ACE

Category: ACE Research

  • Ukraine and the Changing Transatlantic Security Order

    Ukraine and the Changing Transatlantic Security Order

    The Shadow of War Returns to Europe

    The post-Cold War security environment in Europe was characterized by the diminishing influence of Russia, which saw its former Warsaw Pact allies gradually integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Russia under President Vladimir Putin considered this expansion detrimental to its security interests. Russia attempted to stop Georgia and the Baltic Republics from establishing closer security ties with NATO, even going to war with Georgia briefly in 2008. Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution (2014) overthrew a pro-Russia regime and the country aspired to democratize and draw closer to the European Union. In response, Russia forcibly annexed Crimea in 2014 and aided separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region—which borders Russia—in seceding. 

    The United States and its allies considered this a threat to democracy and pluralism in Europe. The allies implemented sanctions against Russia in 2014 with the intention of forcing Russia to negotiate a withdrawal. However, Russia’s economic and military capabilities were not significantly affected by the sanctions. Critical sectors like energy were not sanctioned because European countries like Germany depended on Russian oil and natural gas. Putin demanded a guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO or the EU and, when an agreement was not reached, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The full-scale Russian invasion threatens to reverse post-Cold War borders in Europe, destabilize the trans-Atlantic security order, and affect countries far removed from the theater of war.

    Western Allies Respond

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine was met with strong reactions from the United States and its allies. In his statement on February 26, President Joe Biden declared, “Putin chose this war. And now he and his country will bear the consequences.” The United States coordinated with the G7, the world’s leading industrial nations, to launch a new round of sanctions on Russia to curtail its ability to finance the war, and held an emergency NATO summit to map out the next steps.

    The United States has also been urging allies to increase their defense spending, a long-standing US policy objective. In response to the invasion, Germany announced a shift in its defense policy, including re-armament. During his February 27, 2022 speech to parliament, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged an additional €100 billion for the armed forces and committed Germany to spending 2% of its GDP on defense, in line with NATO expectations. Other European countries have taken similar steps to strengthen their military capabilities. Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced that Poland will allocate 3% of its GDP to defense from 2023. The Netherlands has committed an additional €5 billion to defense over the next few years. This is a 40% increase from its 2022 defense budget and meets NATO’s 2% GDP target in 2024 and 2025.

    The invasion has reignited talks of an EU common defense policy. On February 28, 2022 the Council of Europe, the highest decision-making body for EU member states, approved a historic €500 million package for Ukraine. This includes €450 million in military supplies and an additional €50 million for fuel and protective equipment. This is the first time the EU has pledged lethal equipment to a non-EU member through the European Peace Facility (EPF). The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) Josep Borrell explained that the EU “wants peace in Europe, but we have to be prepared to defend this peace.” 

    EU heads of state and government pledged on March 10, 2022 to take more defense responsibility which several US Presidents had urged. EU leaders also endorsed the Strategic Compass soon after, a plan of action to increase the EU’s ability to respond to crises with rapid deployment capacity, increased defense investment, and better preparedness for hybrid threats. The European Council subsequently met in May and June to reiterate its commitment to increase military and financial support for Ukraine and to advance Ukraine’s EU membership request. EU members also approved the latest round of EU sanctions on Russia which included crude oil and refined petroleum products as well as Russian-origin gold.

    Despite the EU’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, fulfilling some promises may be challenging. For example, the EU pledged to provide fighter jets, but the Ukrainian air force is trained to fly Russian-made  MiG-29s and Su-24s. Only Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia have that type of jet, and those states have been hesitant to send their aircraft to Ukraine due to supply shortages and fear of escalation However, when Poland finally proposed to do so, provided the US accelerates its delivery of F-16s to Warsaw, the United States decided against this move by concluding that the proposal was not tenable. On March 8, in a statement by the Pentagon, Press Secretary John F. Kirby expressed concerns over dispatching American aircrafts into contested airspaces.

    Deepening Transatlantic Ties

    The United States provided leadership to create a coordinated response to the invasion. This included imposing stricter and broader sanctions on Russia than in 2014, providing military aid to Ukraine, and increasing defense coordination. US Foreign Secretary Anthoney Blinken stated, “The strategy that we’ve put in place, massive support for Ukraine, massive pressure against Russia, solidarity with more than 30 countries engaged in these efforts, is having real results.”

    The sanctions imposed on Russia are changing Europe’s economic dependencies, particularly in the energy sector. To restructure these dependencies, Europe is establishing new partners and alternative technologies. The United States is trying to fill in the gap and has seen demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) rise by over 50% in Europe compared to the same period the year before. A protracted war in Ukraine could bolster the significance of the new US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) formed in June 2021 and eventually lead to closer transatlantic cooperation on energy, trade, technology and innovation. This emerging collaborative spirit helps in overcoming the tensions generated by Eurosceptic security and trade positions held by the Trump administration. This shift makes it easier to take coordinated steps for addressing the long-term economic impact of the war.

    Reviving NATO

    Finland and Sweden are traditionally non-aligned countries, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced the two Nordic nations to reassess their security interests and apply for NATO membership on May 18, 2022. Although experts believe an attack on Finland and Sweden is unlikely while Russia is focused on Ukraine, Finland and Sweden remain vulnerable until they are included in NATO’s mutual defense guarantees. Ahead of their formal application, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Finland and Sweden to sign security guarantees. President Biden expressed support for the two countries’ NATO bids and welcomed Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson at the White House.

    Swedish and Finnish NATO membership has a number of advantages. Sweden has naval bases on the Baltic Sea and a navy with experience operating in confined waters, which adds key capabilities in the Baltic region. Gotland is a strategically important Swedish island which can act as a staging ground for naval operations in the region. Finland shares a long border with the Kola peninsula, which is Russia’s Arctic navy and nuclear submarine base. This puts NATO in a position to isolate the peninsula from mainland Russia.

    NATO has functioned as an instrument for United States security interests and conflict leadership, but lost credibility by mishandling conflicts in Libya (2011) and Afghanistan (2015-2021) under US leadership. NATO’s reemergence provides the US a chance to strengthen its relationship with its longest allies and exert US influence on the European continent.

    Ending Aggression Through a United Front

    Some speculate that Trans-Atlantic solidarity will not hold if the war turns into a protracted, localized conflict, with Russia forcibly occupying parts of Eastern Ukraine. There are concerns that the economic toll of the conflict on sanctioning nations, declining public interest, and other international priorities will lead to disunity in the alliance. However, a destabilized Ukraine will remain a source of insecurity for the entire continent.

