Category: Sub Saharan Africa

Introduction

Since its decolonization, France has held outsized influence in French-speaking (Francophone) African countries, cemented by its policy of Françafrique, which was designed to keep Francophone countries firmly within France’s sphere of influence. Through this policy, France was able to continue to protect and promote French interests in Francophone Africa.

However, this sphere of influence has been waning, with France slowly losing its economic influence in the region, and struggling to provide the regional security benefits it once did. Recently, France removed all their soldiers from Mali and Burkina Faso, and was unable to prevent a coup in Niger, despite having troops stationed. With France now seeking a reset of relations within the region as a whole, it provides both opportunity and danger to US interests in Francophone countries, and Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

Background Information

After World War II, France, along with other European empires, began facing increasing pressure to grant independence to their colonies. France, however, did not want to lose the benefits it gained from its African colonies. As France granted its colonies independence, it also worked to set up a pré carré (translated as one’s little corner) system in their former African colonies that would keep the newly independent nations firmly within France’s influence. This was done by setting up Francophone Africa’s economy in a way that tied the countries to France by creating a regional currency and economic bloc, which allowed France to maintain access to essential resources. France also maintained a military presence in the new countries, which allowed France to intervene militarily within the states to protect France’s interests, and made it the de facto stabilizer of the region.

This system began to fall apart in the 1990’s, when the French government supported Juvenal Habyarimana’s Rwandan regime despite concerns of increased ethnic tension, which ended up being the cause of the Rwandan genocide. This severely shook Francophone Africa’s trust in France, as the nations viewed France’s support of Rwanda as protecting French interests at the expense of African lives. This concern surrounding France’s reliability and worth as a partner was further enforced by France’s own shifting view of the partnership, as it sought to scale back its military presence on the continent. This reduced trust in governments that had relied on French help to secure their countries. Economic investment also began to shift away from the previous, French dominated, economic system, lowering confidence in France’s value as an economic ally.

All of these developments have led to a souring of opinion of France in Francophone Africa, and has left the door open for other countries to increase their influence in the region. However, this weakening influence has also decreased the security of the countries, as France struggles to provide regional security as it previously did, and Francophone countries struggle to replace France’s role as a stabilizer in the region. In recent years, France has had to withdraw soldiers from Mali and Burkina Faso, which were stationed in those countries to help fight terrorist groups. France has also watched as regimes supportive of French interests have been overthrown by coups, most recently in Niger.

US Response

The US’s response to France’s diminishing influence has been mixed so far, with the US increasingly expanding its economic ties to Francophone African countries, but working with France often on regional security issues.

On economic issues, the US has been working to increase its economic ties with Sub-Saharan Africa, including Francophone Africa, and have therefore used previously existing acts, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, to help boost trade and improve economic ties with Francophone African countries specifically. The US has also increased its push for a free trade zone throughout all of Africa, which would undercut France’s regional economic strength with Francophone countries, while increasing US access to resources and goods found in French-speaking African countries.

When it comes to military and regional security issues, the US has expanded their military footprint in Africa, establishing a military base in Djibouti and creating AFRICOM, the United States Africa Command, which coordinates security efforts and crisis response on the African continent.

However, US and French interests are more aligned when it comes to security, so the two nations have often found themselves advocating for the same outcome, especially with counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel region. This has often led both countries to push for the same outcomes, such as in response to the coup in Niger, although these efforts have had less success.

Potential Benefits

The potential benefits from the US increasing its influence are mostly found in the economic sphere, where it can sell themselves as a strong partner based on a strong record of trading with English-speaking African countries, which are viewed in Africa to generally be a ‘step ahead’ of their Francophone counterparts. The US has also emphasized equal partnerships with African nations, which resonates well with Francophone countries. Increased trade and economic ties with Francophone Africa are beneficial because of the increased access to markets and resources they provide, but also because they provide the US with an ability to demonstrate its value as an economic partner to the developing world, which tends to view US involvement as imperial, rather than as a partnership.

