ACE

Category: ACE Research

  • Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    AUKUS Partnership Outline

    The AUKUS Partnership was one of the first major foreign policy actions of President Biden’s Administration. On September 15, 2021, AUKUS partners released a joint statement announcing the agreement. The goal of the partnership is to promote information and technology sharing, and integrate security and defense measures by increasing cooperation on a variety of capabilities, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific Region.  

    The AUKUS Partnership has three pillars 

    1. Provide Australia with “conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capabilities (SSN)”. Prior to this agreement, this technology was limited to six nuclear capable states (U.S.,UK, France, Russia, China, and India). The U.S. previously shared SSN technology with the UK, and AUKUS now extends this to Australia, a non-nuclear state. As such, this partnership is set to revolutionize Australian naval capabilities, which have struggled to travel longer distances due to limitations of electrically powered submarine fleets. 
    2. Advance military capabilities “to promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region”. The AUKUS partnership outlines objectives to expand and develop technologies, such as: AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS, the development of robotic undersea technologies), AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA, development of quantum technologies), cooperation on Artificial Intelligence (AI), collaboration on hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and the development of cyber capabilities and security measures. 
    3. Commit to information exchange. As of February 8, 2022, The Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA) came into effect, resulting in AUKUS partners sharing nuclear propulsion intel trilaterally, the first agreement to do so with a non-nuclear capable state.

    U.S. Favorability of UK Partnership 

    Prior to the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the UK had limited influence or presence within the Indo-Pacific Region, with the only formal international agreement being their membership in the Five Eyes security alliance. However, this new partnership indicates a significant shift in UK foreign policy , confirming the UK’s intention to align with U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

    Figure showing the Overlap of Defense, Intelligence, and Security Groups in the Indo-Pacific Region.

    The AUKUS Partnership presented significant political fallout in U.S.–Europe relations, because it prioritized the UK security partnership over a broader European security pact.

    France was the most affected by the establishment of the AUKUS partnership as Australia withdrew from a previously agreed Franco-Australian Submarine deal to join AUKUS. This led to an increased strain on the U.S.–France Relations, due to both the loss of a multi-billion Euro agreement and the creation of a new security alliance formed without major European allies. Following the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, the new alliance took significant attention away from the European Union’s (EU) own policy plans for the Indo-Pacific Region. Given the contentious relations between the UK and the EU in a post-Brexit Europe, this partnership highlighted a perceived favoritism of U.S.–UK relations as loyal security partners, over a united Europe. In addition, with the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the agreement has strengthened an EU-independent UK as the only European state with significant security partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region.

    Ramifications of the AUKUS Partnership

    The response to the AUKUS partnership has been mixed. As discussed, the pact strained U.S.-French relations, and distanced the U.S. from Europe in terms of Indo-Pacific cooperation. Some believe this may lead to the EU pursuing its own independent security strategy when dealing with contentious U.S. and China relations, a position that has been publicly supported by French President Emmanuel Macron.

    The AUKUS partnership, however, will have the most on-the-ground impact within the Indo-Pacific region. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reactions have been divided on the new security partnership present in the region. Recent analysis shows that 36.4% of ASEAN respondents say AUKUS would help “balance China’s growing military power”, yet 22.5% say the deal could spark “a regional arms race”. Overall there is a worry of what the broader consequences of agreements such as AUKUS may be, and their effects on the stability of the region.   

    A major concern of the AUKUS Partnership is the potentially dangerous precedent an agreement of this nature could set for nuclear proliferation. While all three partners emphasized their commitment against nuclear proliferation, this agreement is the first to allow a non-nuclear capable state to access nuclear technology. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear states to declare all nuclear material, with the IAEA verifying the material is not being used for weaponry development, thus acting as a deterrence for nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT relies on states to self-monitor naval nuclear reactors because of practical issues with access. Australia is setting a precedent as the first non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear materials the IAEA is not monitoring. It could be dangerous if other countries follow this path, and derail the current global nuclear nonproliferation system. While Australia may not prove to be an exploitive threat to nuclear weapons development through the AUKUS partnership, a future agreement of this nature could serve as the perfect cover for potential would-be-proliferators to advance nuclear development programs under the guise of access to nuclear material through naval reactors, no longer checked by the IAEA. 

    US–UK Relations and Nuclear Proliferation

    A 2020 report by Pew Research demonstrates that nuclear nonproliferation is a major foreign policy issue in the United States; 73% of Americans perceive the “spread of nuclear weapons” as a major threat to the U.S. This position attracts bipartisan support, with both Democrats and Republicans responding in equal measure to the perceived international threat. Moreover, 80% of respondents favor state cooperation with other countries as “very important” when navigating the spread of nuclear weapons.

    The United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK) have a long history of alignment on foreign policy objectives towards nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear war. Much of the existing U.S.–UK agreements on nuclear cooperation between both states derive and build upon the original 1958 “Atomic Energy. Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes” agreement, which bound both countries in a united front against other state development of atomic weapons. As such, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Partnership is yet another foreign policy step the U.S. and the UK have taken to further their allied cooperation to address the international security threats of today.

  • Policy Debates Surrounding Changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

    Policy Debates Surrounding Changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

    Background Information

    The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP (formerly labeled food stamps, and often still referred to as such), is an American federal food assistance program that provides credits to people that may be used to purchase food items. Funding for the program is covered fully by the federal government, though states are responsible for administering the program, and for some of the administration costs. The program was expanded, starting in the spring of 2020, in order to address increased food insecurity brought on by COVID-19. These pandemic-era expansions of the program have illuminated significant debate about the future direction of the program. 

    Some have placed emphasis on maximizing SNAP’s ability to combat food insecurity, while others have expressed concerns about ensuring that the program does not overly disincentivize work or contribute to a lack of self-sufficiency. Pandemic-era expansions of SNAP in 2020 and 2021 have added fuel to these questions on both sides of the policy discussion, although these debates have been around for decades. 

    At the program’s inception in 1939, and its second iteration in the early 1960s, food stamp recipients were required to purchase stamps equaling their normal food expenditure, and would receive, in the form of the stamps, the ability to purchase more food than they would normally have been able to purchase with that sum. Some criticized the requirement, arguing that it placed limits on participation, and it was removed by the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, leading to an increase in participation.The act also established more regulation on the availability of food stamps. For example, it included a penalty for stamp recipients who voluntarily quit their jobs without good cause. This penalty has persisted in SNAP’s general work requirement. Those who do not meet the work requirements can be suspended from the SNAP program for a month or more.

