ACE

Category: ACE Research

  • How will the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal Address Climate Change?

    How will the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal Address Climate Change?

    Background Information on Greenhouse Gasses

    Greenhouse gasses (GHG) can be emitted through natural processes and human activities. When looking at GHG emissions, CO2 is often tracked because it accounts for the largest portion of GHGs that are emitted from human activities. In 2020, 79% of all GHGs emitted by human activity in the U.S. was CO2.  Fossil fuels are burned for energy production and emit CO2 in the process. Fossil fuel combustion for energy resulted in 73% of the total U.S. GHG emissions and 92% of total CO2 emissions in 2020. Because of this, energy production and climate change are interrelated, and legislation on energy is one way to understand the actions the U.S. has taken to address climate change. 

    The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal and Environmental Policy

    In November of 2020, Congress passed the Biden administration’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal which includes multiple provisions to address environmental justice and climate change. The bill invests in public transit and passenger rail, remove lead pipes, increase internet access, fix roads and bridges, upgrade airports and seaports, upgrade current power infrastructure, create a network of electric car charging stations, focus on environmental remediation, and build infrastructure resilient to extreme weather events. It also contains the following components:

    • Upgrade power infrastructure by investing in clean energy transmission and the electric grid, with the goal of phasing out industries that are high emitters of GHGs, like coal. 
    • Decrease GHG emissions by creating a network of electric car charging stations to expand electric vehicle usability and accessibility.
    • Focus on environmental remediation which is the removal of contaminants that cause environmental damage and health risks. It will do this by cleaning up superfund and brownfield sites (which are contaminated hazardous waste sites), reclaiming abandoned mines, and capping orphaned oil and gas wells. 
    • Build infrastructure resilient to extreme weather events by focusing on the weatherization of homes and buildings. This is a proactive response to climate change because as climate change progresses, extreme weather events are predicted to become more frequent and intense, which could bring more infrastructure damage unless buildings are more prepared.

    Public opinion on the different aspects of the bill varies. The below survey done by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago shows the degree of public support for each facet of the bill. 

    What Should be Part of the Infrastructure Package?, National Opinion Research Center

    Supporters of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal

    Supporters of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal believe upgrading the current power infrastructure will reduce GHG emissions and help the U.S. to be more environmentally sustainable.

    Supporters also note the potential for decreased GHG emissions with the introduction of more electric car charging stations, as the increased accessibility may influence people to convert from gas-powered cars to electric ones. Many car companies including Ford, GM, and Jaguar have all pledged to turn their fleets 100% electric or decrease their GHG emissions substantially in the coming years, and even the ride share service, Uber, is offering “Uber Green”, where users may opt to use electric vehicles. Supporters argue that planning ahead by installing electric car infrastructure now will ready the economy for the large expected increase in electric vehicles in the next several years. 

    Others see the bipartisan infrastructure deal as a positive step in working towards a clean energy future, and the bill’s efforts to address climate change are seen by some as an investment in America’s future. They believe new industry and infrastructure development will generate jobs, including construction on public transit, weatherization projects, budget experts overseeing project implementation, conservationists assisting in remediation, and environmental engineers. Additionally, supporters believe these projects could also create jobs indirectly, as they will require large amounts of supplies, and thus support raw materials manufacturers.

    After COP26, the most recent annual United Nations climate change conference, 154 countries put forward new climate action plans to cut their emissions. Supporters feel that by completing the goals of the infrastructure deal, the U.S. would be following the goals of other nations in working towards clean energy, not coal based energy, and following the global standard to reduce GHG emissions. 

    Opponents of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal

    Past administrations have proposed expensive infrastructure deals that have either not been successful, or not passed through Congress, so some question whether this bill will complete what it sets out to do. There is also concern over the cost of the bill. 

    In 1998, the Clinton administration created a $217 billion infrastructure bill focusing on highways and transit. In 2005, the Bush administration created a $286 billion transportation bill, SAFETEA-LU, that received negative feedback because people felt that the repaired infrastructure was not a priority. In 2009, the Obama administration created the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which cost $831 billion but did not complete the infrastructure goals it initially laid out. Under the Trump administration, four infrastructure deals were proposed but not passed due to concerns over the cost.

    Others feel that the goal to limit GHG emissions and address climate change will only have a negligible impact on global warming. They believe the focus on limiting emissions drastically through a bill like the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal is not where money should be focused. This perspective is shared by those who feel that the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal will not do enough to reach the new emissions reduction goals set by the Biden Administration.

  • U.S.-Mexico Drug Policy Collaboration

    U.S.-Mexico Drug Policy Collaboration

    Introduction

    The U.S. is the leading consumer of illegal drugs in the world. The rate of drug overdose deaths in the U.S. was close to 320 per million residents in 2021, while the average for G20 nations was 23.8 per million residents. The border shared between the U.S. and its southern neighbor Mexico is the entryway for many of these illicit drugs. In 2020, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents seized over 266 tons of illicit drugs (cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, fentanyl, etc.) at points of entry along the border.

    Stopping this flow of drugs is a policy priority for both the U.S. and Mexico. In 1914, the U.S. passed the Harrison Narcotics Act, the first major legislation to regulate the distribution and sale of narcotic drugs. This marked the beginning of drug enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico. By the end of the 20th century, supplying the increasing demand for illicit drugs in the U.S. became the business of powerful Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), popularly known as cartels. These organizations and their violent tactics have become a threat to both countries. Mexican-based DTOs have formally and informally expanded across the border, creating a web of supply chains and control that poses domestic challenges for the U.S. and Mexico alike. This issue has become one of the most important aspects of the U.S. relationship with Mexico and a national security issue. 

    Early 20th Century Prohibition

    Prior to the 1900s, drugs like opium and marijuana traveled freely from areas of cultivation (especially China) to the U.S. due to their unregulated nature. However, the U.S. began to curtail the use of these substances through the Harrison Narcotics Act, and later by the formation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) in 1930. The FBN, led by Harry Anslinger, initiated a campaign to regulate and outlaw these recreational drugs. These efforts culminated in the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act, a bill that de facto criminalized the recreational or medical use of marijuana. 

    Many of these drugs were imported from Europe, yet with World War II disrupting intercontinental trade, Mexico became a major producer and supplier for the U.S. drug market. The economic incentive to produce illicit drugs grew under prohibition. Opium was particularly profitable for the Mexican economy, and since the demand was almost entirely abroad, trafficking of the drug was mostly tolerated by Mexican authorities. Additionally, opium harvesting was concentrated in the remote Sinaloan highlands, which is prime for cultivation of the poppy plant (the natural base for opium and heroin) and far from the reaches of federal oversight. 

    The War on Drugs and Operation Intercept

    One of the many cultural changes that rocked the 1960s was the increase in recreational drug use, especially amongst American youth. The conservative response to this counterculture movement was embodied politically by Richard Nixon, and especially by his declaration of the “War on Drugs” in 1971. The roots of this anti-drug focus can be traced two years prior to Operation Intercept, the 1969 drug enforcement policy that jolted the Mexican government into developing a capacity for domestic drug enforcement. 

    Thousands of U.S. agents spread across the entire U.S.-Mexico border and inspected all passing vehicles for evidence of illicit drugs. This led to catastrophic backups in cross-border traffic, negatively impacting the Mexican public and government officials alike. Intercept was planned unilaterally, with the intent of forcing Mexico to take action within its borders and on its own accord. The policy did not curtail the amount of drugs trafficked from Mexico to the U.S., but it did force Mexico into action. Traffic disrupted licit trade and caused headaches for residents of both nations, and Intercept was halted after only 17 days. Since then, the Mexican government has been a willing partner with the U.S. in drug enforcement operations. 

