ACE

Category: ACE Research

  • Global Status of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weaponry and Testing

    Global Status of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weaponry and Testing

    Anti-satellite weapons, or ASATs, are a growing topic of international concern in the 21st century. These weapons usually consist of a projectile, launched into space on a missile, for the purpose of destroying a target satellite in low Earth orbit. The kinetic impact of an ASAT projectile into its target satellite can create millions of long-lived, microscopic pieces of debris. This millimeter-scale debris poses the highest risk of mission-ending damage to orbiting satellites, and, with over 100 million pieces of debris on the millimeter scale or larger, states and organizations have an interest in decreasing the risk to satellites by preventing the creation of further debris. ASAT tests—which are known to produce large volumes of small, difficult-to-track debris – frequently face international condemnation and rebuke, as they are seen to further endanger and militarize the shared domain of space. Several states, including the US, China, India, and Russia have ASAT capabilities, and all have tested these weapons on their own satellites in the last 20 years. Each state has its own public reasons for possessing such capabilities, and takes a unique approach to the issue of ASAT testing. 

    Current National Positions on ASAT Testing

    The US announced a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing in 2021, and last tested its capabilities in 2008. The US has sought to act as a global peacemaker on the issue, using the moratorium to progress efforts on banning destructive ASAT testing. The Biden administration is also pursuing a parallel strategy of improving US defenses to ASATs and achieving non-destructive means of disabling satellites.

    Russia has tested its ASAT weapons as recently as November of 2021, and faced swift international backlash, including calls for multilateral treaties and bans on destructive ASATs. The negative response was mainly due to the threat to satellites from the created debris, even requiring an emergency avoidance maneuver by the International Space Station. Russia had its own political motives for conducting the test. It wanted to establish and display these capabilities before any treaties or regulations were established on the matter. States consider the advantages and potential negative consequences before testing, as the backlash might not be more significant than the strategic benefits a state gains from performing an ASAT test.

    China and India have both tested ASATs as well, with China last performing a destructive ASAT test in 2007. Despite a claimed opposition to the militarization of space, the US Pentagon says China is building up an “arsenal” of ASAT capabilities. China used the familiar reasonings of national defense and security to justify the test, which faced similar criticism to the Russian test for its long-lived debris in relatively high orbit. India, which claimed to be confronting the regional threat of Chinese ASATs among other security concerns, completed a test in March 2019. The international response was milder, but India faced some domestic opposition to the test not seen in other countries. 

    Future Developments

    The future of ASAT weapons will be complex, as states have interests in maintaining such capabilities for defense while simultaneously seeking to prevent their testing and use due to space debris concerns. Many developments in ASAT tech are leading towards ground-based, non-destructive methods that use electronic systems to jam or disable satellites. This appears to be the future of ASATs, and would enable a state to sign treaties banning destructive ASAT testing without compromising their national defense interests against similarly-armed states. Such treaties are already being pursued and gaining the support of states and organizations. The reduction in space debris could be a welcome change for all states with satellites and other interests in space, who are equally at risk from the millions of pieces of space junk that a country’s ASATs are responsible for. When it comes to global security in space, destructive ASATs and the debris they create are part of the problem, not the solution.

  • Understanding the Deep-Sea Mining Debate

    Understanding the Deep-Sea Mining Debate

    Introduction 

    The development of renewable energy sources like electric vehicle (EV) batteries and wind turbines, crucial for transitioning away from fossil fuels and achieving the Paris Agreement goals, depends heavily on critical minerals and rare earth elements. China, Chile, and Argentina are key suppliers, mining these minerals to meet current global demands. Notably, South America holds about 75% of the world’s lithium, essential for EV batteries.

    However, the demand for these critical minerals is projected to increase sixfold by 2040. This surge in demand extends beyond lithium to other minerals like manganese and gold. In response, private companies and governments are exploring new sources, including the ocean floor. The Pacific Ocean, in particular, is believed to be a rich source of these minerals, attracting the interest of some Pacific Island nations looking to develop mining sites within their territorial waters.

    International Regulation of Deep-Sea Mining 

    The interconnected nature of the world’s oceans means that currents can transport pollution far from its original source. This global interconnectivity underscores the need for an international regulatory framework to govern deep-sea mining, as decisions made by one country could affect the health of oceans worldwide. In response to this need, the International Seabed Authority (ISA), responsible for overseeing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provisions related to seabed minerals, convened in Kingston, Jamaica, in July 2023. This meeting was critical, as the existing regulations on deep-sea mining had expired that month.

    During the conference, member nations agreed on a two-year roadmap to establish deep-sea mining regulations, with a target to finalize these rules by July 2025. However, it’s important to note that this timeline is not legally binding. The United States, which is not a signatory to the UNCLOS, did not participate in this conference. This meeting in Kingston marks a significant step towards regulating deep-sea mining activities, reflecting the growing global recognition of the need to manage these resources responsibly.

    Pros & Cons of Deep-Sea Mining

    Deep-sea mining, particularly for polymetallic nodules rich in manganese and other minerals essential for renewable energy technologies, is a topic of significant controversy. These nodules, found on the ocean floor, are targeted for extraction to support the growing demand for renewable energy resources. Private companies are investigating various technologies for this purpose, including large seabed vacuums and traditional drilling methods.

    However, the environmental impact of mining the ocean floor is a major concern, with the effects on marine ecosystems largely unknown. Scientists and environmental organizations like Greenpeace have raised alarms about the potential harm to marine life, including species and plants that have not yet been discovered or studied. The disturbance caused by seabed mining could have far-reaching implications for biodiversity and ecological balance in the oceans.

    Additionally, there are concerns related to climate justice, particularly regarding the maritime heritage of Pacific Island nations. While some Pacific Island nations initially spearheaded efforts to develop deep-sea mining, others, like Vanuatu, have voiced opposition. These nations worry about the disruption of their maritime environment and heritage, which are integral to their cultural and economic well-being. This division highlights the complex ethical, environmental, and economic dimensions of deep-sea mining and the need for careful consideration and international collaboration in decision-making processes.

    Ireland, Sweden, New Zealand, and several other countries have advocated for a moratorium on deep-sea mining until more clear and comprehensive regulations are established. This stance reflects growing concerns about the environmental impacts and regulatory uncertainties associated with extracting minerals from the ocean floor. Additionally, some European scientists suggest that the current demand for critical minerals necessary for renewable energy technologies can be satisfied through existing mines and enhanced recycling efforts. This perspective emphasizes the potential of sustainable practices and alternative sources over the relatively unexplored and potentially harmful method of deep-sea mining.