    COVID-19 Pandemic Era Expansions

    The pandemic-era relief packages passed by Congress included the following changes:

    While all of these measures have technically been temporary, there was also a permanent increase in SNAP’s maximum allotment in 2021 through a program called the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP). The re-evaluation of the TFP was mandated by the 2018 Farm Bill, which required that the TFP be reassessed to be better representative of the cost of a healthy diet. The TFP re-evaluation raised the maximum allotment by 21%, though other publications have pegged the increase at over 25%, perhaps due to differences in calculation.

    Concerns about SNAP’s impact on employment and self-sufficiency

    The employment-incentive-focused side of the SNAP debate is most contentious when discussing the TFP permanent increase in the maximum allotment, and the temporary and partial suspension of the ABAWD work requirement. One element of controversy are discretionary exemptions, which allow states to exempt one ABAWD from the ABAWD work requirements for a month. States receive a limited number of exemptions, and these can be carried over into subsequent fiscal years. It has been argued that as the current suspension of the ABAWD work requirement makes the use of these discretionary exemptions redundant, states will store up their discretionary exemptions and, once the national public health emergency declaration has ended, use them to exempt a high number of ABAWDs.

    SNAP work disincentives have been alleged to contribute to a host of negative outcomes, including interfering with economic recovery, and contributing to a shortage of labor. One study published in Labour Economics found that access to SNAP decreased the rate at which single women were employed by 6%, and caused married men to reduce the hours they worked by 5%. 

    Concerns about increasing food security

    However, other studies report contrary results. Another study from the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management found that SNAP increased the labor participation of participants by around 5%, and increased their yearly hours worked by 47 hours per year. They attributed this mostly to the ABAWD work requirement and reason that it increases workforce participation.

    Additionally, it has been argued that SNAP’s benefits structure is designed to reduce the work disincentives that some allege emerge when recipients of welfare benefits lose those benefits as a result of increases in income. Because SNAP is designed to gradually reduce benefits with rises in income, and includes an income deduction that further reduces the amount of benefits that are lost with increases in income, there is less risk of SNAP participants being dissuaded from working for fear of an abrupt loss of benefits. There is an income threshold, past which SNAP recipients will lose SNAP benefits, but because of this gradual reduction in benefits, the loss is not a large one.

    A vocal group of supporters of SNAP are calling for extended or permanent expansions of the SNAP benefits that were implemented in the early months of the pandemic. This perspective praises the TFP permanent increase in the maximum allotment, as well as the temporary suspension of the ABAWD work requirement, as providing a necessary increase in the program’s ability to improve the food security of recipients. The program has been shown to have a significant impact on food insecurity—it brings down overall food insecurity by as much as 30%—but the Urban Institute, an economic and social policy-research think-tank, found that before the TFP increase, the average maximum SNAP allotment (which varies based on household size), covered the cost of a modestly priced meal in 4% of the counties in the contiguous United States. The study found that after the increase, the average maximum SNAP allotment covered the cost of a modestly priced meal in 79% of US counties. Some posit that this is still insufficient, and that more should be done to combat food insecurity. 

    Others suggest making the suspension of the ABAWD work requirement permanent. They believe it causes significant harm by taking benefits away from ABAWD SNAP recipients who may be working part time with irregular hours, or facing significant barriers to work and therefore cannot meet the requirement. 

    It has also been argued that available research shows the requirements do not have a meaningful impact on employment. A recent report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) analyzed nine states and found that the ABAWD work requirement reduced SNAP enrollment. The amount of reduction varied based on the state, from a 5% decrease in some Colorado counties to a 41% decrease in Vermont. However, the study found that a large portion of those subject to the ABAWD work requirement were found to be unemployed four quarters after the requirement was implemented. This contradicts the findings of previously mentioned studies and demonstrates a large potential for future research on the subject. 

    The pandemic era expansions of SNAP have illuminated one of the policy debates that has guided the program since its beginning: differing ideas about what recipients should have to do in order to receive SNAP, and how much they should receive. The core of the debate is grounded in differing ideas about the role that government should play in providing resources to citizens to help people better support themselves. This debate will continue to drive the development of future discussions around SNAP.

  • The US Role in Countering Terrorism in Kenya and Somalia

    The US Role in Countering Terrorism in Kenya and Somalia

    Introduction

    On October 11, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the beginning of the Global War on Terror. New US policies were implemented domestically and internationally to combat the threat of terrorism. Both military operations and civilian aid programs have been used for this purpose, and Kenya and Somalia have experienced a combination of both policy types. Both countries have been of interest to US security efforts for the past three decades, with US military operations in Somalia predating the war on terror, and diplomatic relationships with both established shortly after their respective indepences. 

    Diplomatic Overview 

    The US established diplomatic relations with Somalia shortly after its independence from Great Britain and Italy in 1960. Since independence, the country has experienced coups and civil wars which made consistent diplomatic relations difficult. For example the US embassy in Mogadishu was closed from 1991 to 2018. During this period, the US undertook military operations in 1992-1994 and 2002, at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa. At the same time, the Somalian government received $3 billion in humanitarian, governance and security aid since 2006. Additionally, the United States works with local and global organizations to create and support effective systems to locally address humanitarian issues. 

    US relations with Kenya are stronger than those with Somalia. Relations were established in 1964, and the scope of bilateral engagement between the two countries began to expand in 1992 when Kenya became a multiparty democracy. The relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership in 2018, and the first Bilateral Strategic Dialogue with Kenyan representatives took place  in 2019. This dialogue affirmed US commitment to work with Kenya on addressing a variety of issues, including defense and civilian security in both the country and region. Kenya receives a large amount of aid from the United States, which totalled $560 million for fiscal year 2020. The United States and Kenya cooperate closely on security programs, with US agencies including the State Department and Department of Defense contributing millions to improving both civilian law enforcement and defense institutions. Programs focus on different approaches to security, including counterterrorism and countering violent extremism, as well as bolstering criminal investigation capacity, border security, and crisis response. 

    Historic and Present Threats 

    US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were bombed in 1998 by Al-Qaeda, killing a total of 224 people and injuring over 4,500. During the War on Terror, Kenya and Somalia were one region of concern due to Al-Qaeda and its regional affiliate, Al-Shabaab. In January of 2020, Al-Shabab militants attacked a Joint US-Kenyan military installation, CSL Manda Bay, on the Northern, killing three Americans.

