their salaries drop and choose to migrate rather than be laid off or accept low wages. Poor families are unable to afford quality medical supplies. As access to medical supplies and qualified professionals decreases, public health crises are exacerbated. Neonatal mortality rates have increased and responses to HIV/AIDS have been significantly impaired in Sub-Saharan Africa over the duration of SAPs.

    Case study: Mozambique

    While Mozambique is generally hailed as a structural adjustment success, human rights tell a different story than economic growth. Left in socioeconomic disarray from a civil war that began in 1979, Mozambique began requesting aid in the 1980s. Because it refused to sign with the World Bank or IMF, aid was withheld from the country—even during a national famine—until it conceded to what it saw as exploitative and capitalist conditions in 1987. From then on, SAPs shifted Mozambique to a market economy and privatized over 900 public enterprises. In the first year of SAPs, the Mozambican government cut health and education subsidies from MT 21 billion to MT 15 billion. 

    Even after “pro-poor” PRGF programs from the IMF were implemented in 2001, government spending on health and education remained constrained. Mozambican education reached dismal levels of quality and enrollment, and the Mozambican life expectancy remains one of the lowest in the world. Mozambique’s GDP has grown 6-8% per year for the past decade, but that growth remains unevenly distributed. Over the same period, Mozambican wealth inequality and degrees of poverty have increased. Nearly 60% of Mozambicans lived on under $1.25 per day in 2016 compared with 54.1% in 2002, one year after PRGFs were implemented. After over 30 years of SAPs in Mozambique, the country still has one of the worst education systems, shortest life expectancies, and lowest HDIs in the world.

    Conclusions

    Looking to the future, the UN Economic Commission for Africa suggests three conditions to make SAPs more viable for the region: 1) country-specificity, 2) loaner accountability to common people, and 3) increased African participation in identifying problems, ideating solutions, and implementing programs for development.

  • Nonpoint Source Pollution: An Introduction to Its Effects and Policy Approaches

    Nonpoint Source Pollution: An Introduction to Its Effects and Policy Approaches

    Introduction

    Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution refers to pollution sources that do not emerge from a single point of origin, which stands in contrast to point source pollutants where there is a single identifiable source of the pollution. Pollutants coming from NPS are generally carried by stormwater run-off, and some common industries such as agriculture, mining, and urban development. Examples of NPS pollutants include excess fertilizers and herbicides, oil, grease, and bacteria from human and animal waste. While the exact sources of NPS cannot be identified, scientists have developed systems to reduce pollution in environments that create a high volume of pollution (ex. urban areas, agricultural operations, marinas). Examples include buffer strips that absorb pollutants before they reach the water, retention ponds that capture runoff and stormwater, and sediment fences that filter pollutants and slow runoff.

    Implications for Human and Environmental Health

    NPS is responsible for a host of damaging effects on environmental and public health. One example is eutrophication. Certain forms of NPS, such as agricultural run-off, create an overabundance of nutrients in bodies of water. Algae feed on these nutrients and become algae blooms, which block sunlight and can sometimes release toxins. The dissolved oxygen in the water is consumed as the algae are decomposed by bacteria. When the oxygen is removed, it makes it difficult for fish and other aquatic organisms to breathe, creating what is called a “dead zone” because so few life forms are able to survive in areas with such low oxygen levels. The Gulf of Mexico has the largest dead zone in the United States; this 6,500 square mile area has been created due to NPS pollution from the Mississippi River Basin. The high nutrient levels and algal blooms associated with dead zones have harmful community effects, such as releasing toxins into drinking water that in turn cause illness for humans and animals.

    NPS affects not just the ecosystem, but also the economy. If pollution causes mass die-offs and dirty-looking water, then the jobs, tourism, and recreation that rely on the waterways may experience financial losses. Human health is also at risk. For example, urban runoff carries bacteria and viruses due to improper sewage treatment, which contaminates drinking water sources and can even result in severe human illness. One common bacteria found in NPS pollution is Escherichia coli (E. coli), which is associated with human and animal waste. A major source of E. coli in urban and suburban areas is pet waste that is left on lawns and then washed into sewers and waterways. E. coli can lead to human illnesses such as diarrhea, urinary tract infections, pneumonia, and other respiratory illnesses. 