    In the automotive industry, major companies like BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and the Volkswagen Group, all of which require critical metals for the production of electric vehicles, have publicly opposed deep-sea mining. In 2021, these automakers, as members of the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance, committed to sourcing minerals only from mines that adhere to certain environmental standards. This commitment is part of their broader strategy to limit the negative environmental impacts of their supply chains, especially in the context of the increasing demand for electric vehicles and the critical minerals they require.

    These developments highlight a growing international consensus on the need for responsible and sustainable mining practices, with a particular focus on protecting marine ecosystems and ensuring ethical supply chains in industries reliant on critical minerals.

    Proponents of deep-sea mining advocate that extracting metals from the ocean floor can be conducted in a responsible manner and is essential for reducing reliance on China’s mineral supplies. This stance is particularly relevant for countries seeking to diversify their sources of critical minerals and mitigate economic risks.

    The United States and the European Union have both formulated strategic plans aimed at lessening their dependence on China for these essential minerals. This initiative is partly fueled by concerns over China’s control over the global supply of rare earths and other critical minerals. An illustrative example of the risks associated with over-reliance on China was evident in the aftermath of the U.S. decision to limit exports of semiconductor technology. In response, the Chinese government threatened to restrict exports of gallium and germanium, which are vital for manufacturing computer chips.

    In pursuit of supply chain security, the U.S. Department of Commerce has recommended a review of regulations related to offshore drilling and mining. The goal is to expedite the permitting process for extraction projects, thereby enhancing the capacity for domestic production of critical minerals. This approach is seen as a way to achieve greater self-sufficiency and security in mineral supplies, reducing the vulnerability to geopolitical tensions and supply disruptions.

    Several governments with identified critical mineral deposits in their territorial waters are showing interest in developing these resources, driven by the potential economic benefits. Norway, for example, has announced plans to develop a vast field of metals in the Norwegian Sea, an area reportedly as large as Germany. The Norwegian government believes that the environmental impact of this project can be minimized and that the extraction of these metals will be beneficial, outweighing potential risks.

    The island nation of Nauru has been instrumental in prompting the current review of International Seabed Authority (ISA) regulations on deep-sea mining. This move is part of Nauru’s strategy to engage in a public-private partnership to exploit the mineral resources within its waters. Similarly, leaders of the Cook Islands view deep-sea mining as a significant opportunity to diversify their economy, which is heavily reliant on tourism, and to foster economic growth.

    On the other hand, some countries like France and the United Kingdom, although they hold licenses to mine the seabed, have decided not to pursue these mining options at present. This decision reflects the complex balancing act governments face between exploiting underwater mineral resources and considering environmental, economic, and social implications. The varying approaches of these countries highlight the global debate over deep-sea mining and the need for careful consideration of both the opportunities and the challenges it presents.

    The Paradox of the Clean Energy Transition

    The extraction, refinement, and transportation of critical minerals necessary for manufacturing electric batteries, wind turbines, and other renewable energy technologies present significant environmental challenges. These minerals are indispensable for achieving independence from fossil fuels and mitigating climate change effects caused by greenhouse gas emissions. The United Nations endorses the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy as a crucial step towards meeting global climate goals.

    However, policymakers are faced with the complex task of securing a stable supply of these critical minerals while minimizing the environmental damage associated with their extraction. This challenge is particularly acute in the context of critical mineral extraction methods, including deep-sea mining, which have become points of contention. Governments and environmental groups are divided on the best approach to balance these competing needs.

    The debate centers on how to effectively transition to renewable energy sources without exacerbating environmental degradation through the processes involved in obtaining the necessary materials. As the world strives to combat climate change, finding sustainable and environmentally responsible methods of critical mineral extraction remains a crucial, yet contentious, aspect of global environmental and energy policy.

  • Failures and Successes of the Phase One Trade Agreement with China

    Failures and Successes of the Phase One Trade Agreement with China

    Introduction

    In recent decades, trade between China and the US has significantly grown, with China being a major source of imports for the United States and a top market for American goods and services. Despite the economic interdependence, the relationship is complex. The trade war that initiated in 2018 exemplifies the complexities in this dynamic.

    Background Information Of Trade Between China and US

    For about three decades following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, trade between China and the United States was nearly nonexistent due to severed relations. The situation changed in 1979 when diplomatic ties were restored, leading to a significant surge in trade from a few billion to hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the late 1970s played a pivotal role, with the Chinese government, under his leadership, easing fiscal restrictions and promoting business expansion. As part of efforts to boost trade and investment, China applied to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor to the WTO, in 1986.

    As a condition of entry, Beijing pledged to execute a wide variety of economic reforms, including major import tariff reductions, IP protections, and improved law and order transparency. At this time, President Bill Clinton and his advisors argued that incorporating China in the international trading system would be advantageous for both the US and China, helping to foster economic and eventually democratic transition. However, American labor unions and many congressional Democrats rejected the idea, claiming that China’s inadequate environmental and worker standards would inspire similar behavior elsewhere and lead to a “race to the bottom.” 

    Even before China joined the WTO, trade between the two countries began to grow. WTO membership ensured “permanent normal trade relations,” providing further security for American and foreign companies to produce in China and export to the United States. Trade expanded significantly; the value of American goods bought from China increased from about $100 billion in 2001 to $500 billion in 2021. This rise in imports is partially explained by China’s significant contribution to global supply chains, since Chinese businesses assemble products for export to the United States using materials from all around the world.

    Trade War

    The trade war between China and the United States was launched nearly five years ago by then-President Donald Trump. The US levied duties on approximately $350 billion in Chinese imports, and China countered by imposing taxes on an additional $100 billion in imports, as permitted by WTO rules. President Trump’s goal was to put pressure on Beijing to change what was perceived by some as unfair trade policies and decouple the US economy from China’s economy. To avert a trade deficit, President Trump levied hefty tariffs on China. Following the tariffs, China’s access to high-tech US products was restricted, as were foreign investments with security concerns, as well as claims of unfair Chinese business practices.