    Al-Shabaab, a regional cell of Al-Qaeda established 1993 is the primary terror group operating in Kenya and Somalia. The group has varying ideologies, but most members are unified by a commitment to Sharia Law and opposition to the Western-backed Federal Government of Somalia. The group has been responsible for many terrorist attacks in Kenya and Somalia, targeting embassies, shopping malls and hotels. They are composed of an estimated 8,000 active members.  

    Policy 

    United States activities confronting terrorist threats in Kenya and Somalia can be grouped into two categories, counterterrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE). Counterterrorism encompasses a variety of actionable policy, including border security, military operations, law enforcement and legislation. US agencies and military bodies will cooperate with host nations in solving issues in these categories through equipping local armed forces, intelligence support, and advisory support. Countering violent extremism takes a different approach, focusing on prevention through increasing peaceful options for political, economic and social engagement for communities. To accomplish this, programs engage with communities at local levels, focusing on regional governments with specific focuses to prevent the spread of violent extremism. 

    Involved Agencies and Their Roles 

    The State Department increased its focus on regional security following the embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Soon after, Kenya was added to the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which acted as a signal of increased US interest. The program didn’t receive funding until a few years later, and involved training Kenya Defense Force personnel through the Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR). SPEAR is a program through which the Diplomatic Security Service trains forces from ATA member countries in tactical responses to instances of terrorist violence, protecting the interests of both the member state and US personnel and facilities. 

    The Department of Defense cooperates with and trains soldiers and personnel from the Kenya Defense Force (KDF), as well as providing intelligence and technical support during counterterrorist operations. Soldiers from Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) train alongside KDF units, such as SPEAR teams, in situations including crisis response, humanitarian assistance, and evacuation of non-combatant personnel. US military assets are also deployed in tandem with Kenyan military personnel during counterterrorism operations such as Operation Linda Nchi, whose goal was combating the threat Al-Shabaab to the Kenyan homeland. US air assets provided intelligence and survey information, while the KDF shouldered the bulk of the fighting and ground operations.  

    The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) works to counter violent extremism (CVE) in at-risk countries, including Kenya and Somalia. As early as 2011, USAID began conducting CVE activities in the ethnic Somali majority community of Eastleigh in Nairobi. Subsequently, larger scale work began in cooperation with the Kenyan National Counterterrorism Center to support local capability to counter violent extremism. Leveraging the 2010 Kenyan constitution, USAID and the Kenyan NCTC worked with all 47 Kenyan counties to develop local level CVE action plans. USAID focuses primarily on the civilian cooperation between the United States and Kenya, and has provided substantial support for local authorities to counter violent extremist networks through civilian-made solutions.  

    Governance and control of Somalia is fractured, with regional governing bodies maintaining control over certain areas of the country. US organizations primarily work with the recognized Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to support local efforts to combat violent extremism and terrorism. The FGS has implemented a number of its own programs, such as regulations on financial transactions requiring any suspicious movement of funds to be reported to the country’s Financial Reporting Center. The US military also has presence in the country with its stated mission being one of advise-and-assist, enabling local forces to orchestrate more effective campaigns against terrorism. This includes training, advising and equipping the forces of the FGS. 

    Conclusions 

    The United States has major security interests in Kenya and Somalia, stemming from its fight against Al-Qaeda. Policy in the region has been and is varied, using both CT and CVE methods to work towards broad and specific objectives. Cooperation with local authorities is a cornerstone of both types of policy, and will continue to be in the future. Currently active programs from USAID, DOD, and the State Department all cooperate with military and civilian sectors of the Kenyan and Somali governments.

  • Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions Reduction in the U.S

    Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions Reduction in the U.S

    Background Information

    GHGs are gasses which form Earth’s atmosphere. They include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), among others. GHGs keep the Earth warm by taking in heat and keeping it from exiting into space. When concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere are too high, too much heat can be trapped, which has been linked to hotter temperatures, more severe storms, increased drought, rising sea levels, species loss, changes to agriculture, forced displacement, and poverty. As a result, regulating GHGs is a key component of climate change policies. 

    Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector in 2020, EPA

    GHGs can be emitted by different activities including naturally through plant respiration and decomposition of organic matter, as well as through human activities. Transportation emits GHGs through burning fossil fuels for cars, ships, trains, and planes, and about 60% of electricity in the U.S. as of 2020, comes from burning fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas. Industries also contribute to GHG emissions by burning fossil fuels for energy and from chemical reactions producing raw materials. Commercial and residential emissions of GHGs come from businesses and homes burning fossil fuels for heat, handling waste, and using products and electricity that emit GHGs during production. Lastly, agriculture emits GHGs from livestock, soils, and farm equipment. 

    The United States and GHG Emissions

    In 2016, the Obama administration joined the Paris Agreement, an international treaty adopted to phase out fossil fuels and transition the global economy to clean energy. According to the United Nations, “the goal is to limit global warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels.” A poll conducted by Pew Research Center determined that  48% of U.S. adults at the time believed the Earth was warming mostly from human activities. The Obama administration made it the U.S. goal to decrease GHG emissions by 26-28% by 2025.

    U.S. Emissions Under 2020 and 2025 Targets, UNFCCC

    In 2017, the Trump administration left the Paris Agreement due to concerns over the economic impact. The President cited a 2017 National Economic Research Associates (NERA) report which stated attaining the Paris Agreement’s goals would lead to 2.7 million job losses by 2025. 

    In 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Edward Markey reignited American interest in climate change with the introduction of the Green New Deal resolution in the House and Senate. The Select Committee on Climate Crisis was formed in the House, and the bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus was formed in the Senate.

    The Biden Administration reentered the Paris Agreement in 2021. According to a 2022 Pew Research Center survey, 75% of U.S. adults are in support of U.S. participation in international climate change efforts. The Biden administration also established a new set of GHG emission targets. The new targets are:

    1. Reducing U.S. GHG emissions by 50-52% below 2005 levels by 2030
    2. Reaching 100% carbon pollution-free electricity by 2035
    3. Achieving a net-zero emissions economy by 2050
    4. Delivering 40% of the benefits from federal investments in climate and clean energy to disadvantaged communities

    These new targets aim to more drastically decrease U.S. emissions than previous administrations by focusing on using more electric vehicles, negating GHG emissions from human activity, and assisting Americans most affected by climate change. 

