ACE

Category: Middle East and North Africa

  • Turkey’s Strategy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    Turkey’s Strategy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    Turkey shares complicated relationships and maritime borders with both Russia and Ukraine, and it has taken a dual approach to maintain distance from either neighbor. Turkey’s status as a NATO member and an economic partner with both Russia and Ukraine puts it in a unique position to serve as a place of negotiation and a communicator to the West. As Turkey balances its NATO responsibilities and strategic considerations, Ankara has worked to avoid alienating either side as it attempts to secure its own international and domestic position as a regional decision-maker.

    Early Stages of the Conflict

    In late March of 2022, Turkey served as the host of the first of three-way talks between Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba of Ukraine and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov of Russia, along with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu. During these talks in the town of Antalya in southern Turkey, Cavusoglu described Turkey’s role as more of a “facilitator” than a “host”. As part of the talks, Turkey brought up critical issues to the conflict, including free access to humanitarian corridors and the violence occurring in the city of Mariupol. Although no agreement was reached, Turkey has strengthened its position as a diplomatic actor in dealing with a developing conflict with two of its major economic partners. On a more personal level, President Vladimir Putin himself was reported to have called Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to outline his demands throughout the negotiations process. Finding himself in a difficult position, Erdogan has sought to optimize Turkey’s ability to pivot strategically while maintaining a distance from the current conflict. 

    Initially, Turkey’s position on the current conflict favored the Ukrainian cause. Erdogan criticized the West’s response as weak and joined NATO in condemning Russia by voting for the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine. This isn’t the first time that Turkey has publicly denounced Russia’s actions in the region—Ankara criticized Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and has been outspoken in support of Ukraine’s claim over Crimea and for Crimean Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group that has been persecuted under Russian control. Additionally, Turkey has joined Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives such as the August 2021 Crimea Platform summit.

    Naval Response

    Ankara changed its rhetoric after the beginning of the conflict. Erdogan and other Turkish figures in the government and media have called the invasion “unacceptable,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “courageous,” and the Ukrainians “helpless civilians.” However, when Ankara began describing the conflict as a “war” rather than repeating the Russian term “special operation,” it was able to invoke the articles of the 1936 Montreux Convention, at Zelenskyy’s request. Invoking the Articles of the Montreux Convention allowed Turkey to close the Bosphorus Strait to warships and thus block warring states from accessing the Black Sea (Figure 1). This has effectively limited Russia’s ability to move ships from other fleets into the region. Before the invasion of Ukraine, 16 Russian warships sailed through the strait to conduct military exercises in the Black Sea and now are engaged in the conflict. Due to the closing of the Bosphorus Strait, two of Russia’s Slava-class cruisers, the RTS Marshal Ustinov and the RFS Varyag were unable to move into the Black Sea from other operating areas. This move has earned Ankara praise from NATO and EU allies.

    Figure 1 

    Military and Economic Response

    Turkey has also sent aid to Ukraine in the form of weapons. Turkey sent a number of Bayraktar TB2 armed drones to Ukraine. These weapons have been deployed in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh and have been extremely effective in other conflicts. Although Ukrainian officials have repeatedly underlined this contribution and its success, possibly to publicly pressure Turkey to take a more active pro-Ukrainian stance, Ankara has stopped short of claiming the transaction as a form of military aid. Rather, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Sedat Onal has publicly emphasized that the transfer of Bayraktar TB2 drones was instead an agreement made between the Ukrainian government and a private Turkish company. This attempt to distance the Turkish government from any overt lethal aid to the Ukrainian cause underlines the strategic considerations leading Turkey to avoid alienating Russia. 

    Turkey’s commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity has avoided outright alienating Russia. Erdogan’s response to the current invasion has stopped short of other measures pursued by other NATO members. Ankara has continuously declined to join sanctions on Russia, calling them “useless,” and it has refused to close its airspace to Russian aircraft. Through this, Turkey has become a “haven,” becoming the base of Russia’s connection to the rest of Eurasia. Some oligarchs and citizens have fled there as the effects of Western economic sanctions take hold of the Russian economy, leading to fears that it will undermine the effectiveness of the measures. However, this strategy is risky for Turkey. If the United States and the West decide to ramp up secondary sanctions, Turkish banks and businesses could be greatly affected. 

    Russian-Turkish Security Relationship

    Turkey’s strategic hedging of its actions during the current crisis has much to do with its complex security and economic relationships with Russia. Russia and Turkey are historical competitors in multiple security areas and have fought on opposite sides of multiple regional conflicts, such as Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Geography and politics play a major part in Turkey’s decisions. As both a NATO member and a close neighbor to Russia and Ukraine, with economic ties to both countries, Turkey risks becoming deeply involved in a conflict with both security and economic partners.

    There has been an increasing security relationship between Ankara and Moscow in the past few years. Despite their opposing stances in regional conflicts, Turkey has increasingly viewed Russia as a “counterweight” to the West’s powers and pressures in the international sphere and seeks a deepened relationship with Russia to diversify its security strategy. In regional conflicts such as Syria, the countries cooperate. For example, they arranged a 2020 ceasefire agreement, and mutually brokered a security corridor and joint patrols. Criticism over the human rights abuses and the rule of law in Turkey has increased from the West, leading Erdogan to turn to alternative allies. Putin hasn’t questioned any of Erdogan’s domestic human rights crackdowns, and he extended his support during the 2016 failed coup in Turkey. A shared goal of legitimating their role in the regional order outside of Western-led institutions has provided a platform on which the two nations have begun to cooperate.

    Turkey’s pivot towards Russian partnership is exemplified in the highly controversial 2019 purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which led to a downturn in relations with the United States. The U.S.’s response included a sanctions package against Turkey’s defense industry, Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and the resulting cancellation of a large transaction of U.S. F-35 fighter jets. This is indicative of a larger Turkish policy trend of reducing dependence on NATO and the West, looking to alternative allies. Turkey’s pivot to ​​Russian weapons platforms has led to concerns about its future unity with NATO.

    Domestic Considerations

    Aside from its international strategic considerations, Ankara’s domestic economic considerations are a central determinant in the ongoing conflict. Both Russia and Ukraine are key economic partners to Turkey. Turkey, whose energy needs are import-dependent, especially depends on Russia: Russian natural gas made up 45% of Turkey’s gas purchases last year. Rosatom, a Russian conglomerate, began building a nuclear plant at Akkuyu in southern Turkey. Ankara has a very profitable free trade agreement with Ukraine, which it does not want to lose. As the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, Turkey’s security and defense sectors are tied up with Ukraine’s as well. For example, a new drone manufacturing factory has been planned to co-produce the long-range tactical Bayraktar TB2 system with Ukraine, further promoting the Turkish drone brand and expanding it to other markets. Turkey is also a major importer of sunflower oil and wheat, and in 2021 it imported 64.6 percent of its wheat from Russia and 13.4 percent from Ukraine—78% of a critical import overall. Turkey’s exports to Russia have been measured at 4.5 billion dollars in 2020, and to Ukraine at 2.24 billion dollars, figures that are expected to be disrupted as the crisis continues. Additionally, Ukrainians and Russians make up 23% of Turkey’s tourism sector revenue, a large share of an industry that represents about  4% of Turkey’s overall GDP. 