    Summary and Results of the Phase One Trade Agreement

    The Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China: Phase One went into force on February 14, 2020. China committed to expand its purchases of particular US goods and services by $200 billion beyond baseline levels set in 2017 for 2020 and 2021. The impact can be summarized as follows:

    Positive Aspects

    • Between January 2020 and December 2021, China imported $235.3 billion in covered products from the US, while the US exported $210.1 billion to China. In the end, China bought 62% (for imports from China) or 60% (for exports from the US) of all the goods covered by the phase one agreement.
    • Goods made from Covered Manufacture Products went beyond the phase one commitment by 61 percent (for imports from China) or 59 percent (for exports from the US).
    • China’s phase one commitment was spent on purchases of covered agricultural products to the tune of 77 percent (for imports from China) or 83 percent (for exports from the US).
    • China’s purchases of covered energy products accounted for 47 percent (for imports from China) or 37 percent (for exports from the US) of the phase one commitment.
    • All uncovered products, which in 2017 made up 29% of China’s total imports from the US and 27% of the US’s total exports to China, were not expressly covered by the phase one agreement. In 2021, China imported unlimited goods worth $42.0 billion from the US, down 8% from 2017. The total value of all unreported US exports to China during that time was $35.0 billion, up 1% from the prior year.

    The Phase One transaction achieved some success despite notable restrictions and challenges. It contributed to crucial structural reforms in China’s intellectual property laws, facilitated easier access for U.S. agricultural exports, and improved market entry for U.S. financial services firms. Notably, goods made from Covered Manufacture Products surpassed the Phase One commitment by 61% for imports from China and 59% for exports from the United States. Although crude oil prices briefly turned negative in April 2020, impacting sales value, they had rebounded by the fall of 2021.

    Negative Aspects

    The Phase One deal is largely seen as unsuccessful, with China only fulfilling about 60% of the specified goods trade amount. The ambitious purchasing targets, perceived as unattainable by many, were further hindered by the Covid-19 pandemic disrupting trade flows.

    If U.S. services exports to China had expanded at the same rate as exports to the rest of the world from 2018 to 2021, and U.S. goods exports to China of Phase One products had increased at the same pace as China’s purchases of those products globally, the overall U.S. goods and services sent to China would have decreased by approximately 19% from 2018 to 2021 due to the trade conflict and the Phase One deal. These projections suggest that the U.S. could have avoided trade war export losses of $24 billion (16%) in 2018 and $30 billion (20%) in 2019. Under Phase One, exports would have increased by a combined $27 billion (18%) in 2020 and $40 billion (23%) in 2021. Without the export losses, American taxpayers would not have paid tens of billions of dollars in agricultural subsidies in 2018–19.

    Phase Two

    Although the details of phase two have not yet been finalized, it was said that the Phase One agreement only addressed the most straightforward issues in regard to US-China trade. If the agreement is to have any meaning, phase two will need to address more complex topics. During United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s confirmation hearing, Senator Ben Sasse stated that the Phase Two agreement should address “critical issues” like excess capacity, state-owned firms, state-sponsored cyber-enabled intellectual property theft, restrictions on cross-border data transfers, and regulatory transparency that weren’t adequately addressed or achieved in Phase One. Similar to this, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several business associations mentioned issues that should be addressed in a Phase Two agreement, including subsidies, cybersecurity, digital trade and data governance, and competition policy. 

    A Phase Two agreement has also been sought by business organizations. In accordance with a report from the American Chamber of Commerce in South China from the previous year, “Phase One will go down as one of the biggest political and economic failures in a generation unless the U.S. and China immediately return to the negotiating table to start Phase Two, a step that China has also indicated is not imminent.” The National Association of Manufacturers has additionally argued in favor of a Phase Two deal “to improve trade certainty.”

  • How the US can Help Refugees Displaced by the Global War on Terrorism in the Middle East

    How the US can Help Refugees Displaced by the Global War on Terrorism in the Middle East

    The Global War on Terrorism 

    The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is an ongoing, international counterterrorism campaign led by the United States in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. More than 170 nations have taken on the cause, which has included targeting state and non-state actors such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Saddam Hussein regime. The GWOT has succeeded in protecting the United States and its citizens from attacks, with only about 100 Americans dying in the US in attacks by Islamist extremists since 2001. Despite its benefit for America, the GWOT has left many people in the Middle East displaced, both within and across international borders.

    Refugees Displaced by the GWOT 

    At least 37 million people have been displaced by the GWOT through eight post-9/11 wars in which the US has been crucially involved. During these wars, the US either had a clear responsibility for initiating combat, escalating combat, or for being a significant contributor to combat through drone strikes, logistical support, battlefield advising, and arms sales, among others. The 37 million people includes upwards of 8 million refugees and 29 million internally displaced people (IDPs). For the purpose of this brief, refugees will be defined as people who have been displaced across international borders. There have been over 2 million refugees each from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria as a direct and indirect result of the GWOT. The GWOT has expanded beyond the Middle East, leading to hundreds of thousands more refugees from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and the Philippines. While the plight of the 29 million IDPs is extremely important, this brief will focus on the 8 million refugees, as policy solutions for refugees and IDPs would be vastly different.

    How Host Countries Have Handled an Influx of Refugees

    Most refugees who have escaped violence from the GWOT in the Middle East have fled to neighboring countries, especially Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Turkey currently hosts around 3.7 million refugees, Jordan hosts around 3 million refugees, and Lebanon hosts around 1.3 million refugees. Those three countries also host the most displaced people per capita in the Middle East. It is of note that many of these refugees come from Syria as a result of the Syrian Civil War. However, for this policy brief, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan can still be focused on because they host the most refugees displaced by the GWOT.

    Turkey is home to the world’s highest population of refugees. Most of these refugees live outside camps under challenging circumstances, such as reduced food consumption or living in poor-quality housing. Turkey has made efforts to supply registered refugees with education and healthcare, among other rights and services. To help in those areas, the European Union (EU) has provided over six billion euros in aid through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, in which they focus on humanitarian assistance, education, health, and migration management, among others. 

