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Category: ACE Research

  • U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan and its effects on ASEAN relations

    U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan and its effects on ASEAN relations

    U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan in 2021

    In 2021, after twenty years of military occupation, the United States and international forces departed Afghanistan. President Biden remarked: “It’s time to end America’s longest war”. After the withdrawal event, the local Afghan government disbanded, and the Taliban, an Islamic extremist group that formerly took control of the nation, retook power. 

    Many experts supported the decision, calling it “a wise strategic choice that took significant political courage”. Despite continuous investments in Afghanistan, many believed the United States could not change the course of political dynamics in this country. For that reason, this withdrawal would result in the most efficient outcome for the U.S and its allies. 

    Other experts regard the U.S’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan as a sign of weakened American strength in the international arena. Experts speculate that a withdrawal from Afghanistan might potentially signal other withdrawals in other arenas of conflict in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Under the context of the South China Sea conflict, ASEAN countries might face a decline in U.S support, thus they have to find new ways to circumvent Chinese aggression. As a result, such withdrawals can have serious impacts on aspects of United States-ASEAN relations.  

    U.S support for ASEAN nations in the South China Sea conflict

    The end of America’s longest war had major implications for allies around the world, including in relation to U.S. foreign policy in the South China Sea conflict. Since the early 2010s, China has made authoritative claims in the South China Sea to strengthen its authority in the region. China claimed possession of the estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas under the sea. These claims and other militaristic actions antagonized relations with neighboring states including Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. According to the ASEAN countries and the United States, within the framework of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), many of China’s claims were invalid. 

    To ensure regional political security as well as to secure its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, the United States has supported its Southeast Asian partners to combat China’s aggression. U.S allies like Japan also sold equipment and combat ships to the Philippines and Vietnam. In a 2020 press release, Secretary of State Pompeo declared “the world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire. America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law”. The U.S’s proactive approach and continuous support within the span of this conflict signaled the United States’ strong advocacy for ASEAN allies in military conflicts with China.

    Future of U.S- ASEAN relations post-Afghanistan withdrawal

    In reality, most countries in Southeast Asia did not see this withdrawal as a major shift in U.S foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region. While it does signal a temporarily weakened America, it did not alter the U.S’s long term goals in the Indo-Pacific region. Some Southeast Asian policy experts believe the withdrawal might give Southeast Asia the full attention they believe it deserves given U.S-China’s competing interest in the region. 

    While the Afghanistan withdrawal seemed abrupt, most Southeast Asian nations did not see it as a surprise. In 2011, the Obama administration indicated the U.S. would withdraw from the Middle East to focus on the Asia-Pacific. This move was part of the United States’ foreign policy strategy to withdraw from “forever wars”. Overall, the withdrawal was the final result of a decade-long foreign policy. 

    The United States will likely continue and even strengthen its multi-lateral support for ASEAN, especially in disputes such as the South China Sea conflict. The United States will continue to be a strong advocate for other ASEAN claimants in the face of China’s assertive actions. Following Biden’s inauguration and Afghanistan’s withdrawal in 2021, Vice President Kamala Harris visited Singapore and Vietnam, two key ASEAN partners. The trip’s goal was to cement U.S relationships with ASEAN nations after the complications of the Afghanistan withdrawal. According to NPR, one senior administration official in the Biden administration remarked: “Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific are really important and that’s why she’s going”. In addition, during her visit, Harris confirmed that the United States will continue to “bolster economic and security ties with its Southeast Asian countries”. 

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  • Introduction to Russia-West Africa Relations

    Introduction to Russia-West Africa Relations

    The “New Scramble for Africa” is a phrase newly adopted by many in the field of foreign policy, defining the latest form of colonialism where global powers seek control of strategic resources on the African continent. The phrase derived from the 1884-5 Berlin Conference, in which thirteen European countries and the United States met in Berlin to divide African territory and take power and control from existing African states and peoples. Russia was excluded from the process, but now, in a time of tension with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia is a top contender in the “New Scramble for Africa” and its strategy for influence in West Africa is comprehensive and carefully calculated. 

    Trade/Economy

    The 2019 Russia-Africa Sochi Summit, co-hosted by President Vladamir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was a major economic forum “for peace, security, and development.” The summit was attended by 43 African heads of state and developed plans for future cooperation between Russia and Africa. Russia-Africa trade has generally shown a steady upward trend, especially in West Africa. 

    Ghana and Nigeria were the main African destinations of Russian non-commodity exports in 2020, with export industries like agriculture, mechanical engineering, timber, and chemicals leading the charge. The Russian Export Center (the Russian government’s central trade department) has recorded an increase in interest in Russian exports in many West African countries. The total 2020 trade revenue (USD million) was upwards of 2.04 billion dollars between West African countries and Russia. The primary contributors were Senegal (480 USD million), Nigeria (461 USD million), Ivory Coast (291 USD million), and Togo (283 USD million). 

    The Russian Export Center is also involved in infrastructure development projects in the region, including a major railway in the region and supplying energy resources and equipment to West African companies and governments. Russia is also a top arms seller to countries including Mali and Nigeria. Many experts believe Russia is pursuing economic relations to expand military influence in West Africa. 

    Intra-African Conflict

    Russia’s outsider apparatus and its evolution as a partner to West African government and military organizations allow the country to step in when power vacuums occur in the African region. West African citizens in countries such as Mali or Burkina Faso are increasingly opposed to intervention from western states, including former colonial powers like France and the UK. This strengthens the possibility of Russian involvement in those countries. 

    In Mali, a vacuum opened for Russia following the gradual withdrawal of French troops after years of conflict with Islamist militant groups in the Sahel. Operation Barkhane was a French military operation in northern Mali to oust Islamist groups. Russian mercenaries are slowly beginning to substitute French troops, specifically with increased involvement from the Wagner Group—a Russian mercenary organization. The Wagner Group has been identified as a part of several operations in the counter-insurgency mission in Northern Mali. These missions frequently produce human rights abuses and atrocities, such as the alleged Wagner Group-backed massacre of more than 300 civilians in the town of Moura in April 2022. Several experts claim The Wagner Group is closely tied to Russia’s military intelligence agency, GRU although political intentions remain unclear. The Wagner Group has been linked to unpopular military coups and regimes deemed ‘undemocratic,’ such as those in Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic. 