Another benefit for increased US participation in Francophone Africa is counteracting Russia and China’s influence in the region. China, specifically, has used the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative to increase its influence throughout Africa through loans and investments in infrastructure in the developing world. This program now has 44 Sub-Saharan African countries as partners, and China continues to invest heavily in new infrastructure projects in partner countries, along with seeking to increase trade with the continent. By increasing ties to Francophone countries, the US would limit the chance that those countries would end up becoming more hostile to US interests through an increased alignment with China and Russia.

Potential Drawbacks

A major drawback of increasing US influence in Francophone Africa is that security concerns tend to be similar for Western nations. This means weakening France’s sphere of influence further puts US security interests at risk, especially considering the current state of the Sahel region. France is still a strong security partner for Francophone African countries outside of the Sahel, and weakening them further could lead to more instability throughout the entire region, especially considering that the US could struggle to step in as a security partner 

Furthermore, this action would create an opportunity for geopolitical competitors like Russia and China to expand their security influence in Africa. These countries are already becoming more engaged in the Sahel region and across Africa. They could highlight their recent successes, like Russia’s Wagner Group aiding in stabilizing countries where France and Western nations faced challenges. This could make them more appealing to Francophone African countries as partners, shifting countries away from Western interests. This would run contrary to US goals in the region, especially considering that the US is more aligned with France in most global interests.

Cobalt, originally seen as a simple byproduct of copper or nickel mining, has recently become a critical mineral due to its use in lithium-ion batteries. These batteries are lightweight and rechargeable, and are important features in portable technology and energy grids. Cobalt’s demand is on the rise as eco-friendly technology, made possible with rechargeable batteries, provides an alternative for fossil fuels. The International Energy Association’s special report on critical minerals predicts that cobalt will see over a 60% rise in demand as countries attempt to meet the Paris Agreement’s emission goals. 

Much of that cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as the central African nation is home to over 70% of the world’s cobalt production. Still, the country’s history of conflict and corruption has stifled economic development, resulting in widespread poverty and a substantial informal sector. These factors complicate involvement. While minerals such as cobalt provide an incentive for external investors and a symbol of potential prosperity, their coveted nature can lead to conflict and further issues for those who participate in its extraction.

US Energy Demands and Domestic Production

Recent US policies reflect a demand for green energy and the corresponding necessary resources. In 2021, Biden passed the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law which included an emphasis on electrical vehicles and clean energy technologies. The following year’s Inflation Reduction act invested in new energy projects and other technology that uses cobalt. Investing in DRC cobalt mines could provide the foundational resources for many of the new projects. As part of these new pieces of legislation, the Biden Administration aims to focus locally and encourage internal markets for clean energy rather than relying on foreign powers with competing interests.

Because of this, some argue that the US should focus more on mining cobalt domestically. For example, Representative Strauber of Minnesota claimed that investing in Congolese projects both supports the pervasive human rights abuses and sacrifices domestic job opportunity. If the US can mine Cobalt domestically, then this would directly speak to Biden’s goal of a more domestic clean energy industry. However, local mining has been expensive and inefficient with only three projects opening since 2002. One project in the Idaho Cobalt Belt took over 20 years to begin production. Through these mines, the US was able to produce 700 tons of cobalt in 2021, but it still had to import 9,900 tons to match demands. Increasing involvement within the DRC could help address the rising need for cobalt and avoid dealing with potential rivals.

Competition with China

The most prominent rival is China, who dominates cobalt mining in the region. Chinese corporations provide infrastructure investments in exchange for mining opportunities as a way to expand influence and secure control over early stages of the energy supply chain. In 2005, then-DRC president, Joseph Kabila, negotiated with China to reach a $6 billion infrastructure deal to fund schools, hospitals, and roads in exchange for copper and cobalt. As of 2023, China owns all but one cobalt mine within the country.

Even so, the Congolese people often feel exploited by current contracts with the Chinese and hope to secure a more equal partnership. Reflecting this new goal, the DRC is looking to re-negotiate the aforementioned infrastructure-for-minerals deal. In 2022, the DRC government began investigating Chinese mining companies for evading payments. One such investigation resulted in restricting China Molybdenum Co.’s control of the Tenke Fungurume mine. The recent pushback against China may also spur an effort to find new partnerships with countries such as the US.