  • Introduction to the Child Tax Credit

    Introduction to the Child Tax Credit

    Introduction

    The Child Tax Credit (CTC) is a tax benefit granted by the government to American taxpayers for each qualifying dependent child under the age of 18 at the end of the tax year. The CTC provides money to support American families by making it more affordable to raise children and by helping them save for their children’s future. To qualify for the CTC, the taxpayer’s dependent must also be an immediate relative or their descendant, have lived with the taxpayer for more than half the year, provide no more than half of their own financial support, and possess a Social Security Number that is valid for employment in the United States. In addition to the federal government, twelve states currently offer the CTC to enhance the economic security of families with children, particularly those in the lower to middle income brackets. The value of both federal and state tax credits is determined primarily by income level, marital status, and number of dependent children.

    Passed by Congress, the federal government first established the CTC as part of the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act. Under this act, the tax credit was $400 for each child under 17 and nonrefundable. When the child tax credit was initially enacted, it was primarily a nonrefundable tax credit for middle-income families with children. Through legislative changes, eligibility for the credit has expanded to both lower and higher-income families, and the amount of the credit has also generally increased for recipients. 

    Refundable vs Nonrefundable Child Tax Credit

    In 2001, the tax credit amount increased and was made refundable to coordinate with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a refundable earned income-based tax credit available to lower income workers. The refundable portion is called the Additional Child Tax Credit. In 2012, the American Taxpayer Relief Act increased the value of the federal child tax credit to $1,000 and increased the income threshold to correspond with the earned income tax credit. By 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act doubled the tax credit to $2,000 and made limits to the refundable amount of up to $1,400 per child. The act will expire on December 31, 2025. 

    The CTC is nonrefundable and deducted from the amount of income tax a family owes. Hence, if a family owes $6,000 in taxes and is eligible for a $2,000 CTC, its remaining tax that needs to be paid would be $4,000. However, if a family owes $3,000 and its Child Tax Credit is $4,000, its tax bill would be $0. The taxpayer could receive a $1,000 refund from the remaining CTC through the Additional Child Tax Credit. The Additional CTC is a refundable credit that you may receive if your CTC is greater than the total amount of income taxes you owe. Therefore, if a family is eligible for a $2,000 CTC and its taxes are only $1,000, the remaining $1,000 credit would be refunded.

    The Child Tax Credit on a State Level

    In addition to the federal CTC, twelve states—California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, and Vermont—have enacted their own CTC. All but three of these states—Idaho, Maine, and Oklahoma—have made the CTC refundable. Eligibility requirements differ among states’ child tax credits. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened economic burdens for many families, and recent legislative trends suggest states are increasingly considering a CTC. Since 2019, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon and West Virginia have introduced legislation to create state-level child tax credits. California and New York have both introduced legislation to expand their current state CTC.

    The Child Tax Credit on a Federal Level

    In 2021, President Joe Biden unveiled a $1.9 trillion legislative package, the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), to provide economic relief to working families, communities, and small businesses across the nation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under the ARPA, the CTC temporarily increased from $2,000 per child to $3,000 per child for children over the age of six and from $2,000 to $3,600 for children under the age of six, and raised the age limit from 16 to 17. Families qualified if their annual income did not exceed $150,000 for those filing a joint return and for qualified widows or widowers, $112,500 for those filing as the head of their household, or $75,000 for a single filer or one who is married and filing a separate return. Parents and guardians with higher incomes were considered eligible to claim a partial credit. 

    The ARPA temporarily made the tax credit fully refundable and paid out half of the total credit in monthly payments for the first six months rather than once per year. The monthly payments ran from July to December 2021, with families receiving in cash up to half the credit’s total value. That included $300 per month for each child under age 6 and $250 per month for each child ages 6 through 17. Families received the remaining credit when they filed their tax returns in 2022. The CTC enacted in the ARPA was valid until 2021. As of 2022, the child tax credit has reverted to $2,000 per child under 17 with no advance monthly checks. According to his Build Back Better Agenda in the ARPA, President Biden states that this new Child Tax Credit should be extended for years to come. However, conservative politicians call for a revised CTC as they find weaknesses in President Biden’s CTC. 

    Arguments for the Child Tax Credit Expansion

    With the expanded CTC from the ARPA being a temporary action, President Joe Biden and Congressional Democrats have proposed extending it through 2025, or even making it a permanent action. The Social Policy Institute’s Child Tax Credit Panel Survey studies the effect of the expanded CTC on families using a probability-based online panel, which surveys a nationally representative group of 1,782 American parents eligible for the credit and a comparison group of 2,015 ineligible households. The survey specifically compares the employment, well-being, and financial security outcomes of families before and after receiving six months of CTC payments. The results showed that families used the CTC refunds to cover routine payments without reducing their employment. The most common reported uses for the CTC were: housing and utilities (70%), clothing or other essential items for children (58%), purchasing more food for the family (56%), saving for emergencies (49%), and paying off debt (42%). Eligible families experienced improved nutrition, decreased reliance on credit cards and other high-risk financial services, and made long term educational investments for both parents and children. 

    The expansion helped families recover from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021, reducing child poverty by roughly 30%. These monthly payments had this impact on child poverty because the expansion of the ARPA lifted restrictions on the child tax credit. Under the old rules, at least 23 million children didn’t qualify to receive the full benefit because their families didn’t earn enough. The first payment in July kept 3 million children out of poverty, and the monthly child poverty rate fell from 15.8% to 11.9%. By December, the CTC was keeping 3.7 million children out of poverty. After six months the child tax credit payments have, in effect, reduced child poverty in the U.S. by about 30%. Around 70% of CTC recipients who were negatively affected by inflation said the CTC payments helped them to better manage higher prices. After the payments stopped however, the child poverty rate increased by 41% between December 2021 and January 2022.

    Arguments Against the Child Tax Credit Expansion

    Policymakers that oppose the CTC expansion argue that it costs taxpayers too much. According to the Tax Policy Center, the price of reverting to the CTC benefits prior to the ARPA for 2022 would be approximately $125.5 billion of total tax expenditures. In comparison, continuing the expanded CTC would cost about $100 billion more than reverting. Thus, Congressional Republicans including Senator Mitt Romney, Richard Burr, and Steve Daines suggest a CTC proposal of their own. 