    Operation Condor

    By 1975, enforcement measures were not going as planned. Mexico was supplying up to 87% of the heroin entering the U.S., and the two countries needed a reset in drug enforcement collaboration. A series of joint operations, culminating in Operation Condor, was the answer. 

    Mexico, supplied with U.S. military-grade helicopters and aircraft, began a campaign of crop eradication, targeting fields in the states of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, known together as the “Golden Triangle”. This region of Mexico is the cradle of opium poppy and marijuana plantations. The mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure make the land isolated and difficult to patrol. However, federal soldiers infiltrated drug-cultivating communities, ultimately arresting and killing many supposed traffickers while receiving accusations of human rights abuse. In total from 1977-87, Condor missions destroyed over 220,000 fields and indicted more than 2,000 criminals, yet the northern stream of drugs did not subside.

    This crackdown pushed many of the Sinaloans out of the area, most of whom reconvened in Guadalajara. It also motivated the criminals to organize formally, sowing the foundations for the first Mexican DTOs. Condor’s crackdown finally allowed Colombian cartels to blossom and prosper, initiating the rise of Colombia’s export of cocaine to the U.S.

    The Rise of DTOs and the Camarena Incident

    As U.S. efforts to intercept contraband from Colombia became successful, the transport routes shifted to Mexico, thereby increasing the power of the Mexican cartels. In 1985, the muder of U.S. DEA agent Enrique Camarena on Mexican soil began a much more violent chapter in U.S.-Mexico drug policy cooperation.

    Camarena was tortured and killed because he got too close to the cartels. As is dramatized in the popular television show Narcos: Mexico, the DEA agent was investigating the head of the Sinaloa Cartel, Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo, also known as the “boss of bosses”. Camarena’s torture and murder was a turning point in U.S.-Mexico drug enforcement collaboration. The ensuing crackdown led to a dissolution of Mexico’s federal police force, and major kingpins like Gallardo were arrested or killed.

    A year later, in 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive, which allowed the Department of Defense to engage in anti-smuggling activities on the U.S.-Mexico border while classifying drug trafficking as a national security threat. Cooperation on military training began about a decade after, when U.S. and Mexican defense officials agreed to open the bilateral relationship to military support. 

    By the late 1990s, DTOs controlled nearly the entirety of the supply chain. Cartels were willing to resort to brutal violence for the control of profitable territory, demonstrated by the Camarena incident and subsequent uptick in drug-related homicides. This era would be a preview of the first two decades of the new millenia, when cartel violence exploded to even higher levels.

    President Calderón and the Mérida Initiative

    Rampant globalization during the late 20th century ushered in new challenges for bilateral drug cooperation. Drugs began to enter the U.S. through more routes and the violence between DTOs only grew. President Felipe Calderón was elected during this period of strife and insecurity, and declared war on the drug cartels eight days into his term.

    Perhaps politically motivated after a contested election, Calderón’s “war” was no bluff. His initiative against the cartels raised the level of violence in the country. By 2011, up to 96,000 soldiers were combating cartels. Decapitation tactics—eliminating the kingpins at the top of the cartels—were the primary strategy during Calderón’s initiative. U.S. support from DEA agents were essential, providing crucial support in many high-profile arrests like that of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.

    Beyond the services of federal agents, the U.S. was a major actor during this period of drug enforcement. The U.S. and Mexico signed the Mérida Initiative in 2007 to solve the evolving challenges facing drug enforcement. Between 2007 and 2010, the U.S. provided Mexico about $2 billion in equipment, aircraft, technology, and training through Mérida, funding supply-side counternarcotic efforts such as interdiction and eradication of crops. These tactics proved ineffective at slowing drug usage in the U.S., and incited higher levels of violence in Mexico. Calderón’s offensive against the cartels initiated an increase in fighting between rival gangs and security forces, leading to an estimated 47,000 to 70,000 deaths. Under former President Obama, Mérida took on a modified approach, focusing more on training judges and prosecutors.

    Looking Forward

    In October 2021, the U.S. and Mexico announced the end of the Mérida Initiative, and the beginning of the “Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities.” This new collaboration focuses on promoting human rights and providing economic alternatives to organized crime. The agreement is a welcomed return to policy collaboration between the two countries, which was soured in 2020 by the arrest of a former Mexican defense secretary in Los Angeles on drug charges. The focus of the Bicentennial Framework is ostensibly aligned with current Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s “hugs not bullets” approach to drug enforcement. However, many commentators have noted the expansion of Mexico’s military deployment within the country, rising from 69,000 to 125,000 troops since he took office in 2018. 

    The Bicentennial Framework is the most recent iteration of a decades-long policy focus between the U.S. and Mexico, which despite intense effort from both nations, has not led to long-term success. In fact, the statistics on drug use in the U.S. and violence in Mexico reveal a dispiriting report card. Homicides in Mexico during 2021 were over 43,000, four times higher than the rate when President Calderón’s war on cartels began in 2008 (14,000). In late 2021, the U.S. reached the grim milestone of 100,000 overdose deaths annually, nearly three times more than the rate of overdose death in 2008 (36,000). These two statistics indicate the most important drug policy issues in both countries: for the U.S. it is curtailing the evolving opioid epidemic, and for Mexico it is slowing the violence ravaging parts of the country.

  • What is the United States Doing in Guantanamo Bay—20 Years Later?

    What is the United States Doing in Guantanamo Bay—20 Years Later?

    Guantanamo Bay Over 4 Presidencies

    Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, then-President George Bush launched the Global War on Terrorism, which sought to protect US citizens from potential terrorist attacks by funding global security and military efforts. The US federal pricetag for the global War on Terror is estimated to be over $8 trillion. This estimated cost includes the funds to build and operate Guantanamo Bay, a detention facility located in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which is used to detain of suspected members and affiliates of terrorist groups. 

    Since the establishment of Guantanamo Bay, debates have arisen over human rights, safety, and lawfulness. President Obama spent the beginning of his presidency working to shut down Guantanamo, however pushback from members of the Senate prolonged the closure of the center. Arguments against the closing of Guantanamo range from concerns about releasing terrorists or potential terrorists into the U.S. and into other countries, to the high cost of closing Guantanamo Bay. The Obama Administration, however, was successful in enforcing new procedures for handling the detainees. Obama managed to transfer, repatriate, or resettle 197 detainees. Ultimately, his efforts did not see the closure of Guantanamo.

    When President Trump took office in 2017, advocates for the closing of Guantanamo Bay had little hope that this would come to fruition. During his campaign, Trump advocated for the continued transfer of people into Guantanamo. As promised, Trump signed an Executive Act to reverse Obama-era policies aimed to shut down Guantanamo and ultimately halted the closure of Guantanamo. Trump’s Executive Order commands the Secretary of Defense and other officials to offer the President new policies “regarding the disposition of individuals captured in connection with an armed conflict, including policies governing transfer of individuals to the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay” within 90 days. Secretary of Defense Mattis suggested keeping the current U.S. policies on Guantanamo. 

    Now, the question of Guantanamo’s fate under President Joe Biden has taken the foreground. 

    Biden’s Promises of Closing Down Guantanamo

    Before taking office, Biden advocated for the closing of Guantanamo. During a 2016 press conference, Biden was asked about his prospects for successfully closing Guantanamo before the end of his Vice-Presidency. He replied, “that is my hope and expectation”. During his campaign for presidency, Biden promised to close down Guantanamo, though failed to mention in detail his plans for doing so. While Biden’s move into office had given advocates hope for its future shut-down, little tangible change has been seen since the start of his term.