    Some West African countries feel neglected by the West, and jihadist militants in the Sahel are increasingly threatening state security. This has produced an environment ripe for Russian influence. Burkina Faso and Guinea recently underwent coups as a result of growing instability and insecurity in the Sahel, and the potential for further Russian-based expansion in West African military conflicts is looming. 

    Russian military presence in Africa

    Climate/Energy

    The 2019 Sochi Summit did not go into depth about the implications of climate change in West Africa and the rest of the continent. However, there are prospects of addressing the issue in future summits including the impending 2023 Russia-Africa Forum.

    The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine faced global backlash and has caused international food shortages, and caused knock-on effects in Africa Disrupted gas exports from Russia have limited economic activity and the ability of people to heat homes, cook food, and use transport. Countries like Senegal currently rely on oil for half of their electricity generation. In the entirety of West Africa, diesel generators account for more than 40% of total energy consumption. The cost of diesel in Nigeria has increased by 200% and increased prices of electricity generation in Ghana and Ivory Coast.

    Immigration/Education

    Russia is home to a population of 70,000 people of African descent. There is a high population of Nigerians and Cameroonians living in Russia, and many have allegedly been deceptively lured to Russia for false jobs. The language barrier, prejudice, and discrimination have steered many Africans away from living in Russia. The Russian government has shown, however, efforts to integrate African immigrants into their communities, labor market, media, and politics, and recently established Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. The university was named after Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, and aims to provide an opportunity for young people from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to acquire an education. 

    Conclusion

    Nearly 150 years since the Berlin Conference, Russia is now one of the top influencers in African trade, conflict, climate, energy, and society as a whole. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has drastically shifted relations within the new global order. For West Africa, citizens will be heavily relying on democratic institutions to initiate change in the quest for a secure future in the region and a benign relationship with Russia. 

  • U and T Nonimmigrant Status

    U and T Nonimmigrant Status

    What is U and T Visa Status and who currently qualifies?

    U and T visa status are programs with the intention of aiding immigrants that are victims of certain criminal activity. U nonimmigrant status is designed to aid victims of crimes that involve mental or physical abuse who assist law enforcement and other government officials in the investigation and/or prosecution of the crime. T visas are designed for victims of human trafficking who fulfill a reasonable request for aid in detecting, investigating, and/or prosecuting human trafficking. 

    How does one apply for a U or T visa?

    1. Turn in a completed Form I-918 to the USCIS
      1. This is the main application document,
    2. Turn in a completed Form I-918 Supplement B
      1. This form is confirmation that the applicant was cooperative with law enforcement, prosecutors, and other government officials in investigating and prosecuting the crime of which they were a victim. 
      2. This cooperation element is key to the public policy goals of the U and T nonimmigrant status programs, as it encourages cooperation with authorities, even if the victim is undocumented and may be wary of authority figures.
    3. If petitioning for other family members, turn in a completed Form I-918 Supplement A.
      1. This allows other family members to receive U visa status based on their relationship to the victim of the crime.

    What are the benefits of U or T visa status?

    The immediate benefit of U or T visa status is that an individual receives lawful status, allowing them to remain in the United States for four years without entering removal proceedings. They are also allowed to petition for close family members, usually a spouse, unmarried minor children, and, if the victim is a child, parents and unmarried minor siblings. If granted, the family members all receive U nonimmigrant status. Another benefit is that employment authorization comes with U nonimmigrant status, allowing one to work legally in the United States while they are allowed to live here.

    The biggest benefit of U and T nonimmigrant statuses is that they are a pathway to permanent residency, often known as a “green card.” While one does not immediately qualify after being granted a U or T visa, one is eligible after living continuously within the United States for four years after obtaining U or T nonimmigrant status. The process is lengthy, but having a green card is the last step before U.S. citizenship. 

    What are the limitations of U and T visa status?

    One of the main limitations of the current U and T nonimmigrant status programs is that a limited number of principal U visas—10,000—are issued annually. There are significantly more U visa applicants than visas issued annually, with over 35,000 filed in 2017 and again in 2018. Given this difference in applications and visas issued, there is a large queue of pending applications—142,000 as of 2019.

  • The Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Latin America

    The Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Latin America

    What Are Human Rights Defenders?

    According to the United Nations, human rights defenders “individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights in a peaceful manner.” This often takes the form of monitoring governments and businesses to bring attention to human rights violations and crimes, defending vulnerable populations, and advocating for environmental protection. Human rights defenders often come into conflict with authoritarian governments who see them as threats, as human rights defenders can directly criticize government action or fill a gap when a government fails to act. In Venezuela, domestic laws are used against human rights defenders that limit their operations and restrict their access to funding. 

    Violence in the Region

    Central and Latin America is a global hotspot for the persecution of human rights defenders. The region accounts for three quarters of all murders of defenders globally. In January 2022, thirteen defenders were killed in Colombia, three in Honduras, three in Brazil, and one defender and four journalists in Mexico. Eighteen of those killed were involved in defending rights in relation to access to land and the protection of land and the environment. In recent years, human rights defenders have experienced greater persecution due to the effects of the pandemic, increasing environmental hazards, and the lack of legal protections in place for HRDs. The pandemic allowed oppressive governments to implement draconian policies, take new steps to restrict movement and privacy, and crack down on opposition under the guise of public health measures. 

    Many human rights defenders migrate elsewhere within the region to avoid retaliation from the perpetrators of human rights violations, and there is no significant evidence that authoritarian regimes carry out transnational repression. Many defenders and activists attempt to flee to countries that are safer, but there are still many risks in states throughout the region. 