In a May 2022 speech, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken characterized the US strategy towards China as one of economic competition for both technology and foreign influence. Investing in the DRC’s cobalt mining would increase US power in both. Currently the US is not a dominant player in either the production or the raw material side when it comes to battery technologies, and the DRC’s dissatisfaction with China is an opportunity for the US to improve its position in the energy supply chain. 

Already, the US has attempted to expand connections to the DRC through a Memorandum of Understanding focused on electric vehicle batteries. This agreement between the DRC, US, and Zambia expresses a shared interest in improving growth within the African countries’ mining and industrial sectors. However, the memorandum does not include any legally binding components or funding, making the agreement more symbolic than functional. Moreover, the US is starting at a disadvantage when it comes to controlling mines since it sold the one American-owned DRC cobalt mine to China in 2016.

Human Rights Abuses

The US is hesitant to increase ties with the DRC’s mining industry because of the many current human rights abuse scandals. NPR has referred to the cobalt mining projects within the DRC as modern day slavery due to the extreme poverty and coercive forces leading people into the mines. New projects displace villages, leaving the people at risk of homelessness and often creating situations where the only economic opportunity is to work in the mines The slave-like conditions are part of a process called artisanal mining which is done informally and without heavy equipment. Artisanal miners then sell their resources to industrial mining companies. The inhumanely acquired resources enter the formal supply chain through money laundering, untraced and unquestioned. 

To address this issue, the Fair Cobalt Alliance works to improve labor conditions for artisanal miners and harness their production to create a more formal supply chain. American corporations such as Google have invested in the project, suggesting an avenue for US soft power and influence within the region. Other multinational corporations involved in the mining process include Microsoft, who has “committed to responsible and ethical sourcing” of cobalt and Apple, who aims to decrease reliance on mines altogether due to the history of inhumane conditions. These actions by larger companies apply pressure to DRC mines to improve labor standards and lay the groundwork for future relationships.

Even so, the DRC has not met the US’s standards for eliminating human trafficking and is on the US Department of State’s watchlist. Trafficking also often leads to child labor, which the US has made efforts to address. The Combating Child Labor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Cobalt Industry (COTECCO) project focuses on child labor in artisanal mining and trains DRC representatives to combat the issue. By expanding its engagement in the mining sector and at a national level, the US has the potential to tackle issues at both the policy and corporate levels. Such an undertaking is both expensive and time consuming when the US has historically utilized less controversial partners such as Norway and Canada for cobalt.

FTA Opportunity

The US could improve trade with the DRC directly through a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as this would deepen ties between the countries and allow for additional benefits under Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Through expanding trade agreements with the DRC, the US can incentivize closer ties and provide subsidies or tax cuts around targeted resources to ensure American companies are some of the most compelling buyers. As it stands now, the IRA pushes the DRC away because many of the plan’s critical mineral subsidies are restricted to countries with FTAs.

FTAs can also incorporate explicit incentives to advance specific policy objectives that the US aims to tackle in a given country. For instance, the US’s FTA with Peru contains specific environmental goals to minimize deforestation. An FTA with the DRC could incorporate guidelines that directly address human rights abuses within the mining sector. There is also an incentive to include an environmental component similar to the Peruvian FTA as current DRC mining has resulted in crop death and damaged soil within the surrounding areas due to cobalt’s toxic nature. Expanding mining projects within the Congo Basin also threatens the forest and surrounding ecosystems.

The cobalt mines within the DRC raise a complicated challenge. While the United States races against China for control of energy sources and technology, the inhumane conditions and ecological threats associated with congolese mining are heavy deterrents. Moving forward, the US must decide how to address the rising demand for cobalt without compromising its foreign policy goals.

Introduction

South Africa holds a prominent position in Africa as a major economic force with one of the continent’s largest economies and high human development scores. It actively participates in regional UN Peacekeeping operations and hosts the Pan-African Parliament’s permanent seat. Additionally, South Africa wields considerable soft power, using its distinctive national history and narrative to influence global affairs through soft power. As a result, United States – South African relations have an outsized importance on US relations and interests with all of Sub-Saharan Africa, as South Africa’s regional influence helps dictate US ability to achieve its goals in the region.

