ACE

Category: Nuclear Nonproliferation

  • Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    AUKUS Partnership Outline

    The AUKUS Partnership was one of the first major foreign policy actions of President Biden’s Administration. On September 15, 2021, AUKUS partners released a joint statement announcing the agreement. The goal of the partnership is to promote information and technology sharing, and integrate security and defense measures by increasing cooperation on a variety of capabilities, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific Region.  

    The AUKUS Partnership has three pillars 

    1. Provide Australia with “conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capabilities (SSN)”. Prior to this agreement, this technology was limited to six nuclear capable states (U.S.,UK, France, Russia, China, and India). The U.S. previously shared SSN technology with the UK, and AUKUS now extends this to Australia, a non-nuclear state. As such, this partnership is set to revolutionize Australian naval capabilities, which have struggled to travel longer distances due to limitations of electrically powered submarine fleets. 
    2. Advance military capabilities “to promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region”. The AUKUS partnership outlines objectives to expand and develop technologies, such as: AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS, the development of robotic undersea technologies), AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA, development of quantum technologies), cooperation on Artificial Intelligence (AI), collaboration on hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and the development of cyber capabilities and security measures. 
    3. Commit to information exchange. As of February 8, 2022, The Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA) came into effect, resulting in AUKUS partners sharing nuclear propulsion intel trilaterally, the first agreement to do so with a non-nuclear capable state.

    U.S. Favorability of UK Partnership 

    Prior to the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the UK had limited influence or presence within the Indo-Pacific Region, with the only formal international agreement being their membership in the Five Eyes security alliance. However, this new partnership indicates a significant shift in UK foreign policy , confirming the UK’s intention to align with U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

    Figure showing the Overlap of Defense, Intelligence, and Security Groups in the Indo-Pacific Region.

    The AUKUS Partnership presented significant political fallout in U.S.–Europe relations, because it prioritized the UK security partnership over a broader European security pact.

    France was the most affected by the establishment of the AUKUS partnership as Australia withdrew from a previously agreed Franco-Australian Submarine deal to join AUKUS. This led to an increased strain on the U.S.–France Relations, due to both the loss of a multi-billion Euro agreement and the creation of a new security alliance formed without major European allies. Following the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, the new alliance took significant attention away from the European Union’s (EU) own policy plans for the Indo-Pacific Region. Given the contentious relations between the UK and the EU in a post-Brexit Europe, this partnership highlighted a perceived favoritism of U.S.–UK relations as loyal security partners, over a united Europe. In addition, with the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the agreement has strengthened an EU-independent UK as the only European state with significant security partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region.

    Ramifications of the AUKUS Partnership

    The response to the AUKUS partnership has been mixed. As discussed, the pact strained U.S.-French relations, and distanced the U.S. from Europe in terms of Indo-Pacific cooperation. Some believe this may lead to the EU pursuing its own independent security strategy when dealing with contentious U.S. and China relations, a position that has been publicly supported by French President Emmanuel Macron.

    The AUKUS partnership, however, will have the most on-the-ground impact within the Indo-Pacific region. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reactions have been divided on the new security partnership present in the region. Recent analysis shows that 36.4% of ASEAN respondents say AUKUS would help “balance China’s growing military power”, yet 22.5% say the deal could spark “a regional arms race”. Overall there is a worry of what the broader consequences of agreements such as AUKUS may be, and their effects on the stability of the region.   

    A major concern of the AUKUS Partnership is the potentially dangerous precedent an agreement of this nature could set for nuclear proliferation. While all three partners emphasized their commitment against nuclear proliferation, this agreement is the first to allow a non-nuclear capable state to access nuclear technology. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear states to declare all nuclear material, with the IAEA verifying the material is not being used for weaponry development, thus acting as a deterrence for nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT relies on states to self-monitor naval nuclear reactors because of practical issues with access. Australia is setting a precedent as the first non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear materials the IAEA is not monitoring. It could be dangerous if other countries follow this path, and derail the current global nuclear nonproliferation system. While Australia may not prove to be an exploitive threat to nuclear weapons development through the AUKUS partnership, a future agreement of this nature could serve as the perfect cover for potential would-be-proliferators to advance nuclear development programs under the guise of access to nuclear material through naval reactors, no longer checked by the IAEA. 