    In their Family Security Act 2.0 proposal, families would receive monthly cash benefits amounting to $350 per month for each child under the age of 5 and $250 per month for each child from the ages 6 to 17. The benefit would be limited to up to six children annually. In order to receive the full benefit, families would have to earn $10,000 in the previous year. Those who earn less than $10,000 would have their credits reduced proportionally to their earnings. For high income families, the proposed CTC would start to phase out at $200,000 in income for single filers and $400,000 for joint filers. For every $1,000 earned above those thresholds, the credit would be reduced by $50. The Earned Income Tax Credit  would undergo cuts to both the phase-in rate and the maximum credit available to single parents and married couples with children. In total, those changes represent an annual savings of $92.9 billion.

    The EITC is a tax refund believed to be an incentive for work because it is based on taxpayers’ income. Up until the expanded CTC of the ARPA, the CTC was similar to the EITC in that a taxpayer received credit based upon how much they worked. However, President Biden eliminated that feature and provided a CTC to everyone. Hence, those who oppose the expanded CTC are concerned that it will eliminate an incentive to remain in the workforce. The incentive to work can be explained by the substitution effect in economics. In other words, if wages increase, then work becomes relatively more profitable than leisure. If someone can have enough money without working, fewer people might work. In a recent study based on data that combines information from the Current Population Survey with administrative data on earnings, retirement income, federal benefit programs and taxes, it was initially confirmed that child poverty would drop 34% with Biden’s expanded CTC. However, applying the substitution effect modeled that 1.3 million workers would drop out of the workforce because of the money provided by the CTC. Child poverty would then only decrease by 22%.

  • Introduction to U.S.─France Relations

    Introduction to U.S.─France Relations

    Introduction

    France is a founding member of NATO, the European Union, and holds permanent membership and veto power on the UN Security Council. France has influence in all three of these organizations, as well as an extensive military, with the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. It maintains a strong diplomatic presence across the globe and was ranked first in soft power—a country’s ability to persuade others without force or coercion, often through collaboration and the shaping of positive attitudes towards said country—in 2017 and 2019. For these reasons, the United States’ relationship with France is one of the country’s most important diplomatic relationships, as French actions impact American interests.

    Quick Facts

    History of U.S.─France Relations

    France is the United States’ oldest ally. The relationship between the United States and France began during the Revolutionary War, when France allied with the American colonists against Great Britain in 1778 through both a military and economic Treaty of Alliance. This alliance with the United States was essential to the American victory.

    During World War 1, the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies and sent millions of American troops to France to fight on the Western Front, where U.S. troops were essential in turning the tide of the war against Germany. The U.S. and France were also allied in World War 2, and the U.S. was essential in liberating France from German occupation.

    In 1949 France and the United States entered a military alliance once again through the founding of NATO. France supported the United States during the Cold War but had its own interests to look after as well. Due to disagreements over the French nuclear program, France withdrew from NATO’s military command structure in 1966. Prior to the United States joining the Vietnam War in 1964, the U.S. supported French opposition to the Viet Minh through military assistance. When France lost control of Vietnam the United States became the dominant western power in the region, to the dissatisfaction of France.

    The two countries cooperated against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War but France later opposed the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. Relations once again became friendlier in 2007 with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French Presidency. Sarkozy was pro-American, and he returned France to full NATO membership. In the years following, the two countries cooperated in several counter-terrorism operations and were strong allies. 

    The election of President Donald Trump weakened French opinion of the United States. In particular, President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accords (2017) and the Iran Nuclear Deal (2018) were heavily opposed by France. In 2020 the United States established tariffs on French imports over France’s digital services tax, which impacted American tech companies. In 2021 France recalled their ambassador to the United States for the first time ever over the AUKUS crisis. AUKUS is a security pact between the U.S., Australia and the U.K. and France viewed its exclusion as a betrayal. This pact also led to Australia canceling a major, lucrative submarine deal with France without warning. Despite conflicts between the U.S. and France, relations have recently strengthened due to collaboration against Russia after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

    Strategic Interests

    • Security: France is an invaluable ally to the United States in global security efforts. It is a principal member of NATO, and took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union in January, 2022. Cooperation with France is necessary to create a unified front against global threats, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. France has dedicated $2 billion in financial aid to Ukraine and, through the European Union, has imposed several rounds of sanctions on Russia. The United States relies on French support and action to jointly combat security challenges across the globe.
    • Trade: France is a valuable trading partner for the United States, and in 2019, the two countries traded more than $138 billion in goods and services. France is the United States’ third largest trading partner in Europe, and in 2020 they made up roughly 1.9% of U.S. trade. The main U.S. exports to France include industrial chemicals, aircraft and engines, electronics, scientific and medical instruments and supplies, and broadcasting equipment. The U.S. is the top destination for French investment, and the U.S. is also the largest foreign investor in France. The two nations have a bilateral convention on investment, and create a tax treaty bilaterally to address the issues of double taxation and tax evasion that can often occur through international trade and investment. Trade and investment with France is a major source of job creation in the United States, further emphasizing the importance of the economic relationship.
    • Counter-Terrorism: France is one of the central allies in the United States’ ‘War on Terror.’ It runs several counter-terrorism initiatives, and provides aid for U.S. operations across the globe.
      • West Africa: This is one of the principal regions where France has been involved in combating terrorism. Operation Serval is a military operation in Mali that began in 2013 which aimed to stop Islamic militants’ push from northern Mali into the country’s center, and towards the capital. The operation received financial and military support from the United States and was a relative success, as it pushed the militants back, but left the country unstable. Mali has undergone two coup d’états since, one in 2020 and one in 2021. To this day, France maintains a smaller presence in the country fighting militants and receives support from the United States.

    This is just one example of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two nations. France has also allied with the United States in other operations, such as through membership in the Combined Task Force 150 which aims to fight maritime terrorism and criminal activity in the Arabian Gulf. 

    Right-Wing Nationalism: The right-wing nationalist movement has gained popularity across Europe in recent years, and Marine Le Pen, the leader of the French National Rally party is a prime example of this ideology. Despite losing the 2022 French presidential election to Emmanuel Macron, the far-right performed historically well, gaining more than 40% of the vote. Marine Le Pen represents a growing trend of extreme nationalism in France, and has publicly spoken out against the EU and NATO. She believes that French laws should take precedence over laws of international organizations, denounces U.S. influence in France, and is viewed to be sympathetic to Russia. Losing French support in areas such as NATO would be a critical blow to the United States and its allies.

  • California Senate Bill 10: Ending Cash Bail

    California Senate Bill 10: Ending Cash Bail

    What is Cash Bail? 