Quick Facts

• Population: 60.6 million
  • Ethnic Breakdown: Black African (79.2%), Colored (8.9%), White (8.9%), Indian/Asian (2.5%), Other (0.5%)
• Capitals: Cape Town (Legislative), Pretoria (Administrative), Bloemfontein (Judicial)
• Official Languages: 12 (Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa, isiZulu, and South African Sign Language)
• Government Type: Parliamentary Democracy
• President: Matemala Cyril Ramaphosa
• GDP: $419 Billion (2021)
• Currency: South African Rand

History

The connection between the US and South Africa traces back to 1799, during South Africa’s colonial period under the British Empire. In that year, the United States opened a Consulate in Cape Town, marking the initial diplomatic presence within the future borders of South Africa. Formal diplomatic ties were officially established in 1929 when South Africa gained autonomy within the British Empire.

Once South Africa achieved independence, the US identified the nation as a key potential ally in the region, which led it to support the new South African government. However, this decision became more difficult to justify when the new South African government implemented the system of Apartheid—a policy of segregation and discrimination based on race, against non-white South Africans. The US later adopted a ‘Communication‘ policy towards South Africa, aiming to strike a balance between strategic and economic concerns by cultivating favorable relations with the South African government. The goal was to encourage the regime to cooperate with the US and gradually persuade them to dismantle the Apartheid system. This led the US to become one of the few countries not to embargo South Africa, helping give the regime cover at the UN.

Concerned that its close ties to the Apartheid regime were straining relationships with other African nations, the US, during the Carter administration, started gradually reducing its diplomatic engagement with South Africa while still maintaining economic connections. However, due to the Angolan Civil War evolving into a proxy conflict between Marxist and anti-communist forces, the US sought military assistance from South Africa, which created conflicting messages about its stance on South Africa. However, public pressure continued to build to cut ties with the Apartheid regime, so when the Angolan Civil War died down, so did US support for South Africa, as there were no pressing security issues in the region, and therefore no strong justifications to support the regime. With the loss of its last major international partner, the South African regime, now led by F.W. deKlerk, pivoted towards working with Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress to bring an end to Apartheid.

Once the Apartheid regime fell, and the ANC was elected in the free and fair election of 1994, the US and South Africa developed closer relations. This was sparked by the personal friendship between US President Bill Clinton and Mandela. However, Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, and many members of the ruling ANC in South Africa, did not fully trust the US because of the prolonged period of cooperation with the apartheid government, which led to reduced cooperation between the two countries.

Relations between the two countries continued to swing with each new administration on either side, despite the strong economic ties. This has led South Africa to court geopolitical rivals of the United States, including Russia and China. In 2023, tensions escalated between the two countries when the US ambassador accused South Africa of supplying arms to Russia for the conflict in Ukraine, despite South Africa’s official stance of neutrality.

Strategic Interests

• Economic/Trade: Trade between the US and South Africa is strong, and South Africa is the largest African trading partner for the US. South Africa’s mineral wealth, including Platinum and Gold, is sought after by American industries. In return, South Africa’s primary import from the US is automobiles. However, South Africa is part of BRICS, an economic alliance with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, aimed at boosting their economies collectively. This expansion could potentially divert South Africa’s economic interests away from the US.
• Military/Regional Security: The US and South Africa are major partners for promoting regional stability in the Southern Africa region. As a result, the US and South Africa cooperate on military and regional security issues, and the two countries conduct joint military exercises. The US military is involved in health initiatives by providing logistical planning. However, South Africa has also led joint exercises with Russia and China, highlighting how South Africa continues to refuse to align too closely with either the US or its geopolitical rivals.
• Global Health: The US and South Africa have a longstanding partnership working towards promoting global and regional health. The US has invested billions to PEPFAR, a program which helps prevent and treat HIV/AIDS. PEPFAR has invested heavily in South Africa, and the surrounding region, which had some of the highest rates of infection. This partnership expanded to cover other threatening diseases, such as Covid-19. This growth has ensured that the partnership remains a robust point of cooperation between the two countries.

Future Developments

The US will face competition from Russia and China in vying for influence in South Africa. South Africa is expected to use its differing relationships to maximize its own benefits, while carefully managing ties with the global powers to avoid upsetting any one of them. To maintain South Africa as a regional partner, the US must further develop and utilize economic and health connections. Building trust is crucial, given the historical context that still influences the relationship.