    Additionally, the Biden administration formed the National Climate Task Force in order to tackle climate change, create union jobs, and focus on environmental justice. In late April of 2022, the National Climate Task Force hosted a climate summit to revisit carbon emissions targets which led the US government to revise and strengthen the current climate agenda.

    Supporters of Regulating GHG Emissions

    Many support the new targets because they believe the targets will lead to bold action, which will better ensure clean air and water, introduction of greener technologies, and health in American communities. 

    Others support the new targets because they think it is the U.S.’s responsibility to enact strong GHG targets as one of the highest per capita CO2 emitters and the second highest total CO2 emitting country, surpassed only by China. Supporters of the new target believe it is the responsibility of the U.S. to pave the way in GHG reduction, and that these goals could ultimately influence other countries to do the same. Additionally, supporters think this would allow the U.S. to match the ambitious goals of countries within the EU that are more aggressive than the 50% target set by Biden.

    Annual CO2 Emissions Comparing the World, China, and the United States, Our World in Data

    Some support the targets because they believe it will fuel the economy and prioritize workers by creating middle class union jobs laying transmission lines for a clean grid, capping leaking mines, and building electric vehicles and the infrastructure to support them. They also contend that the new jobs could be filled by people moving from the coal industry into these greener industries. 

    Opponents to Stronger Regulations of GHG Emissions

    Some opponents believe the transition from industries, such as coal, to greener energy production will not increase jobs. Instead, they are concerned that workers in high pollution and nonrenewable industries will lose their jobs as those industries are phased out. While some argue that these workers can shift to clean energy sector jobs, others feel the people who are expected to switch industries do not have transferable skills.

    Others caution against what they view as a rapid change to the economy when the effects of climate change are still up for debate. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report laid out a series of potential outcomes, with the most extreme options being the least likely to occur. They assert that scientific understanding of climate change is still growing and improving, so the results of the models used to predict the effects of climate change should not be relied on immediately because the technology is still being perfected. 

    Others believe these targets still are not enough. They believe the global average temperature will still exceed the 1.5 degrees Celsius goal articulated in the Paris Agreement. A 2021 peer reviewed article published in Nature Climate Change states that the best estimates of global average temperature increase under the new regulations are 2-2.4 degrees Celsius by 2100, possibly still within the maximum increase of 2 degrees Celsius outlined in the Paris Agreement.

    Other bills are being enacted and passed which may impact U.S. GHG emissions. These include the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal and the Build Back Better Act, which both have provisions regarding GHGs. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal has been enacted and notices of funding opportunities, requests for information, and funding applications are beginning to open up. The Build Back Better Act is waiting to be passed through the Senate but there are conversations about a bipartisan reconciliation agreement. Additionally, the recent Supreme Court ruling in West Virginia v. EPA, which limits the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ability to regulate carbon emissions. This decision and its impacts will be important to follow as government agencies’ and branches’ roles in regulating GHG emissions are redefined.

  • Latin American Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy

    Latin American Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy

    A Time of Change

    In 2021 and at the start of 2022, Latin American politics were dominated by numerous, significant elections. Newly elected leaders marked the beginning of a new wave of youth attempting to change the region’s status quo. Many of these leaders will come into power facing countless issues that have been plaguing Latin America for years: the rising prices of commodities, economic recovery from COVID-19, corruption, democratic backsliding, debates over extractivism, and growing tensions between the U.S. and China in the region.

    At the same time, the U.S. finds itself at a crossroads in its relationship with the region. While President Biden has made it a priority to work with Latin American governments to tackle issues such as migration crises and economic recovery, the administration will still have to work on amending its partnerships with the region following years of deteriorating relations. A fresh wave of leadership across the region may present an opportunity for the U.S. to realign its foreign policy with Latin America.

    Focusing on the elections in Ecuador, Chile, and Honduras, what do these new governments mean for the future of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America?

    Ecuador

    On May 24th, 2021, Ecuador’s newly elected president, Guillermo Lasso took office. Lasso is a conservative, right-leaning, former banker who had a surprising victory over Andrés Arauz. Arauz was the hand-selected successor of former President Rafael Correa, the long-time serving leftist president who has since been convicted of corruption. Lasso’s victory represents a shift away from the authoritarian leftist politics of Correa, which has ignited both hopes for change and uncertainty about the future of the country.

    Since taking office, Lasso has attempted to enact his pro-business and pro-investment policies but has been faced with limited support in Congress. Further issues have plagued his first six months in power, including the growing security crisis and intensifying drug trade, as well as the massive influx of Venezuelan migrants into the country. Moreover, the need for economic stability in the wake of rising inflation has consumed much of Lasso’s time in office. This has led Lasso to prioritize juridical reforms across the Ecuadorian government to create a safe environment for foreign investments and attempt to renegotiate trade and debt agreements with the U.S., China, and IMF to help revitalize the economy.

    Lasso has proven that he can be a strong ally for the U.S. in South America. Both his participation in the Summit of the Americas and the recent visit by First Lady Jill Biden exhibit the continued strength of the U.S.-Ecuadorian relationship. Moreover, despite the growing presence of China in Ecuador’s economy, the U.S remains the country’s number one trading partner. With this strong ally in South America, the U.S. has the option to work with Lasso and the Ecuadorian government to tackle many of the important issues that President Biden has been focusing on in Latin America, including dealing with migration, drug trafficking, corruption, and climate change. Lasso and Ecuador have the potential to be key allies as the U.S. attempts to reestablish itself as a primary player in Latin America.

    Chile

    The election of Gabriel Boric for president in December of 2021 marked a monumental shift in Chilean politics. Boric represents the epitome of the new wave of leadership sweeping across Latin America, as a young, leftist leader with a focus on the issues of climate change, social reform, and inequality. Boric came into power riding a massive wave of social unrest beginning in 2019. This wave of support is what pushed Boric to victory over José Antonio Kast, a right-wing lawyer, whom many Chileans viewed as a dangerous regression towards the conservative right-wing dictatorship of Pinochet.

    Since Boric’s inauguration in March of 2022, he has focused on tackling many of the same issues that plague governments across the region, including migration and economic instability. However, following the 2019 protests in the country, Chile has been attempting to rewrite its constitution, which has remained unchanged since Chile transitioned to democracy in 1990. The Constitutional Referendum has consumed much of Chilean politics in Boric’s first months in charge and has hindered many of his efforts to pass taxes on mining companies and social justice reform. Further issues such as rising inflation and the soaring cost of commodities have left Chile, a country that imports much of its food and crude oil, in a difficult economic situation that Boric will have to face in the coming months.