    Biden and Guantanamo in 2022

    Since 2002, roughly 800 detainees have been held at Guantanamo. As of April 22nd, 2022 37 remained, most of whom will be held indefinitely. Of the remaining detainees, the Department of Defense recorded:

    On June 24, 2022 the Defense Department transferred a detainee to his home country, Afghanistan, which reduced the number of detainees to 36. While the steady reduction in detainees is seen as a concrete step towards closing Guantanamo as compared to the last administration’s efforts, progress is slow and it will be a long time before the process is complete. 

    Biden’s Low Profile Approach towards Guantanamo—Matter Avoidance or a Matter of Tactic?

    The Biden Administration has taken a low profile approach to handling Guantanamo—a notably quieter approach than that of Obama. 

    So far into Biden’s presidency, little has been said about his plans for Guantanamo. Some speculate that Biden’s quiet approach is a tactic to minimize political backlash. “President Biden appears to have learned from Obama’s missteps, transferring one prisoner and clearing many without being too loud about it and painting a target on his own back,” Ramzi Kassem, a law professor at the City University of New York, stated. In February, a review board approved the safe release of more than half of the men held indefinitely at the detention facility. Biden has not yet made public the process used in releasing detainees, however it seems the Administration is taking measures to ensure the release of these detainees following Obama-era policies. 

    Pushback on Biden’s attempts to close Guantanamo is anticipated in the current political climate. Some believe the United States has the right to keep Guantanamo Bay open since the US is still in armed conflict and Guantanamo might serve a function in helping obtain vital information that will ensure the safety of American citizens. In his testimony to the senate, Cully Stimson, defended the need for Guantanamo, saying “[U.S.] is entitled, under domestic and international law, to detain opposing enemy forces for the duration of hostilities, including the terrorists at Guantanamo”. Others have criticized Biden for his silence on the topic as they “fear a repeat of what happened under President Obama”. 

    Is Biden implementing Obama’s Policies on Guantanamo Bay? 

    At the start of his presidency, Obama signed executive orders which proposed a timeline for the trial or release of detainees. The timeline was faster than the Bush Administration’s process which proposed trying prisoners through military commissions on a case-by-case basis. Obama’s plan involved securely transferring detainees to home countries or to countries which would accept them, accelerating periodic reviews, prosecuting detainees under federal government jurisdiction, and finding secure locations for some detainees in the United States. Some criticized Obama’s plan to bring detainees into the United States, arguing that it would compromise citizen safety. A second courtroom is under construction, which would allow military commissions to undertake multiple cases at once, accelerating detainee processing.

    What does the Future of Guantanamo Look Like? 

    It is yet unclear the fate of Guantanamo under the presidency of George Biden. As for future plans: “[Biden’s] Administration is dedicated to following a deliberate and thorough process focused on responsibly reducing the detainee population of the Guantánamo facility while also safeguarding the security of the United States and its allies” says Ned Price, the State Department spokesperson.

  • President Biden’s Proposed U.S. Citizenship Act (H.R. 1177)

    President Biden’s Proposed U.S. Citizenship Act (H.R. 1177)

    Bill H.R. 1177, otherwise known as the United States Citizenship Act, was introduced by President Biden on the first day of his presidency in 2021. The bill, if passed, would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act enacted in 1952 and mark the first significant change in U.S. immigration policy in several decades. As it stands, H.R. 1177 was introduced to the House of Representatives but has not yet been voted on as of June 30, 2022. 

    The U.S. Citizenship Act would change the way migrants and asylum seekers are received and treated upon arrival in the United States. The core aim of the act is to “provide an earned path to citizenship, to address the root causes of migration and responsibly manage the southern border, and to reform the immigrant visa system”. The proposed bill begins by changing the terminology to describe new arrivals in the U.S. from the former “alien” to the new term, “non-citizen. Many felt that the previous terms were dehumanizing to migrants. 

    Earned Citizenship and DACA

    Title I of H.R. 1177 offers non-citizens the opportunity to “earn” citizenship if they have a clear criminal record and pass a national security background check. This earned citizenship allows formerly illegal migrants to apply for work authorization and makes them eligible for coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Spouses and children are covered by their partner’s or parent’s citizenship application and are not required to apply for themselves, but must also pass both types of background checks. The earned citizenship must be renewed every six years. The act also allows those who entered the United States as children and received Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status to obtain citizenship through a streamlined process. Activists have long pushed for permanent status for DACA recipients.

    Addressing Root Causes of Migration

    Title II of the U.S. Citizenship Act establishes a strategy for reform in Central America that aims to reduce the rate at which migrants appear at the southern border. By addressing prevalent issues cited by migrants as reasons for migration, such as sexual, gender-based, or domestic violence, extreme poverty, criminal violence, and corruption, the United States aims to aid in improving Central American livelihood to decrease the need to emigrate. To do so, the U.S. Citizenship Act would allocate $1 billion per year to a program entitled The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. However, concerns over the legitimacy and necessity of U.S. intervention in Central America have arisen.

    Improving Border Infrastructure

    H.R. 1177 would set a new precedent for the conditions and capabilities of the resources available to migrants at the border between the United States and Mexico. For example, H.R 1177 would include a wide range of facility updates that ensure arrivals at the border receive adequate medical care, clean water for drinking and bathing, proper nutrition, clothing, shelter (which includes appropriate sleeping accommodations for those held overnight), resources to practice one’s religion, and accessible information about migrants’ legal rights at the border. Proponents believe these protections would establish the United States as a more welcoming and secure destination for migrants and asylum-seekers compared to the former Immigration and Nationality Act. 

    H.R. 1177 also seeks to address child welfare at the border. To ensure that children’s rights are protected at the border, the U.S. Citizenship Act requires that all Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel whose jobs require that they come into contact with children must complete child welfare  training. Additionally, the bill would create accessible systems to report cases of child abuse and neglect and would prohibit DHS personnel from separating children from their legal guardians. These provisions, if passed, would improve pre-existing protections of migrant children and families under U.S. law. Current protections include access to fair immigration proceedings, detention in the “most humane” conditions available, and the right to legal representation. These existing migrant protections do not prevent forced separation of children from their parents, and do not guarantee that children will be properly cared for and protected while in DHS custody. After the family separation scandal under the Trump Presidency, activists renewed calls for stronger protections for children in U.S. border facilities.

    Strengthening Humanitarian Responses for Refugees

    Subtitle B of H.R. 1177 establishes provisions to improve how immigrants and refugees are welcomed and aided upon arrival to the United States. This section of the U.S. Citizenship Act highlights an alliance between the Secretary of State and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to increase the number of refugees that the U.S. can admit, as well as the quality of care taken to ensure their well being once in the country. 

    Additionally, given lengthy waiting periods for those filing refugee claims worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, Subtitle B creates provisions that aim to improve the process of applying for asylum and refugee status. These provisions include ensuring that all refugee-seekers receive information about their rights, due process and access to existing protections, proper screening and security measures, and required documentation to ensure freedom of movement and social services. Subtitle B also expands upon current temporary shelter networks for newly-admitted refugees, especially for migrants from vulnerable populations, including women and unaccompanied children. Proponents of H.R. 1177 have emphasized the importance of protecting refugees and vulnerable populations of migrants, and argue that the bill would greatly improve the United States’ asylum program and set newly-admitted migrants on track for prosperity in their new homes. 