Introduction

The United States developed a diplomatic relationship with Somalia in 1960 following its independence from British and Italian rule. After a period of stagnation between the two countries throughout the 1990s, the United States formally recognized the new federal government of Somalia (FGS) in 2013. While the United States has worked with Somalia to maintain regional security and relieve humanitarian aid for decades, Somalia has continued to face a series of political upheavals and violence with the absence of a functioning central government. For almost two decades, al-Shabaab, a clan-based militant group, has conducted violent insurgencies in southern and central Somalia and officially became an al-Qa’ida affiliate in 2012. The United States officially designated al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2008. 

Historic and Present Threats 

Al-Shabaab’s primary goal has been to expel foreign forces and establish an Islamic state in Somalia based on its interpretation of Sharia law. Historically and currently, they exploit local grievances, carry out attacks, and enforce their strict interpretation of Islamic law in the regions they control, especially in southern and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab killed more than 500 people by detonating two truck bombings in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, in 2017, and killed 148 people at Garissa University College in central Kenya. They were able to gain strength by taking advantage of the lack of effective governance and security in Somalia. 

The United States has been involved in countering the militant group’s attacks since 2013. U.S. forces executed the former leader of al-Shabaab, Ahmed Godane, with an airstrike in 2014. Al-Shabaab’s successor, Ahmad Umar, has publicly communicated that his organization sees the U.S. as a key enemy and has aimed to dismantle U.S. operations in Somalia and other neighboring countries. According to the Pentagon, the U.S. has authorized over 275 strikes in Somalia during the Trump administration.

The African Union (AU) and United Nations agreed to terminate their multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia (AMISOM) by the end of December 2024. Due to the reduced military presence, al-Shabaab was able to capture a Somali military base in 2023. Several regional forces were also killed in an al-Shabaab suicide car bomb. Al-shabaab’s threat has pushed the AU to reevaluate its withdrawal and complicated U.S. counterterrorism operations. As a developing country, Somalia has dealt with severe internal political disputes between Mogadishu, AU leaders, and Somali federal state authorities, as well as state corruption. After involvement with Somalia since the early 2000s, the U.S. suspended support to the Somali army in 2017 due to corruption concerns related to the accountability of weapons, fuel, and other assistance provided through security aid programs. Although assistance was partially resumed in 2019, the Trump administration officially withdrew all U.S. troops from Somalia in 2020. 

Current U.S. Policy in Somalia

Current U.S. policy in Somalia focuses on two key areas: military intervention and capacity-building. Through its Africa Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. military conducts targeted airstrikes, drone operations, and ground raids to disrupt al-Shabaab’s leadership, training camps, and logistical networks. The U.S. also provides military and financial support to the Somali government and its security forces. For example, they provided training for Somali troops, advised and assisted counterterrorism operations, and enhanced the capacity of Somali security institutions. Since the early 2000s, Washington has partnered with several local and international partners, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, the African Union (AU), the UN, and various Somali forces. 

In 2022, President Biden authorized the redeployment of 450 Special Operations forces to Somalia. This replaced a system where U.S. troops periodically trained and advised Somali and AU forces. The new directive is for the U.S. troops to provide security and services for Somali officials rather than engaging in direct combat. This decision is based on research indicating that the American presence in Somalia before Trump’s withdrawal was effective in countering al-Shabaab. In the year following the U.S. pullout, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies estimated that the number of al-Shabaab attacks rose by 17%, from 1,771 to 2,072. U.S. security assistance to Somalia and peacekeeping operations in the country has amounted to approximately $3 billion since 2010. This makes Somalia one of the top recipients of security aid in sub-Saharan Africa.