    While domestic issues remain central during the early days of Boric’s presidency, his election victory provides a new opportunity for U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, Boric represents the new “millennial” left wave that is passing through Latin America: a “new left” with an ideological shift away from the authoritarian leftist governments of the early 2000s who vilified the United States, to one that seeks to work and collaborate with the U.S. to preserve democracy and tackle other international affairs. Boric has already shown his desire to work with the U.S. by attending the recent Summit of the Americas. Fostering a positive U.S.-Chile relationship can be an example for other newly elected leaders across the region.

    Moreover, much of the Biden administration’s goals and priorities align well with Boric’s agenda, especially the focus on strengthening democracy, social reforms, inequality, and climate change. The issue of climate change could be a key point of collaboration between both countries as Boric seeks to make the country’s mining companies more community-oriented and environmentally friendly, which are efforts that can be aided by U.S. support. 

    Chile can also be an opportunity for the U.S. to reinvigorate itself as an important economic partner in the region. Chile has the second-largest lithium deposits in the world and is the number one exporter of copper, so the country has a vital role in the global economy, as the demand for batteries and electric cars continues to grow. The natural resources have attracted Chinese manufacturers, culminating in China being Chile’s number one trading partner. The U.S. could pursue new economic strategies such as increasing investments, building on current trade deals, and strengthening the region’s supply chain, to lessen the trade gap with China in Latin America. 

    Honduras

    The election of Xiomara Castro in November of 2021 was a turning point for Honduran politics; it marked the end of a 12-year single-party rule, and Castro became the country’s first female president. A 62-year-old center-leftist, Castro is the wife of former President Manuel Zelaya, who was ousted in a 2009 military-backed coup, which both the U.S. and OAS condemned. 

    Castro has taken over the country at one of its lowest points. Her predecessor, former President Juan Orlando Hernádez was indicted by the U.S. for drug trafficking. Moreover, the country has begun to recover from the devastating shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as two Category 4 hurricanes in 2020, which resulted in a 9% decline in GDP. While the past two years have been a slow growth towards recovery, Honduras remains one of the poorest countries in Central America. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, 73% of the population lives below the national poverty line, with almost 54% living in extreme poverty. With a reeling economy and intensifying violence, thousands of families have made the treacherous journey northwards to the U.S. causing a mass migration crisis.

    However, Castro’s victory could prove to be a reset in U.S.-Honduran relations. During her campaign, Castro ran on a platform heavily aligned with the Biden administration’s goals for Central America. This led Vice President Kamala Harris to attend Castro’s inauguration, showing positive signs for the relationship. Efforts by the Biden administration such as the “Root Causes of Migration” policy seek to tackle the issues such as economic insecurity, corruption, human rights violations, and violence that push families to migrate northwards. However, such policies will require support from government officials in Central America to be effective. As Castro shows signs of being a strong ally in the region, Honduras may become essential for the U.S. plan to deal with the current migration crisis.

    U.S. support could also be crucial in aiding Honduras with its economic recovery. Over 30% of the country’s budget is consumed by debt to international financial institutions, many of whom the U.S. is a primary financier. By renegotiating this debt, much of the country’s budget could be redistributed towards health, education, and national development. Furthermore, dealing with Honduras’ rampant corruption problem is also a major target for Castro, who has already pledged to create an anti-corruption commission. Congruently, President Biden has made solving corruption an important part of his “Root Causes of Migration” plan. He has also promised $4 billion in aid which Honduras will only have access to once government corruption is dealt with. 

    The Future Remains Uncertain

    For Ecuador, Chile, and Honduras change brings hope and uncertainty. While new leadership could prove to be a turning point for many of these countries, many developments still remain to be seen. For the U.S., this could be the opportunity to push for a new foreign policy to re-establish itself in Latin America. However, these leaders need time and patience, which might be the hardest thing to find.

  • Curbing Migration in the Northern Triangle

    Curbing Migration in the Northern Triangle

    The Root Causes Strategy is the Biden administration’s attempt to address the root causes of migration from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In July of 2021, the administration announced this strategy via executive order to use the private sector, US diplomacy, and foreign assistance programs to work with governments and local organizations in the Northern Triangle. The strategy is made up of five pillars: 

    1. Addressing economic insecurity and inequality, 
    2. Combating corruption and advancing the rule of law,
    3. Respecting human rights, 
    4. Preventing crimes and criminal organizations, and 
    5. Combating gender-based violence. 

    This policy is in response to the rise in migration from the Northern Triangle, evidenced by the rising Central American-born population in the US which has grown tenfold since 1980. The increase in recent years has been attributed to government corruption, violence, and natural disasters in the region. The Trump administration attempted to curtail this increase in migration through asylum bans, the “Remain in Mexico” program, metering, and the detention of migrant families at the border. Biden’s plan aims to shift away from the criminalization practices and address the root issues of migration using this $4 billion program. 

    Recently, the administration released an update on the Root Causes Strategy on April 19, 2022. Vice President Kamala Harris created the Call to Action initiative, which brings together private sector leaders, and generated $1.2 billion in commitments from companies like Microsoft, Nespresso, and Mastercard who plan to launch projects across the Northern Triangle. Furthermore, the US has sent vaccines, given humanitarian assistance, created the Anti-Corruption Task Force, supported human rights defenders, assisted in increasing security, and supported initiatives for women and local organizations.

    Arguments in Support of the Root Causes Strategy

    Supporters of the Root Causes Strategy argue that relief alone does not curb migration. The COVID-19 pandemic and weather have exacerbated root causes like corruption, violence, and consequences of climate change, and alleviating the effects of these problems alone does not solve them. Others also say that the use of the private sector allows for more economic opportunity in the region. They claim that US and international investment boosts economic activity and forces regional govts to create conditions to attract investment. This ultimately improves conditions for citizens.

    Arguments Against the Root Causes Strategy

    However, some critics say that the US avoids discussing state-sponsored violence, US intervention, the negative effects of neoliberalism, and historical land inequality when tackling root causes. Therefore, they denounce the program’s dependence on private sector investment, citing that this structure has not worked in the past. Instead, the strategy should focus on labor rights, benefits, and better wages for people instead of corporations. Additionally, they contend that Biden and Harris need a more localized approach. Often, when money goes to local and national governments in the Northern Triangle, which are usually corrupt, it does not end up helping people. Therefore, these critics argue that more money must go to grassroots, faith-based, and local organizations as they are best positioned to curb the root causes of migration. 