    When a person is arrested, cash bail is the amount of money arrestees must pay in order to leave custody before their trial. Bail is used as collateral to incentivize arrestees to attend their trial, and this amount of money is assigned by a judge. When assigning bail, judges take into account the severity of the alleged crime, the risk of the defendant fleeing, and the potential danger the defendant poses. Despite monetary bail’s longevity in the American criminal justice system, there is a recent movement to end cash bail, as some claim that it leads to inequity. States like Kentucky, New Mexico, and New Jersey passed reforms to their cash bail system, but California’s Money Bail Reform Act was the first to propose completely eliminating monetary bail. While the policy ultimately failed to pass a referendum, other states like New York have adopted similar policies.

    What Would CA Senate Bill 10 do? 

    Under the California Money Bail Reform Act, or Senate Bill 10, cash bail does not determine pretrial release. Rather, release decisions are determined by orders issued by judges. Judges base these release decisions on their reasoning of the arrestee’s public safety threat and their likelihood of attending their trial. To assist in these judgements, the policy establishes Pretrial Assessment Services in each court system, which provide the judge a recommendation for release based on predictive algorithms. While this recommendation is shared with a judge, they are not restricted by this suggestion and ultimately have final discretion in issuing a release order. SB 10 did not pass a ​​2020 referendum, and efforts to pass a scaled down version of the bill in the state legislature this year have failed as well. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court ruled that setting bail at an amount a person cannot pay is unconstitutional. 

    Arguments for SB 10 

    Proponents of SB 10 assert the change in policy decriminalizes poverty as the cash bail system meant those who could not afford bail were imprisoned without due process. Following this logic, cash bail unequally burdens impoverished arrestees in a way it does not for wealthier arrestees. According to a study analyzing Bureau of Justice statistics by the Prison Policy Initiative, those in jail (arrestees awaiting trial) had a median income of $15,000. Additionally, cash bail means that large numbers of arrestees are incarcerated before their trial, which incurs a cost that falls on taxpayers. In a survey conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice in 2015, approximately 53% of the jail population in the state of California consisted of individuals incarcerated before their trial. Additionally, according to a brief from the Pretrial Justice Institute, nationally taxpayers spend $38 million per day to incarcerate individuals who are awaiting trial. 

    Furthermore, because cash bail means release is dependent on monetary value and not risk assessments, it cannot not take into account the potential danger that an arrestee poses to society. There is little societal value for imprisoning individuals who are not likely to pose a public safety threat and individuals who do present a public safety threat may be released because they can afford bail. Proponents point to research suggesting that the majority of those held pretrial were not charged with a serious crime following their trial. For example, a survey of Connecticut prisons by the Office of Policy Management found that only approximately ⅓ of the arrestees faced incarceration post-trial. Additionally, a study from the Prison Policy Institute found that 75% of arrestees held in jails are legally innocent.

    Arguments Against S.B. 10 

    One argument against SB 10 is that cash bail is a necessary screening measure that prevents dangerous arrestees from committing further crimes as they await their trials. Opponents point out that those who are imprisoned likely committed a crime, and a monetary barrier based on a judge’s discretion is likely to prevent further danger to society. Additionally, opponents argue that cash bail disincentivizes crime, as the threat of jail time before a trial could mean people are less likely to offend. 

    Additionally, opponents also had concerns about the equity of pretrial release assessments, as there is evidence that these algorithms show racial bias. For example, a 2016 study done by ProPublica analyzed the effectiveness of a commonly used criminal assessment tool called Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) by comparing the program’s predictions of arrestees’ recidivism and actual criminal records in a Florida county. The study found that COMPAS incorrectly predicted black defendants would reoffend at a rate of 44.9%, and only a rate of 23.5% for white defendants. Criminal justice experts theorize that because algorithms rely on criminal records within a system that often overpolices communities of color, as well as markers of poverty, the results of many algorithms are subject to some of the same inequities as cash bail. 

  • Healthcare Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act

    Healthcare Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act

    Introduction

    In resuscitating the previously stalled Build Back Better Act, the Senate Democratic Caucus has reached a reconciliation passage consisting of investments in climate/energy, IRS enforcement, deficit reduction, and healthcare in the 725-page Inflation Reduction (IRA). While the $300 billion is far from the original agenda that President Joe Biden had envisioned when Democrats regained the federal trifecta, it will still institute substantial changes to the US healthcare landscape as we know it, primarily intending to lower prescription drug costs for Medicare and private insurance enrollees. According to a CBO report, the prescription drug provisions, set to begin implementation in 2023, are projected to reduce the federal deficit by $288 billion by 2031. Additionally, it’s aimed at reducing Medicare out-of-pocket spending and limiting drug price increases.

    Medicare Drug Price Negotiation

    One of the key provisions rescued from the Build Back Better legislation enables Medicare to negotiate prescription drug prices. Currently, retail prescription drug benefits covered under Medicare Part D are provided by private plan sponsors contracted and approved by Medicare. Since its enactment, Part D is governed by the “noninterference” clause, establishing that the Secretary of Health and Human Services “may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP [prescription drug plan] sponsors, and may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.” Concurrently, for physician-prescribed drugs covered under Part B, Medicare reimburses providers 106% of the Average Sales Prices (ASP), the average price for all non-federal purchases, including rebates. 

    Under the IRA, however, the Secretary of Health and Human Services will be required to negotiate prices for high-priced drugs covered under Medicare. This will apply to top-spending brands and biologic drugs without generic or biosimilar equivalents covered under Medicare Part B or Part D and are at least nine years (small-molecule drugs) or at least thirteen years (biologicals) from FDA approval. Beginning in 2026, the Secretary will be limited to negotiating 10 Part D drugs, 15 Part drugs in 2027, 15 Part B and Part D drugs in 2028, and 20 Part B and Part D drugs in 2029 going forward. 

    Rather than simply allowing the Secretary to negotiate drug prices as in the previous House-passed BBBA, the IRA closes the “rogue Secretary” loophole by requiring the Secretary to negotiate the maximum number of drugs that year, to the extent that the number of drugs is eligible for negotiation. CBO predicts $99 billion in Medicare savings from IRA’s version of the drug price negotiation provision, as opposed to $76 billion for its BBBA counterpart.

    Pros and Cons of the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Provision

    A recent Kaiser Family Foundation Tracking poll found that, after hearing arguments on both sides, 83% of respondents are in favor of the federal government negotiating the Medicare drug prices. 

    Significant biomedical innovations, including vaccine development during the COVID pandemic, have come at a high cost. In 2019,  the US spent more than $1,126 per capita on prescription drugs, following a steep increase from $831 in 2013. Comparatively, countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, and Germany paid $285, $434, and $825 respectively in 2019. For example:

    • Dulera, an asthma medication, has a US listing price 50 times more than that of its international average. 
    • Januvia, a diabetes drug, and Combiga, for glaucoma, cost about 10 times more. 
    • Insulin, costs $98.70 per vial in the US, versus $6.94 in Australia. 