    US–UK Relations and Nuclear Proliferation

    A 2020 report by Pew Research demonstrates that nuclear nonproliferation is a major foreign policy issue in the United States; 73% of Americans perceive the “spread of nuclear weapons” as a major threat to the U.S. This position attracts bipartisan support, with both Democrats and Republicans responding in equal measure to the perceived international threat. Moreover, 80% of respondents favor state cooperation with other countries as “very important” when navigating the spread of nuclear weapons.

    The United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK) have a long history of alignment on foreign policy objectives towards nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear war. Much of the existing U.S.–UK agreements on nuclear cooperation between both states derive and build upon the original 1958 “Atomic Energy. Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes” agreement, which bound both countries in a united front against other state development of atomic weapons. As such, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Partnership is yet another foreign policy step the U.S. and the UK have taken to further their allied cooperation to address the international security threats of today.

  • Intro to 2018 U.S. Sanctions on Iran

    Intro to 2018 U.S. Sanctions on Iran

    History

    Sanctions have been the core of U.S.-Iran foreign policy since the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the U.S. government imposed sanctions as part of its strategy to prevent the Iranian government from supporting terrorist groups and destabilizing the Middle East. In the mid-2000s, U.S.-imposed sanctions expanded to curb Iran’s nuclear weapon production and reduce the country’s missile arsenal. Financial sanctions weighed heavily on Iran’s economy for decades, and led to the Iranian government agreeing to the 2015 J.C.P.O.A. 

    The Iran Nuclear Deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.), was supported by permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Germany, the European Union, and Iran. It committed to alleviating U.S., E.U., and U.N. sanctions if Iran complied with a list of demands, including restrictions on nuclear production. Though many economic sanctions were lifted under the J.C.P.O.A., some U.S. sanctions, including on direct trade with Iran and on Iran’s support of regional armed groups, remained in place.

    In 2018, the Trump Administration claimed Iran was not obeying the Iran Nuclear Deal rules, which sought to place limits on the country’s nuclear arms program, among other guidelines. In response, the Trump Administration removed the United States from the J.C.P.O.A. and introduced a “maximum pressure” campaign. At this time, sanctions that were eased under the 2015 nuclear agreement were reimposed with greater intensity.

    Benefits for the U.S.

    According to the Trump Administration, Iran’s nuclear program threatened  U.S. interests, and the J.C.P.O.A. didn’t curb inappropriate actions committed by the Iranian government. In a 2019 report by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the reintroduction of sanctions sought to prevent the Iranian government from proceeding further with the following actions:

    1. Repressing the Iranian people
    2. Diverting humanitarian aid from low income Iranians to government interests
    3. Growing the country’s weapons arsenal
    4. Contributing to destabilization in the Middle East and promoting terrorism around the world

    In order to stop Iran’s “unacceptable actions” in the Middle East, sanctions were designed to cripple Iran’s main industries (oil, shipping, and banking) and weaken the country’s currency and purchasing power. These “unacceptable actions” referred to Iran’s support of terrorist organizations in Syria, Yemen, and other countries.

    Impacts on Iran

    Political Impact

    Sanctions can make counties more authoritarian and give more power to corrupt governments that hoard resources and use their power to control their people. While the entire country loses wealth, the government and financial elites lose less wealth than average citizens. In this way, U.S. sanctions on Iran have slowed the movement for democracy and civil rights in the country. Since the reimposition of sanctions, the Iranian government has continued to arrest activists for demonstrations and for promoting equal rights. However, it is not clear that these actions are directly related to the reimposition of sanctions.

    Economic Impact

    Financial sanctions have contributed to the following consequences for the Iranian economy:

    1. Currency Decline and Inflation: Iran’s currency value declined from 35,000 rials to the U.S. dollar under the J.C.P.O.A. to 265,000 rials to the U.S. dollar in late 2020. This contributed to major inflation – 45% in 2021 –  after the U.S.’s 2018 reimposition of sanctions.
    2. Lack of International Financial System Involvement: Additional sanctions in 2018 were placed on Iranian banks that were owned privately or by the government. Any financial institution who enters transactions with these sanctioned banks could face prosecution in the U.S. In 2019, international firms feared retaliation from the U.S. if they were caught in any form of transaction with Iran, including humanitarian imports into Iran. This threat prevented many firms from any interaction with Iran-based banks or organizations. Years of similar sanctions have inhibited Iran’s role in international trade, which ultimately affects the country’s wealth, imports of necessary items, and the number of reliable trading partners abroad.
    3. Oil Sales Reduction and Recession: Oil exports and petroleum production are the main industries in Iran. Reimposed and additional sanctions on banks involved in Iranian exports caused a decrease in oil sales and the inability of Iran to fully participate in the international financial system. In turn, this made Iran’s economy fall into a recession.