    On the other hand, other critics insist that the Root Causes Strategy focuses too much on the “push” factors of Central American migration, like limited women’s rights and climate change, instead of the “pull” factors. For example, they argue that assistance to single-parent households in Central America incentivizes men to migrate to the US, and that combating climate change is a waste of money because most migrants come for economic reasons. They recommend policies that strengthen border security and migrant detentions. They also claim that the US government can only make modest changes to the root causes of poverty because Central Americans must change social attitudes about education and corruption. Furthermore, they argue that giving money to community organizations is not the most effective because these groups are unelected, unmonitored, and cannot be held accountable.

  • Homelessness in Austin, Texas

    Homelessness in Austin, Texas

    This brief was originally published by Rebecca Molina on November 30, 2021. It was updated by Jaya Sood on July 6, 2022.

    Introduction

    Austin, the capital of Texas, is the state’s fourth largest city. The city’s population is ethnically diverse—less than half of the population are of European descent, and more than one-third of the population is Hispanic. Many have moved to Austin for economic opportunity to find a job. With the city rapidly expanding, the price of housing is rising and affordable housing supply has not kept up with demand . In 2020, the number of people who were homeless in Austin was estimated to be 3,200 on a given night, which is likely to be an undercount because many people move in and out of homelessness throughout the year. 

    Who are the homeless in Austin, TX? 

    African Americans represent 1 in 3 people in the homeless population but 1 in 10 people in the Travis County/Austin area. People ages 25 – 44 are the largest group homeless population with 35.2% followed by 45 – 64 with 30.7%. The largest racial and ethnic groups are White (79.9%) and non-Hispanic (66.2%). Men overall have a disadvantage to women being homeless in the Austin area with 59.3% of men, 40.5% with women, and .2% of trans and non-binary. This could explain the reason many shelters in Austin are geared towards men. 6%of the homeless population are veterans.

    Household Size

    About 11% of those who are experiencing homelessness in Austin are families with children. 2 to 3 person households make up 13.7% of the population. Household size of 4 or more consists of 4.2%. 7% of youths between the ages of 13 to 24 are living alone.

    The Homeless Experience in Austin

    • Medical Issues: 44% report that they are experiencing health issues which require treatment. 30% of households report at least one member having a physical disability. Physical disabilities further limit housing options, because otherwise-affordable housing may not be accessible. 36% of households report experiencing mental health issues and 13.4% report having substance use issues.
    • Personal Violence: 53% report that at least one of the household members has been violently attacked when they were homeless. 
    • Poverty: 51% of households report they are unable to consistently meet their needs such as bathing, water, access to food, and other essentials.  

    City Policies and Resources 

    In spring of 2021, the city of Austin banned homeless camping. The law defines camping as an individual camping temporarily in a place with shelter. This includes a tent, sleeping bag, bedroll, blankets, or any form of shelter other than clothing to protect a person from weather and health reasons. People can camp for recreational purposes or on property that has been approved for homeless living. 

    The Austin Resource Center for the Homeless is the main service provider for the homeless population. This resource center offers emergency shelter, basic needs, and services. However, this center only has the capacity to house 130 men overnight, so demand outstrips supply. Several private shelters also provide similar services.

    The Travis County Commissioners Court recently allocated $110 million to rehouse the homeless. This goes along with the American Rescue Plan Act that is addressing homelessness and affordable housing across the country. Currently, another $50 million was requested by the Travis County Supportive Housing Collaborative to help develop new affordable housing communities across Austin to house around 1,000 people. 

  • The Southern Gas Corridor and European Energy

    The Southern Gas Corridor and European Energy

    This brief was originally written by Nick Griffin. Before its publication, it was updated by Arielle Romm.

    As Europe transitions away from fossil fuels and towards green energy, natural gas has filled the gap between what existing fossil fuel generators are permitted to produce and clean energy sources are capable of providing. Natural gas generates about 22% of Europe’s energy supply, of which Russia supplies 33%. Russia’s influence over Europe’s energy supply poses a security threat for the continent. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the West’s ensuing sanctions have disrupted the supply of essential fuel. Many target Russia’s lucrative energy industry, which U.S. President Joe Biden has called “the main artery of Russia’s economy” and the U.S. banned imports of Russian oil, gas, and coal entirely. As Russia becomes more aggressive, European leaders have begun to recognize the necessity of diversifying energy imports and look elsewhere for natural gas supplies. In light of this, Central Asia and the Southern Gas Corridor have become key players as a counterbalance to both Russian energy power and strategic considerations regarding China’s influence in the region. 

    The Invasion of Ukraine and Impact on Energy Supply

    After Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, the United States, Europe, and other allies imposed sanctions to punish the nation for invading and deter further escalation. Though these sanctions aim to target the Russian economy, Europe and the West face steep energy prices as a result and may have to pay exorbitant gas prices if the conflict does not end quickly. Immediately following the invasion, gas prices rose 36% due to fear of sanctions impacting the European markets’ natural gas supply. The ongoing conflict has resulted in the destruction of pipelines and threatens to disrupt the flow of energy to European homes. In March of 2022, Putin set an ultimatum to Western nations that had previously been recipients of Russian gas and resources, requiring payment for gas in Russian rubles, rather than US dollars or euros. In the aftermath of this announcement, gas prices in the West jumped even further, and governments scrambled to find alternatives. Already, Russian energy giant Gazprom has halted the flow of gas to Bulgaria, Poland, and Finland, who refused to capitulate to the demands. Damaged Russia-West relations could impact the energy supply well into the future. Germany has canceled the certification of an important pipeline, Nord Stream 2, and sanctions could persist for years. 

    Building and Expanding the Southern Gas Corridor

    The ongoing war in Ukraine has highlighted the necessity of diversifying, but plans to connect Central Asian energy with Europe have been in the works for more than a decade. In 2012, an agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey resulted in a new, Trans-Anatolian pipeline to transport Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian Sea gas fields to European markets. Construction began in 2015 and was completed in 2018. The existing Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) was expanded to connect with Greece, Italy, and Southeastern Europe. Known as the Southern Gas Corridor, this energy source has become essential in recent weeks and could be the future of European energy. Further expansions are underway; the Gas Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria will connect to the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline in Stara Zagora. When the expansion is complete, Bulgaria is projected to import ⅓ of its natural gas from Azerbaijan.