    Hit hard already by the ripple effects of Western sanctions, Turkey also knows well what a cooling economic relationship with Moscow would look like. In 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet on the Turkish-Syrian border area, the subsequent sanctions and downturn in relations proved devastating to the Turkish economy. The impacts of tensions with Russia caused double-digit inflation, high unemployment, and a rising current account deficit. Russia cracked down on tourism to Turkey, imposed import restrictions on Turkish goods, and even suspended the building of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. The ten-month sanctions eventually ended when Erdogan personally apologized for the downing of the Russian bomber. This example of Russia’s status as a close economic partner to Turkey may explain Ankara’s hesitation to join harsher sanction measures.

    The conflict, as well as Western-imposed sanctions, has already compounded Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis. Since sanctions were introduced, Turkey’s economy has taken a turn for the worse, including surging inflation at a 20-year high of 54%. The tourism industry has taken a hard hit from the loss of Ukrainian and Russian visitors, losing Turkey billions in revenue. As supply chain disruptions affect imports and exports, grains, oil, and gas prices have skyrocketed. With national elections coming in 2023, worries about civic dissatisfaction due to economic losses have been at the forefront of Erdogan’s mind.

    Ankara’s position as a mediator in the talks has so far seemed to work more than any other measure. The only signs of diplomatic progress have emerged from the three-way discussions, as Russia said it would significantly scale back its military activity around Kyiv and northern Ukraine, a confidence-building “de-escalation” step. Whether this step will be carried out, however, is unclear. In this way, Ankara has worked to solidify itself as a key independent international intermediary to both the West and Russia while avoiding endangering either of its critical partnerships.

  • The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant Part 2

    The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant Part 2

    Though climate change and its effects do not recognize state borders, they affect states in the Levant in different ways due to variations in states’ geography, environment, economy, and government response. In Syria, the adverse effects of climate change have caused new and exacerbated existing socioeconomic problems, worsening living conditions for the Syrian people. In the past two decades, environmental conditions in Syria have deteriorated further because of unsustainable, unhelpful government policies. 

    Environmental Effects of Climate Change in Syria 

    • Drought and Desertification: In the years leading up to the Syrian civil war, the country experienced its worst drought on record. The drought began in the winter of 2006-2007 following a reduction in regional rainfall, which is the primary water source for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and their tributaries. Lasting from 2007 to 2010, the drought followed a number of multi-year droughts in the 1980s and 1990s. 
    • Water Scarcity: According to data collected by climatologists, water became much more scarce during the recent Syrian drought with decreased surface moisture and groundwater supplies. Rising temperatures contributed to drier soil and increased evaporation. In the years since the onset of the Syrian conflict, the country has faced rainfall deficits and other worsening environmental conditions. 
    • Crop Failure: This water scarcity has substantially reduced vegetation and agricultural output. The drought caused widespread crop failure throughout the Syrian countryside and left farmers and nomadic herders without needed water sources for irrigation and livestock. According to former Vice President Al Gore, between 2006-2010, the severe drought destroyed 60% of Syrian farms and caused 80% of livestock to perish.
    • Dust Storms: Another interrelated consequence of the Syrian drought has been increased sandstorms throughout the country and region. The sharp decline in Syrian farming caused an increase in the amount of untended soil, which can easily be swept up in a dust storm. 

    Economic and Societal Effects 

    • Food Insecurity: Syria’s reduced agricultural production has caused significant price hikes in imported food products like wheat and rice and greater food insecurity overall. Syria’s reduced irrigation capacity and pasture availability have diminished its cereal production and livestock while wheat production has reached record lows. In 2020, 50.25% of Syrians, were food insecure. 
    • Urbanization and Population Displacement: As drought undermined hundreds of thousands of farmers’ livelihoods, many were forcibly displaced from rural areas to urban centers. While estimates vary, some reports suggest that as many as 1.5 million Syrians were internally displaced because of climate-related factors, meaning they became climate migrants or refugees. Additionally, the influx of more than one million Iraqi refugees by 2010 exacerbated the economic pressures and resource demand caused by internal population displacement in Syria. 
    • Social Upheaval: Syria’s rapid urbanization prior to the civil war increased social unrest in the country’s cities, with greater competition for employment and increasingly scarce resources. As food and economic insecurity and climate migration rose in, the Assad regime violently suppressed protesters and worsened living conditions for the Syrian people.

    Syrian Government Mismanagement 

    • Unsustainable Environmental Policies: While climate change has worsened living conditions in Syria, the country’s government has also contributed to this issue. Even before the 2011 uprising, unsustainable agricultural policies like the overuse of water for water-intensive crops degraded agricultural land in Syria. This policy intensified the climate change effects and related issues on Syrians. Additionally, Syria lacked and still lacks the necessary drought monitoring and management capabilities to respond effectively to droughts and their negative byproducts.
    • Poor Governance: The Assad regime failed to provide subsidies for powering irrigation pumps and transporting produce, exacerbating Syria’s water scarcity and crop failure. While the government had developed a national drought strategy by 2006, it did not implement the plan in time to alleviate the drought’s effects. The regime worsened the drought’s economic fallout by shutting down a micro-finance network of village funds a few years before the uprising. By taking away this network, which functioned as an income security net, the government denied rural Syrian farmers economic relief.
  • The Vienna Talks: Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal

    The Vienna Talks: Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal

    Background

    As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden pledged to reenter the Iran nuclear deal that the Obama administration brokered in 2015. The deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), offered international sanctions relief in exchange for limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, which the Iranian government insists is for peaceful purposes. In 2018, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and implemented  a “maximum pressure” campaign consisting of harsher sanctions, new designations of terrorist organizations, and travel restrictions, among other measures. In response, Iran committed significant breaches of the JCPOA including enriching uranium to higher concentrations, exceeding uranium stockpile limits, developing advanced centrifuges, and restricting international monitoring. 

    In an op-ed written in September 2020, President Biden expressed his desire to “strengthen and expand” the deal to include provisions addressing Iran’s regional activities and ballistic missile program, among other concerns expressed by critics of the original deal. A month into his presidency, Biden made three preliminary moves to jump-start negotiations with Iran. First, the U.S. accepted an invitation from the EU to attend a meeting with the other JCPOA signatories, the P5+1–Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany–and Iran to discuss a path forward. The Biden administration also reversed former President Trump’s decision to reinvoke all United Nations sanctions when Iran initially violated the terms of the agreement (known as “snapback sanction”). Finally, Biden removed travel restrictions on Iranian diplomats based at the United Nations in New York. Despite such overtures, Tehran rejected the invitation to meet and diplomacy initially stalled over disagreements about which country should make the next move. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif refused to engage directly with the U.S. until Biden agreed to lift all sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. However, after weeks of discreet negotiations, Tehran committed to indirect talks with the P5+1. 