    Environmental activists are especially vulnerable in Mexico and Colombia. 212 environmental and land/water activists were murdered globally in 2020—a record high. 165 of these deaths took place in Latin America, with 65 in Colombia and 30 in Mexico. Colombia had led in the number of murders for two consecutive years (2019 and 2020) and almost half of these offences were against people engaged in protecting small-scale agriculture/land rights. 40% of human rights defenders killed in 2019 were involved in land protection, worked with indigenous groups, or advocated for environmental changes. 

    Honduras: The Honduran government has been accused of using the criminal justice system to persecute activists, especially the Garifuna indigenous group which is currently disputing ownership of certain properties. In 2021, 200 were harassed, threatened, or attacked, and 80% of the violence targeted activists defending land and environmental rights. Roughly 90% of violent incidents reported against human rights defenders went unpunished.

    Nicaragua: Human rights abuses have been prevalent in Nicaragua and, as a result, 100,000 have fled the country. Costa Rica, Panama, and Mexico are major destinations for Nicaraguan migrants. Many opposition leaders and activists were arrested prior to the contentious 2021 election, causing supporters to leave out of concern for political persecution.

    Policy Options Looking Forward:

    The goal for HRDs today and in the future is to be allowed to work freely in their environments to promote respect, protection, and equality for all along with environmental protection(including land access and control). The US, EU, all Latin American countries, businesses, and investors are being called on to “protect HRDs from the attacks they face and to tackle the drivers of abuse.” However, it is not clear what that protection should look like, and, apart from asylum processes for at-risk individuals. The mechanism for changing another state’s domestic practices is nonexistent, beyond vague statements about soft power and diplomacy.

    The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders: In 1998, the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders was adopted by the General Assembly and commits the UN to promoting and protecting those who advocate for human rights across the world. This resolution was adopted twenty-five years ago, and could be updated to address the current state of human rights. The current resolution recommends utilizing diplomacy to protect defenders, but lacks details for how that should take place. The Declaration does not have a mechanism for enforcement  and relies on powerful countries to create consequences for human rights violations, which may not align with other strategic interests. For example, the US works closely with Mexico to manage migration and security along the shared border, so pressuring Mexico to change its behavior towards journalists could come at a high cost in terms of reduced cooperation on migration.

    The Biden Administration: In October 2021, President Biden announced that the US would serve on the UN Human Rights Council for three years in order to work to protect human rights defenders globally. Biden aims to promote accountability of governments that have persecuted, threatened, and killed defenders. The Biden and Harris Administration claim to put democratic values and human rights at the center of US Foreign Policy, yet there is no formal policy for protecting those who are defending human rights abroad. The US State Department has published a list of ways in which the US attempts to protect activists abroad that include assisting defenders obtain international protection, attending judicial hearings of defenders, attempting to keep close contact with activists abroad, encouraging host governments to work with the defenders, working with the UN to address specific threats, etc.

    La Esperanza Protocol: This protocol aims to improve the investigation of and response to serious threats against human rights defenders. This protocol, implemented in 2019, is the first international tool to establish best practices and guidelines to investigate threats of this kind. This project does important work in gathering knowledge and making it publicly available, but does not have a mechanism to ensure its implementation.

  • US Response to the EU Energy Crisis

    US Response to the EU Energy Crisis

    Over the course of the past six months, the United States committed to several EU-U.S. trade agreements to support the European economy in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The US aims to reduce the European Union economy’s dependence on Russian gas and oil. The EU and the US have restricted energy imports from Russia, and Russia has responded with energy-related sanctions.

    Background Information

    According to the European Commission, the EU imported 155 billion cubic meters

    of natural gas from Russia, as well as €48 billion worth of Russian crude oil and €23 billion worth of Russian refined oil in 2021. During this same year, crude oil was one of the largest energy imports into the EU, amounting to 62%, followed by natural gas at 25%, the majority of both coming from Russia.

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    Within the EU, Germany is Europe’s largest importer of Russian gas, importing 42.6 billion cubic meters of gas in 2020, followed by Italy who imported 29.2 billion cubic meters of gas in the same year.

    Russian sanctions on EU fuel imports were devastating given the EU’s dependency on natural gas and crude oil. Russia imposed sanctions in May 2022 on European subsidiaries of the state-owned energy giant Gazprom who categorized these sanctions as “a ban on the use of a gas pipeline owned by EuRoPol GAZ to transport gas through Poland [and to the rest of the EU].” Since Russia’s sanctions were implemented, the EU has attempted to find new alternatives to Russian oil and gas, and some—including Germany—are rationing oil consumption to mitigate the sudden loss of fuels. 

    Current Discussion 

    Due to its dependency on Russian fuels, Germany initially opposed EU plans to target the Russian energy sector.

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    However, three months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany announced support for an embargo on Russian fuel imports, allowing the EU to pass a more aggressive package of restrictive measures against Russia.

    Adopted in June, the new package has five main elements: 

    • Restricts oil imports including an immediate embargo on all crude oil and refined oil products and a gradual embargo on petroleum products and seaborn crude oil for countries lacking the infrastructure to fully transition to non-Russian energy. 
    • Gradually restrict Russian oil transportation to “third world” countries.
    • Prohibits financial relations with the Russian government and state-owned entities, as well as with three major Russian banks and one Belarusian bank.
    • Suspends three Russian State outlets from broadcasting as well as advertising for Russian products and services.
    • Expands the list of banned items to include any additional chemicals and technologies that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons as well as halts exports to entities in many sectors, including weapons and scientific research.

    As a result of the increased severity of EU restrictions on Russian gas and fuel, the EU turned to the U.S and began importing liquified natural gasses (LNGs) and other fuel sources. The EU imported 60 billion cubic meters of LNGs from the United States since April 2016, and experienced a surge in U.S. LNG imports since 2019. 