    Social Impact

    In recent years, Iran has experienced an increase in food insecurity due to inflation and a decrease in value of the rial. In addition, reports suggest a rise in domestic violence and suicide due to stressful economic conditions. Further, street fights have broken out in lines at food markets and currency exchanges over tense financial conditions exacerbated by economic sanctions on Iran.

    According to the Iranian National Bank in 2020, the poverty rate in Iran was close to 20%. However, other reports claim the rate to be as high as 35-40%. There are reports that generational poverty is more growing under the financial sanctions, which make it harder for employed Iranians born into poverty to climb the ladder to higher socio-economic classes.

    Though the U.S. government claimed sanctions would not impact the entry of humanitarian aid into the country, Human Rights Watch claims that sanctions have limited the purchasing power of Iranian healthcare facilities to acquire medicines for Iranians. Depreciation of Iranian currency, limits on banks who can finance sales with Iran, and threats to companies importing goods into the country prevent many Iranians from obtaining goods. 

    Future of U.S.-Iran Relations

    Election of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi

    The reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 2018 suggested to Iranians that working with the U.S. through diplomatic channels would not equate to a healthy relationship between the countries. Since sanctions were imposed, Iran saw “hardliners” win a majority of parliamentary elections in February of 2020. Additionally, many strong candidates running for president of Iran in 2021 considered themselves on the conservative and uncompromising side of politics. This categorization included the newly elected president, Ebrahim Raisi. 

    Raisi was elected president of Iran in June, 2021 with less than 50% voter turnout. Raisi is supported by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and has a record of human rights abuses. With Khamenei and Raisi on the same page, reports suggest Iran will become more conservative. This will likely include the Iranian government acting without the voice of the urban middle class, who support social reforms.

    J.C.P.O.A. (Iran Nuclear Deal)In early 2021, the Biden Administration said it welcomed a return to the J.C.P.O.A., with modifications, and a removal of harsh sanctions if Iran is willing to comply. On the other hand, the Iranian government wants the U.S. to remove the economic sanctions before an agreement is made and promise longevity for the future agreement. Further, Raisi suggested he would agree to a similar deal to the 2015 agreement but promised to push harder in talks related to Iran’s weapons capabilities. However, Raisi brings more conservative and unwavering views to the table, suggesting an unclear path to a deal between the countries. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain, and Israel believe they have a right to enter talks regarding an updated nuclear deal with Iran, but Iranian leadership has qualms about the involvement of these countries.

  • Russia’s Commitments Under New START in the Context of the NPT and the TPNW

    Russia’s Commitments Under New START in the Context of the NPT and the TPNW

    The creation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 marked the first major shift towards nuclear disarmament that occurred on a global scale. The NPT is a landmark international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and achieving international disarmament. The treaty itself has culminated in a “grand bargain” between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers to ensure that no new nuclear weapons can be acquired, that nuclear energy use remains peaceful, and that nuclear materials stay secure. The creation and enforcement of the NPT by the United Nations prompted talks between the United States and Russia to create mutual arms control agreements and reduce nuclear stockpiles. Beginning in November of 1969 with the presentation of SALT I, which limited each countries’ strategic missile defenses, the two nations went on to engage in more than half a dozen other nuclear-focused disarmament treaties with one another.

    The New START Treaty between Russia and the United States was renewed in 2021. The renewal was significant because it assured both countries’ continued commitment to regulating and limiting nuclear weapons and weapons technology, and because of the upcoming review of the NPT that occurred later this year. However, there is a growing concern that existing agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, are unraveling. Experts hope that because of the transparency in U.S.-Russian strategic relations that New START has provided, the rest of the world will follow suit and the NPT review conference will be a space to promote stability and strengthen commitments by signatories of the NPT. The New START treaty, which was signed in 2010, by the U.S. and Russia, legally binds each state to limit their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 on 700 strategic delivery systems, and limits each side to 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. This limit is 30% lower than the previously allowed 2,200 nuclear warhead amount agreed upon in the 2002 SORT Treaty and 50% lower than the 1,600 vehicle delivery limit established under the 1991 START 1 agreement. In addition to major limits on each country’s physical nuclear stockpiles, the treaty also commits each state to mandatory on-site inspections of nuclear storage and production facilities, data exchanges, and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by this treaty. 