    “On the Right Track” 

    The first round of negotiations began in Vienna on April 6, 2021. European envoys acted as intermediaries, shuttling between the Iranian and U.S. delegations. In initial meetings, the Joint Commission formed two expert working groups: one charting Washington’s timetable for lifting sanctions, the other discussing Iran’s plan for reversing nuclear breaches inconsistent with JCPOA guidelines. At the third round of talks, another working group formed to address the sequencing of measures necessary to bring the U.S. and Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA. Enrique Mora, the EU coordinator for the talks, reported  “good progress,” a phrase echoed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov. However, after the sixth round of talks concluded on June 20, 2021, negotiations reached an impasse. 

    Challenges 

    Two events aroused suspicion during the talks, although it is unclear to what extent these events impacted negotiations. After the first round of talks in Vienna, an explosion hit Natanz, Iran’s key uranium enrichment facility. Iran blamed the act of “nuclear terrorism” on Israel, and in retaliation, increased its uranium encirchment level from 20 to 60%, a step closer to weapons-grade (90%). Although some JCPOA signatories expressed “grave concern” about Iran’s enrichment activities, Foreign Minister Zarif emphasized that Iran “will not allow this act of sabotage to affect the nuclear talks.” Shortly after the explosion at Natanz, a taped interview with Zarif was leaked to the press. In the recording, Zarif, who helped negotiate the original deal in 2015, alleged that Russian officials conspired with Iranian General Suleimani to sabotage the JCPOA before it was brokered in 2015, suggesting that Moscow sought to prevent Tehran from normalizing relations with the West. Iran’s Foreign Ministry characterized the leak as “illegal” and the Russian Foreign Ministry refused requests for comments. Despite skepticism from outside observers and JCPOA signatories, negotiations continued seemingly unaffected by the revelations, although the explosion in Natanz pressured the delegations to expedite the negotiation process.  

    Aside from external controversies, Iran’s domestic politics played a substantial role in delaying negotiations. Throughout the talks, Iran’s outgoing president Hassan Rouhani faced pressure from a hardline parliament hostile to the JCPOA.  Rouhani blamed a law passed by the Iranian parliament and Guardian Council in December 2020 for hindering diplomatic success. The law, which required the Atomic Energy Association of Iran to accelerate its nuclear development if certain sanctions were not lifted, raised concern from other JCPOA participants and cast doubt regarding Iran’s commitment to the deal. Additionally, some observers including Ali Raibee, a spokesperson for the Rouhani government, contended that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sought to postpone a final agreement until Iranian elections in June, which promised a hardline victory. After a controversial vote on June 18, the new hardline president Ebrahim Raisi requested time to consolidate a new government before continuing negotiations in Vienna. Raisi’s decision was no shock, as Zarif and other JCPOA signatories previously expressed a desire to reach an agreement before Raisi’s election. Since Raisi’s election, no date has been set to resume talks in Vienna.

    Future Prospects 

    Despite speculation, the Biden administration stated that the new Iranian government would not significantly alter Tehran’s negotiating position. However, President Raisi has held firm that regional and missile issues are “non-negotiable,” complicating Biden’s plan to open discussions related to these matters. Although the Biden administration and the other JCPOA signatories have confirmed their willingness to resume negotiations after Raisi forms a new government, White House officials have warned that the option will not remain open “indefinitely.” Aside from disagreements over the lifting of U.S. sanctions, members of the JCPOA are concerned that Tehran’s nuclear escalation resulting from the 2020 law has shortened Iran’s breakout window—the time it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb. If Iran’s recent nuclear developments are irreversible, the one-year breakout period envisioned in the 2015 accord may be null and JCPOA signatories may be less willing to restore the 2015 deal as it stands if the intended nonproliferation benefits are weakened. 

    Although the U.S. and its JCPOA partners have expressed a desire to resume talks in Vienna immediately, Iranian officials have requested bilateral meetings with EU officials in Brussels to find “practical solutions to the current deadlock in Vienna.” The Biden administration views this step as unnecessary and recently announced its willingness to explore a “Plan B” with Israel. The current path forward remains unclear, as questions regarding U.S. sanctions relief and Iran’s breakout time complicate the prospect of future diplomatic negotiations. Presently, Tehran is not ready to resume a seventh round of talks in Vienna, and the Biden administration’s current rhetoric indicates increasing impatience over the deadlock.

  • Intro to the Houthi Movement in Yemen

    Intro to the Houthi Movement in Yemen

    History of Conflict in Yemen

    Modern Yemen formed in 1990 through the unification of two regions: The Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. Soon after the union, a military officer, Ali Abdullah Saleh, became the country’s leader. Though Yemen is a majority-Sunni country, the north region is Shia-dominant, which poses religious tensions.

    The U.S. supported Saleh in the early 2000s in the fight against growing terrorist organizations in the country and region. The U.S. also lent support to the country during the chaos of the Arab Spring, when Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also became more active. The U.S. continued its involvement in Yemen when further political tensions emerged.

    In 2011, Saleh was ousted due to accusations of corruption, and former Vice President Abdrahbbuh Mansour Hadi took over. Hadi’s interim government is backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S., and the UN sees Hadi as Yemen’s rightful leader. However, Hadi’s leadership has been challenged by jihadists, a separatist movement in south Yemen, former government loyalists, and factors such as corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity.

    The Houthis saw an opportunity during the period of weak leadership, government transition, and many actors vying for power to attempt to gain military power in the north. The Houthis didn’t have faith in Hadi’s interim government and wanted to ensure their own security and take control of their homeland in northern Yemen. The Houthis also oppose Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for backing Hadi’s government. At the same time, Saleh allied with the Houthis against his former political ally, Hadi, and sought to regain the presidency. In 2015, the Houthis and Saleh loyalists ousted Hadi, and he fled to Saudi Arabia.

    The Houthis had initially opposed Saleh because he supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Despite this disagreement, the Houthis later allied with Saleh against Hadi’s UN-backed government. However, in 2017, Saleh withdrew his support from the Houthi coalition and was killed by Houthis. 

    Who are the Houthis?

    The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), is a group of Zaidi Muslim who were a sect of Shia Islam, and believed to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad’s family. Hussein al-Houthi formed Ansar Allah to revive the Zaidi Shia tradition and gain more power for the group in Yemen. Because Zaidi ancestors were seen as a threat by leaders of modern-day Yemen, they suffered discrimination. This caused the Houthis to question Yemeni government authority and demand more respect and control of their homeland.

    The Houthis challenged Saleh’s legitimacy by claiming he was a weak leader and was a puppet of the U.S. Because of their stance, the Houthis gained support from anti-Saleh Yemenis around the country. The Houthis wish to install an interim government friendlier to their goals of:

    • Maintaining regional autonomy
    • Respecting diversity
    • Strengthening a democratic state
    • Lowering fuel prices
    • Securing military control in the north
    • Controlling much of the country, specifically the oil-rich eastern region
    • Gaining political power and international recognition

    Gulf states and the U.S. view Hadi as Yemen’s rightful leader and view the Houthis as an insurgent group.

    Regional and International Impact

    In 2015, Saudi Arabia, other majority-Sunni Arab states, the United States, United Kingdom, and France feared a rise in Houthi support from Shia-majority Iran. In response, the Saudi-led coalition targeted Houthis in air strikes with the goal of stopping Houthi advances and returning Hadi to power. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the UAE pushed the Houthis and their allies out of southern Yemen and out of the city of Aden. This made way for Hadi to establish a temporary government in Aden. The government was unable to provide basic services and security to the city and surrounding areas, and Hadi himself was still primarily living in Saudi Arabia.