    This exacerbated the cost-related noncompliance situation in the US, with roughly 18% of adults, especially seniors, reporting that they skip their prescribed medications due to cost. In peer nations, this proportion of cost-related nonadherence is nearly unheard of. 

    One of the biggest opponents of this provision is the pharmaceutical industry. They argue that by empowering the HHS Secretary to negotiate drug prices, long-term innovation in medical development will be stifled. To that point, the new CBO report estimates that 15 out of 1,300 potential drugs, or 1%, will not be commercially available in the next 30 years. A separate study from the University of Chicago analyzing the analogous Medicare negotiation provision from the BBBA paints a bleaker picture. It projects a $663 billion, or 18.5%, decline in research and development spending through 2039, resulting in R&D funding delayed by up to seven years and 135 fewer market-available drugs for consumers. 

    Critics of the law also indicate several possible implementation challenges to the way the negotiation provision is designed. For instance, since the IRA gives Medicare the authority to regulate high-revenue drugs that have been FDA approved for at least nine years and do not have a competitor—generics are only allowed to enter the market to compete with their name-brand counterparts after the expiration of their patents. However, the market entry period, the interlude between a drug’s launch and first generic entry, for high-selling drugs is around 13 years. Therefore, critics argue Medicare’s regulatory negotiations may be delayed. Additionally, drug manufacturers can make agreements with generic drug producers that allow the generic to be available on the market to be sold in only a small quantity prior to the end of the patent protection period. In doing so, drug manufacturers can evade Medicare’s price-setting authority, rendering it essentially inept. 

    Inflationary Cap on Drug Manufacturers
    Reining in prices for people with Medicare and private insurance is one of today’s biggest healthcare policy demands. The IRA will institute rebates on drug manufacturers that increase prices at a rate greater than that of inflation. This provision will be implemented starting in 2023, using 2021 as the base year of the inflation metric. Due to the disincentivization of list prices reducing spending and rebates as sources of new revenue, the CBO estimates a net federal deficit reduction of $100.7 billion over 10 years. 

    The number of individuals, whether Medicare-covered or privately insured beneficiaries, who will have lower out-of-pocket drug costs in a given year under this provision is dependent on how many and which drugs will experience lower price increases and the extent of the price changes relative to 2021’s baseline.

    Pros and Cons of the Inflationary Cap Provision

    The status quo has prompted many to be in favor of an inflationary cap. In 2021, drug manufacturers of 900 brand-name drugs increased prices by a record average of 4.2%. Between 2018 and 2019, half of Part D covered drugs experienced a price increase beyond that of the 1.8% inflation, with some reaching as high as 19.7%. 

    While the Medicare program has long existed without an inflationary cap, the Medicaid program has had one in place since 1993. In terms of holding down prescription drug spending, it’s largely successful as Medicaid now pays the lowest prices of all federal healthcare programs. A 2015 HHS report indicates that the provision is responsible for more than half of the existing price differential between the same products under Medicare and Medicaid. Consequently, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and HHS have both advised that such a provision in Medicare can lead to significant savings.

    A similar provision appeared in both the 2019 Prescription Drugs Pricing Reduction Act (S. 2543) and the Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act (H.R. 3), and the CBO projected up to $10 billion over 10 years in reduced cost-sharing and premiums. While the CBO anticipated that the inflation rebate will reduce the cost of prescription drug benefits in commercial insurance plans, it also anticipated that manufacturers would increase the launch prices of new drugs to balance out the rebate’s effects. Additionally, a Milliman report concluded that the provision would result in modest price increases for private insurance in the commercial market. 

    In terms of the federal budget, the increased federal savings will eventually reduce Medicare program spending. It will also result in a moderate gain in tax revenues due to employers increasing taxable wages for their employers rather than having to pay insurance premiums. Furthermore, since state Medicaid programs already have instated inflationary rebates, smaller increases in drug list prices will reduce the states’ rebate amounts.

  • Introduction to US-Serbian Relations

    Introduction to US-Serbian Relations

    Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

    Serbia, a country of over ten million people with a unique cultural background and ties to two different global powers, is a key player in US foreign policy. Serbia is a country that has existed as the battleground between Europe and Asia. Serbia was part of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia and the following Yugoslav wars saw the US intervene through NATO and the United Nations. Relations following the war were strained due to the US-led support for the independence of Kosovo, a region full of Albanians who declared independence in 2008. Relations are also strained with the west due to Serbian ties to Moscow and the drawn-out process of joining the EU.  

    Fact Sheet

    • Population: 10,533,871
    • Capital: Belgrade
    • System of Government: Parliamentary republic
    • Chief of state: President Aleksandar Vucic
    • Head of government: Prime Minister Ana Brnabic
    • Primary Language: Serbian (official) 88.1%, Hungarian 3.4%, Bosnian 1.9%, Romani 1.4%, other 3.4%
    • Ethnic demographics: Serb 83.3%, Hungarian 3.5%, Romani 2.1%, Bosniak 2%, other 5.7%,
    • Religious populations: Orthodox 84.6%, Catholic 5%, Muslim 3.1%, Protestant 1%, atheist 1.1%, other 0.8%
    • Real GDP: $125.8 billion (2021 est.)/ GDP per Capita: $18,200 (2020 est.)
    • Gini index: 34.5
    • Freedom score: 62-Partly Free

    Brief History with the U.S.

    Following World War I, the United States under President Woodrow Wilson helped to establish the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, known as Yugoslavia. The United States was the first major power to establish relations with Yugoslavia on February 6, 1919, which lasted until the country was invaded in 1941. The United States along with the United Kingdom unsuccessfully pressured Yugoslavia to side with Allied forces, despite Germany being Yugoslavia’s main trading partner. Yugoslavia eventually joined the Axis. The rise of Communist leader Joseph Tito, caused the US to distance itself from Yugoslavia. Tito eventually distanced Yugoslavia from the USSR, and the US provided some military and economic aid.

    Following Tito’s death, the different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia struggled to find a balance of power, eventually leading to the Yugoslav wars and the dissolution of the country. The United States intervened through NATO and the United Nations initiatives. Clinton oversaw the first use of NATO force which was a controversial decision, as NATO up until that point had behaved as a defensive, not offensive military alliance. President Clinton oversaw the Dayton agreement which ended the conflict and led to the creation of independent nations out of former Yugoslavia around ethnic and linguistic identities.

    Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević lost power (he was later convicted of war crimes), and the United States began providing development aid amounting to 1.1 billion dollars to stimulate economic development and support democratic institutions. Relations began to improve until 2008 when Kosovo, with backing from the US and EU, declared independence under a new constitution. Modern-day US-Serbian relations focus mainly on the issue of Kosovo, and its close ties to Moscow 

    U.S. Strategic Interests:

    • Trade: The United States has a total trade and investment relationship with Serbia amounting to $1.6 trillion every year. Major US businesses invested in Serbia include Coca-Cola, Microsoft, and Panasonic. Much of this investment and growth is thanks to US and EU efforts following devastating periods including the end of the Yugoslav wars, the great recession of 2008, and a crippling storm season in 2014 that ended in negative GDP growth. The United States can leverage this economic reliance on foreign investment to help ensure Serbian cooperation with US interests, such as providing economic benefits in exchange for recognizing Kosovo or implementing sanctions against Russia. 
    • Military: The US has recognized Kosovo as an independent nation since 2008 and relations between Kosovo and Serbia have been slowly improving. However, recent Kosovan policies have exacerbated tensions. A new set of laws requires those traveling from Serbia to Kosovo and Serbs living in Kosovo to carry identification documents to separate themselves from Serbia. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) made an official statement that it would intervene if the stability of the region is threatened. The US is in a difficult position as it wants to keep strong relations with Serbia due to its strategic position in the Balkans.

    Diplomatic: Serbia criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but has not implemented sanctions against Russia. Serbia has also been on a slow EU accession process, and may be less enthusiastic about siding with the US and EU allies because the prospect of joining now feels remote and onerous.

  • Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

    Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

    What are Enhanced Interrogation Techniques? 

    Enhanced Interrogation Techniques refers to interrogation methods employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on detainees at remote detention centers, including Guantanamo Bay. These interrogation techniques were authorized shortly after the 9/11 attacks with the goal of extracting intelligence from suspected terrorists. During these special interrogations, the U.S. government approved the use of techniques including sleep deprivation, total isolation, waterboarding and more. Enhanced Interrogations were carried out between 2002 to 2009. At least 39 detainees during this time period underwent “enhanced interrogation”.

    The Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) was enacted by Congress as another War on Terrorism initiative. The Act granted the President the power “to take…necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations,  organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001”. AUMF served as a legal foundation for the military invasion and operations in countries over two decades. 

    On Sept 17, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a classified covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON), authorizing the CIA to capture and detain persons suspected of terrorist activities.  

    AUMF and MON were used to justify the use of enhanced interrogation on detainees deemed to be suspected terrorists. Policymakers are now asking whether the use of these techniques is an effective and ethical method of eliciting information or discouraging insurgents.

    Enhanced Interrogation Arguments: 

    Following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration grappled with what to do with prisoners of war and suspected terrorists offered to the U.S by other countries. A letter sent by the CIA to the White House advocated for torturing individuals such as Abu Zaubaydah, a detainee in Guantanamo Bay, to protect American lives; The CIA wrote to the White House, “countless more Americans may die unless we can persuade [Abu Zubaydah] to tell us what he knows.” 

    The Senate Intelligence Committee published a report that details hidden aspects of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA continued to justify the usa of enhanced interrogation by describing their program to the Department of Justice and Congress as “getting unique, otherwise unobtainable intelligence that helped disrupt terrorist plots and save thousands of lives,” an official who briefed the report informed The Washington Post. As a testament to the effectiveness of the enhanced interrogation techniques used on detainees, the CIA cited examples of specific terrorists plots “thwarted” and terrorists captured based on information revealed following enhanced interrogation. 

    The Senate Intelligence Committee studied 20 counterterrorism success cases cited by the CIA, and uncovered discrepnies. For example, in some cases, there was no relationship between the counterterrorism success and information gained using enhanced interrogation techniques from detainees. In the other cases, the information acquired by the CIA was incorrectly labeled as acquired “as a result” of interrogation techniques. 

    There are also serious concerns over the reliability of intelligence obtained through the use of enhanced interrogation. A study done by Social Issue and Policy Review on the use of torture as a interrogation technique indicate the strategy resulted in unreliable information, mental and emotional tolls on victims, and risks of retaliation against solidiers and civilians. The report concludes that in tense situations, detainees are motivated to lie. 

    A form of Torture? 

    Jose Rodriguez, a CIA official, drew a distinction between torture and enhanced interroration. He believed that torture was not effective, but the information gleaned from enhanced interrogation was essential in dismantling al-Qaida’s operations.

    The Human Rights First Organization disagrees with this claim, citing that International committees and US courts have found that waterboarding, mock executions, and other authorized techniques “violate the protections afforded all persons in custody – whether combatants or civilians – under the laws of armed conflict and international human rights law, and can amount to torture or “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.” The United Nations Committee against Torture and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture have stated these techniques constitute torture. In addition, President Barack Obama acknowleged the cruelties suffered by detainees at the hands of the CIA, and considers waterboarding a form of torture.

    The labeling of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques as torture is important because of the implications. If it is found to be defined as torture, the CIA program was a direct violation of the“anti-torture” laws enacted in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the United States help draft. Advocates against EIT insist that criminal laws used to prosecute people on U.S. soil can be applied too torture cases overseas. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which the United States ratified, requires all parties to “take effective legislative, administrative, judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” According to Elizabeth Hotzman, a former congresswoman, the law may be applied to anybody including people who engaged in torture outside of the U.S.

    On the other side of this debate, some advocates for the practice acknowledge that enhanced interrogation is a form of torture, though claim that enhanced interrogations can be effective in situations where standard interrogation cannot. In 2017, President Trump expressed similar views, and suggested permitting waterboarding because he believes it worked. In addition, there is no mechanism for punishing states for violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so many disagree with the impact of being found in violation. 

  • The War in Yemen Part 2: US Response

    The War in Yemen Part 2: US Response

    U.S. Response

    U.S. involvement in Yemen is multifaceted. Primarily, Washington has been engaged in counterterrorism efforts in Yemen since the early 2000s, fighting AQAP, the Islamic State, and affiliate groups. Since 2002, the U.S. has launched nearly 400 air strikes associated with counterterrorism efforts in Yemen. Policymakers fear that the instability in Yemen will embolden transnational terrorist groups and thus are interested in supporting a government that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 

    Regarding the conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, Washington’s support for the coalition is tied to the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership and concerns that the war threatens Saudi Arabia’s position vis-a-vis Iran. Additionally, the U.S. is interested in maintaining access to the Bab al Mandeb strait through which many of the world’s oil shipments pass. 