    Turkey also has both international and national legislation pertaining to refugees. Turkey is a party to the United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Convention defined the term “refugee,” gave refugees protection from persecution, and established a principle of non-refoulement, which states that refugees cannot be sent back to their home countries if there are concerns of oppression.  The 1967 Protocol removed geographic and temporal limitations of the Convention. In terms of national legislation, Turkey implemented its first domestic asylum law in 2014, titled the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. This law established a legal framework for migration and asylum, stating that refugees will not be sent back to dangerous or discriminatory places. It created an institution to manage international protection, and gave refugees a way to apply for residence permits. The same year, Turkey adopted the Temporary Protection Regulation, which outlines rights of refugees and procedures for refugees granted temporary protection. However, it is of note that Turkey does not recognize Syrians seeking asylum as refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention.

    Unlike Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan both have not ratified the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. The governments of those two countries view asylum seekers from other countries as guests, not as refugees. A partial goal of this approach is to prevent the integration of refugees into society. Because Lebanon and Jordan are not party to the international treaties, they are not required to recognize the rights of refugees guaranteed by the Convention. Instead, it is their job as host countries, as well as the jobs of  international agencies, to promote the wellbeing of refugees, which can be problematic. In both countries, refugees face employment restrictions, poor housing, and inadequate access to services. On top of that, there are negative views from many citizens in Lebanon and Jordan towards refugees, and the same goes for the views of Turkish citizens towards refugees.

    Although many aspects of the refugee situation in Lebanon and Jordan are similar, both countries have also dealt with the influx of refugees using differing strategies. The Jordanian government has input a legal framework to address the refugee crisis. What seemed like progress for refugees actually turned out to be a liability, as the policies have become more restrictive. The Lebanese government has taken a different approach, allowing local institutions to handle many aspects of accommodations for refugees. Despite its downfalls, Jordan has made some recent progress. In 2021, Jordan issued 62,000 work permits to refugees, which is a record number.  

    US Policy Options

    There are policy options that can help improve the wellbeing of refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Since these countries have the most refugees displaced by the GWOT, it makes sense to focus on them for US policy options. It is notable that by listing policy solutions to help refugees, this brief only explores the view that the US should intervene to help refugees. Listed below are some of the options.

    The US could encourage Lebanon and Jordan to sign the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its accompanying 1967 Protocol. The US could do this through negotiations with Lebanon and Jordan, such as a deal to provide increased aid to support refugees in those countries in return for signing the Convention and Protocol.

    Pros 

    1. The US fulfills its strategic interest as a global peacekeeper.
    2. There are many benefits for refugees. Their quality of life could improve, and they would be granted many protected rights and freedoms outlined under the Convention and Protocol. In Lebanon and Jordan, legal aid actors spend too much time advocating for the right to legal stay for refugees. Since the Convention requires states to regularize the status of refugees within their borders, signing it would make legal stay in Lebanon and Jordan more accessible. 
    3. Promoting the Convention and Protocol would be less of an infringement on Lebanese and Jordanian national sovereignty than promoting domestic laws.
    4. Providing aid as a negotiation tactic would help lower Lebanon and Jordan’s out-of-pocket costs to help refugees. More money could then be spent to promote the refugees’ wellbeing.

    Cons 

    1. Since signing the Convention and Protocol would help refugees to gain legal stay in Lebanon and Jordan, it may exacerbate tensions between refugees and citizens of Lebanon and Jordan.
    2. Signing the Convention and Protocol may not actually do much, as there is already influence from both in Lebanon and Jordan today. That influence comes in the form of norms being spread to those countries. Therefore, the US may be wasting resources to pursue this option.

    The US could promote peace and positive relationships between refugees and the citizens of host nations. Refugees are not likely to leave Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan any time soon, so the US can try to improve their quality of life there so that they can more easily integrate into those societies. The US can do this through diplomatic talks with government leaders, which would ideally lead to a campaign supporting refugees trying to integrate into their societies. 

    Pros

    1. If the relationship between refugees and host citizens becomes more positive, there will subsequently be more support for programs, laws, and infrastructure that would promote the wellbeing of refugees. 
    2. Although an ultimate goal would be for refugees to safely return home, this is often not possible due to unsafe conditions. Therefore, improving quality of life may be the best option at the current moment. 

    Cons

    1. Turkish president Erdoğan suggests that he is not on good terms with President Biden. Because of this, diplomatic talks may be difficult.
    2. Citizens of the host nations may view the US attempt to integrate refugees into their societies as an infringement on their national sovereignty.
    3. Host citizens may not want refugees to integrate into their societies.
  • US Response to Iran’s Space Program 

    US Response to Iran’s Space Program 

    Amid US concern over Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the Middle Eastern nation’s space programs have also come under scrutiny. Tehran’s interest in space dates back to 1957, when the country joined the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Iran’s recent technological achievements have raised concerns about the potential for expanded space development to accelerate the country’s acquisition of a nuclear arsenal.

    History of Iran’s Space Program 

    Since joining COPUOS, Iran has participated in several international discussions regarding Space, including the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Iran has maintained a state-run space program, the Iranian Space Agency (ISA), since 2003. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also runs a separate space program within the country as part of the IRGC Aerospace Force. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the IRGC is more heavily involved than the ISA in the development of solid-fuel rockets, which have the potential to be converted into missiles. 

    In 1998, Iran showcased its satellite capabilities with the Mesbah satellite program, established through a partnership with the Russian Federation. The Mesbah was intended for civilian image capture but was often speculated to have potential spy satellite features. While the Mesbah was never launched, the agreement marked an early sign of ongoing cooperation between Russia and Iran in space and military technology endeavors.

    US-Iran Relations 

    The relationship between the United States and Iran has been marked by a history of diplomatic struggles. During the Trump administration, tensions escalated when the IRGC was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The IRGC has been a state sponsor of Shia terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, as well as the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. The Iranian government has also been responsible for numerous cyber attacks on foreign governments and private corporations. Eutelsat, a French satellite operator, reported in October that Iranian state actors had intentionally jammed two of its satellites. 

    Washington has made clear its intention to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capabilities. This objective is reflected in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed in 2015 by Iran, the EU, and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The JCPOA includes specific stipulations to prevent the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, but both President Biden and Tehran have publicly supported resuming the deal. 

    Iran’s space programs have also raised concerns for US officials regarding the dual-use nature of space program technologies and the potential for their application in advancing the nation’s nuclear capabilities. There is a recognized correlation between the growth of space programs and weapons programs. Space technology holds the potential for application in missile development, particularly evident with IRGC solid-fuel rockets and space launch vehicle technologies. These connections played a role in the US-imposed sanctions on Iran in 2019. US intelligence indicates the expansion of Iran’s missile program through rocket launch tests, and the successful 2020 launch of the Noor-1 satellite by the IRGC suggests advancements in Tehran’s ability to develop and deploy missiles.  