    Current Policies and Responses

    United States

    In the United States, there are initiatives at the national and state level to address NPS. Nationally, the USDA runs the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, a voluntary conservation program. Through this program, the USDA provides both financial and technical assistance to farmers to help them address concerns about natural resource management and create environmental benefits. Another federal program that addresses NPS pollution is the EPA’s 319 Grant Program for States and Territories. The 319 Grant Program was established under the Clean Water Act and provides funding for state efforts to reduce nonpoint source pollution. One limitation of this program is that the EPA has no regulatory authority over the programs created by the states and must rely heavily on their voluntary participation. However, a benefit is that each state can use these funds to craft an approach that best fits its particular context. 

    California’s NPS programs are directly funded by the 319 Grant Program. One example is the Porter-Cologne Act, the central law regarding water quality in the state. This policy regulates all activities and factors that could affect water quality and declares that the state can exercise its full power and jurisdiction to protect the water and prevent degradation. To continue combatting NPS, California is instating the 2020-2025 Nonpoint Source Program Implementation Plan. It aims to reduce NPS pollution through waste discharge requirements, create a grant program focused on controlling NPS, and continually evaluate the success of the NPS Program through tracking activities and water quality improvements.

    Overall, NPS programs in the US have had mixed success. A federal review of the 319 Grant Program found that state programs have not reliably yielded measurable water quality improvements and some of the funds were not effectively implemented or were not clearly linked to water quality improvements. Limitations include budget constraints, which have led states to prioritize the most cost-effective projects instead of simply the most effective projects, and inconsistent levels of EPA involvement and support in state programs. Despite this, the 319 Grant Program has reduced agricultural runoff of sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus.

    China

    Within the international community, China takes a markedly different approach to NPS prevention. While many US policies are aimed at state and local levels, NPS policies in China are focused on the national level. For example, China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs started implementing new policies around NPS prevention in 2015, including water-saving agriculture practices and a “zero-growth” action plan for regulating fertilizer and pesticide application. These policies have been successful in decreasing the amount of NPS pollution in China from 2016 to 2020. While these policies have been achieving their goals, there are additional areas to continue addressing NPS. One area of potential is in China’s new national emissions trading scheme, where the trading between point source and nonpoint source pollution can trigger the adoption of new techniques and methods for the proper production and management of natural resources. This program is still in the early stages of development but shows potential, as the market behaviors associated with NPS have been untapped in reducing pollution.

    Future of NPS

    The effects of NPS pollution will likely be exacerbated by climate change, which is predicted to cause more frequent and intense rainstorms. Rain will fall more frequently and in new parts of the world on infrastructure not built to withstand this amount of water, leading to polluted runoff. This runoff as well as potential sewer overflows would contribute to a great increase in NPS pollution and negative effects on human health.

    However, a number of new technological advances and policies may help control and prevent further pollution. These include the refinement of practices to reduce the application of nitrogen and phosphorus, the use of ecological ditch systems to remove agricultural runoff, and end treatment technologies that remove pollutants from waterways. Many of these technologies show promise for controlling nonpoint source pollution.

  • Ukraine Crisis and U.S. Sanctions Part 2

    Ukraine Crisis and U.S. Sanctions Part 2

    Russian Central Bank

    In coordination with European allies, the United States has also targeted investment in Russian funds. It has prohibited any U.S. individual or entity from engaging with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and frozen any assets of the Bank held in the United States or by Americans elsewhere. On a larger scale, the G-7 countries announced that Russia will be restricted from accessing its reserve holdings in G-7 jurisdictions, freezing about half of Russia’s foreign reserves. 

    The measures the United States has taken against the Central Bank are most significant in the imposition of limits on employing international reserves, which otherwise would be used to bolster the Russian economy in the face of U.S. sanctions. Moscow’s financial defense system against international economic sanctions has been referred to as a “fortress Russia” economy. Moscow’s efforts to sanction-proof the Russian economy have included amassing $630 billion dollars in foreign currency reserves. The foreign currency reserves were built up by over 75% since 2015, intended to enable Russians to exchange rubles for foreign currencies in the case of foreign sanctions. Despite a concerted attempt to shift towards the Chinese yuan, 45% of those assets were held in Western currencies. Preventing Moscow from selling foreign currency reserves to stabilize the ruble curtails its ability to protect its domestic economy from international economic sanctions.