    Understanding Europe’s Dilemma

    Although plans are currently in the works to fully transition to green energy (eliminating the need for gas pipelines altogether), Germany’s carbon emission reduction goals are currently set to a 65% reduction by 2030 and an 88% reduction in carbon emissions by 2040. The EU, recognizing the urgency of this energy shift, has pledged to spend €210 billion ($222 billion) to wean itself off Russian oil and gas through the REPowerEU plan. works to reduce its consumption of Russia’s gas by 66% before the end of this year, but may only be able to break its dependence completely before 2027 even at the best-case scenario. However, the most ambitious plans still require Europe to import natural gas at least a few more years, if not decades. Continued reliance on Russia is a security risk while changing suppliers to Turkey and Azerbaijan would shift the risk and support two regimes that have been accused of human rights violations. 

    • Azerbaijan, the source of the gas, has been called an authoritarian state by organizations like Freedom House. The leader of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has ruled since a 2003 election that featured accusations of repression and intimidation of opposition candidates and rallies. Azerbaijan has been accused of violating its citizens’ human rights, including those of opposition leaders and journalists by Human Rights Watch. The country is also purported to have committed war crimes during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, including decapitations and mutilations of Armenian soldiers as well as the use of cluster bombs against civilian targets. 
    • Similarly, Turkey has been accused of clamping down on civil rights, limiting the free speech rights of dissidents and journalists, and criminalizing criticism of Turkish President Erdogan. Erdogan’s government has been charged with torturing political dissidents in prison.

    China’s economic presence in Central Asia has grown in recent years. Already, China poses a counterbalance to the West’s efforts to use energy as leverage against Russia. In February of 2022, Russia and China signed a 30-year contract to supply gas to China via a new pipeline, agreeing to do so in euros, and increase their relationship since the 2019 signing of the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline between the two. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, imports of Russian oil have risen by 55% from a year prior, taking Saudi Arabia’s place as China’s biggest oil supplier. This energy alliance is a distinct concern in the face of growing Western sanctions on Russian energy, leading to fears of a so-called “gas pivot” to China. China has also developed energy relationships with both Turkey and Azerbaijan, leading to increased fears of its growing influence in the region. The region is undergoing a geopolitical shift that continues to diminish ties to the Euro-Atlantic states and elevates China’s influence in Central Asia. Beijing and Moscow are the region’s principal economic, political, and security partners, a marker of declining U.S. influence.

    United States Role and Consideration

    The United States has long been concerned about Russia using energy supplies as a political tool to influence other nations. A recent report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations states that U.S. interests lay in “alleviating Russian gas-fueled pressure against NATO allies” and “bolstering bilateral relations in the Caspian Sea region.” U.S. diplomacy was critical in developing this project, and has opened doors for U.S. engagement in Central Asia, strengthening ties with Azerbaijan as an alternative to its relationship with Russia, and opened doors to advancing rule-of-law and climate investment issues. Even in the United States, domestic considerations have come into play as gas prices reach record highs. Although the U.S. does not import large amounts of Russian oil (and has now banned it), the lower supply caused by the conflict has prices rising as Europe seeks to find other sources, raising demand and cost globally.

  • Abortion History and Access in the US

    Abortion History and Access in the US

    This brief was originally published by Maisie Talbot on February 10, 2022. It was updated and republished by Zachariah Seecoomer on July 4, 2022.

    Abortion is a procedure to end a pregnancy, which can be carried out via two different methods: medication abortion and in-clinic abortion. Medication abortion consists of two different types of medication: mifepristone and misoprostol. The effectiveness of this method ranges from 94% – 98%, while the effectivesness of in-clinic abortion is 99% . After the 12th week of pregnancy, it becomes more difficult to find a provider who will provide both procedures; however, this ultimately depends on which US state the patient is in.

    Pre-Roe v. Wade Supreme Court Decision

    Illegal abortions were common before the judical decision handed down by Roe v. Wade, but they were not widely available to everyone. During the mid 1800’s, many states enacted laws restricting abortions. By 1900, abortion was illegal in all states, with the exception of circumstances where the mother’s life was in danger. At the time, the procedure elicited a high death toll due to unsafe methods, and the lack of antibiotics posed a risk of infection. By 1930, one fifth of the maternal mortality rate was due to unsafe abortions. During the 1950s to the 1960s, the rate of illegal abortions ranged from 200,000 to 1.2 million per year. 

    Access to safe abortion was not an easy task at this time, especially for low-income women. The high cost of having an abortion from a safe provider, the cost of the review process prior to the procedure (to acertain if the mother’s life was in danger), and the costs of travel increased the rates of self-induced abortion. This procedure presented health-related risks like sepsis, internal injuries, and mortality due to a lack of both medical skills and standards necessary for positive health outcomes.

    Roe v. Wade

    Jane Roe, a fictional name to protect the plaintiff’s identity, was an unmarried pregnant woman who filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas in 1970. Roe fought against the state law that outlawed abortion except for when the mother’s life was in danger if the pregnancy continued. Roe claimed that it infringed upon the right to ‘personal privacy’, and went against the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th amendments. Roe won by a 7-2 majority in the Supreme Court in 1973, thus protecting a woman’s right to have an abortion without “extreme” government restrictions throughout the United States. There are certain specifications relating to the three trimesters of pregnancy within the Roe v. Wade decision:

    1. In the first trimester, the state may not regulate the woman’s choice to have an abortion; it is between the mother and the physician.
    2. During the second trimester, the state may place regulations on the procedure that are ‘reasonably related to maternal health’.
    3. At the third trimester, the state may regulate or exclude abortions entirely, but not if the mother’s life in in danger.

    Without Roe v. Wade, states could enact laws that further restrict the ability to receive a legal abortion. Currently, 22 states have laws restricting the ability to obtain an abortion, and on the alternate side, 15 states, along with D.C., have laws that protect legal abortion access. To check which states have restrictions, and to what extent, click here. 

    Health Implications

    According to the World Health Organization, unsafe abortions still pose a significant risk for maternal health across the world, with 7 million women admitted to the hospital every year as a result. The major long-term physical health impacts of unsafe abortion range from infection, haemorrhage, and injury to the genital tract and internal organs. 

    The American Psychological Association notes that having an abortion within the first trimester poses no more mental health risks than carrying a pregnancy to term. Women who are unable to access abortion are seen to experience higher levels of “anxiety, lower life satisfaction and lower self-esteem,” compared to women who were able to access one.