    New START gives the U.S invaluable national security information by providing insights on the Russian nuclear arsenal, and maintains the international standard for nuclear non-proliferation by the world’s two largest nuclear powers. In a larger sense, the treaty creates a stable base on which to uphold the major international arms control treaties such as the NPT, Treaty on The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The renewal of New START by the U.S. and Russia is particularly important for the continued support and upholding of the NPT because although its global support is strong, statements by members of civil society confirm that its long-term viability needs to be continually addressed.

  • Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

    Negotiations between Iran and the United Nations Security Council have been ongoing since Iran was detected building uranium enriched centrifuges in 2002, in violation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, negotiations did not result in meaningful action until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed on July 14, 2015 by Iran, the European Union and the P5+1 (the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, which included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany). Iran aimed to relieve sanctions which hindered its economic growth, while the P5+1 wanted to delay Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon. The agreement was gradually fulfilled by both sides until the United States withdrew from the JCPOA under the leadership of President Trump. Under President Joe Biden, the JCPOA has been revived with new negotiations underway. 

    The journey towards the JCPOA was not entirely smooth. Initially, Iran had already signed onto the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1967 where it agreed to forgo becoming a nuclear armed state. So when Iran was discovered to have secret nuclear sites in 2003, the international community began to worry about what the discovery would mean for the rest of the world, and the Middle Eastern region in particular. If Iran were to attain a nuclear weapon, Israel, which has had a strained relationship with Iran ever since the Gulf War, promised military action would be a consequence. This would potentially trigger a war involving Hezbollah, a Shiite political party and militant group that opposes Israel, or serve as an example to other Arabian states, like Saudi Arabia, that they could also obtain a nuclear weapon without ramifications.

    For almost ten years, the international community unsuccessfully tried to find different ways of reaching a deal with Iran. The first negotiations that took place were between Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). This agreement had Iran cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, sign the Additional Protocol and temporarily suspend conversion and enrichment activities but not stop enrichment entirely. The agreement between Iran and the E3 was only temporary and a start to a possible long-term solution that could benefit both sides. However, negotiations broke down in 2005 under the newly elected Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was viewed as a hardliner. Iran announced they would be resuming uranium conversion and rejected the EU3’s proposed Long Term Agreement. For Iran, the agreement was viewed as heavy on demands, light on incentives, and did not adequately compromise with Iran’s demands. Another agreement was proposed in 2008 between Iran and P5+1 which would give Iran access to light water reactor (LWR) technology and a nuclear fuel supply in exchange for Iran’s suspension of enrichment activity. As with the previous agreement, Ahmadinejad refused the offer and instead pushed for more enrichment. In 2011, a potential plan was proposed by the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. This new plan would involve the gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for Iran limiting enrichment. The eventual goal would be Iran suspending enrichment entirely and all sanctions being lifted. Iran agreed to the plan, but the United States, United Kingdom, and France refused. Negotiations remained at a stand-still, while the West continued to sanction Iran and Iran continued improving its enrichment capability.  

    Following a 2011 IAEA report which fully laid out Iran’s nuclear program, the rest of the world realized Iran was only a year or two away from attaining a nuclear weapon. This resulted in an increase in bilateral talks to reach a preferential agreement, one of which took place in 2012 between the P5+1 and Iran. The P5+1 proposal included Iran stopping uranium enrichment up to 20%, shipping out the enriched uranium they had already produced, and closing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, an uranium enrichment facility in Iran. Iran proposed their own plan which included the recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, sanctions relief, cooperation in nuclear energy and safety, and a possible cap on 20% uranium enrichment. Both sides disagreed with the proposals, resulting in further sanctions against Iran. 

    The situation evolved in 2013 when Iran elected a new president, Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned towards ending sanctions and stated in his inaugural address that his goals included “elevating Iran’s position based on national interest and lifting of the oppressive sanctions.” His statement was an indication of Iran becoming more receptive to negotiations regarding nuclear technology. Talks between Iran and the P5+1 were held in 2013, when the US stopped demanding that Iran completely cease enrichment activities. On November 24, an interim deal was struck which detailed the steps that would be taken until a more comprehensive solution could be agreed upon. The negotiations for a lasting agreement took until July 14, 2015.

