Category: Middle East and North Africa

The Global War on Terrorism 

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is an ongoing, international counterterrorism campaign led by the United States in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. More than 170 nations have taken on the cause, which has included targeting state and non-state actors such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Saddam Hussein regime. The GWOT has succeeded in protecting the United States and its citizens from attacks, with only about 100 Americans dying in the US in attacks by Islamist extremists since 2001. Despite its benefit for America, the GWOT has left many people in the Middle East displaced, both within and across international borders.

Refugees Displaced by the GWOT 

At least 37 million people have been displaced by the GWOT through eight post-9/11 wars in which the US has been crucially involved. During these wars, the US either had a clear responsibility for initiating combat, escalating combat, or for being a significant contributor to combat through drone strikes, logistical support, battlefield advising, and arms sales, among others. The 37 million people includes upwards of 8 million refugees and 29 million internally displaced people (IDPs). For the purpose of this brief, refugees will be defined as people who have been displaced across international borders. There have been over 2 million refugees each from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria as a direct and indirect result of the GWOT. The GWOT has expanded beyond the Middle East, leading to hundreds of thousands more refugees from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and the Philippines. While the plight of the 29 million IDPs is extremely important, this brief will focus on the 8 million refugees, as policy solutions for refugees and IDPs would be vastly different.

How Host Countries Have Handled an Influx of Refugees

Most refugees who have escaped violence from the GWOT in the Middle East have fled to neighboring countries, especially Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Turkey currently hosts around 3.7 million refugees, Jordan hosts around 3 million refugees, and Lebanon hosts around 1.3 million refugees. Those three countries also host the most displaced people per capita in the Middle East. It is of note that many of these refugees come from Syria as a result of the Syrian Civil War. However, for this policy brief, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan can still be focused on because they host the most refugees displaced by the GWOT.

Turkey is home to the world’s highest population of refugees. Most of these refugees live outside camps under challenging circumstances, such as reduced food consumption or living in poor-quality housing. Turkey has made efforts to supply registered refugees with education and healthcare, among other rights and services. To help in those areas, the European Union (EU) has provided over six billion euros in aid through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, in which they focus on humanitarian assistance, education, health, and migration management, among others. 

Turkey also has both international and national legislation pertaining to refugees. Turkey is a party to the United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Convention defined the term “refugee,” gave refugees protection from persecution, and established a principle of non-refoulement, which states that refugees cannot be sent back to their home countries if there are concerns of oppression.  The 1967 Protocol removed geographic and temporal limitations of the Convention. In terms of national legislation, Turkey implemented its first domestic asylum law in 2014, titled the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. This law established a legal framework for migration and asylum, stating that refugees will not be sent back to dangerous or discriminatory places. It created an institution to manage international protection, and gave refugees a way to apply for residence permits. The same year, Turkey adopted the Temporary Protection Regulation, which outlines rights of refugees and procedures for refugees granted temporary protection. However, it is of note that Turkey does not recognize Syrians seeking asylum as refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention.

Unlike Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan both have not ratified the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. The governments of those two countries view asylum seekers from other countries as guests, not as refugees. A partial goal of this approach is to prevent the integration of refugees into society. Because Lebanon and Jordan are not party to the international treaties, they are not required to recognize the rights of refugees guaranteed by the Convention. Instead, it is their job as host countries, as well as the jobs of  international agencies, to promote the wellbeing of refugees, which can be problematic. In both countries, refugees face employment restrictions, poor housing, and inadequate access to services. On top of that, there are negative views from many citizens in Lebanon and Jordan towards refugees, and the same goes for the views of Turkish citizens towards refugees.

Although many aspects of the refugee situation in Lebanon and Jordan are similar, both countries have also dealt with the influx of refugees using differing strategies. The Jordanian government has input a legal framework to address the refugee crisis. What seemed like progress for refugees actually turned out to be a liability, as the policies have become more restrictive. The Lebanese government has taken a different approach, allowing local institutions to handle many aspects of accommodations for refugees. Despite its downfalls, Jordan has made some recent progress. In 2021, Jordan issued 62,000 work permits to refugees, which is a record number.  