    In response, the Houthis have committed drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in recent years, including air strikes on Saudi Arabian oil fields that affected oil production in the country in September of 2019.

    In August 2019, the Saudi-backed Hadi forces and UAE-backed southern separatists clashed. The southern separatists took over Aden and demanded a power sharing deal with the Saudi-led coalition. The UN hoped this would lead to peace, but in January 2020, more conflict erupted between Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. In April of 2020, southern separatists broke a peace deal with the Saudi-led coalition and wanted to govern Aden and southern Yemen themselves.

    Internal conflict, divided political loyalty in southern Yemen, and divided military loyalty throughout the country all contribute to tensions in the region on religious, political, and geographical grounds. These tensions make countries vulnerable to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In Yemen, AQAP and a local branch of the Islamic State have capitalized on the instability and attempted to gain ground in the south. 

    Image 1

    The complexity of the internal conflict is deepened by international influence. With continued Sunni-Shia tensions in and between countries, we see Shia-majority Iran backing the Houthis (though Iran denies this) while Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States backing Hadi’s government. This proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia exacerbates the region’s worst issues of ineffective leadership, internal violence, and religious extremism.


    Image 2

    Yemen is strategically located on a strait that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, through which many of the world’s oil shipments pass. In addition the U.S. is interested in securing Saudi Arabia’s borders, having access to free travel for oil through the strait connecting the Arabian and Red Seas, and a Yemeni government that will effectively work with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

    U.S. President Biden’s Response

    U.S. President Biden seems to be a less staunch supporter of the Saudi-led coalition. Biden claims he wishes to end support for the coalition’s military involvement, including selling weapons to Hadi loyalists. Instead of the military approach, Biden plans to appoint a special envoy to Yemen to encourage cooperation through diplomacy. In addition, Biden reversed former President Trump’s categorization of the Houthi Movement as a terrorist organization as this designation threatens the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemenis.

    Future of Conflict in YemenPeace deals between warring groups with international allies on both sides have failed, meaning a stalemate for the conflict. A conflict which Saudi Arabian leadership thought would last a few weeks became years of suffering, tension, and conflict.

  • The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant

    The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant

    With each passing year, the detrimental effects of climate change are becoming ever more apparent, especially in regions like the Levant. As conditions worsen, they lead to social and economic crises in countries throughout the Levant which have struggled to adapt. Ultimately, climate change threatens U.S. interests in the Levant because it exacerbates instability, heightens social and economic problems, and weakens states’ ability to implement an effective response. 

    Background 

    The Climate of the Levant Region 

    The Levant is a geographic region along the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean and includes Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, and Palestine. Located in a transitional climate zone between North-Atlantic-influenced climate systems and monsoonal-influenced climate systems, the region has an arid to semi-arid climate, meaning it receives relatively little precipitation. Despite this dry climate, the Levant has historically been known as the Fertile Crescent for its rich soil and relatively high access to water, which comes from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. 

    These factors have allowed for high agricultural output in the Levant, which has helped many civilizations flourish over thousands of years. Climate change threatens this agricultural productivity and the humans who depend on it. 

    Climate Change 

    Climate change refers to long-term shifts in regional or global climate and weather patterns. Though these changes can result from natural processes, today, climate change is primarily driven by human activity. The IPCC notes that there is strong evidence for anthropogenic drivers of climate change, meaning man-made drivers. These include the burning of fossil fuels and other human actions—such as deforestation, increased livestock farming, and the use of fluorinated gasses—that have caused the Earth to warm. Global warming refers to the overall heating of the Earth due to the greenhouse effect, which occurs when greenhouse gasses, such as carbon dioxide, trap heat from the Sun in the Earth’s atmosphere. 

    Since the Industrial Revolution, humans have exponentially increased the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to the extent that the Earth is warming at an unprecedented and accelerated rate. As the Earth’s temperature increases on a global level, regional climate systems are affected differently, meaning the climate is changing rather than simply warming.

    Man-made global climate change is having and will continue to have many harmful effects. These include sea level rise; more frequent and extreme natural disasters; biodiversity loss; longer, hotter heatwaves and droughts; and changes in precipitation patterns, among others. As the Earth warms, these effects will exacerbate existing economic, social, and political problems. For this reason, climate change is widely considered a threat multiplier—it increases political instability and social upheaval and therefore poses a security risk to humans and governments around the world. 

    The Physical Effects of Climate Change in the Levant 

    In the Levant, the worst effects of climate change include longer and more severe droughts, desertification, hotter temperatures, decreased rainfall, and more frequent dust storms. These effects are occurring simultaneously today and will only get worse in the future. 

    • Drought: According to a NASA study 1998-2012, the Levant region experienced its most severe drought of the past 900 years. During this recent drought, the Levant was 50% drier than at any other point in the past 500 years and 10-20% drier than the driest period during the last nine centuries. Because of climate change, droughts in the Levant and elsewhere globally are expected to be more intense, last longer, and set in quicker. 
    • Desertification: The Levant’s dryland ecosystem is extremely susceptible to overexploitation and improper land use. These practices contribute to the region’s desertification—land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas caused by human activities and climatic variations. This process causes reduced crop and livestock productivity, changes in the composition of plant species, and reduced biological diversity. Thus, in the Levant, it will cause a reduction in the amount of land suitable for agriculture. 
    • Hotter Temperatures and Worse Heatwaves: Because of climate change, the Levant is expected to experience both increased average temperatures and more intense and longer heatwaves. Climate models predict that temperatures in the Levant will continue to rise, and the region will become increasingly hotter and drier. These climate change effects are already visible throughout the region as countries experience record-breaking heat. When combined with high humidity, extreme heat poses health risks, especially to the elderly and children. 
    • Decreased Rainfall and Changing Patterns: Climate change is projected to decrease the average amount of rainfall in the Levant, a region that already does not receive much precipitation. This effect not only poses a problem for regional agriculture, which often relies on rainfall but is also connected to the other environmental problems the region faces. In the past, the Levant’s climate has been characterized by dry summers and more temperate, rainy winters. However, as the climate changes, rainfall patterns are shifting, which has meant drier winters. This shift in rainfall patterns, likely due to an atmospheric shift bringing drier air to the region, is important because rain-fed farming systems like many in the region are especially vulnerable to changes in rainfall patterns. 
    • Sand and Dust Storms: Another major climate-related concern for the Levant is the increase and worsening of dust storms. These storms are remarkable for their intensity and the large size of their dust particles. The particles from the massive sandstorm that occurred in the region in September 2015 were bigger than any that had been recorded since 1995. The sandstorm created a thick layer of dust spanning Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Cyprus. Dust storms cause significant air pollution, which is a hazard for people’s health in itself, and these storms also increase aircraft and traffic accidents. 