    Critiques of the Bill

    Those against the passage of H.R. 1177 or some of its many changes to the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act have several reasons for their opposition. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) argues that the legislation invites more illegal migrants at a time when public health concerns are at their highest. Senator Cotton states that the bill has “no regard for the health and security of Americans”. Several democratic politicians have also taken this view of H.R. 1177, with Representative Vicente Gonzalez (D-TX) stating “The way we’re doing it right now is catastrophic and is a recipe for disaster in the middle of a pandemic.” 

    Others argue that strengthening the United States’ humanitarian response to illegal migrants is unnecessary, and that we should instead focus on increasing our border security to prevent migrants from entering the country in the first place. Several Senate Republicans feared that this act would “incentivize illegal immigration” that would spur an overwhelming influx of migrants across the U.S.-Mexico border.

  • An Overview of The Ryan White Program

    An Overview of The Ryan White Program

    Who was Ryan White?

    Ryan White was a boy in Indiana who contracted HIV after a blood transfusion at the age of 13. Ryan experienced discrimination at school and had to fight to be allowed to attend. He passed away in April 1990, a month before he graduated high school. Prior to Ryan White, HIV/AIDS was largely seen as a problem restricted only to the gay community, and policymakers gave little attention to the crisis. Ryan White’s case challenged the dominant narrative at the time that the members of the LGBTQ+ community were the only ones at risk from the virus, and addressing the pandemic became a priority when it became clear that HIV/AIDS could affect anyone.

    The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act

    On August 18th, 1990, Congress enacted the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act—the legislation that made the Ryan White Program—to increase the availability and quality of HIV treatment and care for people who have HIV and are of low-income. The Ryan White (CARE) Act was amended and reauthorized in 1996, 2000, and 2006. In 2009, it was reauthorized as the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–87).

    The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program is the largest federal program specifically supporting people living with HIV in the United States, contributing to improvements in disease morbidity and life expectancy. The program gives support services and outpatient care to people and families that have been affected by the disease. It is administered by the HIV/AIDS Bureau (HAB) at the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS), and services and programs are provided by sub-grantees and grantees at the local and state levels. In 2019, the federal government launched Ending the HIV Epidemic, which aims to lessen new HIV infection by 75% in five years and 90% in ten years. The Ryan White Program, and the HRSA which administers it, leads these efforts.

    The Ryan White Program Clients

    In 2019, The Ryan White Program gave services to around 568,000 people—more than half of all who have been diagnosed with HIV in the U.S. 88.1% of clients in 2019 achieved viral suppression, meaning they had fewer than 200 duplicates of HIV per milliliter of blood. This marked an improvement from the 69.5% that achieved viral suppression in 2010. In 2019, almost ¾ of Ryan White Program clients were from ethnic/racial minority populations:

    • 46.6% Black/African American 
    • 23.3% Hispanic/Latino. 

    In that same year, 71.6% of clients were male, 26.2% were female, and 2.3% were transgender. 60.7% of Ryan White Program clients were living at or below the federal poverty level.

    The Ryan White Program Parts

    The Ryan White Program consists of five Parts that fund for medications, clinical training, support and medical services, technical assistance and the development and distribution of new HIV care strategies:

    • Part A funds support and medical services to Eligible Metropolitan Areas (EMAs) and Transitional Grant Areas (TGAs), which are cities and counties that the HIV epidemic has affected the most. About 72% of all HIV-diagnosed people in the U.S. live in EMAs and TGAs.
    • Part B gives funding to states and territories to improve the availability, quality, and organization of HIV support services and health care. All 50 states are recipients, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, Republic of Palau, Republic of the Marshalls Islands, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia.
    • Part C gives funds to local, community-based organizations so that they can provide full-scale essential HIV support services and medical care in an outpatient setting for people who have HIV. Part C also funds Capacity Development grants, which assist organizations in more successfully delivering HIV services and care.
    • Part D gives funds to local, community-based organizations so that they can provide ambulatory, outpatient, family-oriented primary and specialty care for infants, kids, youth, and women with HIV.
    • Part F funds support clinician training, technical support, and the development of new HIV care strategies to better health outcomes and lessen HIV transmission. These programs include-
      • The AIDS Education and Training Centers (AETC) Program
      • The Special Projects of National Significance (SPNS) Program
      • The Minority AIDS Initiative

    Two Part F programs center on funding oral health care for people who have HIV:

    • The HIV/AIDS Dental Reimbursement Program (DRP)
    • The Community-Based Dental Partnership Program

    Pros of the Ryan White Program

    Half a million Americans who live with HIV/AIDS are alive and well due in part to the resources that the Ryan White Program provides. More than thirty years after its inception, it is still the only federal program that has wide bipartisan support and is funded at $2.38 billion. The program recently received $90 million to address new COVID-19 issues in people who have HIV/AIDS.

    Cons of the Ryan White Program

    There are disagreements about the most effective distribution of funding. Currently, greater funding is allocated to cities that have the highest number of HIV cases. One of the highest risk demographics for HIV is incarcerated individuals. Therefore, cities that have large prisons tend to have the largest number of HIV positive individuals. Critics of the Ryan White Program argue that funding should be distributed in a manner that most benefits law abiding citizens suffering from the disease, which ultimately prioritizes certain demographics over others as opposed to relying solely on the number of HIV cases to determine funding. 

    Another source of contention is whether municipal or state governments should receive the funding allocated by the program. Large metropolitan areas with high HIV burdens benefit most when cities are funded. This is the common scenario in most northern states. However, in southern states the distribution of HIV cases is often highest in rural areas. In this scenario, it’s more beneficial for states to receive the funding as opposed to cities, since the HIV cases aren’t congested in one small area.

  • Universal Basic Income

    Universal Basic Income

    Introduction

    Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a developing policy of providing a regular, guaranteed payment to all citizens regardless of financial need to replace other need-based social programs that potentially require greater government involvement. This concept of “free money with no strings attached” can be implemented by all levels of government: local, state, and federal. Interest in UBI has grown in recent years due to the fundamental changes to the economy—mainly due to the growth of automation—that threaten to leave many Americans without jobs. A 2019 report by the Brookings Institution found that one-quarter of all U.S. jobs are susceptible to automation. Researchers argue that jobs entailing more routine tasks, such as those in manufacturing, transportation, and office administration, are most vulnerable. 

    With the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on unemployment, UBI has gained more attention from the public. After the COVID-19 pandemic drove up unemployment and job insecurity in 2020, some have urged for a nationwide UBI, and pilot programs have been initiated across the country. Those who support UBI say it’s an easy way to distribute aid to vulnerable populations. Others worry that it would be costly and discourage workers from finding jobs. Opinions vary, but UBI has developed into a political debate among policymakers in the United States.

    Universal Basic Income in the United States: Federal

    On a federal level, Democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang made UBI a key pillar of his 2020 campaign, which helped bring UBI into the national spotlight. Yang’s plan promised every American adult $1,000 per month from the federal government. According to the nonprofit Tax Foundation, Andrew Yang’s $1,000-a-month Freedom Dividend for every adult would cost $2.8 trillion each year. He proposed funding the program by consolidating welfare programs (food stamps, homelessness services, disability services, etc.) and implementing a Value Added Tax of 10%. Residents who receive benefits from welfare and social programs would be given a choice between their current benefits or $1,000 cash unconditionally.