    The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action required Iran to suspend and concede several points:

    In return, most of the economic sanctions imposed by the EU, UN and the US would be lifted or suspended once the IAEA had certified that Iran had taken the required steps outlined in the agreement. 

    The JCPOA allowed for 90 days between the Finalization Day and Adoption Day for Iran and the US to begin review processes of the agreement domestically. On Adoption Day, October 18, 2015, Iran and the P5+1 took the steps necessary to meet the commitments listed out in the JCPOA. On Implementation Day, 2016, the IAEA certified that Iran had taken the steps necessary to restrict its nuclear program and allowed for increased IAEA monitoring, which resulted in the U.S., EU and UN relieving some sanctions. In 2023, eight years after adoption day, the UN would lift missile restrictions, Iran would ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol, the EU would terminate all nuclear sanctions, and the United States would remove entities from the sanctioned list and continue sanctions relief. The JCPOA would end in October 2025 in which Iran’s nuclear file would be closed. 

    When then U.S. President Donald Trump was elected, he unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed all U.S. sanctions on Iran. Trump cited the sunset clause in the agreement as one of the reasons for his withdrawal. The sunset clause provided an expiration date to the ceasing of Iran’s enrichment activity. Many critics, including the Trump administration, viewed this as a countdown clock that would still lead to the eventual development of nuclear weapons by Iran. In addition, IAEA inspections would only take place at sites where legitimate concern for nuclear activity could be demonstrated, which excluded many military sites. Many critics claimed military sites are potential places for nuclear activity. Lastly, Trump also claimed the deal failed to account Iran’s ballistic missile program as during JCPOA negotiations, this topic was excluded from talks. The US withdrawal from the deal meant a reinstatement of sanctions against Iran that were previously waived. The US also terminated sanction waivers for cooperative nuclear projects, including transfer of enriched uranium out of Iran, transfer and storage of heavy water outside of Iran, and construction of additional reactor units at the Bushehr nuclear reactor. 

    While the US withdrew from the JCPOA, the rest of the signatories—France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—reemphasized their support for the deal and the importance of nonproliferation. The United Nations and Russia’s Foreign Ministry also released a statement in continued support of the JCPOA. 

    In response to the renewed sanctions, Iran began to recede from their JCPOA commitments. Iran began to enrich uranium past 3.67% and invested in research and development of centrifuge technology that did not adhere to IAEA monitoring and safeguards. Iran also notified the IAEA that its stock of heavy water had exceeded 130 metric tons. Additionally, in 2020, Iran passed new legislation to increase nuclear activities by boosting enrichment, increasing monthly uranium output and conducting research and development on centrifuges. Still, Iran continues to allow IAEA inspectors onto sites related to the JCPOA for verification and monitoring.  The Biden administration has been more willing to enter into negotiations with Iran on the future of the agreement. Biden has stated that the US would only rejoin the agreement if Iran returns to compliance, but also wants to further broaden the agreement topics to include Iran’s missile program. Iran is willing to return to compliance only to the original deal. Negotiations are currently still taking place between Iran and the P5+1.

  • The Nuclear Umbrella and North Korea

    The Nuclear Umbrella and North Korea

    Nuclear umbrellas have been a central part of US nonproliferation policy for most of American nuclear history. A nuclear umbrella, also known as extended deterrence, is when one nuclear armed country, officially says it will use its nuclear weapons to protect a non-nuclear ally, i.e. the United States guaranteeing it will retaliate against North Korea if it strikes an allied country, such as Japan. The extended deterrence policy in the United States is called an extended nuclear deterrence (END) guarantee. The US began using nuclear umbrellas during the Cold War to prevent European countries from pursuing weapons programs, and have continued to be implemented up to the present day. An END guarantee can also cover conventional forces stationed in that country. It is a comprehensive way for the US to use its military power to both protect another country and avert their need to invest in military or nuclear weapons, furthering the US goal of nonproliferation. 