Involved Agencies and their Roles 

• Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was a multinational force led by the U.S. in 1992. It was authorized by the Security Council to use “all necessary means” to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Although the initial peace-keeping efforts were successful, the lack of political transparency and absence of a disciplined national armed force in Somalia led UNITAF to transition to UNOSOM II. Under UNOSOM II, the new force was granted enforcement powers by the United Nations (UN) and assigned military tasks such as monitoring hostilities, controlling heavy weapons, and protecting UN personnel and agencies. However, in 1993, Somali militia carried out armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops, leading to the withdrawal and termination of the UN-sanctioned multinational force.
• The Department of Defense has been actively involved in targeting al-Shabaab militants, disrupting their activities, and weakening their capabilities through military operations. They collaborate with US AFRICOM, which leads these efforts by closely working with Somali forces and other international partners. In August 2022, Somali President Hassan Mohamud initiated a “total war” strategy, encouraging African nations to apply pressure on al-Shabaab extremists from all angles. Local clans are supporting Somali forces in driving out al-Shabaab militants from various parts of central Somalia and challenging their presence in southern strongholds.
• The CIA offers intelligence support by collecting information about al-Shabaab’s leadership, operations, and financing. They have uncovered that al-Shabaab finances its operations through piracy, kidnapping, and extortion from local businesses, farmers, aid groups, and others. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the militant group generates approximately $100 million per year through these activities.

Conclusion

U.S. troops are assisting in political reconciliation efforts among Somalia’s different groups and tribal factions. The reintroduction of American troops, along with military advances from Somali forces, will play a crucial role in determining how effectively al-Shabaab’s control over different regions in Somalia can be reduced in the future. Both sides’ leaders are grappling with the challenge of finding a balance between the costs of continuing the conflict and their interests in negotiating its end.

The hegemonic rivalry between the U.S. and China has continued to escalate over the past several decades, with battles for global development, military presence, and other modes of action taking the forefront. The resource-rich region of West Africa is one of the latest theaters of operation in this scramble for influence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has propelled them to become West Africa’s top foreign investor, with military associations and education programs furthering their presence in the region. However, BRI’s lack of transparency, untenable debt, and suspect intentions has left many West Africans skeptical.

Trade and Development

In 2020, Chinese exports to West African countries peaked at over $40 billion U.S. dollars, making the western region China’s principal trading partner in Africa. Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia received the most trade exports, with the main products being machinery and electronics, textile and apparel, hi-tech products, and finished goods. West African imports to China accounted for $10.8 billion dollars in trade mostly consisting of minerals, metals, agricultural products, and crude oil. 

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) encapsulates China-West Africa trade relations through the most recent 2035 China-Africa Vision document. This agreement entails a 60$ billion USD Chinese investment promise in Africa by 2035 directed at agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, environmental protection, and digital economy. The Dakar Action Plan is an analogous proposal that originated during the most recent FOCAC in November 2021. The plan suggests a reorientation of China’s economic engagement with Africa and reciprocates the thorough, exhaustive list submitted for the China-Africa 2035 Vision. These plans favor the developmental facet of Chinese-West Africa relations and insinuate further endeavors through China’s global Belt and Road Initiative, which has been met with fierce criticism by the international community because of the high risk of debt traps through unsustainable loans and erratic negotiations. 

Certain West African countries epitomize BRI’s high-risk investment, particularly Guinea and Nigeria. In Guinea, Chinese diplomatic, regulatory, financial, and commercial actors operate in different capacities to secure vital materials such as bauxite and iron ore. The mining partnerships are rooted in state-owned enterprises’ connections with private Chinese companies, demonstrating the importance of China’s costly infrastructure investment to gain access to the valuable mining sector. 

Nigeria has received the most investment from China, with over $20 billion from Chinese firms. In March 2020, Nigeria confirmed it borrowed over $3 billion from the Chinese government for infrastructure projects. The latest data from the Debt Management Office in Nigeria revealed that the debt is continuing to grow, causing experts to warn the federal government of debt traps and potential reclamation of Chinese-funded projects in Nigeria. As infrastructure projects and trade with China continue to materialize, China’s intentions provoke suspicion amongst the international community, and the lack of transparency validates this distrust. 

Intra-African Conflicts

Chinese intervention in West African conflicts tends to be muted. However, as BRI’s influence advances amongst states, certain arms sales and partnerships confirm that China is not shying away from strategic military intrusion in the region. From 2016 to 2020, China ranked as the world’s fifth-largest arms exporter, selling nearly 100 million TIVs (trend-indicator value of major conventional weapons) to Nigeria. Many linked this mass transfer of arms to China’s “domestic demand for oil” whereas other experts claim that China is simply involved for the profit. 