    Government Mismanagement in the Levant 

    While climate change has caused or exacerbated these physical effects, related issues have contributed to the problems the region faces today. Namely, pollution and other consequences of government mismanagement have further worsened environmental and living conditions in the region. Poor governance and corruption make people in the Levant less able to feel relief from extreme heat and other climate change effects, as citizens face water and electricity shortages when they need these resources the most. In other words, there is less water now, and of what water there is, the public cannot access it. 

    The Effects of Climate Change on Humanity in the Levant 

    Between the intensifying impacts of climate change and inadequate government responses to these effects, the people living in the Levant face worsening living conditions due to a number of climate-related problems. These include water scarcity, food insecurity, climate migration, more disease, worsening economic conditions, and social strife. 

    • Water Scarcity: Due to climate change and its drying effects on the Levant region, freshwater resources have become more scarce, in both quantity and quality. Additionally, pollution and the salinization—increased salt concentration in water—of rivers and other water sources worsen water quality. An increasing number of people in the region are facing a lack of access to clean water, which is a public health concern as well. The effects of climate change, such as increased rainfall, flooding, and droughts, can often degrade water quality even as population growth increases its demand. As clean water becomes increasingly inaccessible, the risk of water-borne illnesses like cholera goes up as people are forced to consume contaminated water. For instance, contaminated water in Gaza leaves people more vulnerable to illnesses and infections, including cholera, Salmonella, diarrhea, polio, and viral meningitis. 
    • Food Insecurity: As temperatures continue to rise, water supplies continue to fall, and environment degradation worsens, food insecurity is likely to increase throughout the Levant. Agriculture productivity has and will continue to decrease because of droughts, desertification, and dust storms. The latter is particularly damaging to crops and can remove nutrient-rich topsoil further reducing food production. Food insecurity has serious public health consequences, especially for children, since malnutrition can stunt development physically and intellectually. Moreover, Syria’s food shortage prior to the civil war caused the mass displacement of farmers, who could not remain in their homes after they lost both their source of income and sustenance. Food insecurity in the country has only grown worse since 2011, as millions of Syrians continue to go hungry. 
    • Climate Migration: Another effect of climate change is an increase in forced internal and international migration throughout the Levant. Extreme weather events, like severe flooding, will at least temporarily displace tons of people and destroy tons of acres of crops, taking away people’s livelihoods in the long term. More slow-onset events like desertification will permanently displace people as more and more areas become uninhabitable. Climate change has already caused the mass migration of millions of people in the Levant alone. In Iraq, for example, water scarcity has led to a dramatic increase in forced migration and urbanization. 
    • More Disease and Illness: As the Earth warms, mosquitoes are able to travel outside of their normal regions, increasing the spread of infectious diseases and reaching new populations. Indeed, climate-related effects will result in more disease transmission in the Levant in multiple ways. Malnutrition from lack of access to nutritious food can increase the likelihood of contracting an infectious disease. According to the United Nations, change in land use is the “primary transmission pathway for emerging infectious diseases of humans, over 60% of which are zoonotic.” Other issues are the negative health outcomes that come from extreme temperatures, including dehydration, heat exhaustion, heatstroke, and death. Extreme heat also reduces health systems’ capabilities to address issues and increases the number of accidents and the transmission rate of illnesses. All of these climate factors are present in the Levant.
    • Worsening Economic Conditions: Climate change will exacerbate existing economic issues and deepen poverty in the Levant as well. It has and will continue to increase employment fragility as it threatens economic productivity and many industries like agriculture. It will also increase competition for low-skill jobs as displaced people search for work. The rising costs of climate change put additional pressure on national economies while constraining governments’ capabilities to implement sustainable policies and invest in sustainable infrastructure. On a macro and micro level, climate change poses a great risk to people’s economic fortunes. 
    • Social Strife: In addition to the economic and societal problems described above, global climate change drives social unrest and accelerates armed conflict in the Levant. As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and others have noted, “The climate crisis isn’t coming. It’s already here,” and it brings with it instability and conflict in Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere. Furthermore, resource mismanagement by governments in the Levant exacerbates the climate change effects, thereby worsening living conditions even more.

    Conclusion

    Climate change and its effects have already worsened living conditions in the Levant and will continue to exacerbate problems in the coming years. Furthermore, as the impacts of climate change worsen economic and social conditions, these bad social and economic conditions can cause further climate effects in a devastating feedback loop. For example, scientists believe that the Syrian civil war may have created the conditions for a deadly dust storm across the region. This terrible cycle will intensify as the temperature of the planet continues to rise and as these climate effects wreak more and more havoc on people throughout the Levant.

  • Intro to 2018 U.S. Sanctions on Iran

    Intro to 2018 U.S. Sanctions on Iran

    History

    Sanctions have been the core of U.S.-Iran foreign policy since the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the U.S. government imposed sanctions as part of its strategy to prevent the Iranian government from supporting terrorist groups and destabilizing the Middle East. In the mid-2000s, U.S.-imposed sanctions expanded to curb Iran’s nuclear weapon production and reduce the country’s missile arsenal. Financial sanctions weighed heavily on Iran’s economy for decades, and led to the Iranian government agreeing to the 2015 J.C.P.O.A. 

    The Iran Nuclear Deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.), was supported by permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Germany, the European Union, and Iran. It committed to alleviating U.S., E.U., and U.N. sanctions if Iran complied with a list of demands, including restrictions on nuclear production. Though many economic sanctions were lifted under the J.C.P.O.A., some U.S. sanctions, including on direct trade with Iran and on Iran’s support of regional armed groups, remained in place.

    In 2018, the Trump Administration claimed Iran was not obeying the Iran Nuclear Deal rules, which sought to place limits on the country’s nuclear arms program, among other guidelines. In response, the Trump Administration removed the United States from the J.C.P.O.A. and introduced a “maximum pressure” campaign. At this time, sanctions that were eased under the 2015 nuclear agreement were reimposed with greater intensity.

    Benefits for the U.S.

    According to the Trump Administration, Iran’s nuclear program threatened  U.S. interests, and the J.C.P.O.A. didn’t curb inappropriate actions committed by the Iranian government. In a 2019 report by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the reintroduction of sanctions sought to prevent the Iranian government from proceeding further with the following actions:

    1. Repressing the Iranian people
    2. Diverting humanitarian aid from low income Iranians to government interests
    3. Growing the country’s weapons arsenal
    4. Contributing to destabilization in the Middle East and promoting terrorism around the world

    In order to stop Iran’s “unacceptable actions” in the Middle East, sanctions were designed to cripple Iran’s main industries (oil, shipping, and banking) and weaken the country’s currency and purchasing power. These “unacceptable actions” referred to Iran’s support of terrorist organizations in Syria, Yemen, and other countries.

    Impacts on Iran

    Political Impact

    Sanctions can make counties more authoritarian and give more power to corrupt governments that hoard resources and use their power to control their people. While the entire country loses wealth, the government and financial elites lose less wealth than average citizens. In this way, U.S. sanctions on Iran have slowed the movement for democracy and civil rights in the country. Since the reimposition of sanctions, the Iranian government has continued to arrest activists for demonstrations and for promoting equal rights. However, it is not clear that these actions are directly related to the reimposition of sanctions.