    Nonproliferation has been the main goal of the United States since World War II. Extended deterrence became a tool to reach that goal in the 1950s when the United States officially offered its nuclear umbrella to South Korea for protection against Russia. This policy ended with the end of the Cold War, as Russia was no longer the biggest nuclear threat to South Korea. However, with North Korea withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1994, a new threat emerged towards both South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Nuclear umbrellas were one of the only reasons many European countries did not pursue nuclear weapons, despite many countries having both the technology and resources to make a weapons program a viable defense option. More recently, this policy has been enacted in East Asia, to deter North Korea from attacking South Korea or Japan. Because of the number of countries now relying on the US nuclear program for deterrence, the US is continuously upgrading and renewing its own nuclear program.

    For nuclear umbrellas to be effective, South Korea and Japan must trust that the United States would be willing to risk a counter strike from North Korea. Would the US be willing to sacrifice Washington to save Seoul? This is the key question to answer for any country that is offered extended deterrence. In the case of protection against North Korea, the general consensus is that it is. While credibility was not as certain during the Cold War era of extended nuclear deterrence, currently North Korea’s minor nuclear capabilities render it unlikely that they could launch a second strike against the United states successfully. This means the United States does have to sacrifice as much to offer South Korea and Japan extended deterrence. However, the more capability North Korea obtains, the less credible the extended deterrence will be. Increased North Korean capability would throw off the balance the United States has been able to find in the region.

  • Intro to Nuclear Related Sanctions Against Iran

    Intro to Nuclear Related Sanctions Against Iran

    The international community implements sanctions against Iran to discourage their development of nuclear technology. These sanctions mainly target the Iranian economy and individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear development program. Sanctions come from three major actors: the United States of America, the United Nations and the European Union. In international diplomacy, sanctions, especially economic ones, are utilized by countries or organizations to coerce, deter, punish or shame other international actors that might endanger their own interests or violate international norms of behavior. Iran has become the target of economic sanctions since they were suspected of developing uranium enrichment in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1967. 

    United Nations Sanctions

    The United Nations led the first set of sanctions related to Iran’s development of nuclear technology. The UN adopted Resolution 1737 in 2006, which prohibited countries from transferring nuclear and missile related technology to Iran and required all countries to freeze the assets of Iranian organizations and individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Sanctions were levied after Iran refused to suspend uranium enrichment activities after warnings from the International Atomic Energy Agency. The UN Security Council further expanded its sanctions against Iran in 2008 by adopting Resolution 1803, which required UN member states to actively prevent Iran from acquiring sensitive nuclear or missile technology and added thirteen people and seven entities to the UN blacklist. The additional resolution was adopted because Iran continued to oppose IAEA inspections of their nuclear facilities. In 2010, Iran, Brazil and Turkey came to a joint agreement to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. In reaction,  the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 which tightened proliferation-related sanctions and banned Iran from carrying out nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests. The resolution also added an arms embargo on the transfer of major weapons systems to Iran. In 2016 the UN acknowledged Iran had complied with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and passed a new resolution which lifted some sanctions. 

    European Union Sanctions

    Similar to the UN, the European Union levied sanctions to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. In a 2007 measure, the EU froze the assets of individuals and entities related to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. Further measures like visa bans, frozen assets, and actions against Iranian trade, financial services, energy and transport were implemented by the EU in 2010. The EU lifted their sanctions in 2016 when Iran signed onto the JCPOA and began adhering to those regulations.

    United States Sanctions

    Compared to the UN and the EU, the United States has a more complicated history of sanctions against Iran. The US began to impose sanctions on Iran in 2009 in response to then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s stated aim to build 10 uranium enrichment facilities. The U.S. House of Representatives passed sanctions on foreign companies that helped supply gasoline to Iran.

    In 2011, the IAEA released a report detailing how Iran’s current nuclear program could lead to the development of a nuclear weapon. Following this report, the US designated the Government of Iran and all financial institutions in Iran as entities of money laundering concern and warned global financial institutions that doing business with Iran was risky. That same year President Obama sanctioned the Central Bank of Iran and other financial institutions for processing transactions related to oil and petroleum products on behalf of Iranian companies and the government. Despite continued talks between Iran and the international community, negotiations for an agreement fell through as both sides were unwilling to make concessions In 2012, the US signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act which banned insurance, reinsurance, and other shipping services involved in nuclear proliferation. Congress further limited Iran’s oil exports and access to foreign currency reserves in 2013. President Obama added sanctions against foreign financial institutions that conducted transactions with Iranian currency or had accounts outside of Iran. When the JCPOA was implemented in 2015, the US slowly began to lift sanctions However, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and brought back all previous nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. Similar to the previous set of sanctions, these new sanctions were made against the Central Bank of Iran and required U.S. companies to sever contracts with Iran within 180 days.