    Universal Basic Income in the United States: State

    A form of UBI on a state level is Alaska’s distribution of $1,000-$2,000 checks to its residents each year since 1982 from a fund created with oil revenues, also known as the Alaska Permanent Fund. In 2017, the government distributed a dividend of $1,100 per person including children. For example, a household of six would have received $6,600 in that year. The National Bureau of Economic Research conducted a study to observe the effects of the permanent fund on the state. The study was based on data from the Current Population Survey and a synthetic control. The study focused on tracking two outcomes: the full-time employment to population ratio and the population share working part-time. The results showed that the dividend had no negative effect on full-time employment. For part-time employment, a 1.8 percentage point (17%) increase since the beginning of the program was observed. Overall, the test results suggested that UBI does not significantly decrease aggregate employment.

    Universal Basic Income in the United States: Local

    A local-level experiment on UBI is the Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED). SEED was the nation’s first mayor-led guaranteed income demonstration launched in February 2019 by former mayor Michael D. Tubbs of Stockon, California. For comparative purposes, Stockton’s median household income of $46,033 is about 40% below that of California as a whole. SEED distributed $500 a month to 125 randomly selected residents for 24 months. From a preliminary analysis of the first year of the program, those who received the monthly dividend were surveyed as healthier, happier, and less anxious than those in a control group not receiving the monthly dividend. At the start of the study period in February 2019, 28% of recipients had full-time employment. A year later, it increased to 40%. By comparison, full-time employment in the control group rose from 32% to 37% after a year. Additionally, the experiment suggested that recipients experienced less income volatility than those who did not receive the guaranteed income, which allowed them to plan for the future with fewer financial burdens.

    Arguments for Universal Basic Income

    Those who support UBI argue that it is the most efficient method of distributing aid to vulnerable populations. Its simplicity provides immediate aid to income poverty as it eliminates eligibility restrictions that make it difficult for some households to access other need-based services. For the government, UBI systems eliminate the need to spend resources reviewing applications and monitoring benefits. Programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and housing vouchers require 10% of their funding for benefits and services to be spent on state administrative costs. In other words, only 90% of the program expenditures are allocated to distribution. Also, these programs require recipients to invest their time in applying. UBI would likely cost less than 1% in administrative costs and involve little to no burden on recipients. 

    Some conservatives argue that UBI provides a possible replacement for current social safety nets at a lower cost for those in need. According to political scientist Charles Murray, a guaranteed universal income of $10,000 a year could potentially eliminate need-based programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, agricultural subsidies, and corporate welfare. It can remove both the social stigma that accompanies public assistance and the risk of anyone in need falling through the cracks. Furthermore, UBI can provide a boost in entrepreneurship as people would feel more comfortable starting a business. The stipend provides a financial cushion needed for workers who are considering changing jobs, retiring earlier, or quitting the workforce to care for children or other loved ones.

    Arguments Against Universal Basic Income

    According to the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, the federal government providing all Americans with a basic $10,000 a year would cost $3 trillion annually. That would be three-quarters of the federal budget and the influx of cash into the economy could also drive up inflation. Paying for it, along with Social Security, Medicare, defense, and infrastructure, would require higher tax rates. Moreover, even substituting these social programs with UBI is not so simple as studies show that the current programs—Social Security, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), housing assistance, food stamps (SNAP), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)—have cut the poverty rate across family types. Comparing administrative data from these programs and the 2008-2013 Survey of Income and Programs Participation data, the study found that Social Security cut the poverty rate by a third within the 5 years. All programs except the EITC reduced poverty below 50% of the poverty line. For the elderly, Social Security decreased poverty levels by 75%. If the UBI program was to acquire funding through new taxes, it would most likely leave some people worse off from the reduced income after taxes and transfers. Furthermore, there is a vast difference in the cost of living across the country. Depending on the size of payments, UBI could allow people in some parts of the country to live comfortably without working. The benefit might be more than sufficient in low-cost states such as South Dakota, but it might not be enough in high-cost states such as California and New York. 
    Outside the United States, Finland carried out a nationwide, randomized control experiment on UBI. The results of the 2017 UBI Program in the country did not meet the expectations set from the beginning. The experiment consisted of giving 2,000 unemployed people a basic income of €560 (approximately $630) per month for two years with the hope that it would motivate them to work. The findings from the first year suggested that individuals who received a basic income were no more likely to find work than those who didn’t. On average, both groups worked nearly 50 days a year and earned around €4,250.

  • Race Gap in U.S Higher Education

    Race Gap in U.S Higher Education

    There are prominent race gaps across higher education as a field with respect to college enrollment and degree completion. 56% of Hispanic or Latino and 46% of Black or African American students finish a four-year degree within six years, compared to 72% of White students. Further, there are increasingly fewer Black and Latino/Hispanic students at the higher levels of education – the population size shrinks by 27% at each educational tier. 

    Explaining the Race Gap

    There are a few factors that have contributed to causing this gap:

    • American universities began as exclusively white, male institutions, and measures to actively combat segregation in public education began after the Supreme Court’s ruling of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954;
    • Education achievement gaps are correlated with racial socioeconomic disparities because higher-income and more-educated families typically can provide more educational opportunities for their children;
    • With historically lower-income and less educational resources, Black and Hispanic families often have lower educational attainment than their White counterparts.

    Affirmative Action – What is it?

    In order to help bridge these gaps, higher education institutions have practiced a contested policy choice – affirmative action. Affirmative action includes policies aiming to increase the representation of people of color. This includes race-conscious admissions and extra consideration for underrepresented groups in college acceptances.  In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that using race as a factor of consideration, among others, in admissions was permissible, but having quotas for underrepresented minority groups was not. Currently, 8 states have banned race-based affirmative action: California (1996), Washington (1998), Florida (1999), Michigan (2006), Nebraska (2008), Arizona (2010), New Hampshire (2012), and Oklahoma (2012).

    Arguments in Favor of Affirmative Action

    One argument in favor of affirmative action is that it could potentially help close the race gap, since students of color remain underrepresented on college campuses. For example, in California and in the University of California (UC) System, the ban on affirmative action has harmed Black and Hispanic students, decreasing their number in the University of California (UC) system while reducing their odds of finishing college, going to graduate school, and earning a high salary. At the University of California, Berkeley, the underrepresentation gap before the ban on affirmative action was 14.9 percent. The year after, it grew to 24.9 percent, and in 2015 it hit 34.4 percent. Many also argue that race is an important factor in college admission to ensure campus diversity in race, experience, and thought.

    Arguments Against Affirmative Action

    One argument against affirmative action is that race should not be necessary or required information for an officer to know when making a college admission decision. Merit and other factors students can control should be of greater focus, including grades, extracurriculars, test scores, etc. Furthermore, many argue that affirmative action hurts other groups – primarily Asian Americans – in the college admissions process as a lesser number of these students are being admitted to elite universities despite their merit. One study showed that in order to be admitted to certain selective institutions, Asian applicants needed to score 140 points higher than White students, 270 points higher than Hispanic students, and 450 points higher than African American students, if other factors are held equal.

    Current Status of Affirmative Action

    The Supreme court recently agreed to hear two cases that challenge the race-conscious admissions programs at Harvard University and the University of North Carolina. The cases argue that Asian-American students have suffered discrimination in the admissions process at both schools. The group suing both universities, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), has petitioned the Supreme Court to ban affirmative action in higher education in a 99 page filing. The decision is anticipated to be heard in Spring or Summer of 2023.

  • Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya and Somalia

    Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya and Somalia

    Introduction

    The United States has been diplomatically engaged with Kenya since 1964, and with Somalia since 1960. Substantial amounts of aid have accompanied diplomatic relations, including development, monetary and military aid. In later decades, particularly since the 1998 bombings of the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, these aid types have made up a significant part of the US response to terrorism in the region. Two semi-distinct approaches to terrorism have emerged: countering violent extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism (CT). The two are used to address terrorism in different ways, including through actions taken against terrorism’s immediate and proximate causes. US attention to these issues became more comprehensive during the Global War on Terror in response the attacks on September 11th, 2001.

    Counterterrorism 

    The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “[t]he unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.” Counterterrorism, in turn, is the neutralization of the ability of terrorists and their organizations to perpetrate this kind of violence. This neutralization is primarily accomplished through military operations, law enforcement activity, and the prevention of terrorism through the strengthening of these capabilities.   

    The United States has had and currently has numerous counterterrorist programs in both Kenya and Somalia, spanning a wide breadth of approaches. Numerous government agencies are responsible for these programs, including the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of State. These programs address the threat of terrorism through kinetic action, law enforcement and investigation, and conventional security programs. 

    Kinetic action involves active forms of warfare, which the US has used in Somalia since 1992. Between 2001 and 2011 the US, through the Department of Defense, used ground raids and traditional airstrikes to find and neutralize elements of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. Starting on June 23, 2011, counterterrorism efforts in Somalia included the extensive use of drone strikes. These strikes have resulted in an estimated 1,729 deaths as of June 3, 2022. Of these deaths, 1,589 are estimated to be militants with either Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, or ISIS. The strikes occur in areas of high Al-Shabaab activity, such as in the southern part of the country. Training camps for terrorist organizations are preferred targets for strikes, as they represent large gatherings of individual terrorists often located some distance from major civilian population centers. These strikes deny terror organizations manpower and cripple their leadership, resulting in hampered capability to carry out violence. 

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation handles investigations into terrorist activity against US assests in the region, most notably in the aftermath of the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Its investigation was, at the time, the largest conduct in the history of the bureau, drawing on over 900 agents and many more supporting staff. The investigations in Kenya and Tanzania set a precedent for a greater overseas presence for the FBI, bettering the organization’s ability to counter the threat posed by terror groups. Additionally, the cooperation between US law enforcement and law enforcement in Kenya was demonstrated to be strong and yielded arrests, extraditions and prosecutions. 

    The Department of State aids in augmenting the ability of local forces to respond to terror attacks. An internal component called the Diplomatic Security Service trains and helps equip local teams of police officers, from both regular forces and from the Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR). Both of these units were tested during the attack on the DusitD2 hotel in Nairobi on January 15, 2019. Members of the SPEAR team engaged and dispatched at least two of the attackers. The following explosive sweeps of the compound were then accomplished by bomb squads equiped by the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (ATA). The SPEAR program and ATA program have been implemented in countries across Africa, aiding response to terror activity and increasing international cooperation through joint training excersises. 

    Countering Violent Extremism 

    Countering violent extremism (CVE) policy approaches the problem of terrorism by addressing its driving factors. The United States Agency for International Development is the primary US agency responsible for this kind of program, and has active programs in Kenya. Its stated goals for CVE policies are to reduce the risk of recruitment into and support for terrorist organizations, as well as building local capacity to do the same. 

    USAID’s program Kenya NiWajibu Wetu (NIWETU), translated from Kiswahili to Kenya is Our Responsibility, was an effort to engage local officials and individuals to build capacity to prevent violent extremism. One of the program’s key actions was its support and funding of an expansion of the Kenya School of Government to build curriculum teaching CVE policy to civil servants in Kenya’s administrative bureaucracy. The cooperation and willingness of the Kenyan Government to engage with and support this policy has been key to its success, and will result in civil servants taking their knowledge to postings in departments across the country. In addition to education initiatives, NIWETU has worked with Kenya’s National Counter Terrorism Center and county level authorities to create county-level CVE action plans for creating solutions at a more local level. These plans were developed with the assistance of various groups of local stakeholders, including religious and youth leaders, government and security officials, private sector representatives and women’s groups.  

    Other USAID programs aim to address driving factors of violent extremism directly, through creating programming that offers alternatives to recruitment by violent extremist organizations. The Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions program provided assistance to county governments in bettering access to social services for youth and vulnerable groups. Another program, the Kenya Youth Employment and Skills program, aimed to address lack of access to economic opportunities and help youth register for ID cards that prove Kenyan citizenship. 

    Benefits and Drawbacks 

    The strengths of counterterrorism activities lie in their ability to address the immediate effects of terrorist violence, as well as acting against terrorist organizations. CT programming improves the ability of host nations to respond to terror attacks as they occur, and improves their ability to proscute liable individuals in the aftermath. They allow for the destruction of assets utilized by terrorist organizations, and allow military assests to hunt and destroy individual terrorists. These policies are not without their drawbacks,  Counterterrorism programming can result in locals becoming discontented with the United States. In Kenya, some locals blame the United States for discouraging tourism, and even for causing an uptick in terrorist violence by the American presence. Counterterrorism programming does not address the roots of terrorism itself, and so remain necessary so long as the ideology remains rooted among at-risk communities. 

    Countering violent extremism targets the roots of terrorism by attempting to build stability among communities and create lasting solutions from within countries. As Kenya works to build its own robust CVE capabilities, US support to their efforts has helped to advance and improve the quality of their CVE policies as well as the implementation of CVE at the local level. US-Kenya cooperation has been dependent upon political, security, and diplomatic good will on both sides; effective cooperation will require continued good will. For both the United States and Kenya, CT has been the main budgetary focus of both governments; CVE receives substantially fewer resources. USAID handles US CVE efforts, and has a budget for 2023 of $60.4 billion, of which CVE makes up a very small percentage. CT efforts, on the other hand, received $96 billion across various agencies in 2017.    

  • American Supply Chains and American Food Security

    American Supply Chains and American Food Security

    Background

    American grocery stores offer customers a variety of foods, allowing for significant options year-round, and in 2020, the average American spent only 11.9% of their disposable income on food. This sort of reliable and affordable food supply contributes to a robust food system and increases food security. However, these advantages are not felt evenly across incomes. Those in the lowest income quintile spent, on average, over 25% of their income on food in 2020 and according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 10.5% of households in the U.S. were affected by food insecurity. Additionally, recent increases in food inflation (alongside inflation in the larger economy) have created issues for American consumers, especially low-income consumers, though this inflation has been caused by a number of outside factors, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. The American food system is thus characterized both by generally affordable, accessible and varied food options, and food insecurity rooted in inequality. 

    This juxtaposition between positive and negative aspects in the food system is reflected in the supply chains that make up the U.S. food system. The U.S. infant formula and meat supply chains are useful examples. The latter is not a solitary system, but a number of different chains that make up the meat-product elements of the U.S. food system (and contribute to the global food network in which that system is embedded). Beef, poultry, and pork, for example, each have their own supply chain, though there is some overlap between the companies that operate in each industry. Both the infant formula and meat supply chains are characterized by significant concentration in market share and concentration in production facilities, meaning there are a relatively small number of large firms that are responsible for a very large amount of production, in addition to there being a relatively small number of factories that are responsible for a very large amount of production. Both must strike a balance between the useful aspects of this concentration, and the drawbacks it produces.