    Economic Impact

    Financial sanctions have contributed to the following consequences for the Iranian economy:

    1. Currency Decline and Inflation: Iran’s currency value declined from 35,000 rials to the U.S. dollar under the J.C.P.O.A. to 265,000 rials to the U.S. dollar in late 2020. This contributed to major inflation – 45% in 2021 –  after the U.S.’s 2018 reimposition of sanctions.
    2. Lack of International Financial System Involvement: Additional sanctions in 2018 were placed on Iranian banks that were owned privately or by the government. Any financial institution who enters transactions with these sanctioned banks could face prosecution in the U.S. In 2019, international firms feared retaliation from the U.S. if they were caught in any form of transaction with Iran, including humanitarian imports into Iran. This threat prevented many firms from any interaction with Iran-based banks or organizations. Years of similar sanctions have inhibited Iran’s role in international trade, which ultimately affects the country’s wealth, imports of necessary items, and the number of reliable trading partners abroad.
    3. Oil Sales Reduction and Recession: Oil exports and petroleum production are the main industries in Iran. Reimposed and additional sanctions on banks involved in Iranian exports caused a decrease in oil sales and the inability of Iran to fully participate in the international financial system. In turn, this made Iran’s economy fall into a recession.

    Social Impact

    In recent years, Iran has experienced an increase in food insecurity due to inflation and a decrease in value of the rial. In addition, reports suggest a rise in domestic violence and suicide due to stressful economic conditions. Further, street fights have broken out in lines at food markets and currency exchanges over tense financial conditions exacerbated by economic sanctions on Iran.

    According to the Iranian National Bank in 2020, the poverty rate in Iran was close to 20%. However, other reports claim the rate to be as high as 35-40%. There are reports that generational poverty is more growing under the financial sanctions, which make it harder for employed Iranians born into poverty to climb the ladder to higher socio-economic classes.

    Though the U.S. government claimed sanctions would not impact the entry of humanitarian aid into the country, Human Rights Watch claims that sanctions have limited the purchasing power of Iranian healthcare facilities to acquire medicines for Iranians. Depreciation of Iranian currency, limits on banks who can finance sales with Iran, and threats to companies importing goods into the country prevent many Iranians from obtaining goods. 

    Future of U.S.-Iran Relations

    Election of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi

    The reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 2018 suggested to Iranians that working with the U.S. through diplomatic channels would not equate to a healthy relationship between the countries. Since sanctions were imposed, Iran saw “hardliners” win a majority of parliamentary elections in February of 2020. Additionally, many strong candidates running for president of Iran in 2021 considered themselves on the conservative and uncompromising side of politics. This categorization included the newly elected president, Ebrahim Raisi. 

    Raisi was elected president of Iran in June, 2021 with less than 50% voter turnout. Raisi is supported by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and has a record of human rights abuses. With Khamenei and Raisi on the same page, reports suggest Iran will become more conservative. This will likely include the Iranian government acting without the voice of the urban middle class, who support social reforms.

    J.C.P.O.A. (Iran Nuclear Deal)In early 2021, the Biden Administration said it welcomed a return to the J.C.P.O.A., with modifications, and a removal of harsh sanctions if Iran is willing to comply. On the other hand, the Iranian government wants the U.S. to remove the economic sanctions before an agreement is made and promise longevity for the future agreement. Further, Raisi suggested he would agree to a similar deal to the 2015 agreement but promised to push harder in talks related to Iran’s weapons capabilities. However, Raisi brings more conservative and unwavering views to the table, suggesting an unclear path to a deal between the countries. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain, and Israel believe they have a right to enter talks regarding an updated nuclear deal with Iran, but Iranian leadership has qualms about the involvement of these countries.

  • Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

    Negotiations between Iran and the United Nations Security Council have been ongoing since Iran was detected building uranium enriched centrifuges in 2002, in violation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, negotiations did not result in meaningful action until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed on July 14, 2015 by Iran, the European Union and the P5+1 (the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, which included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany). Iran aimed to relieve sanctions which hindered its economic growth, while the P5+1 wanted to delay Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon. The agreement was gradually fulfilled by both sides until the United States withdrew from the JCPOA under the leadership of President Trump. Under President Joe Biden, the JCPOA has been revived with new negotiations underway. 

    The journey towards the JCPOA was not entirely smooth. Initially, Iran had already signed onto the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1967 where it agreed to forgo becoming a nuclear armed state. So when Iran was discovered to have secret nuclear sites in 2003, the international community began to worry about what the discovery would mean for the rest of the world, and the Middle Eastern region in particular. If Iran were to attain a nuclear weapon, Israel, which has had a strained relationship with Iran ever since the Gulf War, promised military action would be a consequence. This would potentially trigger a war involving Hezbollah, a Shiite political party and militant group that opposes Israel, or serve as an example to other Arabian states, like Saudi Arabia, that they could also obtain a nuclear weapon without ramifications.

    For almost ten years, the international community unsuccessfully tried to find different ways of reaching a deal with Iran. The first negotiations that took place were between Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). This agreement had Iran cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, sign the Additional Protocol and temporarily suspend conversion and enrichment activities but not stop enrichment entirely. The agreement between Iran and the E3 was only temporary and a start to a possible long-term solution that could benefit both sides. However, negotiations broke down in 2005 under the newly elected Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was viewed as a hardliner. Iran announced they would be resuming uranium conversion and rejected the EU3’s proposed Long Term Agreement. For Iran, the agreement was viewed as heavy on demands, light on incentives, and did not adequately compromise with Iran’s demands. Another agreement was proposed in 2008 between Iran and P5+1 which would give Iran access to light water reactor (LWR) technology and a nuclear fuel supply in exchange for Iran’s suspension of enrichment activity. As with the previous agreement, Ahmadinejad refused the offer and instead pushed for more enrichment. In 2011, a potential plan was proposed by the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. This new plan would involve the gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for Iran limiting enrichment. The eventual goal would be Iran suspending enrichment entirely and all sanctions being lifted. Iran agreed to the plan, but the United States, United Kingdom, and France refused. Negotiations remained at a stand-still, while the West continued to sanction Iran and Iran continued improving its enrichment capability.  

    Following a 2011 IAEA report which fully laid out Iran’s nuclear program, the rest of the world realized Iran was only a year or two away from attaining a nuclear weapon. This resulted in an increase in bilateral talks to reach a preferential agreement, one of which took place in 2012 between the P5+1 and Iran. The P5+1 proposal included Iran stopping uranium enrichment up to 20%, shipping out the enriched uranium they had already produced, and closing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, an uranium enrichment facility in Iran. Iran proposed their own plan which included the recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, sanctions relief, cooperation in nuclear energy and safety, and a possible cap on 20% uranium enrichment. Both sides disagreed with the proposals, resulting in further sanctions against Iran. 

    The situation evolved in 2013 when Iran elected a new president, Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned towards ending sanctions and stated in his inaugural address that his goals included “elevating Iran’s position based on national interest and lifting of the oppressive sanctions.” His statement was an indication of Iran becoming more receptive to negotiations regarding nuclear technology. Talks between Iran and the P5+1 were held in 2013, when the US stopped demanding that Iran completely cease enrichment activities. On November 24, an interim deal was struck which detailed the steps that would be taken until a more comprehensive solution could be agreed upon. The negotiations for a lasting agreement took until July 14, 2015.