    Impact of Sanctions

    Sanctions have greatly affected Iran’s economy but failed to deter Iran’s development of nuclear technology. Before the JCPOA, Iran’s GDP decreased by 20% and unemployment rose. Oil exports decreased from 2.5 mbd (thousand barrels) in 2011 to 1.1 mbd in 2014 and Iranian currency depreciated. The economic sanctions discouraged international banks and firms from engaging in commercial and financial transactions with Iran. With the return of sanctions and withdrawal from the JCPOA during the Trump presidency, similar economic consequences have impacted Iran’s economy. The reimplementation of sanctions have further damaged the oil industry in Iran with oil exports plummeting in mid-2020. Even with the new sanctions, the Iranian government refuses to slow down their nuclear development. Citing Trump’s backing out of the JCPOA, the Iran government sees the JCPOA as useless and believes it is in their right to push for higher uranium enrichment. As a result, Iran has begun to develop new centrifuges to accelerate uranium enrichment and has placed restrictions on the IAEA’s ability to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities. 

  • Intro to Nuclear Treaties with Russia

    Intro to Nuclear Treaties with Russia

    1968 marked the first major shift towards nuclear disarmament on a global scale with the creation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose primary objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and to achieve international disarmament. The treaty itself has culminated in a “grand bargain” between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers to ensure that no new nuclear weapons can be acquired, nuclear energy use remains peaceful, and nuclear materials stay secure. The creation and enforcement of the NPT by the United Nations prompted talks between the United States and Russia, formerly known as the Soviet Union, in regards to the creation of mutual arms control agreements and the reduction of nuclear stockpiles. The two nations would go on to engage in more than half-a-dozen nuclear-focused disarmament treaties, beginning in November of 1969 with SALT I which limited each countries’ strategic missile defenses.

    The New START Treaty between Russia and the United States was renewed in 2021. This is significant because it assures continued commitment to the regulation and limitation of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, but it is also important in light of the upcoming review of the NPT that is anticipated to occur in August of 2021. Despite the success of the NPT over the past 50 years, there is a growing concern that existing agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, are unraveling. Experts hope that because of the transparency in U.S.-Russian strategic relations that New START has provided, the rest of the world will follow suit and the NPT review conference will be a space to promote stability and strengthen commitments by signatories of the NPT. 

    The New START treaty, which was signed on April 8, 2010 by the U.S. and Russia, legally binds each state to limit their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 on 700 strategic delivery systems as well as limits each side to 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. This limit is 30% lower than the previously allowed 2,200 nuclear warhead amount agreed upon in the 2002 SORT Treaty and 50% lower than the 1,600 vehicle delivery limit established under the 1991 START 1 agreement. In addition to major limits on each country’s physical nuclear stockpiles, the treaty also commits each state to mandatory, on-site inspections of nuclear storage and production facilities, data exchanges, and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by this treaty. New START entered into force on February 5, 2011, after both parties had signed and gained Senate and parliamentary approval in their respective governments, and both parties recently agreed to extend the treaty by five years in January of 2021. 

    New START provides invaluable national security information to the U.S. by providing insights on the Russian nuclear arsenal, as well as maintains an international standard for nuclear non-proliferation by the world’s two largest nuclear powers. In a larger sense, the treaty creates a stable base on which to uphold the major international arms control treaties such as the NPT, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The renewal of New START by the U.S. and Russia is particularly important for the continued support and upholding of the NPT because although its global support is strong, statements by members of civil society confirm that its long-term viability needs to be continually addressed. The U.S. and Russia have had contentious relations dating back to Soviet-era politics, and the constant imbalance between competition and cooperation perpetuates their struggle to coexist. START is significant for what it aims to achieve in terms of international arms control measures, but also because it is one issue that the U.S. and Russia have been able to work together and agree upon. Although bilateral relations have sharply deteriorated when it comes to other international security issues such as offensive cybersecurity, counter-space, and hypersonic weapons, nuclear non-proliferation remains an issue that the U.S. and Russia actively cooperate with.