In Benin, the private Chinese company Poly Technologies Inc. built the country’s largest military barrack in the town of Allada, in addition to providing training and donating trucks, logistics materials, and arms to the Beninese military. Whether China is using Benin for geopolitical strategic purposes or interested in economic engagement, the Sino-Beninese alliance proves to be one of the most dynamic in West Africa. 

Although the Spanish-speaking nation of Equatorial Guinea is not in West Africa, West African governments and global powers should pay close attention to China’s prospects in the insular country. A recent U.S. Department of Defense report stated that China is actively seeking a naval base in the Port of Bata, Equatorial Guinea. This budding Chinese port could grant access to the Gulf of Guinea and be the closest Chinese military base in distance to the United States. Akin to China’s economic and developmental engagement in the region, their military aspirations remain unclear or undisclosed. 

Climate Change

In 2021, China’s CO2 (carbon dioxide) emissions reached almost 12 billion metric tons, accounting for nearly 33% of the global total. In an attempt to counteract this drastic contribution to climate change and its effect on regions like West Africa, the Chinese government claims to have launched over 100 clean energy and green development projects under the framework of the FOCAC. The 2021 Dakar Ministerial meeting issued a Declaration on China-Africa Cooperation on Combating Climate Change which intends to improve energy development, upgrade industrial structure, and achieve low-carbon, green, high-quality development in African countries including Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and other West African countries. Minimal evidence has appeared since FOCAC that a shift toward greener Chinese development is taking place, and some stakeholders demand the expansion of the FOCAC process.

One Chinese-backed project exemplifying environmental adaptation is the Great Green Wall (GGW) initiative which aims to create an 8,000 km wall of fertile land and trees across the Sahel. GGW’s ambition is to restore 100 million hectares of currently degraded land, sequester 250 million tons of carbon, and add local job opportunities. Rural Sahelian communities in Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Niger would all have access to this climate-resilient wall in a region-wide effort to combat temperatures which are rising more rapidly than anywhere else in the world. Although there has been minimal progress on the construction of the GGW, the symbol of hope for a new climate-friendly era of Chinese-West African relations is blossoming in the barren dunes of the Sahara. 

Immigration/Education

There are an estimated 500,000 African migrants currently living in China and between 1 million and 2 million people from China living on the African continent. Many African migrants to China are merchants or traders who are granted M visas, which permit a 30-day stay. Some migrants have applied for study or tourist visas to circumvent the requirements for other visas. China’s 2013 Exit and Entry Administration law was met with bitter criticism for excluding many African immigrants due to illegal entry, residence, and employment. The COVID-19 pandemic also inflamed anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa due to conspiracies about virus’ origin in Wuhan, China. 

Scholarships and university programs have played a part in bringing a considerable influx of African students to China, especially those from anglophone West African countries such as Nigeria or Ghana. One element propagating Chinese ideology is the Confucius Institutes (CI) which are a vital component of China’s soft power efforts to promote the Chinese language and the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative of history and culture. The first CI’s were inaugurated in 2009 in Lomé (Togo), Lagos (Nigeria), and Porto-Novo (Benin). There are now more than 15 CIs around major West African cities. 

Conclusion

Is China a sustainable and valuable partner for West African economies and communities? Or is their presence a Trojan horse hoping to exploit resources and people in a race for global hegemony? The United States, which has a complex relationship with the region, must carefully examine China’s every move to fully understand and compare the repercussions and advantages of foreign policy in West Africa. Ranging from a prospective Chinese port in Equatorial Guinea to Confucius Institutes in Nigeria, China’s scope continues to expand in every direction and it is in the hands of the international community to inspect and analyze Chinese intentions and keep West Africa on the route to prosperity. 

West Africa is the most populated region in Africa, home to over 420 million people and natural resources such as petroleum, diamond, gold, timber, and cacao. West Africa and the United States cooperate on issues including trade, development aid, climate-related issues, intra-African conflicts, and immigration. 