    The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action required Iran to suspend and concede several points:

    In return, most of the economic sanctions imposed by the EU, UN and the US would be lifted or suspended once the IAEA had certified that Iran had taken the required steps outlined in the agreement. 

    The JCPOA allowed for 90 days between the Finalization Day and Adoption Day for Iran and the US to begin review processes of the agreement domestically. On Adoption Day, October 18, 2015, Iran and the P5+1 took the steps necessary to meet the commitments listed out in the JCPOA. On Implementation Day, 2016, the IAEA certified that Iran had taken the steps necessary to restrict its nuclear program and allowed for increased IAEA monitoring, which resulted in the U.S., EU and UN relieving some sanctions. In 2023, eight years after adoption day, the UN would lift missile restrictions, Iran would ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol, the EU would terminate all nuclear sanctions, and the United States would remove entities from the sanctioned list and continue sanctions relief. The JCPOA would end in October 2025 in which Iran’s nuclear file would be closed. 

    When then U.S. President Donald Trump was elected, he unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed all U.S. sanctions on Iran. Trump cited the sunset clause in the agreement as one of the reasons for his withdrawal. The sunset clause provided an expiration date to the ceasing of Iran’s enrichment activity. Many critics, including the Trump administration, viewed this as a countdown clock that would still lead to the eventual development of nuclear weapons by Iran. In addition, IAEA inspections would only take place at sites where legitimate concern for nuclear activity could be demonstrated, which excluded many military sites. Many critics claimed military sites are potential places for nuclear activity. Lastly, Trump also claimed the deal failed to account Iran’s ballistic missile program as during JCPOA negotiations, this topic was excluded from talks. The US withdrawal from the deal meant a reinstatement of sanctions against Iran that were previously waived. The US also terminated sanction waivers for cooperative nuclear projects, including transfer of enriched uranium out of Iran, transfer and storage of heavy water outside of Iran, and construction of additional reactor units at the Bushehr nuclear reactor. 

    While the US withdrew from the JCPOA, the rest of the signatories—France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—reemphasized their support for the deal and the importance of nonproliferation. The United Nations and Russia’s Foreign Ministry also released a statement in continued support of the JCPOA. 

    In response to the renewed sanctions, Iran began to recede from their JCPOA commitments. Iran began to enrich uranium past 3.67% and invested in research and development of centrifuge technology that did not adhere to IAEA monitoring and safeguards. Iran also notified the IAEA that its stock of heavy water had exceeded 130 metric tons. Additionally, in 2020, Iran passed new legislation to increase nuclear activities by boosting enrichment, increasing monthly uranium output and conducting research and development on centrifuges. Still, Iran continues to allow IAEA inspectors onto sites related to the JCPOA for verification and monitoring.  The Biden administration has been more willing to enter into negotiations with Iran on the future of the agreement. Biden has stated that the US would only rejoin the agreement if Iran returns to compliance, but also wants to further broaden the agreement topics to include Iran’s missile program. Iran is willing to return to compliance only to the original deal. Negotiations are currently still taking place between Iran and the P5+1.

  • Intro to Nuclear Related Sanctions Against Iran

    Intro to Nuclear Related Sanctions Against Iran

    The international community implements sanctions against Iran to discourage their development of nuclear technology. These sanctions mainly target the Iranian economy and individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear development program. Sanctions come from three major actors: the United States of America, the United Nations and the European Union. In international diplomacy, sanctions, especially economic ones, are utilized by countries or organizations to coerce, deter, punish or shame other international actors that might endanger their own interests or violate international norms of behavior. Iran has become the target of economic sanctions since they were suspected of developing uranium enrichment in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1967. 

    United Nations Sanctions

    The United Nations led the first set of sanctions related to Iran’s development of nuclear technology. The UN adopted Resolution 1737 in 2006, which prohibited countries from transferring nuclear and missile related technology to Iran and required all countries to freeze the assets of Iranian organizations and individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Sanctions were levied after Iran refused to suspend uranium enrichment activities after warnings from the International Atomic Energy Agency. The UN Security Council further expanded its sanctions against Iran in 2008 by adopting Resolution 1803, which required UN member states to actively prevent Iran from acquiring sensitive nuclear or missile technology and added thirteen people and seven entities to the UN blacklist. The additional resolution was adopted because Iran continued to oppose IAEA inspections of their nuclear facilities. In 2010, Iran, Brazil and Turkey came to a joint agreement to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. In reaction,  the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 which tightened proliferation-related sanctions and banned Iran from carrying out nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests. The resolution also added an arms embargo on the transfer of major weapons systems to Iran. In 2016 the UN acknowledged Iran had complied with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and passed a new resolution which lifted some sanctions. 

    European Union Sanctions

    Similar to the UN, the European Union levied sanctions to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. In a 2007 measure, the EU froze the assets of individuals and entities related to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. Further measures like visa bans, frozen assets, and actions against Iranian trade, financial services, energy and transport were implemented by the EU in 2010. The EU lifted their sanctions in 2016 when Iran signed onto the JCPOA and began adhering to those regulations.

    United States Sanctions

    Compared to the UN and the EU, the United States has a more complicated history of sanctions against Iran. The US began to impose sanctions on Iran in 2009 in response to then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s stated aim to build 10 uranium enrichment facilities. The U.S. House of Representatives passed sanctions on foreign companies that helped supply gasoline to Iran.

    In 2011, the IAEA released a report detailing how Iran’s current nuclear program could lead to the development of a nuclear weapon. Following this report, the US designated the Government of Iran and all financial institutions in Iran as entities of money laundering concern and warned global financial institutions that doing business with Iran was risky. That same year President Obama sanctioned the Central Bank of Iran and other financial institutions for processing transactions related to oil and petroleum products on behalf of Iranian companies and the government. Despite continued talks between Iran and the international community, negotiations for an agreement fell through as both sides were unwilling to make concessions In 2012, the US signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act which banned insurance, reinsurance, and other shipping services involved in nuclear proliferation. Congress further limited Iran’s oil exports and access to foreign currency reserves in 2013. President Obama added sanctions against foreign financial institutions that conducted transactions with Iranian currency or had accounts outside of Iran. When the JCPOA was implemented in 2015, the US slowly began to lift sanctions However, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and brought back all previous nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. Similar to the previous set of sanctions, these new sanctions were made against the Central Bank of Iran and required U.S. companies to sever contracts with Iran within 180 days.

    Impact of Sanctions

    Sanctions have greatly affected Iran’s economy but failed to deter Iran’s development of nuclear technology. Before the JCPOA, Iran’s GDP decreased by 20% and unemployment rose. Oil exports decreased from 2.5 mbd (thousand barrels) in 2011 to 1.1 mbd in 2014 and Iranian currency depreciated. The economic sanctions discouraged international banks and firms from engaging in commercial and financial transactions with Iran. With the return of sanctions and withdrawal from the JCPOA during the Trump presidency, similar economic consequences have impacted Iran’s economy. The reimplementation of sanctions have further damaged the oil industry in Iran with oil exports plummeting in mid-2020. Even with the new sanctions, the Iranian government refuses to slow down their nuclear development. Citing Trump’s backing out of the JCPOA, the Iran government sees the JCPOA as useless and believes it is in their right to push for higher uranium enrichment. As a result, Iran has begun to develop new centrifuges to accelerate uranium enrichment and has placed restrictions on the IAEA’s ability to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities. 