    Women of lower socioeconomic status (SES) and women of color have the highest rates of abortion in the US, compared to women of higher socioeconomic status and white women. Unintended pregnancy rates among African Americans and Hispanic Americans with a low SES are high. 70% of all pregnancies among Black women are unintended, and 57% for Hispanic women, compared to 42% for White women. These statistics are mostly due to various social and cultural factors, and access to contraceptives if a major factor in unintended pregnancy.

    Current Events

    Restrictive Legislation

    The Texas Heartbeat Act was signed into law on May 19th, 2021 and enforced on September 1st, 2021. This law restricts abortion access after 6 weeks within the state of Texas. This law also allows private citizens to sue individuals who receive, provide, or otherwise abet an abortion past the 6 week mark for up to $10,000 in damages. The United States Department of Justice has sued the state of Texas for the Heartbeat Act, claiming it is invalid under the 14th Amendment, meaning no state can enforce a law that deprives an individual of privilege and immunity; the 14th amendment also prevents the state from depriving life, liberty, and property without due process. However, the Supreme Court rejected the case.

    A draft of a Supreme Court opinion, which is a legal decision, that would overturn Roe v. Wade was leaked on May 2nd, 2022. This verdict would greatly restrict abortion access on the grounds that abortion is not historically a Constitutional right. This would result in 13 states immediately banning abortion in the first and second trimesters of pregnancy (week 1 through week 26) given these states have trigger laws in place. Abortion trigger laws automatically ban or restrict abortion access if Roe v. Wade is revoked.

    Florida Govern Ron DeSantis further restricted abortion access through new legislation which takes effect July 1, 2022; abortion will now be banned after 15-week of pregnancy. Similar 15-week abortion bans were recently passed in Kentucky and Arizona as well.  

    In February and March of 2022, multiple restrictions on abortion medication or pills have been enacted in Kentucky, Wyoming, and South Dakota. These FDA-approved abortion medications are the most widely used form of abortion in the U.S, being responsible for an estimated 54% of abortions. According to the FDA, they are safe to use within the first 10 weeks of pregnancy. The recent restrictions include prohibiting the use of abortion pills, the mailing of these medications, and physicians’ ability to prescribe the medications to these states. 

    Protective Legislature 

    In January 2022, the New Jersey state lawmakers introduced statuary protections in relation to abortion. Abortion statuary protections in New Jersey are state laws that guarantee a woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy, authorize healthcare professionals to prescribe abortion medication, and ensure insurance coverage for pregnancy terminating services. Similar legislation was passed in Colorado and Connecticut in April and May of 2022. In March 2022, a new law was passed in California increasing the economic accessibility of abortions. The law prohibits cost-sharing charges for abortion services by insurance companies. This means that abortion services are included in monthly insurance costs with no additional fees, such as copays. In addition, Oregon lawmakers have passed the Reproductive Health Equity Fund, allocating $15 million to organizations that provide abortions and to individuals in need of abortion services.

  • Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

    Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

    This brief was originally published on October 5, 2021 by Nina Robertson. It was updated and republished on July 1, 2022 by Tra My Duong.

    The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, was passed on March 23rd, 2010 with three principal goals: lower the cost of healthcare, increase the quality of care, and increase access to care. The legislation aimed to make affordable health insurance available to more people living in the United States while also expanding Medicaid Programs to cover all adults with incomes below 139% of the Federal Poverty Level. In addition, it hoped to support innovative medical care delivery methods designed to lower the costs of healthcare more generally. Under the Obama Administration, the ACA was implemented to extend health insurance coverage to about 32 million uninsured Americans. A report released by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) indicated that between 2010 and 2016, the number of nonelderly uninsured adults decreased by 41% falling from 48.2 million to 28.2 million. 37 states and the District of Columbia have expanded Medicaid coverage under the ACA. 

    About the ACA

    The ACA had several main components:

    • A universal mandate required individuals to possess health insurance or pay a fine. In 2018, the mandate was repealed under the Trump Administration. However, some states have their own individual mandates with hopes of encouraging more coverage for the uninsured.
    • Dependents are covered until the age of 26 on their parents’ health insurance plans. Prior to the bill, insurance plans decided when young adults were removed after they turned 18.
    • The federal government encouraged the expansion of Medicaid to cover people with incomes below 133% of federal poverty guidelines. 
    • Minimum benefit standards for health plans were established and funding for states to expand Medicaid was provided, but expansion is left to the discretion of the states. 
    • Insurance is subsidized so the government pays individuals to buy private insurance while limiting premium costs to between 2% of income for those with incomes at 133% of federal poverty guidelines. 
    • New employer reporting mandates created the first model for paying health providers based on patient outcomes rather than volume of services. 
    • Insurers were barred from denying people coverage due to pre-existing conditions. 
    • Annual or lifetime limits of health insurance for individuals were eliminated. A health plan cannot limit the total amount it will spend to cover benefits during the time enrolled in the plan. 

    Strengths of the Legislation

    • Prevents insurers from making unreasonable rate increases on plans
    • People with pre-existing conditions cannot be denied coverage 
    • Preventative Services are covered such as: proactive healthcare, health screening, immunizations, and services for pregnant women or women who may become pregnant
    • Prescription Drugs are more affordable. In a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services press release from 2017, medicare beneficiaries have saved over $26.8 billion of prescription drugs under the ACA.

    Weaknesses of the Legislation

    • High costs if the system does not work well and insurance companies can now provide a wider range of benefits and coverage of pre-existing conditions which cause premiums to increase.
    • Weak enforcement mechanisms and weak competition between private and public health insurance. This leads to the reduction of the role of private non-profits.
    • There was a failure to establish a long-term care component to the ACA.
    • In order to pay for the ACA and new medical devices and pharmaceutical sales, there was an overall increase in taxes which was met with disagreement from conservatives. 

    Achievements and future development of the ACA:

    • A record of 14.5 Million Americans signed up for health insurance between November 1st 2021 and January 27th 2022.
    • According to ASPE, under the impact of the ACA, the size of the uninsured population decreased by about 20 million people from 2010 to 2020.
    • The ACA considerably increases rates of preventative services and provides free access to these services among more than 150 million Americans with private 
    • The ACA increased the access to healthcare, especially access to low-premium and zero-premium plans for lower-income adults. 
    • Along with the American Rescue Plan, ACA helped lower costs and expand healthcare access with an annual saving of about $2,400 on their annual premiums.
    • For future development, the Build Back Better Plan looks to strengthen the ACA and reduce premiums for 9 million Americans. The Build Back Better Plan seeks to expand affordable healthcare and patient protection.