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    The United States announced it will supply 15 billion cubic meters of LNGs to the EU to mitigate the developing energy crisis abroad. In March 2022, President Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a joint task force to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. 

    The Task Force has two primary objectives: 

    • Diversifying LNG Supplies in Alignment with Climate Objectives: the United States will work to ensure at least 15 billion cubic meters of LNG exports to the EU in 2022 with the intention of increases in the future and both entities will work to ensure that any and all expansions of LNG import/export infrastructure will prioritize sustainability and efficiency.
    • Reducing Demand for Natural Gas: both the EU and the US commit to decrease dependency on natural gas by accelerating market deployment of clean energy measures through funding advancement of renewable energy technologies.

    Concerns

    This Task Force will cost about $60 billion dollars. Currently, the EU does not have LNG import infrastructure to sustain this ambitious plan. Most of the regasification facilities in the EU are in coastal countries, so central European countries will have difficulty accessing the LNGs after they have been processed. The United States will also need to build more LNG export facilities as current liquefaction plants have reached maximum capacity. The construction of these facilities would cost upwards of $10 billion in investments. 

  • US Military in South Korea

    US Military in South Korea

    The presence of the American military in South Korea began at the end of WWII, when American and Soviet forces entered the peninsula to facilitate the removal of Japanese forces. The American military was positioned south of the 38th parallel whereas Soviet forces moved north. When North Korean forces invaded South Korea in 1950, triggering the Korean War (1950-1953), the US supported South Korea to oppose the communist regime. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 1.8 million Americans served in the war. The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, which ended hostilities and established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The Korean Peninsula remained divided at the 38th parallel in a perpetual state of war as the armistice agreement was not a permanent peace treaty. The Truman administration prioritized stability over reunification, and America and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. The American military has remained in South Korea ever since. 

    Financing the US Military Presence

    The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) establishes the obligations of the US and South Korea in maintaining American forces. The US is responsible for the maintenance of US troops in South Korea, and South Korea fund the facilities. The financial contribution of South Korea comes in the form of Special Measure Agreements (SMA’s). Eleven SMAs have been signed since 1991, with the 11th signed in 2021. 

    The Trump administration raised concerns over South Korean contributions. In the SMA signed in 2014, which was supposed to last until 2018, South Korea paid 920 billion won, or approximately $866.86 million USD. This was a 5.8 percent increase from the previous agreement. The increase was theorized to be from the decision to send more tanks and soldiers. In the 2019 SMA, South Korea paid 1.04 trillion won, or $921.5 million USD, which was an 8.2 percent increase from the previous agreement. The 2019 agreement was only for one year, while the agreements usually last for 3-5 years. In the negotiations for a 2020 SMA, President Trump rejected the South Korean offer of a 13 percent increase and requested a 5 billion dollar contribution. The delays that resulted from the disagreements resulted in furloughs for the first time since the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and increased tensions with South Korea. 

    The Biden administration signed the 11th SMA in 2021, and it will last until 2025. South Korea paid 1.1833 trillion Korean Won in 2021, and the amount will rise according to the contribution of the previous year by the ROK defense budget increase rate. The 2021 defense budget increase rate will be used for the 2022 contribution, the 2022 rate for 2023, and so on. The renewal rate was partially driven by the rift that had been created by the Trump administration, and Biden’s attempts to repair this. 

    Operation Control (OPCON)

    Operational control can be defined as “authority to perform functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission” and does not involve “authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.” In 1994, peacetime opcon was transferred to Korea, but wartime opcon is still maintained by the United States Forces Korea (USFK), under combined command of both the US and SK. The peacetime transfer means that the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff controls the operations during peacetime, and Combined Forces Command will control operations during wartime. 

    The controversy mainly lies in the transfer of wartime OPCON. Wartime OPCON was initially supposed to transfer to South Korea in 1996, but the discussion was postponed when North Korea threatened a nuclear attack. President Roh Moo hyun agreed with President Bush, in 2007, that wartime OPCON would be transferred over to South Korea by 2012. President Roh politicized the issue, and framed it as South Korea needing to retake sovereignty. The following president, Lee Myung bak postponed the discussion to 2015 because of the “evolving security environment”, most likely referencing the North Korean Cheonan incident in 2010. In the following presidential administration, Park Geun hye rejected the 2015 deadline, citing that it was too soon considering the increased nuclear threats and testing from North Korea, and President Obama agreed that it could be reconsidered. In the 46th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Joint Communique, article 11 details an implementation of a conditions-based approach in the transfer of wartime OPCON to Korea:

    • ROK will assume wartime OPCON when ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured (meaning the ROK military capabilities will need to be able to counter North Korean missiles, and confidently lead the combined defense posture) 
    • The security environment on the Korean peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable transition 

    This would delay the transfer to sometime in the 2020’s, but it was not clear precisely when. The following president, Moon Jae In, conversed with the Trump administration in order to speed up the process of transfer, and the Alliance Guiding Principles were drafted at the 50th SCM. Post-transition, the CFC would be a “separate standing entity” (therefore, not dissolved), and the ROK would appoint a General or Admiral to serve as Commander of the CFC, with a US General or Admiral as deputy commander. The current CFC command has a four star US general as Commander, and a four star ROK general as deputy commander. The Moon administration wished to undertake a Full Operational Capability (FOC) exam in 2021, but the Trump administration said neither side was ready. 

    The current president, Yoon Suk yeol, believest South Korea lacked sufficient readiness to operate intelligence assets, which suggests that the OPCON transfer may not happen in the immediate future. President Yoon maintains that he wishes for a speedy transfer, but only if it does not undermine the combined defense posture of SK and US. At the 53rd SCM, the joint communique lists the reaffirmation “that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before the wartime OPCON is transitioned to the F-CFC [Future-Combined Forces Command]”. They also pledged to do a FOC exam in 2022. There are speculations that the war in Ukraine and tension between the US and China may lead the Biden administration to hesitate to transfer wartime OPCON, but the 2023 54th SCM may yield more clear answers.