    Both the Obama and Trump administrations provided logistical and intelligence support–weapons, military advice, and a coordinated planning cell–to the Saudi-led coalition. Both presidents scaled down support for the coalition as the humanitarian situation in Yemen worsened and human rights groups alleged the Saudi-led coalition of indiscriminately bombing civilians and critical infrastructure. 

    In February 2021, President Joe Biden introduced a new initiative to end the conflict in Yemen, signaling a renewed focus on advancing diplomatic efforts and resolving the humanitarian crisis. The plan included ending U.S support for Saudi-led offensive operations in Yemen and appointing a special envoy for Yemen, career diplomat Timothy Lenderking. A week later, the State Department revoked the Trump administration’s designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). However, the Biden administration has sanctioned some Houthi leaders under Yemen-specific authorities. Despite his decision to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition, President Biden reiterated the United States’ commitment to helping Saudi Arabia defend itself from Houthi attacks. 

    A small number of U.S. military personnel are stationed in Yemen to conduct operations against AQAP and the Islamic State. Amidst Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Biden administration authorized additional deployments of U.S. military personnel and equipment to the UAE in February 2022.

    Perspectives on Washington’s Yemen Policy 

    Although Congress has been divided on Washington’s Yemen policy since 2015, many lawmakers supported Biden’s Yemen plan due to increasing concerns that U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition has enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law and contributed to Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. However, some lawmakers and human rights organizations find Biden’s distinction between weapons systems used for offensive operations in Yemen and arms supplied for Saudi Arabia’s territorial defense vague. Some assert that the U.S. still enables coalition air strikes by providing spare parts and maintenance for the Saudi air force. This concern was echoed by 50 members of Congress who proposed a bipartisan War Powers Resolution in June 2022 to end U.S. involvement in the war entirely. The House has adopted the provision for three consecutive years, but the legislation has not been enacted.

    Additionally, lawmakers and aid organizations supported the Biden administration’s reversal of the FTO designation. Many claimed that the FTO designation of the Houthis prevented the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid. However, critics of revoking the FTO designation claim that the decision fails to incentivize the Houthis to end attacks on coalition targets, halt advances, or participate in peace talks.

    Recent Developments 

    On April 1, 2022, the Houthis and the internationally recognized government in Yemen agreed to a two-month UN-mediated truce, which the parties renewed in June for an additional two months. The parties agreed to halt all military operations, open ports to fuel ships, and allow flights to and from the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport. Shortly after the parties reached an agreement, interim President Hadi stepped down and ceded his powers to an eight-member presidential council. According to some reports, Saudi officials arranged Hadi’s resignation. In August 2022, the parties agreed to renew the truce for another two months, although significant barriers to lasting peace remain. 

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    Additional Policy Considerations  

    Washington’s current priority in Yemen is to use the leverage from the current truce to advance a more permanent political settlement and improve the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Several experts and members of Congress have suggested that the Biden administration propose a plan to Saudi Arabia to further ease port restrictions at Hodeida or lift the air and naval blockade altogether. The current blockade prevents some delivery of fuel and supplies to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port, which threatens the delivery of aid, food, and water to Yemenis in areas under the Sanaa-based authorities’ control. Although the current truce has allowed more fuel ships to enter the port and opened flights from the Sanaa airport, President Biden’s Yemen team could push the Saudis to expand upon the current agreement. 

    Some analysts are skeptical of lifting the blockade, which the Houthis have historically identified as a prerequisite for peace talks. Some believe such action will allow Iranian weapons to reach the Houthis and provide them with more funds and aid, which the Houthis have withheld or diverted in the past. If the truce breaks down and hostilities continue, some fear that Ansar Allah could use newly acquired resources from port revenues to fund their offensive further. However, a United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects imports for illicit weapons, is already in place; the Saudi and Yemeni government-enforced vessel clearance process is a secondary measure. A possible solution to the anti-Houthi camps’ fears about port revenues is to allow the UNVIM to manage and direct port revenues while the parties negotiate a broader political settlement. 

  • The War in Yemen Part 1: Background and Main Actors

    The War in Yemen Part 1: Background and Main Actors

    The Republic of Yemen, a small country of 29 million on the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, has been torn apart by war since 2014. Separate but overlapping violent conflicts, exacerbated by a Saudi-led military intervention, have generated political fragmentation and the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Of the estimated quarter of a million people that have died in Yemen since 2014, over half of those deaths are the result of indirect causes such as hunger and inadequate access to medical services. As of 2022, 16.2 million people, over half the population, face acute hunger, and 4.3 million Yemenis are internally displaced. All parties to the conflict are accused of violating international humanitarian law. As the war in Yemen approaches its eighth year, many are hopeful that the recent UN-mediated truce will finally end Yemen’s crisis. 

    Background 

    Yemeni politics are complicated by historic divisions across cultural, religious, and geographic lines. The modern state of Yemen was established in 1990 through the unification of two regimes: the Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. Soon after, a military officer named Ali Abdullah Saleh became the country’s leader. Saleh remained president until the 2011 Arab Spring protests, when thousands of Yemenis took to the streets to demand his resignation following accusations of corruption. After his ousting, Saleh’s vice president, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, took over in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

    Backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. and recognized as legitimate by the UN, Hadi’s interim government faced challenges from various groups, including a secessionist movement in south Yemen, former government loyalists, and Houthi rebels. Meanwhile, Yemen continued to be plagued by government corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity.

    Yemen’s civil war began in September 2014 when the Houthis and Saleh loyalists took control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, demanding a new government and fuel subsidy reforms. Following failed negotiations with Hadi’s government, the Houthis and Saleh’s forces captured the city of Aden and seized the presidential palace, which led Hadi’s government to resign in January 2015. Subsequently, Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia and requested international intervention. In 2015, the Saudis formed a coalition backed by the United States and launched an offensive consisting of air raids and an economic blockade aimed at halting the Houthi advance and returning Hadi to power.

    Who is Involved?  

    The Houthis: The Houthi movement, named after its founder Hussein al Houthi, emerged in the 1990s as a Zaydi revivalist movement in Yemen’s northern region. Zaydis practice a form of Shi’a Islam and are a minority in Yemen and the global Islamic community. In the early 2000s, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), grew into a political and military movement opposed to then-president Saleh’s government. From 2004 to 2010, Saleh attempted to suppress the group using military force, but the Houthis maintained a presence in the north. 