  • EU-Turkey Migration Agreement

    EU-Turkey Migration Agreement

    The EU-Turkey Migration Agreement was a 2016 agreement made between the 28 European Union member states and the Republic of Turkey to decrease crossings on the Greece-Turkey border. The agreement is still in effect in 2021.

    Context of the Agreement

    European nations experienced an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in 2015 when hundreds of thousands of migrants traveled from the Middle East and North Africa to apply for asylum. The leading cause of this crisis was the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011. By 2015, nonstate actors and extremist groups controlled more than half of the country, so millions of Syrians fled. In addition to Syria, protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan contributed to the surge in asylum applications. At the peak of the crisis in 2015, 1.3 million people filed asylum applications in the European Union. The Greek-Turkey land and maritime border became a main pathway for those seeking to enter the EU.

    Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics

    The European Union has a similar asylum policy to the United States; any person with a well-founded fear of persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group,” can apply for protection from an EU-member state if they are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin. This definition does not automatically apply to those fleeing violence and war, so EU law includes a stipulation for “subsidiary protection,” where a person who does not qualify through the traditional pathway but can demonstrate they would suffer a real risk of serious harm if returned to their country also qualifies for protection. European Union member states granted protection through both pathways during the humanitarian crisis.

    Logistics of the Agreement

    The agreement had three main components:

    1. All new “irregular migrants” crossing to Greece via Turkey could be returned to Turkey, as well as asylum seekers in Greece whose applications were denied. In exchange, for every irregular migrant returned to Turkey, one Syrian would be resettled in the EU. “Irregular migrants” was not defined in the agreement, but it is generally accepted to mean those without visas to enter Greece, which would include asylum seekers. This was designed to incentivize displaced people to stay in Turkey, rather than cross to Greece and apply for protection there. Since the agreement came into force, 28,000 Syrians have been resettled in the EU from Turkey through the exchange agreement.
    2. The European Union would provide €6 billion ($7.1 billion) to Turkey for refugee aid.
    3. Turkey and the European Union would work to revitalize cooperation through trade agreements, visa liberalization, and Turkey’s accession to the EU.

    Since the agreement was implemented, irregular migration to Greece has decreased 97%

    European Perspective

    Arguments in support:

    1. Humanitarian concerns: as asylum seekers flooded into the Greek islands, the conditions in refugee camps and shelters deteriorated. The camps became overcrowded and unsanitary, and it was seen as vital to stem the flow of migrants for the wellbeing of those already there. In addition, many asylum seekers drowned attempting to sail to Greek islands, or else paid smugglers to transport them and fell victim to human trafficking. 
    2. Political concerns: there was a widespread perception among citizens of member states that the European Union was failing to handle the crisis. A 2016 survey found that citizens overwhelmingly disapproved of the EU response, with attitudes ranging from 60 to 80% disapproving and reaching as high as 95% disapproving among Greek citizens. Governments and citizens felt overwhelmed by the sheer number of asylum seekers, and were concerned about the economic burden and a potential strain on the social safety net. The United Kingdom voted to leave the EU in 2016 (also known as “Brexit”) and the refugee issue and immigration concerns played a large role in that decision. All of these factors contributed to a desire to take immediate action.

    Arguments in opposition:

    1. Outsourcing asylum: human rights organizations and activists objected to the agreement because they felt it allowed European Union member states to abdicate their obligation to those in need of international protection. The agreement effectively created a “buffer state” blocking asylum seekers from applying for international protection. Following the Turkey agreement, the European Union came to a similar deal with Libya.
    2. Turkey as a “safe country”: recent reports suggest that Syrians and other displaced people in Turkey do not have access to resources to fulfill basic human needs. Many are homeless or living in dilapidated housing, and rely on charity or work in the informal sector. In addition, human rights organizations have documented the Turkish government forcibly relocating refugees back to Syria, violating the international principle of “non refoulement,” which means refugees should not be forced to return to a country where they will face persecution. Because of these factors, some argue that Turkey is not itself a safe country, and therefore returning refugees to Turkey also violates the non refoulement principle.

    Turkish Perspective

    Arguments in support:

    1. Improve cooperation with the EU: the agreement included a provision to discuss visa liberalization, meaning that Turkish citizens would be able to enter the Schengen Area without applying for a visa in advance. In addition, the EU and Turkey currently have a Customs Union which allows for tariff-free trade with several exceptions; part of the agreement involves updating the Union for improved trade relations. Finally, the agreement specifically mentions working towards Turkey’s accession to the European Union, however there are doubts about whether either side really believed this would come to pass. Turkey had not met the economic and political standards needed to join the EU at the time of the agreement, and subsequently experienced democratic backsliding which made joining the EU even more distant.
    2. Funding for refugee aid: as part of the agreement, Turkey received €6 billion to fund refugee aid and resettlement, relieving some of the pressure on the government.
    3. Strong lever in international negotiations: Turkey is currently working to project influence in its neighborhood by playing a larger role in the outcome of conflicts in the region. This brings it into conflict with the European Union in the protracted Cyprus conflict and the Libyan Civil War, among others. The 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey make for a powerful bargaining chip in EU-Turkey negotiations. In March of 2020, Turkey opened the border with Greece and actively pushed for migrants to cross, after a disagreement over military strategy in Syria.

    Arguments in opposition:

    1. Same political concerns: although Turkey was initially welcoming to refugees, after five years, 3.6 million refugees, and no end in sight, public approval has turned decidedly negative. Refugees tend to be conservative and religious, while a large portion of the Turkish middle and upper classes are secular and more progressive, creating a culture clash. In addition, Turkey’s economy was struggling even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic’s toll on the tourism industry, which accounts for 12% of Turkey’s GDP. In the last election, the governing AKP party experienced significant losses which were largely attributed to economic and refugee issues.
    2. Costs outweigh benefits: the Turkish government estimates it has spent €35 billion on refugee resettlement and aid, far outpacing the EU commitment of €6 billion. In addition, Turkey is far from  from meeting EU accession targets and no progress has been made on the visa liberalization as of yet.

    Impact and Future Developments

    The immediate impact of the agreement was a dramatic decrease in the crossings from Turkey to Greece (97% down two years out). In the longer term, Turkey-EU relations have continued to worsen despite the immigration cooperation, due to a lack of strategic alignment on regional issues. Despite the agreement, European citizens overwhelmingly disapprove of government handling of the refugee crisis. This led to the rise of anti-immigrant parties across Europe. It is possible that without the agreement, disapproval with the government response would be even higher.

    In the future, the situation in Turkey for refugees is likely to devolve. Turkish citizens want to see progress on the issue, but Syria is still largely unsafe for refugees to return. There have been some reports that the Turkish government is deporting Syrians and returning them to unsafe areas—these reports are denied by Turkey.