  • The Usage of Detention Centers in the US

    The Usage of Detention Centers in the US

    The United States is home to the largest immigration detention system in the world. These detention centers are used to lawfully detain 7% of the noncitizen US population. According to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, US detention facilities are intended to hold individuals who await an immigration decision or departure to their home country. The decision to detain a noncitizen is based on a person’s immigration history, risk, ties to the community, and criminal record. Detention centers are used for an extensive breadth of immigrants, including asylum seekers and legal migrants. In the fiscal year of 2021, nearly 250,000 people were detained by ICE. About 43% of the detainee population are Mexican, and 46% of this population claim origin in the Northern Triangle region of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. The use of detention centers speaks to the dual challenges of addressing the needs of asylum seekers while countering illegal activity at US borders.

    The History of Immigrant Detention and Enforcement

    The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act began modern-day immigration detention by setting minimum daily detention quotas and broadening the baseline for criminal offenses in an immigration context. In 1979, the average population of detainees was 2,371, and in 2019, this number had grown  to 49,403 individuals. To maintain this vast system, private detention centers contracted by ICE, such as the GEO Group and Core Civic, along with ICE-operated centers averaged spending of $3.1 billion in the 2018 fiscal year. 

    Current Administration’s Approach

    In January 2021, President Biden’s administration proposed reversing the stringent policies of the Trump administration. The US Citizenship Act of 2021 aims to promote citizenship, prioritize border control, and address the root causes of migration. The Citizenship Act: 

    • Removes the one-year deadline for filing asylum applications and provides funding to reduce application backlogs, addressing the detention length of asylum seekers.
    • Supplements border resources with technology to facilitate screening, improving the ability to process asylum seekers.
    • Orders the Secretary of the Department of Homeland to implement alternative programs to detention. 

    Arguments in Favor of Immigrant Detention 

    1. National Safety: Proponents of immigrant detention centers cite border security as an objective for the type of immigration control in order to ensure community security concerns and individuals labeled as flight risks are confined to these centers.
    2. Enforced Compliance with Immigration Protocols: The Department of Homeland Security oversees the organizational structure and detention standards of US centers in which noncitizens are placed into detention centers to undergo asylum processes. Detention centers are used to hold unaccompanied children who are evading violence, poverty, and other dangerous conditions. DHS is responsible for the standards of care for migrant children which include medical services and access to food and water. 

    Arguments Against Immigration Detention

    1. Unsafe Detention Conditions: In a 2019 Inspector General report, confinement conditions, such as inappropriate treatment, lack of professionalism, inadequate medical care, and hygiene supplies were detailed, resulting in mental and physical trauma amongst some migrants. In a 2021 Pew Research survey, 91% of Democrats and 61% of Republicans believed that supplying safe and hygienic conditions at the southern border is of some importance. Today, amidst the pandemic, detention centers lack masks, soap, appropriate space for social distancing, and other necessities. In June 2021, more than 20,000 individuals contracted COVID-19 while in detention centers.
    2. Expense: ICE-operated detention centers cost a daily average of $144 per immigrant during FY 2021, representing $2.8 billion out of ICE’s gross budget of $8.4 billion. Due to the costly nature of detention, immigration courts prioritize the cases of detained individuals, leaving more than 3 million asylum seekers and individuals with cases of other relief forms without support. The large contribution to detention centers diminishes the investment in other immigration functions, such as providing social services.
    3. Lack of Legal Resources: During the detention period, noncitizens are not guaranteed legal resources, such as lawyers and translators. Asylum seekers without legal representation may clog the system by filing multiple claims in efforts to identify a claim that will be granted, whereas those with counsel file applicable claims due to legal advice. Additionally, language barriers pose an obstacle within the immigration system.

    Alternatives to Detention Centers

    Alternatives to detentions (ATDs) are informal and formal policies, practices, and legislation that deter detentions due to immigration-related reasons. In 2022, the budget for ATDs is $443 million which resulted in the enrollment of 182,607 people in such programs as of mid-March. Today, ICE-operated ATDs include the Intensive Appearance Supervision Program and Extended Case Management Services which utilize monitoring practices, such as in-person check-ins, electronic monitoring (GPS tracking through ankle monitors or cellphones), and case managers. Due to the elimination of needs, including beds, food, medical care, recreational and religious activities, and other resources required within detention centers, daily costs per person reach as low as $0.70 compared to $144, the daily average in detention centers. 

    Similarly, community-based ATDs are used within the US immigration system to provide individuals with the ability to garner close ties to a community and its resources while undergoing the asylum process. In 2016, ICE initiated the Family Case Management Program for families that are not well-suited for detention centers, such as families with children, pregnancies, and histories of domestic abuse. Given a case manager, families were able to receive medical care, English training, and legal assistance. Despite its early cessation in 2017, compliance rates from FCMP were 99% and the average daily cost per family was $38.47.

  • What the Colombian Presidential Election Means for US Relations

    What the Colombian Presidential Election Means for US Relations

    Introduction

    On June 19, 2022, Colombia elected Gustavo Petro, the 62-year old, left-wing senator, former mayor of Bogotá, and former member of the M-19 guerilla, as president with 50.8% of the vote, defeating Rodolfo Hernandez, a 77-year-old real estate tycoon and former mayor of Bucaramanga. 

    Petro’s win is historic, as he becomes the country’s first-ever leftist president. His running mate, Francia Márquez, is also breaking new ground by becoming the first Afro-Colombian and first woman to be elected vice president. Petro received almost 11.3 million votes, the most any presidential candidate has ever received. Many of those votes were the result of a surge in participation from poor and coastal communities.

    Many of these voters were not energized to the polls by concerns over security and counter-narcotics, which have dominated past election cycles. Instead, the COVID-19 pandemic, mass protests, and a deteriorating economic climate, along with issues such as inequality, poverty, social problems, police brutality, corruption, and climate change have become the main drivers for a new wave of poor, young, and urban Colombians. Many viewed Petro as a figure to challenge the establishment and help “the nobodies”.