    Infant Formula Supply Chain

    Around 98% of infant formula consumption in the U.S. comes from domestic production, with a very small imported portion. Domestic production is done mainly by four large firms: Abbott Laboratory, Nestlé, Mead-Johnson, and Perrigo. In August of 2020, market concentration in these firms was very high, with Abbott Laboratories holding 48.1%, Mead-Johnson 20%, Perrigo 11.6%, and Nestlé 7.7%. The remaining 12.6% of U.S. production comes from small, independent operators. The industry’s high concentration creates some serious vulnerabilities to the food security of those who use infant formula—though there are other sources of vulnerability in the system as well, such as issues with bacterial infections in infant formula—, as seen in the baby formula shortage that occurred in 2022. 

    The crisis began when Abbott Nutrition Facility in Michigan was temporarily shut down by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), because of formula contamination and unsanitary conditions. It was reopened under strict oversight in early June 2022, but had to be closed again soon after due to serious flooding in the area. The facility was responsible for an estimated 43% of domestic infant formula consumption. The industry’s concentration has a number of different causes, including tariffs and quotas on infant formula imports, and the process by which the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) obtains the baby formula that it offers WIC recipients. WIC is a nutrition support program that provides services to almost 8 million women, children and infants. About 50% of the United States’ formula consumption comes from purchases of infant formula through the program, and as such, the program plays a massive role in the industry. 

    In order to facilitate this large expenditure, WIC utilizes an extremely competitive bidding process. Each state (in addition to a number of American territories and Tribal organizations) operates its own WIC agency to administer the program and utilize the funds given to it by the federal government. In addition, each state WIC program allows different infant formula companies to compete to become the sole-source provider of infant formula to WIC recipients in that state. This means the brand that wins the bid becomes the only brand that can be purchased through that state’s WIC program. The companies compete to offer the lowest wholesale price and largest rebate to the state’s agency. The rebates are sums of money that companies give to state WIC agencies, essentially allowing the state WIC agencies to acquire infant formula at a significantly reduced cost. The rebates are very large, accounting for up to $2 billion in savings each year for the WIC program overall (meaning every state WIC program combined). Without them, the program would either need to receive far more government funding, or serve 2 million fewer people.

    The winning formula brand, in turn, receives significant rewards. Because the company that wins in a state’s bidding process becomes that state WIC agency’s sole-source provider, retailers recognize that there will be a guaranteed volume of product sales. As such, retail outlets (e.g. stores in which infant formula is sold, such as Walmart) give the brands that win state WIC contracts eye-catching product placement and large amounts of shelf space. Additionally, winning a state WIC contract may lead physicians to be more likely to refer patients to the corresponding brand. These market impacts appear to make it more difficult for new companies to enter the infant formula industry.  

    President Biden has used the Defense Production Act to give infant formula companies preferential access to resources vital to formula production, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced a decision to exercise case-by-case discretion on enforcing certain infant formula production requirements, which could increase the amount of formula the U.S. receives from foreign manufacturers. The Access to Baby Formula Act – which gives WIC recipients greater flexibility in using WIC to purchase infant formula – was also enacted in an effort to address the infant formula shortage. These actions were designed to both bolster domestic production, and potentially increase imports (temporarily at least), while increasing WIC recipients’ options without significantly changing the WIC competitive bidding process. 

    Meat Supply Chains

    Much like the infant formula industry, meat supply chains each experience significant market concentration. In the beef supply chain, the top 10 largest processing facilities are responsible for 47% of average daily beef slaughter. Because firms can own multiple facilities, the concentration among firms is higher than concentration among facilities, and the four largest cattle processing firms are responsible for 85% of annual slaughters in the U.S. 

    Figures for the pork industry are similar to that of the beef industry, although concentration among firms is lower: the four largest firms are responsible for only 67% of total annual hog slaughter in the U.S. The poultry sector is less concentrated in terms of facilities, with the ten largest poultry processors responsible for only 13% of total annual chicken slaughter in the U.S., but its firm concentration rate is more in line with that of beef and pork, with the four largest processing firms responsible for 53% of total annual slaughter. Additionally, the way in which livestock are grown has moved towards an increase in the size of farms and a decrease in the number of farms. 

    There are sources of vulnerability in U.S. meat supply chains that are not directly tied to concentration, including a lack of a steady labor force in processing facilities and the threat posed by diseases that target farm animals. Additionally, some of the meat supply chains’ characteristics may improve food supply issues overall by allowing for highly efficient food production, but also have some negative impacts on specific groups, such as small farmers. For example, it has been argued that vertical integration in meat processing increases efficiency by allowing the owners of processing facilities to have greater control over the characteristics of the livestock they are processing and the rate at which those animals are processed. But it has also been argued that these increases in efficiency come at a cost to family farms.

    Understanding the Tradeoffs

    In the meat industry, as in the infant formula industry, there is a tradeoff between the benefits offered by concentration, and the challenges that it creates. Because people need to eat every day, any disruption in a food supply chain will have an immediate impact on American consumers, making vulnerabilities in supply particularly important. The concentration in meat supply chains appears to make them more vulnerable to these sorts of disruptions, thereby exposing consumers to food insecurity. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, several big meat processing facilities were closed due to illness among workers, which caused temporary, but major, disruptions in the supply chain and led to price volatility (meaning the prices of meat products became less stable). Some have also expressed concerns that facility concentration will result in increases in food prices for consumers (and lower prices for meat-producing farmers). USDA funds have been used to support local, regional, and diversified processing facilities through loans, grants, and technical assistance; in addition, there are measures designed to encourage competition in the meat industry, such as passing new rules under the Packers and Stockyards Act in order to improve its antitrust enforcement. These measures reflect the federal government’s intention of addressing market concentration in meat supply chains. 

    On the other hand, it has been argued that the level of concentration in food supply chains in general has, overall, not resulted in higher prices for consumers, and that concentration is at least partially responsible for the affordability of food for the average American, as well as for the range of year-round food options that American consumers are able to access. It has also been argued that the practices of large food retailers like Walmart have driven down the food prices of competitors, and their participation in global supply chains allows for access to a wide variety of foods. In addition, large food retailers have complex disaster alert infrastructures that can be a useful tool in managing environmental threats to the food supply. As such, the meat supply chain, like the infant formula supply chain, faces the challenge of balancing the gains it receives from concentration against the vulnerabilities concentration can create.

  • What is the Public Charge Rule?

    What is the Public Charge Rule?

    “Public Charge” is defined as a ground of inadmissibility, or a reason why an individual may be denied a green card, visa, or entry to the US. A public charge is someone who lacks the resources or ability to take care of themselves. An individual who is likely to become a public charge is ineligible to become a legal permanent resident (LPR) which is also known as a green card holder. The rule only applies to individuals who are seeking to become an LPR. LPRs may be targeted to take a Public Charge test if they leave the country for more than 180 consecutive days. In rare cases, an immigrant, even if they are an LPR, may be subject to deportation if they become a public charge within 5 years after entering the US. The Public Charge Rule does not apply to every immigrant and has  the following exceptions: refugees, asylees, certain T and U nonimmigrant visa applicants including human trafficking, self-petitioners under the Violence Against Women Act

    The Public Charge Rule was designed to identify individuals who cannot support themselves and depend on benefits that provide cash such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy People (TANF), state or local general relief, and long term care at a nursing home paid by the government. The Public Charge Rule does not prevent immigrants from applying for assistance as the use of benefits will not automatically make an individual a public charge. Programs not included in the public charge test include:

    • Medicaid programs 
    • COVID-19 testing, treatment, vaccinations
    • Nutrition programs such as SNAP and WIC
    • Public housing and other housing assistance

    Origins

    The Public Charge Rule finds its roots in poor laws which established governmental authority to provide aid to the poor. The laws became prominent during the 19th century where the US experienced an influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. The poor laws established the number of years individuals must have resided in a town before they became eligible for public aid, and required local governments to provide the basic needs of residents who were unable to provide for themselves. Government officials prohibited dependent individuals, or those who were likely to become dependent, from residing in the jurisdiction they had not already established residency at the time they were impoverished. These poor laws later transformed into state immigration laws governing the admission and removal of non-citizens. Supporters were concerned with individuals who would become a burden to the community by depending on public relief so states sought to protect themselves. For example, anti-Irish sentiment led to an 1837 law in Massachusetts which authorized the exclusion of immigrants who had been, “impoverished in any other country, or who suffered from health conditions that would prevent them from supporting themselves.” 