    The US State Department has publicly expressed concern over Iranian rockets and their potential for use in delivering nuclear weapons. Members of Congress have supported Biden’s promise to reenter the JCPOA, but are critical of Biden’s lack of progress on the deal. During a visit to Israel, President Biden committed the US to use “all elements of its national power” to prevent Iran from developing nuclear capabilities. American officials are also worried about Iran’s significant alliances forged via its space programs, notably with Russia and China. Iran provided drones and missiles to Russia during its conflict with Ukraine, and some scholars are concerned about the potential expansion of Russian and Iranian influence into Latin America as well.

    Future DevelopmentsIn June 2023, analysts reported that Washington and Tehran are coming to an informal agreement to limit Iranian uranium enrichment to 60%. The level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon is 90%. In exchange for a cap on enrichment, Washington will work to unfreeze Iranian assets. Nuclear deal talks have grown stagnant in part due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but analysts speculate that an informal agreement may open the door for further diplomatic talks.

  • Introduction to U.S.-Spain Relations

    Introduction to U.S.-Spain Relations

    Quick Facts

    Introduction

    Spain’s shift to democracy in 1978, solidified by its new Constitution, also signaled a move from isolationism to greater international collaboration. This was followed shortly by Spain’s entry into NATO in 1982 and the European Union in 1986.

    Spain consistently ranks as the EU’s fourth most populous and economically significant nation by GDP. As of July 2023, Spain holds the presidency of the EU Council. The United States maintains a robust relationship with Spain through these global entities. It stands as the EU’s primary trading partner and consistently appoints a U.S. military officer as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

    History of U.S.–Spain Relations

    Spain was the first country to colonize North America, beginning with present-day Florida in the 1500’s, and expanding northwards from Central America into the American Southwest and up along the Pacific Coast. Spanish colonies coexisted in relative harmony with the United States, and established diplomatic relations with them in 1783. An important early diplomatic event between the two countries was the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819, through which the U.S. obtained Florida from Spain and Spain gave up its rights to the Pacific Northwest.

    The Spanish-American War of 1898 emerged from conflicting interests in Spanish-ruled Cuba. It led to Cuban independence, the U.S. gaining Puerto Rico and Guam, and the U.S. purchasing the Philippines. During the 20th century, Spain dealt with internal conflict, which caused their neutrality in World War I and limited engagement in World War II. As a result, Spain stood as the sole surviving Fascist state in Europe after the war. For a long time, it followed isolationism, but in the two decades after World War II, Spain started welcoming tourism and collaborating with the U.S. Soon after the war, the two countries signed the Pact of Madrid. This pact allowed the U.S. to establish military bases on Spanish soil in exchange for military and economic assistance. This marked the beginning of lasting U.S.-Spanish cooperation.

    This cooperation grew stronger when Spain became a democracy in 1978. Besides joining NATO and the EU, Spain collaborated with the U.S. in various military efforts, including the Gulf War in 1990, the post-9/11 conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Although Spain has consistently followed the U.S.’s lead in these endeavors, domestic disagreements over participation in Iraq and disagreements between the two on relations with Cuba marked a short-lived deterioration of the U.S.-Spain relationship, which improved after Spain committed to increased involvement in Afghanistan. 

    Strategic Interests

    Spain, the U.S., and China

    Spain leans towards China for imports, with 9% coming from China compared to 4% from the United States. While the U.S. and Spain share similar political values, economic dynamics play a role. The Trump Administration’s protectionist policies and competition with China can push Spain to align more closely with the U.S. Despite this, Spain’s reliance on China for imports and telecommunications networks complicates the decision to move away from China. Spain has been under mounting pressure from the United States concerning their utilization of Huawei’s telecommunications system, due to raised security worries. This primarily stems from China’s exploitation of “crucial infrastructure to gather intelligence on potential vulnerabilities and [using] spear-phishing to conduct cyberespionage in order to acquire technological capacity and economic and security intelligence.”

    In the face of a bipolar global economic system, Europe—with Spain included—is attempting to position itself as an alternative to both the United States and China. Spain’s relative openness towards China can put Spain’s relationship with the U.S at risk, and if U.S-China relations continue deteriorating and becoming more antagonistic, Spain might feel alienated from the U.S and forced to pick a side.

  • US Response to Putinist Ideology in Russia

    US Response to Putinist Ideology in Russia

    Introduction

    Amid Russia’s ongoing conflict and occupation of Ukraine, the underlying motives driving the war have become increasingly evident. A significant focal point has emerged around the personal aspirations and geopolitical perspective of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin’s authoritative leadership style has positioned him as a central figure in Russia’s actions and choices, where his personal beliefs and principles influence the direction of the nation he governs. Upon dissecting Putin’s ideology, it becomes apparent that his system is inherently antagonistic toward the United States and its allied nations. This hostility stems from the foundational principles on which his ideology is constructed, as well as the broader objectives it seeks to accomplish beyond the confines of Russia’s borders. 

    Characterizing Putinism:

    Vladimir Putin’s ideology, often referred to as Putinism, does not adhere to a rigid set of traits that dictate all of Russia’s actions. Putin’s nearly quarter of a century rule has seen Russian politics change drastically as the democratic system established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been gradually replaced by an authoritarian system headed by Putin. However, recurring principles in the domestic and international spheres can be identified.

    Domestically, Putinism’s most prominent characteristics are authoritarianism, political illiberalism, and social conservatism. In practice, this manifests as a political system in which Putin leads as a strongman with his party, United Russia—a loyal state security apparatus—and various allied oligarchs wield control over the media, internet, economy, and political process. Civil rights are curtailed while rights of marginalized groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community, are met with open hostility.

    Internationally, Putinism can be categorized by three characteristics:

    These principles are significant because all three characteristics build upon and sustain one another, and they are fundamentally opposed to and hostile towards the United States and its allies. Each of these principles offers a lens through which Russia’s foreign policy can be understood.