    Petro’s Colombia

    When Petro was inaugurated n August 2022, he took over a nation reeling from rising inflation, poverty, and unemployment. According to Americas Quarterly, 4 million Colombians went into poverty during the pandemic. A 2022 poll found 85% of Colombians think the situation in the country is worsening, with 34% believing the economy is the main problem. Only 26% of Colombians are satisfied with its democracy. 

    Petro is taking over an unsatisfied and disillusioned Colombia. But it’s up to Petro to find allies for his Pacto Historico coalition—a coalition of left-leaning and center political parties and social groups—to begin to enact some of his campaign promises and goals from the economy to climate change.

    Economic Reform

    During his campaign, Petro emphasized the need for structural economic reform, stating in an interview with El Pais, “the establishment does not want change. It has become wealthy with an economic model that prioritizes the financial sector and is based on the extraction of oil and coal….a model like this increases social inequality, which is the mother of violence.” 

    Petro’s goals include tax reform to finance new social programs and public projects to combat rising inequality and poverty in the country. 42.5% of the Columbia population—21 million people—live below the poverty line of 331,000 pesos (~$77) per month. Much of his plan is focused on increasing taxes and royalties on extractive industries and their products, such as mining endeavors and fossil fuels, which could raise around $5.2 billion in added revenue. Petro wants to implement a new progressive income tax where Colombians earning more than 10 million pesos per month—1% of the population—will pay progressively higher taxes. 

    Petro also plans to focus on corporate tax evasion. According to Reuters, tax evasion costs the Colombian government $17.6 billion annually. These funds could be used to reduce the country’s deficit, which sits at 7.1% of its GDP.

    Climate Change

    Petro has been adamant that his priority as president is dealing with the environment and moving the country away from extractive industries, towards a productive economy. His vision of a “productive” economy would be becoming independent of oil and mining industries, which account for 50% of Colombia’s exports and 14% of government revenue, and replace them with renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and tourism. He also committed to end new oil exploration licenses which will be a complicated task because the government currently holds an 88% stake in EcoPetrol. However, Petro has made it a key goal of his presidency to make Colombia a global example in shifting away from extractive industries toward an environmentally oriented future.

    Social Reform

    Petro’s running mate, Francia Marques, represents a crucial advancement for many marginalized groups in Colombia. Petro’s has proposed creating a Ministry of Equality and ensuring 50% of all government positions are held by women. His campaign has put forward reforms to the public pension, healthcare programs, and public education in an effort to expand coverage and accessibility.

    The issue of hunger has also intensified recently, with the Colombian Association of Food Banks reporting that around 16 million Colombians have access to 2 meals or less a day. To combat this issue, Petro plans to declare a state of emergency against hunger in the country.

    Security & Counter-Narcotics

    In regards to security, Petro has stated that he wants to properly implement the 2016 peace agreement with the guerilla group FARC, and begin peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN). He has also set his goals to promote reforms for the military and police including hold military officials accountable for human right violations, dismantle the police riot squad (ESMAD), professionalize the military, and reform its merit-based promotion system.

    US-Colombia Relations Under Petro

    Colombia has been the US’s strongest Latin American partner for over two decades, with the US providing over $13 billion in aid. However, with the election of Gustavo Petro, the US finds itself with a new Colombian government different from the conversative governments of the past. While the Biden administration seems to be taking an open and cautious approach with Colombia, Petro seeks a ‘more equitable’ relationship” with Washington. At this time, it is not yet clear what that equitable relationship will entail.

  • Preventing Crime Through Rehabilitation

    Preventing Crime Through Rehabilitation

    What is Rehabilitation Theory and how does it relate to crime prevention?

    Rehabilitation Theory is a forward-looking theory, similarly to Deterrence Theory and Incapacitation Theory, where punishment through rehabilitation is justified through its ability to control crime. In contrast to Deterrence Theory and Incapacitation Theory, however, Rehabilitation Theory positions punishment as a mechanism to improve an individual’s character or behavior, which would then reduce the likelihood of recidivism. The word “punishment” often has a negative connotation, but Rehabilitation Theory gained traction in the United States through a concept known as the Rehabilitative Ideal, which positions punishment as a way for corrections to serve higher social purposes, notably the reduction of recidivism. 

    The Rehabilitative Ideal follows a positivist school of thought where participation in crime is the outcome of processes such as environmental factors, including family upbringing and social conditioning, or genetic factors. Throughout the early 20th century, the Medical Model of Intervention became the baseline rehabilitative treatment for individuals who commit crimes. People who commit crimes were seen as products of socio-economic or psychological forces beyond their control. Crime became a “sickness,” where the goal of rehabilitative treatment was to “cure” individuals, which would in turn reduce recidivism. Proponents of the Medical Model point to the subsequent introduction of psychiatrists, psychologists, and clinical social workers into prison settings. However, advocates for individuals in prison ultimately brought the Medical Model’s failures to light, pointing to the invasive and illegal procedures taking place in correctional institutions such as psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy, and chemical castration performed under the guise of “rehabilitation.” 

    Rehabilitation Policy in the US Before Martinson

    The use of rehabilitation as a form of punishment and crime prevention emerged in the late 19th century in penitentiaries at a time when people in prison were responsible for their own rehabilitation. The primary rationale behind crime was thought to stem from an individual’s inability to “to lead orderly and God-fearing lives.” However, penitentiaries soon became reformatories, which aimed to rehabilitate offenders through educational and vocational training, though they still utilized physical punishment. 

    The 1936 Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study was one of the first experiments that operated under the guidance of the Rehabilitative Ideal. The program aimed to prevent delinquency, and targeted under-priveleged boys by offering individual counseling through activities and home visits. Such attempts to utilize rehabilitation as a form of crime prevention would inform the intensive use of the Rehabilitative Ideal throughout the 1950s and 1960s in public policy. 