    Nord Stream 2

    A significant development in the sanctions against Russia is within the energy and gas sector: Germany’s agreement to halt certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, worth $11 billion. After Russia recognized two breakaway regions in Ukraine, the United States terminated a previous waiver that exempted Nord Stream 2 AG, the parent company of the natural gas pipeline project, and its CEO from sanctions under U.S. law. Nord Stream 2 AG is a company under Gazprom, a Russian state-owned gas company. Despite pressure from the United States to reduce energy reliance on Russian suppliers, Berlin has resisted discontinuing the Nord Stream 2 project. Russia produces about 10% of the world’s oil, and concerns have arisen over the dependence of Europe on Russian gas. Europe’s significant economic interdependence on Russia’s gas companies has made this sector difficult to sanction as concerns emerge about rising gas prices. However, sanctions stopped short of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which is operational and has transferred gas to Germany since 2011. 

    SWIFT Sanctions

    The most recent sanctions blocking Russian banks from the global financial network SWIFT have the potential to cripple the Russian economy. Just days before Russia invaded Ukraine, disconnection from the SWIFT financial system was not included as a potential sanction, and the move seemed unlikely. A measure restricting banks from SWIFT has only been used once before against the Iranian government in 2012. SWIFT, or “Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication” is the world’s primary international payment network and is central to participation in the global financial system. Restricting banks from using SWIFT blocks international trade flow and undermines transfers and messaging across borders. Cutting Russia off from SWIFT was floated as a potential economic sanction in the aftermath of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, but it was ultimately not implemented because these sanctions could hurt the economies of the U.S. and its allies by stymying Russian participation in the global financial system. However, a day after the invasion, a joint statement by the U.S., European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, U.K., and Canada announced that certain Russian banks would be subject to a disconnection from SWIFT, marking an approach that would allow further expansion of SWIFT sanctions and protect against outsized economic harm in the rest of Europe. This measure marks a distinct escalation in sanctions against Russia.

    Consequences

    Isolating Russia economically in this way may put pressure on Moscow to temper or halt its actions in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. As the situation in Russia and Ukraine continues to develop, additional sanction measures may be introduced by the United States and the EU as a deterrent and political punishment for Russia’s violations of the Minsk Protocol and international law regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty, especially the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by the U.S., U.K., and Russia. Under that agreement, the United States provided assurances that it would not only respect Ukraine’s conditions to denuclearize but respond if Russia were to violate its security. By providing military assistance and imposing sanctions on Russia, it fulfills those assurances. 

    The economic consequences of the sanctions have already begun to take effect on Russia’s domestic economy. The Kremlin’s “fortress economy” has been put to the test: after sanctions were introduced there was a run on central banks as Russians attempted to withdraw foreign currencies. The Russian rouble collapsed against the dollar, depreciating to record lows—losing more than 40% of its value, settling at less than a U.S. penny. This depreciation has accelerated inflation in Russia; the central bank has more than doubled interest rates (to 20%), introduced capital controls, and blocked interest payments to foreign investors. 

    Image 1 

    While sanctions on Russian financial institutions and industries imposed by governments have damaged the Russian economy in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, economic consequences are emerging from the private sector as well. Disruptions in the supply chain and the volatility and depreciation of the ruble have created an unattractive and risky business environment. As the Russian economy begins to face the repercussions of a swift Western response, it has become increasingly difficult for private companies to operate there. Those who stay risk violating sanctions, reputational damage, and logistical complications. American credit rating agency Fitch downgraded its evaluation of the Russian economy from ‘B’ to ‘C’, indicating that a sovereign debt default is “imminent.” Many Western investors and companies have pulled out of Russia or announced their intentions to do so, severing sometimes decades-long business ties. This includes multinational corporations such as Paypal, ExxonMobil, BP, Visa, Mastercard, IBM, Amazon Web Services, Goldman Sachs, Apple, and Disney. In addition to the loss of consumer goods trade, many of these entities have significant financial and industrial clout. The loss of international business has more long-term implications than sanctions imposed by Western governments; private trepidation to operate in Russia could last far longer after sanctions have been lifted.

    However, it is unclear whether sanctions and their economic ramifications will be effective in swaying Moscow’s decision-making regarding Ukraine. Just as the economic impact of sanctions in the past has been debatable in altering Russia’s behavior, it is difficult to evaluate how much of an effect the 2022 sanctions will have. As of this moment, the fighting continues to escalate, as does the intensity and urgency of the international response to the conflict. Whether the economic damage will influence the Kremlin to back away from military action is yet to be seen.