    Eurasianism

    Eurasianism is the concept that Russia, as well as the other former members of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, comprise a distinct civilization separate from Europe. This “Eurasian Civilization” has been the result of Russia’s history as a site of conquest for various nomadic empires including the Huns and the Mongols. A core principle of Eurasianism asserts that ideas originating in the West, including those stemming from the Enlightenment, are inherently detrimental to Russia’s Eurasian civilization. As a result, proponents of Eurasianism advocate for the rejection and active opposition to these Western-born concepts. 

    A significant aspect of Russian foreign policy is the Eurasianist perspective regarding the inevitable consolidation of states within the Eurasian civilization into a unified Eurasian state under Russia’s leadership. This viewpoint gained recent prominence, as evidenced by a foreign policy charter released by the Kremlin in March of this year. The charter identified Russia as a “unique country-civilization” and a prominent Eurasian power, asserting its role as the destined leader of the “civilizational community of the Russian world.”

    The Eurasianist component of Putinism contributes to its adversarial stance toward the United States. Through the Eurasianist perspective, opposition to the United States and its allies is seen as crucial to safeguarding the integrity of the Eurasian civilization against the encroachment of Western influence. Consequently, this viewpoint transforms the rhetoric of conflict with NATO from mere propaganda into a genuine ideological belief held by Putin’s Russia.

    Russian Nationalism

    Putin’s nationalism draws heavily from the veneration of two predecessors of the Russian Federation: the historical Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The prestige, power, and legacy of both states are central to Putin’s particular brand of nationalism. 

    Having served as a former officer of the Soviet KGB, Putin holds a distinct reverence for the legacy of the Soviet Union, even describing its collapse as the most significant calamity of the 20th century. This sentiment has left a lasting impression on Putin’s Russia. Notably, the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany remains a pivotal aspect of the new national narrative Putin aims to construct. During Putin’s leadership, this triumph has been integrated into the core identity of contemporary Russia, serving as a cornerstone in framing the nation’s present actions. This was particularly evident in Putin’s initial justification for Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, which he described as an effort to “denazify” the country. By branding adversaries as Nazis or Fascists, support for Russian actions is spurred through an emphasis on Russia’s Soviet legacy. This narrative positions these actions as a continuation of the Soviet struggle against Nazi Germany, thereby generating support for Russia’s activities.

    Russia’s historical antecedents have been leveraged not only for domestic propaganda but also as a rationale for its aggressive actions towards neighboring countries. Notably, Russia’s actions concerning Ukraine and other nations like Georgia can be interpreted as components of a wider aspiration to regain the status and influence once held by the Russian Empire. Putin himself has articulated this sentiment on various occasions, drawing parallels between his leadership and historical figures such as Peter the Great. In these instances, he draws analogies between Peter the Great’s extensive territorial expansion of Russia in the 17th century and his own engagement in the conflict in Ukraine, illustrating a perceived continuum of Russia’s pursuit of power and territorial influence.

    Anti-Americanism

    While the Soviet Union’s anti-Americanism and broader anti-Western sentiment were rooted in the ideological contest between capitalism and communism during the Cold War, Putin’s Anti-Americanism within Putinism adopts a unique character influenced by the Eurasianist perspective on the West. Under this framework, Western Europe and the United States are perceived as embodying inherent malevolence that demands a defensive posture. It is notable that despite this departure from the Soviet era, Putinism maintains the Soviet anti-imperialist narrative within its Anti-Western standpoint. In practice, Putinism adeptly integrates both Eurasianist rhetoric and anti-imperialist arguments to rationalize Russian actions. By referencing previous interventions in regions like Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, this form of Anti-Americanism portrays Russian actions as a counterforce to American imperialism, positioned to safeguard the interests of the developing world.

    Putinism’s anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism inevitably places Russia on confrontational grounds with the United States and its allies. The centrality of hostility towards the United States and its allies in the ideology of a robust military power which has already demonstrated aggressive action in Ukraine makes the real world implications of Putinism a particularly relevant threat. 

    Charting the Implications for the United State’s and the American Response

    In broad strokes, Putinism aims to dislodge the current world order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the most direct implementation of this aim. However Russia is also seeking to accomplish this goal by sowing internal discontent in the United States and its allies as well as expanding influence in states and regions with animosity towards the United States and the West. West African states which were previously French colonies have been the strongest examples of this method. Amidst coups and increasing hostility towards France, various states in West Africa have become increasingly aligned with Russia. The Wagner Group, a mercenary group with links to the Russian government, has established a presence in countries such as Mali. 

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine has stood out as a prominent realization of Putinism’s objectives. However, the American response to this invasion can be viewed as a notably successful strategy for countering Russia’s ambitions. Specifically, the provision of consistent military assistance to Ukraine before and during the ongoing invasion has yielded favorable outcomes. The resilient resistance put forth by Ukraine has significantly strained Russia’s capacities and triggered a weakening of its military legitimacy. This setback has hindered Putinism’s objectives.

    The persistent pressure stemming from Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Ukraine has introduced substantial challenges to the nation’s stability. Consequently, this strain has impeded Russia’s ability to pursue other avenues for advancing its objectives, including efforts to destabilize regions and cultivate relationships with countries harboring tensions towards the United States or its allies.

    Future Outlook

    Perhaps the most peculiar outcome of Putinism so far is its potential impending self implosion. Failure to secure a swift victory in Ukraine has delegitimized the aims and rhetoric of Putinism internationally. More damningly, the strain which the war has put on Russia internally is perhaps the biggest sign that Putinism is already in decline. The lack of response by Putin to the Wagner Group rebellion in June of this year demonstrated how significantly Putin’s rule, and by extension Putinism, has been weakened by Ukraines steadfast resistance. Thanks in large part to the continuing material support to Ukraine, which enabled Ukraine to fend off Russia’s military, the initial actions necessary to defeat Putinism have perhaps already been put into place by the United States and its allies.

  • Introduction to Israel-US Relations

    Introduction to Israel-US Relations

    Fact Sheet

    A small country in terms of landmass, Israel spans 21,937 sq km in the Middle East, bordered by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. It stands as one of America’s robust economic allies, boasting a 2021 GDP of $488.5 billion and a 6.5% growth rate in 2022. With a population exceeding nine million, Israel is highly diverse, with 74% Jewish, 21.1% Arab, and 4.9% representing other cultures. In terms of religion, it comprises 74% Jewish, 18% Muslim, 2% Christian, and 1.5% Druze, while the remaining 4.5% adhere to other religions.