    The Prisoner Rehabilitation Act of 1965 authorized furloughs, a system of work release, and standardized the use of community residential treatment centers for adult federal prisoners. The act emphasized the importance of reforming correctional work to create improved educational and vocational training programs for people in prison. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach verbalized his support of the Prisoner Rehabilitation Act of 1965 by stating that the policies would amplify “the growing trend in the correctional field to augment inherently limited institutional resources with potentially greater community resources.” The law contained three major provisions:

    1. The Attorney General would have the authority to transfer individuals who were in prison to residential community treatment centers (more commonly known as Halfway Houses);
    2. The Attorney General can give individuals in prison brief periods to leave for emergencies or purposes relating to release preparations; and,
    3. The Attorney General can allow people in prison to work in private employment or participate in community training programs while remaining in prison.

    The aim of the Prisoner Rehabilitation Act of 1965 was to codify the federal government’s dedication toward creating rehabilitative programs for people in prison in order to reduce crime in the United States. 

    The Martinson Report: “Nothing Works”

    While the United States gravitated toward rehabilitation as a form of crime prevention throughout the 1950s and 1960s, everything changed in 1974 when Robert Martinson released his paper titled, “What Works? – Questions and answers about Prison Reform,” more commonly referred to as “The Martinson Report.” Between the years of 1960 and 1975, reported rates of robbery, aggravated assault, rape, and homicide increased by 263%, and property crime rates, specifically burglaries, increased by 200%. Crime was at an all time high in the United States, which led sociologists like Martinson to explore the effectiveness of rehabilitation as a form of crime prevention in America. 

    In Martinson’s research involving over two-hundred studies, he concluded that there was little reason to believe that rehabilitation reduces recidivism. Martinson addressed forms of rehabilitation such as education and vocational training, individual counseling, transforming the institutional environment of rehabilitation, medical treatment, and decarcerating individuals in prison, providing evidence for why he believed such measures do not work to prevent crime. Criminological reports leading up to the 1970s that found no significant treatment effects for prison rehabilitation programs coupled with Martinson’s Report ultimately coined the phrase and conclusion that “nothing works” in rehabilitating people in prison and that prison sentences should not include opportunities for rehabilitation. 

    Because Martinson’s Report arrived during a period of intensified rates of crime and recidivism in the United States, policymakers from all political backgrounds began to lean into the “get tough on crime” era. Martinson’s message was attractive to liberals, since it could be used to argue against incarceration and indeterminate sentencing, as well as conservatives, who demanded tougher handling of people who commit crimes. The political right and left, in addition to academics, found common ground through Martinson’s “nothing works” mentality, ultimately leading to the decimation of rehabilitative prison programming as a form of crime prevention in US public policy. 

    Rehabilitation Policy in the US After Martinson

    The Martinson Report, along with the overall agreement of policymakers and academics, culminated in the decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal and the rise of “new punitiveness.” As a result, the United State’s current criminal justice system is more punitive, where incapacitation is the most common form of crime prevention in US policy, rather than rehabilitation. 

    The 1989 Mistretta v. United States case ultimately reversed the Prisoner Rehabilitation Act of 1965, as well as any efforts by the federal government to implement rehabilitation as a way to prevent crime. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress eliminated indeterminate sentencing at the federal level and created the United States Sentencing Commission. The Commission was intended to address the discrepancies in sentencing by federal court judges by creating sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses. Mistretta argued that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 violated the delegation-of-powers principle in US constitutional law by giving the Commission “excessive legislative powers.” However, the Supreme Court upheld the federal sentencing guidelines implemented by the Commission, which removed rehabilitation from serious consideration when sentencing people who committed a crime. In other words, the guidelines established by the commission were to be applied in all scenarios, ignoring factors such as responsiveness to treatment, person and family history, previous efforts to rehabilitate oneself, or alternatives to incapacitation.

    In 2008, Congress passed the Second Chance Act, which sanctioned federal investment in strategies to reduce recidivism and increase public safety using Rehabilitation Theory. Allegheny County, PA established reentry programs for people who were in prison that connected individuals with education, job readiness, treatment, and other services. Iowa also established pre-release planning for individuals nearing the end of their prison sentences. Overall, there have been few efforts from the federal government over the past few decades to implement reforms rooted in rehabilitation to reduce recidivism. A 2017 Department of Justice report on the Federal Bureau of Prison points to several policy goals focusing on rehabilitation as a form of crime prevention such as identifying individual’s criminogenic needs, developing standardized, evidence-based programs to reduce recidivism, ensuring that people who are in prison receive substance abuse treatment, and helping people in prison maintain family ties. 

    Effectiveness of Rehabilitation on Crime Prevention and the Impact on People of Color 

    Although Martinson later retracted many of his conclusions regarding rehabilitation programs, and his original report was found to include major methodological flaws, the academic community and policymakers embraced his views on rehabilitation as a form of crime prevention. Contemporary research demonstrates that rehabilitation programs reduce recidivism by about 10%. The risk-need-responsivity (RNR) model uses risk assessment tools to provide rehabilitative treatment to individuals with the highest risk of committing another crime. In a study focusing on the effects of RNR efforts on Ohio’s halfway house programs, the recidivism rate of high-risk individuals lowered by 20%. The Boston Reentry Initiative (BRI) serves as an example of how community partnerships can also reduce recidivism. The BRI provides a family member or mentor to meet each released person when they leave prison, and researchers found that participants had a rearrest rate 30% lower than the control group. Rehabilitation has the capacity to lower recidivism rates when policymakers invest in mental health care, personalized education plans for individuals in prison, and ensuring that individuals leaving prison have job opportunities. People in prison who participate in education programs have a 43% lower chance of returning to prison than those who do not, and individuals who have a job when they are in prison are 24% less likely to recidivate. 