Trade and Development

West Africa has experienced GDP (Growth Domestic Product) growth of 3.5% in 2019 and 3.6% in 2020. The U.S. has significantly increased trade with several West African countries including Nigeria ($3.2 billion), Ghana ($1.8 billion), and Cote d’Ivoire ($1.2 billion) in total goods traded (two-way) during 2019. The primary platform created in an attempt to stimulate U.S.-Africa trade is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), established under the Clinton administration in 2000. This preferential trade agreement facilitated stronger commercial ties between the U.S. and selected beneficiary countries in Sub-Saharan Africa by allowing eligible countries to gain duty-free access to the U.S. market for thousands of products. Fifteen countries in West Africa were eligible for AGOA benefits in 2020, although many argue the eligibility requirements for countries can be too stringent, and the trade growth since AGOA was established has been inconsistent. Most countries registered gains in exports, although many exports, especially those derived from fuel, have been largely unsteady and have limited market diversification and expansion. 

The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID)’s West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (WATIH) exemplifies a more recent venture to further integrate West African businesses into U.S.-African trade through a five-year $140 million trade and investment activity. This program seeks to catalyze sustainable economic growth and increase competitiveness through market-based strategic partnerships with the private sector. The primary objectives are to improve food security in West Africa, create job opportunities for women, and increase investment and exports in key growth sectors.

Other initiatives enacted by Congress such as the U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF) aim to provide grants to small enterprises in underserved communities in Sub-Saharan Africa to strengthen operational assistance, business expansion, and market integration. USADF has made strides in generating partnerships with Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger with over $20 million in investments in more than 50 local businesses impacting millions of lives. 

Dissension over the history of United States development programs in Africa is pervasive. Many experts argue the system is plagued with profligate investment and is unsustainable or inefficient, frequently only benefitting a small fraction of individuals. Despite these concerns, trade between the United States and West Africa is on the rise.

Intra-African conflicts

Since 2020, West Africa has experienced 5 coups d’état in Chad, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso due to security challenges aggravated by ongoing conflicts with jihadist insurgents in the greater Sahel region. The region is no stranger to internal conflict, with the recent turmoil aggravating the situation of food insecurity, political corruption, violence, inflation, and refugees or displaced peoples. 

Washington attempts to mitigate conflict through the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), established in 2007 as a combatant command responsible for U.S. Department of Defense operations and security cooperation on the African continent. American troops have been deployed to Niger to provide training, logistics, and intelligence to assist the Nigerien and Malian military’s fight against jihadists affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and to assist in the Boko Haram-induced conflict in northern Nigeria. In 2020, the U.S. halted military cooperation with Mali following the coup and has limited most of its military presence in West Africa to Niger. 

Climate Change

Conflict in the Sahel has complicated access to food and water in the region and is a major contributor to the high number of nearly 40 million food-insecure people in West Africa. This situation has been exacerbated by climate-related issues, with climate change likely to lower crop yields and production, resulting in a rise in the price of food for communities, especially in rural areas. Following the minimal success of the West Africa Biodiversity and Climate Change (WA BiCC), a five-year climate support juncture that ended in 2021, USAID created the West Africa Biodiversity and Low Emissions Development (WABILED) program. WABILED aims to enhance the capacity of national and regional networks and institutions to enforce wildlife trafficking laws in West Africa, lower deforestation and forest degradation, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions through technology and knowledge management support and funding. 

Immigration

Rural to urban movement has dominated internal migration patterns as well as the crucial seasonal migration from inland to coastal areas due to droughts, reduced crop yield, or heat waves. By 2050 it is predicted that nearly 32 million people will be displaced within their own countries in West Africa due to climate factors. Those already attempting to leave the region have been characterized as climate migrants or climate refugees.

In 2019, approximately 2.1 million sub-Saharan African immigrants lived in the United States. While the region accounts for roughly one-third of the population of sub-Saharan Africa, the chart below demonstrates that West Africans make up nearly half of the total population of sub-Saharan African migrants to the United States. The Trump administration was criticized for its 2020 travel ban, which restrained entry and visa issuance that could lead to permanent residency for several Muslim-majority countries, including Nigeria. The Biden administration lifted the ban, although the impact it had on West African immigration today is still unclear.