    The United States and Israel share a robust economic relationship, with a trade value of $47.0 billion in 2019. Israeli exports to the U.S. comprised $26.9 billion, and U.S. exports to Israel were $20.2 billion. Key traded goods include pharmaceuticals, technology, and raw minerals. Additionally, the U.S. provides substantial military and development aid to Israel, sending over $3.8 billion in assistance to the Israeli government in 2020.

    History of Israel-US relations

    Since its inception on May 14th, 1948, the United States has maintained a steadfast relationship with Israel. The U.S. was the first nation to recognize Israel’s sovereignty upon its declaration of statehood. Although initial hesitation existed, particularly after World War II, due to concerns about a Middle Eastern arms race, the U.S. eventually deepened its military ties with Israel, especially as the USSR militarized Arab states. This marked the beginning of a longstanding military alliance. U.S. military aid played a crucial role in Israel’s conflicts, including the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Beyond the military sphere, Israel’s advanced technology and trade sectors have solidified its position as a vital trade ally. The U.S. also values Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East, considering it a bastion of democracy and a close ally.

    The U.S.-Israel relationship plays a crucial role in mediating the Israel-Palestine conflict, stemming from the UN’s adoption of Resolution 181, which partitioned Palestine in 1947. Territorial disputes escalated after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and the 1967 conflict, leading to the occupation of disputed territories by Israel. The U.S., while broadly supporting Israel, has opposed the full absorption of disputed land. It has actively pursued diplomatic solutions, leading diplomatic efforts after the 1967 and 1973 wars. Through the United Nations Security Council, the United States was a key player in passing Resolutions 497 (1981), Security Council Resolutions 252 (1968); 267 (1969); 298 (1971); 446 (1979); 445 (1979), all of which condemned Israel’s territorial expansion. Moreover, the U.S. has been a leading actor in brokering compromises, hosting the 1978 and 2000 Camp David accords. The overall commitment remains to a “two-state solution,” advocating for a fair division of land between Israel and Palestine for peaceful coexistence.

    Modern U.S.-Israel Relations

    In the modern era, the U.S.-Israel relationship has grown more complex. Critics within the United States argue that America’s defense aid to Israel contradicts its goals for Israel-Palestine, as U.S. weapons may be used against Palestinians. Despite this, military cooperation, particularly in cyberwarfare, information, and technology, has deepened. Israel’s democracy has faced challenges, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government adopting increasingly conservative views, leading to a weakening of the judiciary, reduced human rights, and restricted freedom of speech. Recent spikes in Israeli-Palestinian violence have heightened regional unrest. Consequently, recent meetings between U.S. officials like Secretary of State Blinken and President Biden and Israel have centered on democracy promotion and regional de-escalation, reflecting strains in the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

    In a controversial foreign policy move in 2018, the United States, under the Trump administration, relocated its embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem and officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This decision sparked controversy as the international community considers East Jerusalem as occupied territory, and Palestinians aspire to have it as their capital. Critics argue that recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital undermines peace processes, while proponents contend that it supports Israel’s claim to Jerusalem as its capital.

    Shared Israel-US Interests

    Historically, the United States and Israel share a commitment to common values and goals, rooted in their democratic principles. This alignment forms the basis of their strong relationship, evident in the significant aid, trade, and support that Israel receives from America. This mutual understanding is crucial for both nations.

    In terms of U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East, supporting Israel serves multiple purposes. Elevating Israel as a geopolitical power provides the U.S. with a democratic ally to promote its values in an unstable region. Israel’s status as a nuclear power also aligns with U.S. security interests, leading to a shared commitment to safeguarding Israel’s capabilities. Some liberal politicians find affinity with Israel’s historically progressive politics, although this sentiment has waned in recent years. Moreover, Israel’s advanced cyber defense technology and strong economy contribute to a symbiotic relationship, allowing the U.S. to leverage mutual economic growth through this partnership.

  • Understanding the Minimum Wage Debate

    Understanding the Minimum Wage Debate

    Introduction

    A minimum wage is the lowest hourly pay that employers may give their employees. Each U.S. State has the power to set its own minimum wage at or above the federal minimum of $7.25/hr. Minimum wages vary greatly from state to state, ranging from $7.25/hr to $17/hr. Typically, minimum wages will rise over time in an effort to keep up with inflation. Currently, adjusted for inflation, the federal minimum wage is at its lowest value since 1956. While many call for a raise to the federal minimum wage, many states have passed legislation to raise their own wages. Across the country, the question of whether or not to raise the minimum wage remains a spirited debate.

    Arguments for Raising the Minimum Wage

    Many argue that higher minimum wages promote equity in terms of race, gender, and class. In 2022, on average, women earned 82% of what men did. Among full time workers in 2015, black people earned 25% less than white people. Women and black people are also more likely to hold minimum wage positions than men and people of other races. Thus, some argue that raising the minimum wage promotes equity by disproportionately aiding those who are victims of the wage gap. 

    More generally, the minimum wage also exists to reduce poverty and narrow class divide. Studies have suggested that minimum wage raises are correlated with shrinking wage disparities, as those earning the least are given higher incomes. Some studies show that a majority of workers whose families lived below the poverty line would receive a pay increase if the minimum wage were raised. Some also argue that raising minimum wages specifically reduces child poverty. One study found significant increases in employment in conjunction with minimum wage hikes among single mothers with children from ages 0-5, thus reducing child poverty. This is likely due to the increased incentive for participation in the workforce that an increased minimum wage provides.

    Arguments Against Raising the Minimum Wage

    Increases in the federal minimum wages also tend to be associated with increased prices, as employers seek to maintain their profit margin despite being forced to spend more on labor. One study found that a 10% increase to the minimum wage translates to a 0.36% increase in grocery prices. In the same study, they estimated that, due to the increased prices, net income would actually be reduced for households earning less than $10,000/yr. Another study suggested that 75% of the increase in minimum wage is passed onto consumers. Fast food chains largely pay their employees minimum wage, and thus, they are often subject to price increases in correlation with wage hikes as well. Price increases in fast food and grocery stores disproportionately harm low income households, as they are more likely to spend a greater proportion of their income in these industries. 