    Since capturing Sanaa in 2014, Ansar Allah has created a coalition–often referred to as the Sanaa-based authorities–with northern political, military, and tribal groups. The alliance, led by the Houthis, has cemented control of Yemen’s north-western highlands and Red Sea coast, where about 70% of Yemen’s population lives. Many Yemenis oppose the Houthis’ de facto governance and criticize the group’s repressive security system and its’ practices of firing missiles into populated areas and shelling cities. The Houthis’ primary goal is to gain international recognition of a Houthi-led government in Yemen. The group has increasingly attacked coalition targets, mainly critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the Houthis also face a web of adversaries inside Yemen, including the Southern Transition Council (STC), al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the Islamist party Islah. In February 2021, the Houthis launched an offensive to capture Marib, the last stronghold of the internationally recognized government. The group faced setbacks due to coalition airstrikes but made territorial gains in the Marib governorate in the final months of 2021. 

    Iran: Shi’a-majority Iran has increasingly conducted irregular warfare against its adversaries, primarily through proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Iran is often accused of providing the Houthis arms, technology, training, and other forms of support. Tehran openly supports the Houthis politically but denies providing the Houthis arms or material aid. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the Houthis receive weapons or weapons components from Iran. Local media outlets assert that officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of Iran’s Armed Forces, are stationed in Yemen. However, the extent of coordination between Tehran and the Houthis is debated; some analysts maintain that Tehran’s decision-making power in Yemen is likely limited. 

    The Saudi-led coalition: In 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition to reinstate Hadi’s government and reverse the Houthis’ territorial gains. The coalition includes Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco (until 2019), Qatar (until 2017), Senegal, Sudan, and the UAE; Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti have also lent logistical and military support to the coalition. Saudi officials’ perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy capable of launching cross-border attacks has fueled the coalition’s offensive. According to the Yemen Data Project, the coalition has conducted about 25,054 air raids, resulting in almost 9,000 civilian casualties. Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government also enforce a vessel clearance process on commercial shipments directed to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port. This blockade, intended to prevent the flow of illicit weapons, has impeded or delayed the delivery of fuel and other essential supplies to parts of Yemen and has contributed to Yemen’s economic crisis. 

    United Arab Emirates: After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most prominent military role within the coalition. While Saudi Arabia has focused much of its operations in the north, the UAE has deployed ground troops and formed and backed local militias, including the STC, the Support and Backup Brigades, and the Hadrami Elite Forces, in Yemen’s south around key ports and shipping lanes. Some of these forces, notably the STC and affiliates, have come into conflict with the Yemeni government forces, which has weakened the anti-Houthi camp and created a rift within the Saudi-led coalition. Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical ambitions and desire to undermine Islah, a Yemeni Islamist party loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, are two objectives driving the Emirates’ intervention. The UAE scaled down its military involvement in 2019 but still maintains influence in southern Yemen.

  • Russia-Ukraine invasion and Southeast Asian Responses

    Russia-Ukraine invasion and Southeast Asian Responses

    Russia-Ukraine invasion explained

    The Russia-Ukraine conflict began in early 2014, and tensions have slowly escalated ever since. Last year, the Russian government started sending troops and placing resources in proximity to Ukraine’s border. In December 2021, Russia issued a set of demands calling on NATO to cease expansion to Eastern and Central Europe and reject Ukraine’s application to join the treaty organization. NATO did not accept these demands and implemented sanctions on Russia in response. The United States and other NATO member states also supplied Ukraine with weapons. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has displaced eight millions of people internally and caused thousands of deaths.

    In response, President Biden declared Putin’s actions “unprovoked and unjustified.” The United States and NATO nations implemented further sanctions, and the U.S and other G7 countries committed to continue military support. In an United Nations emergency session, 141 out of 193 states voted to condemn Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine and called for immediate ceasefire. Caught between Russia, China, and the United States, many Southeast Asian nations remained in the minority that stayed neutral and/or supported Russia.

    ASEAN’s relationship with China and the United States

    Southeast Asian countries have historically had to balance interests with China and the United States. The ASEAN block is the fifth biggest economic region in the world. Since 2010, trade between China and ASEAN has doubled from $235.5 billion to more than $507.9 billion. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China has projected influence while investing in the infrastructure and digital economy of ASEAN nations. 

    The United States considers ASEAN a crucial partner for trade and strategic cooperations in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden Administration has brought relations with ASEAN to the forefront, hosting the first U.S-ASEAN summit and prioritizing ASEAN states as the first destination for high profile members of the administration like Vice President Kamala Harris.

    In the past decades, most ASEAN nations sought to remain neutral between the United States and China, maintaining good relations with both great powers. However, this is not always possible and conflicts like the Russian invasion of Ukraine have forced ASEAN to publicly take a side as China has maintained support for Russia while the United States has led the efforts to support Ukraine and punish Russia.

    ASEAN’s relationship with Russia and its variety of responses to the Russian-Ukraine conflict

    Economic ties between Russia and the ASEAN pact are modest, and Russia is ASEAN’s 9th largest trade partner. The Russian-Ukraine conflict is predicted to have a low impact on ASEAN’s economic prospects. However, shortages from Russian sanctions and rising gas prices are likely to impact many ASEAN’s economies. Russia is a leading supply for arms sales in the region since Putin rose to power. In general, ties between Russia and Southeast Asian nations are weak and vary from nation to nation. However, since Russia and China are important strategic partners, negative sentiments towards Russia might affect relations with China. This places ASEAN nations in a difficult position in deciding whether to condemn Russia’s violation of international law or to appease an important partner. 

    At the United Nations session discussing the Russian attack, eight out of ten ASEAN nations voted to condemn Russia, while Vietnam and Laos abstained. Singapore has voiced the strongest opposition to the Russian invasion, and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked that if politics were based on “might is right”, such as the recent attack, the “world would be a dangerous place for small countries like Singapore”. This aligns with Singapore’s past reactions to international violations. In the 1980s, Singapore condemned China’s attack at Gac Ma in Vietnam as well as the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. 

    Meanwhile, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei condemned Russia’s attack but were less outspoken. These countries voted against Russia at the United Nations session. However, they did not name Russia as the “aggressor” and focused on advocating for respect for international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. 

    The countries with the most muted responses were Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. With their proximity to both China and Russia, it is more difficult for these countries to use strong language to condemn Russia’s actions. Here, both Malaysia and Thailand used neutral language such as “concerned” or “deeply concerned” to refer to the conflict, rather than specifying that Russia was at fault. Vietnam refused to use any language to condemn Russia, likely because Russia is its most important defense partner. In the past several decades, Vietnam has relied heavily on Russian imported weapons for national defense, especially in the South China Sea conflict.