  • Intro to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

    Intro to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

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    North Korea has several motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. First and foremost is security. Ever since the end of the Korean War and the bifurcation of the Korean Peninsula, the Kim regime has perceived an existential threat to their survival. With the US backing two of their closest enemies, Japan and South Korea, North Korea has had a longstanding concern that the West will eventually attempt to overthrow the authoritarian government and install a leader friendlier to democratic ideals and South Korea’s Western allies. Pyongyang has determined that the only way to prevent this from happening is to become a nuclear-armed power and uses this belief to justify having nuclear weapons as a way to guarantee protection against the US.  Not only does the North Korean government think that their nuclear weapons will deter attacks, but they also provide North Korea with the chance to achieve self-preservation and be militarily self-sufficient.

                Another motivation for developing nuclear weapons is legitimacy on the world stage. Since becoming a nuclear power in 2006, North Korea has shoehorned itself into a very small club of countries that have nuclear weapons and put itself to some degree on equal footing with them. Compared to other nations with nuclear weapons, North Korea is by far the least economically, technologically and socially developed. By elevating themselves to be in the same elite group as the United States, Russia and the UK, North Korea is able to upgrade its global status and have their demands as a nation taken seriously. 

    The legitimacy the Kim regime derives from their nuclear arsenal also allows them to engage in coercive diplomacy. Pyongyang’s military threats are usually issued in a conditional context, portraying them as a necessary response to any potential U.S. attacks. For example, in his 2018 New Year’s Day speech, Kim Jong-un said “As a responsible nuclear weapons state, our Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes.” This statements seems to allude to some sort of ‘no first use’ sentiment, however without a formal agreement saying as much, this notion has to be disregarded as bluster and propaganda. 

    North Korea is also motivated by the prestige and fear associated with nuclear weapons, both at home and abroad. Being perceived as strong and powerful has always been very important to the Kim regime, and photo-ops with President Trump have been widely successful in increasing Kim Jong-un’s leadership legitimacy within his own country. Moreover, North Korean state media frequently release photos of Kim attending missile parades and launches, often lauding him as the visionary and driving force behind the success of the program. By constructing an image of invincibility, Kim boosted his personal prestige and, by extension, the prestige of his regime. In addition to serving as propaganda, the continued showboating of their military capabilities perpetuates the fear instigated by the Kim regime. Kim Jong-un wouldn’t be seen as nearly as dangerous without his nukes.

  • Nuclear Weapons Design

    Nuclear-Weapons-Design_Final

  • Introduction to Nuclear History & the Manhattan Project

    Introduction to Nuclear History & the Manhattan Project

    The Manhattan Project was the code name for the confidential American led effort to develop a nuclear weapon during the Second World War. The initiative was spurred by intelligence reports that Germany had been developing nuclear weapons since the 1930’s and that Hitler was prepared to use them against the Allies.

    First convened in 1939, President Roosevelt created the Advisory Committee on Uranium as a science-leaning research center to study uranium enrichment and nuclear chain reactions.  In response to Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Army Corps of Engineers was diverted to supplement this research and the ACU eventually became the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), which had a significantly more militaristic bent.

    President Roosevelt authorized the creation of the Manhattan Project in 1942 to bring together the various research initiatives under one umbrella. This pulled in J. Robert Oppenheimer, who was a leading expert on nuclear fission. The name “Manhattan Project” came from the OSRD’s Manhattan Engineer District, named after the borough in which it was located.

    Manhattan Project research was relocated to the secretive Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, the creation of which was known as Project Y. In 1945, the first atomic bomb was successfully detonated in the New Mexican desert in what was called the Trinity Test. Scientists working under Oppenheimer created two distinct types of bombs: a uranium-based gun-type design called “Little Boy” and a plutonium-based implosion bomb named “Fat Man.” The success of the Trinity Test led to nuclear weapons becoming part of the US strategy to win World War II.

    Once it became clear that Germany was close to surrender, the US delivered an ultimatum to Japan at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 to surrender or face “prompt and utter destruction.” Since part of the terms of surrender included the formation of a new democratic government with no role for the Emperor, the proposal was rejected.

    On August 6th, 1945, “Little Boy” was dropped over Hiroshima. Three days later, “Fat Man” was dropped over Nagasaki. The bombs killed over 100,000 people combined and levelled the cities to the ground. Some historians have theorized that a desire to test the implosion type design factored into the decision to drop a second bomb.

    While the Manhattan Project was effectively shuttered with the end of World War II, various agencies and committees were created to apply Manhattan Project-era technologies to other fields. These include the Atomic Energy Commision, the Department of Energy, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.