    Some studies also suggest that minimum wage hikes result in reduced hours for employees. In doing so, minimum wage hikes can result in overall reduced pay for workers. In addition, increases in the minimum wage are associated with increases in worker schedule fluctuation. This is likely because employers’ cost of labor rises, leading them to make changes in the way they organize their labor.  The study found that a $1 increase to the minimum wage resulted in a “33.0% increase in fluctuations in the number of hours worked per week, a 9.5% increase in fluctuations in the number of hours worked per day, and 9.8% increase in fluctuations of shift start times.” The lack of schedule consistency can be difficult for low income workers, and make it substantially harder for them both to balance their personal lives and to achieve longer term financial stability – especially those working multiple jobs.

    On Employment

    Economists have long debated the effects of minimum wage on employment, and continue to do so today. Some studies find no substantial decrease in employment correlated with minimum wage jumps, while some suggest that increases in the minimum wage result in decreased employment. Specifically, these studies point to decreased employment among low skilled workers, who therefore would not be able to benefit from the increased wages that the new minimum provides. However, much of the recent data corroborates the theory that minimum wage increases have minimal impact on employment with some even suggesting an increase. Overall, minimum wage increases remain highly debated throughout the country today. As discussed above, beyond the vexing impact on employment, research suggests ways in which increases can result in both financial aid and financial harm to those earning the lowest incomes.

  • Pros and Cons of Oregon’s Senate Bill 608 (Statewide Rent Control)

    Pros and Cons of Oregon’s Senate Bill 608 (Statewide Rent Control)

    Background

    Oregon’s Senate Bill 608 passed in 2019 and established statewide rent regulation. The legislation includes a seven percent cap on rent increases (plus inflation) in a given year as well as specific tenant protections, such as limits on no-cause evictions. SB 608 is often described as “statewide rent control,” but the law resembles rent stabilization more than rent control because it limits the percentage rent can increase over time (rent stabilization), as opposed to a maximum base rent (rent control). Rent stabilization and rent control are two different forms of the larger category of rent regulation, but discussions around this topic tend to use the term “rent control” when referring to either topic. 

    Oregon’s statewide rent regulation aims to address rising rents which have led to a housing affordability crisis. In Portland, Oregon, median rents rose by 30 percent between 2011 and 2019 (including inflation). Incomes are not rising at the same rate as Oregon’s State Government reported in 2016 that “¾ of renters with extremely low incomes are paying more than 50% of their income in rent.” Those most impacted by this legislation include Oregon renters, especially middle to low income tenants, and landlords across the state. Recipients of government-subsidized rent are exempt from this law.

    Arguments in Favor

    Those in favor argue that rent regulation reduces landlords’ “disproportionately high profits” which disadvantage lower-income residents and create an unequal relationship between landlords and tenants. Supporters argue that the law balances the relationship between landlords and tenants through restrictions on no-cause evictions at the end of a lease. These no-cause evictions occur when a tenant, at the end of their lease, is asked to leave without having violated any terms of the lease, but SB 608 now requires a landlord to renew leases and only evict for a breach of contract or specific circumstances, such as when a landlord wants to move into the property themselves. UC Berkeley’s Haas Institute released a brief on rent stabilization that described the physical and social benefits to housing stability and reduced risk of eviction, including improved graduation rates, social relationships, and health.  

    Supporters also claim that SB 608 benefits Oregon’s rental housing market because increased accessibility raises the demand and the range of people who are able to enter the market. For instance, a 2019 study on the impact of rent control in San Francisco found that residents living in rent controlled properties were 4.5 times more likely to remain living in San Francisco, rather than being displaced outside of San Francisco. As described in more detail below, opponents counter this argument by stating that this increase in demand creates a lack of supply, leading to less accessibility overall.

    Proponents commend Oregon’s law for making the housing market more inclusive to lower socio-economic statuses and marginalized groups. One way the legislation accomplishes this is through mandating that private landlords accommodate lower-income individuals and families, rather than relying mostly on the government to provide affordable housing options. SB 608 includes groups in the rental housing market that have historically been marginalized from the market. Housing affordability is an issue with multiple dimensions, and people of color have historically been disproportionately impacted. This is because the many issues which collectively create the racial wealth gap result in lower incomes for people of color. In turn, issues like housing affordability, while not explicitly racial, can have an outsized effect on racial minorities. The San Francisco rent control study mentioned above found that the benefits of rent control were stronger for racial minorities, “preventing minority displacement from San Francisco.”

    Arguments in Opposition

    A common argument from opponents is that SB 608 creates a harmful imbalance between rental housing supply and demand. The argument claims landlords will make lower returns on their investments despite spending similar amounts on construction. As a result, supply decreases because landlords and developers will potentially have less incentive to continue to build and manage new properties. Further, this lowered supply combined with higher demand has the potential to result in lower quality of housing overall because renters will have less leverage when it comes to requesting repairs and amenities. The 2018 San Francisco study on rent control found that “impacted landlords reduced the supply of available rental housing by 15 percent,” supporting the argument that rent regulation can negatively impact rent housing supply. SB608 does not apply to new construction for 15 years, which Oregon’s lawmakers believed would prevent rent regulations from lowering new housing development. Additionally, research in New Jersey and Washington D.C. “found no significant relationship between rent control and new housing construction.”

    In addition, opponents claim that lack of housing supply is the root of Oregon’s housing crisis in the first place. Instead of implementing statewide rent regulation to address demand, those not in favor of SB 608 believe Oregon needs to address its housing crisis by increasing their housing supply to improve the market. This could include expanding construction of lower-priced buildings and changing zoning laws to better accommodate lower-income individuals and families. Part of the reasoning is that if demand is rising while supply does not increase to the same extent, prices will rise overall. Since many opponents claim that housing supply is the source of Oregon’s housing crisis, they argue that addressing demand is not the solution. 

    Looking Ahead

    Oregon has recently introduced revisions to their statewide rent regulations. On July 6, 2023, Oregon’s Governor Kotek signed a new bill (SB 611) into law, which states that annual rent increases cannot exceed ten percent with inflation. In the previous legislation, there was no limit on how much inflation could affect rent increases. Thus, this revision ensures that despite how high inflation is in a given year, rent increases will remain stabilized. 

    Oregon was the first state to implement statewide rent control, but will other states in the U.S. do the same? California implemented statewide rent control in 2020 not long after Oregon’s SB 608 passed. While Oregon and California are the only two states at the moment with statewide regulations, many stakeholders are wondering how Oregon and California’s actions will influence other states.