    The Immigration Act of 1882, the first act to regulate immigration at the federal level, allowed the government to prevent any individual “unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge” from entering the country. The act later legalized the deportation of any individual who was likely to become a public charge within a year. However, it did not define how a public charge should be identified, which allowed immigrant officials to determine who could enter the US and exclude those who were likely considered to become a public charge.

    In 1999, the Department of Justice passed the Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds which clarified the definition of the public charge rule. Under this Guidance, a public charge is a person who will become dependent on the federal government for cash, income maintenance, or institutionalization for long-term care at the government expense. The guidance emphasized that immigrant officers should not place any weight on the receipt of non-cash public benefits, besides institutionalization, when determining noncitizens who want to enter the US or their LPR status.

    The Trump Administration redefined the Public Charge Rule, which went into effect on February 24th, 2020, as a non-citizen who receives one or more public benefits for more than 1 year within any 3 year period. The Administration expanded the types of government benefits that could disqualify immigrants from obtaining green cards to include non-cash benefits such as Medicaid, public housing assistance, and SNAP. In addition, the Trump Administration relied on the “totality of circumstances” test to predict whether a person will become a public charge in the future based on their age, health, family status, income and resources, skills, and education. The rule also explains how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will interpret the minimum statutory factors for determining whether an individual is likely to become a public charge by considering a list of negative and positive factors. It directs the DHS and immigration officers to consider these factors in the totality of the individual’s circumstances. For example, a characteristic that is considered a negative factor that increases the likelihood of someone becoming a public charge is having income below 125% of the federal poverty level which is $28,787 for a family of 3 as of 2022. The DHS acknowledges that one likely outcome of this change is that some individuals who may have been eligible to immigrate under the 1999 Interim Field Guidance will now be deemed inadmissible. The 1999 Interim Field Guidance did not clarify how to evaluate statutory factors, like age and health. The totality of circumstances test provides the legal standards and factors which individuals must meet to demonstrate they are not likely in the future to become a public charge. 

    The Biden Administration withdrew the 2019 Public Charge Rule in March 2021, causing the US Citizenship and Immigration and Citizenship Services (USCIS) to stop applying the rule to all pending applications and petitions. However, the Biden Administration proposed a new public charge rule which would largely codify the 1999 field guidance. The proposed rule would drop the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and pandemic assistance from those programs that would affect a public charge determination. 

    Support for the Public Charge Rule

    Advocates for the Public Charge Rule tend to embrace two core beliefs: self-reliance is a fundamental American value, and immigration should benefit American citizens.

    • Self-reliance: many believe that hard work and self-reliance lay at the core of the American ethos. A common narrative in the US discusses immigrants entering the country with limited means and working their way towards financial stability. For this reason, many people (including both those who want to severely restrict immigration and those who want to increase it) support the idea that immigrants should not immediately rely on government services. Forced migrants (refugees, asylum seekers, etc.) are not included under this policy, so the impacted populations are generally those applying to enter the country to work or join family members.
    • Benefitting Americans: a core dispute in immigration policy is how to balance benefits to American citizens and to immigrants. For example, the process to receive a work visa can be onerous and challenging, because there are concerns that immigrants could displace US workers and drive down wages. Some believe that immigration policies should prioritize adding value for current citizens, by supplying a specific, needed skill set or by investing in US firms. Those who want to prioritize benefits to US citizens tend to support the Public Charge Rule, and believe that potential immigrants should receive social services in their home countries, rather than use resources funded by US taxpayers.

    Critiques of the Public Charge Rule

    One argument in opposition to the Public Charge Rule is its “chilling effects” in reducing immigrants’ use of safety programs and public benefits especially during the Trump administration in 2019. Though the rule did not go into effect until February 2020, many immigrant families avoided programs specified in the rule as well as other public programs before the rule was implemented. For example in 2019, 1 in 4 low-income immigrant adults in California  reported that they avoided public programs like Medicaid or nutrition assistance programs due to the belief that participating in such programs would harm their immigration status or that of a family member. The researchers also found that 37% of the immigrants who reported avoiding public programs in the past year were uninsured, and 54% of those who avoided public programs in the past year were food insecure. 

    Reduced participation in nutrition programs such as SNAP could lead to worse health outcomes if families experiencing food insecurity do not use food assistance. According to the 2019 California Health Interview Survey (CHIS), the percentage of immigrants who reported delays in medical care, delays in getting prescription medication, and not receiving needed mental health treatment was twice as high among those who had avoided public programs in the past year as among those who had not. The Public Charge Rule has the potential to influence the health of millions of immigrants and their dependents by decreasing the use of health services and worsening health disparities. Lower rates of insurance coverage would reduce the use of prenatal and postnatal care and cause higher rates of low birth weight, infant mortality, and maternal morbidity. The effect of losses in insurance coverage on morbidity and mortality among both children and adults would also increase the poverty rate among households headed by noncitizen immigrants due to reductions in the use of tax credits and housing energy assistance.  

    Many immigrant families, who are not subject to the rule, also avoided medical care for fear of being deemed a public charge despite formal clarification by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services announcing that COVID-19 testing and treatment are not applicable to the rule. For instance, immigrant-serving organizations reported that 37% of families avoided public programs like the Pandemic EBT, a COVID-19 relief program designed to feed children who were receiving free or reduced priced meals at school. The Public Charge Rule has been critiqued to create misinformation and confusion:

    •  23% of adults in immigrant families know that the rule does not apply to citizenship applications.
    • 19% of adults knew children’s enrollment in Medicaid will not be considered in their parents’ public charge determinations.

    Immigrants are afraid to access COVID-19 treatment even if they fall ill due to public charge concerns. Among undocumented individuals in Massachusetts households, 18% of survey respondents reported fear of being labeled a public charge, and 13% fear that their information would be shared with immigration agents. Thus, many argue that there should be more resources and outreach programs to address the misinformation that the rule has created among immigrant communities.

    Moving Forward

    Multiple states have started to implement education and outreach programs to clarify any misinformation of the Public Charge Rule. Colorado, Kentucky, and Washington have information available on their website about changes to the Public Charge Rule to reassure individuals that public benefits are safe. Oregon and DC have included public charge FAQs in multiple languages on their websites. Having clear information on the Public Charge Rule available and accessible on states’ websites could ensure that eligible immigrants are receiving necessary public benefits.

    As of June 2022, the Supreme Court dismissed Arizona and other states case claiming states have the right to defend the Trump-era public charge rule after the Biden Administration refused to revive the policy. The states argued that the federal government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by dropping the rule without consenting to public hearings. Supporters of the Trump-era public charge rule, such as Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich, have vowed to continue to push against the Biden Administration’s decisions regarding the Public Charge Rule. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the case which left the states no legal ability to defend the Trump-era public charge rule.