    More than 600,000 individuals are released from state and federal prisons every year, but within three years of their release, two out of three individuals are rearrested. Because one in three African-American men are imprisoned throughout their lifetime, compared to one in six Latino men and one in seventeen White men, rehabilitative measures, rather than deterrence or incapacitation, have the greatest potential to reduce the mass incarceration of people of color in the United States. However, rehabilitation programs, specifically during the peak of US Rehabilitative Ideal policymaking, were reserved for individuals deemed capable of reform by policymakers who mostly prioritize white people. As a result, any early sociological studies of prisons do not include people of color in prison, which means the impact of rehabilitation as a form of crime prevention on people of color was, and still is, largely unexamined.

  • The Expedited Removal Process

    The Expedited Removal Process

    Expedited Removals

    Expedited Removals are a deportation procedure established by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responbility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). An expedited removal is a procedure that permits U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a major component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to promptly deport non-citizens who are undocumented and/or have commit fraud. Expedited removals were established by IIRIRA as an attempt to streamline the removal process for immigrants who entered the United States illegally. Since 1996, the expedited removal process has evolved to apply to a broader range of non-citizens and has been increasingly applied over the years.

    Differences Between Expedited Removals and Regular Removals

    Regular removal hearings, as established by IIRIRA, are held in front of a judge and can take 2 to 3 years to reach a final decision. Wait times for hearings are growing longer—the average case in 2022 takes five years to resolve due to backlog. This is because during a regular removal, an immigrant has the time to make a complete case against their deportation. The more testimonies and evidence presented, the longer a case will take a judge to deliberate. When the final verdict is decided, regular removals can be challenged and canceled in the federal courts of appeals. 

    By contrast, expedited removals quicken the deportation process by leaving the hearing process to the immigration officer who arrested the immigrant. Immigrants do not appear in front of a judge and there is no formal court hearing. This means that the individual has to prove they are wrongly being convicted to the officer who detained them. Although the immigrant can consult an attorney, this is rare in most cases due to expedited pace of the hearing, which can take as little as 2 weeks.

    Outcomes of Expedited Removals

    When an immigrant is deported upon arrival in the U.S. through the expedited removal process, they typically receive a five-year ban from reentry into the country. This ban is extended to ten years for immigrants who left the United States while having an outstanding order of removal. A non-citizen can get banned forever from returning to the United States if they are removed quickly on the basis of fraudulent entry or fraud.

    To cancel a removal, the immigrant would issue an appeal to the federal court of appeals to dispute their removal. However, immigrants cannot appeal an expedited removal. The power of cancellation is limited to the Homeland Security officer supervising the port of entry at which the immigrant was originally apprehended.

    Expedited Removal Through the Years

    The expedited removal process was originally limited to non-citizens intending to illegally arrive in the U.S. who were removed at ports of entry. By 2002, the policy broadened to qualify more migrants for expedited removals. The Bush Administration extended expedited removals to include immigrants who had illegally traveled by water to get to the United States. Alongside the expansion, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) introduced the concept of “credible fear” to ensure that immigrants seeking asylum were not wrongly deported through expedited deportations. If an asylum seeker proves during a credible fear interview that there is a credible danger of returning to their home country, then they will not get deported. 

    In 2004, the Bush Administration expanded the policy to include illegal immigrants who traveled by sea and were encountered within 100 miles of the United States borders and were encountered within 14 days of their arrival. In general, the years following the September 11th attacks saw trends of tightened immigration policy—expedited removals being one of the policies that were expanded to apply to more immigrants. The cultural context of the United States at any given time influences restrictions of the expedited removal policy.

    In addition to cultural context, a given president’s political agenda also influences the conditions of the expedited removal process. For example, President Trump’s agenda included strengthening and enforcing stronger illegal immigration laws. In 2019, under the Trump Administration the DHS expanded expedited removals to include immigrants who did not arrive by sea and are encountered within 100 miles of the United States border within 14 days of their arrival. By 2022, the Biden Administration withdrew Trump’s 2019 expansion of expedited removals.

    Arguments in Favor of Expedited Removals

    Proponents of expedited removals argue that the process accelerates the deportation process. The DHS estimated that the regular removal proceeding for noncitizens remains pending for more than two years. This has led to a backlog of nearly 5.2 million unresolved immigration cases that still require hearings. Backlog prevents immigrants from getting their cases resolved and requires the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to hire more staffers—another process that includes lengthy training and more funding. Unlike regular hearings, the expedited removal process takes only two to three weeks. Every year following 1997, the amount of removals has increased; from 1996 to 1997 alone the amount of removals increased from 69,680 to 114,432. This data suggests that since the implementation of expedited removals, deportation proceedings have become more effective and quick. 

    Recently, DHS and advocates of expedited removals have cited the Coronavirus crisis in the states as a justification for expedited removals. The DHS has cited the process as a “safe and orderly” way to deal with immigration processing whilst also keeping Americans’ safety a priority during spikes of COVID-19. Governor of Texas Greg Abbott has expressed support of expedited removals, stating that “the dramatic rise in unlawful border crossings has also led to a dramatic rise in COVID-19 cases among unlawful migrants,” directly impacting the health and safety of Texans.

    Arguments Against Expedited Removals

    Those against the expedited removal process believe that migrants should have a right to due process and that the expedited removal process undermines these rights. Due process rights include a right to a hearing and ample opportunity to be heard, or the opportunity to defend yourself fairly and reasonably when convicted. The Supreme Court has held that those who have physically entered the United States, even illegally, should have their due process rights recognized. Yet, many argue that under the expedited removal process immigrants have their due process rights deprived because they are not granted a traditional hearing before a judge. Instead, they are subject to detention and deportation in an expedited hearing before an immigration officer.

    In addition to the lack of opportunity to defend themselves, many of those against expedited removals have cited family detention centers, where families facing expedited removals are held, as places that incite physical and emotional trauma. A 2016 study found that 83% of adults and 85.7% of teenagers in a given detention center showed symptoms of depression and anxiety—many people view detention centers as a result of the expedited removal processes as a violation of human rights.