US Policy Options

There are policy options that can help improve the wellbeing of refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Since these countries have the most refugees displaced by the GWOT, it makes sense to focus on them for US policy options. It is notable that by listing policy solutions to help refugees, this brief only explores the view that the US should intervene to help refugees. Listed below are some of the options.

The US could encourage Lebanon and Jordan to sign the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its accompanying 1967 Protocol. The US could do this through negotiations with Lebanon and Jordan, such as a deal to provide increased aid to support refugees in those countries in return for signing the Convention and Protocol.

Pros 

1. The US fulfills its strategic interest as a global peacekeeper.
2. There are many benefits for refugees. Their quality of life could improve, and they would be granted many protected rights and freedoms outlined under the Convention and Protocol. In Lebanon and Jordan, legal aid actors spend too much time advocating for the right to legal stay for refugees. Since the Convention requires states to regularize the status of refugees within their borders, signing it would make legal stay in Lebanon and Jordan more accessible. 
3. Promoting the Convention and Protocol would be less of an infringement on Lebanese and Jordanian national sovereignty than promoting domestic laws.
4. Providing aid as a negotiation tactic would help lower Lebanon and Jordan’s out-of-pocket costs to help refugees. More money could then be spent to promote the refugees’ wellbeing.

Cons 

1. Since signing the Convention and Protocol would help refugees to gain legal stay in Lebanon and Jordan, it may exacerbate tensions between refugees and citizens of Lebanon and Jordan.
2. Signing the Convention and Protocol may not actually do much, as there is already influence from both in Lebanon and Jordan today. That influence comes in the form of norms being spread to those countries. Therefore, the US may be wasting resources to pursue this option.

The US could promote peace and positive relationships between refugees and the citizens of host nations. Refugees are not likely to leave Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan any time soon, so the US can try to improve their quality of life there so that they can more easily integrate into those societies. The US can do this through diplomatic talks with government leaders, which would ideally lead to a campaign supporting refugees trying to integrate into their societies. 

Pros

1. If the relationship between refugees and host citizens becomes more positive, there will subsequently be more support for programs, laws, and infrastructure that would promote the wellbeing of refugees. 
2. Although an ultimate goal would be for refugees to safely return home, this is often not possible due to unsafe conditions. Therefore, improving quality of life may be the best option at the current moment. 

Cons

1. Turkish president Erdoğan suggests that he is not on good terms with President Biden. Because of this, diplomatic talks may be difficult.
2. Citizens of the host nations may view the US attempt to integrate refugees into their societies as an infringement on their national sovereignty.
3. Host citizens may not want refugees to integrate into their societies.

Fact Sheet

A small country in terms of landmass, Israel spans 21,937 sq km in the Middle East, bordered by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. It stands as one of America’s robust economic allies, boasting a 2021 GDP of $488.5 billion and a 6.5% growth rate in 2022. With a population exceeding nine million, Israel is highly diverse, with 74% Jewish, 21.1% Arab, and 4.9% representing other cultures. In terms of religion, it comprises 74% Jewish, 18% Muslim, 2% Christian, and 1.5% Druze, while the remaining 4.5% adhere to other religions.

The United States and Israel share a robust economic relationship, with a trade value of $47.0 billion in 2019. Israeli exports to the U.S. comprised $26.9 billion, and U.S. exports to Israel were $20.2 billion. Key traded goods include pharmaceuticals, technology, and raw minerals. Additionally, the U.S. provides substantial military and development aid to Israel, sending over $3.8 billion in assistance to the Israeli government in 2020.

History of Israel-US relations

Since its inception on May 14th, 1948, the United States has maintained a steadfast relationship with Israel. The U.S. was the first nation to recognize Israel’s sovereignty upon its declaration of statehood. Although initial hesitation existed, particularly after World War II, due to concerns about a Middle Eastern arms race, the U.S. eventually deepened its military ties with Israel, especially as the USSR militarized Arab states. This marked the beginning of a longstanding military alliance. U.S. military aid played a crucial role in Israel’s conflicts, including the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Beyond the military sphere, Israel’s advanced technology and trade sectors have solidified its position as a vital trade ally. The U.S. also values Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East, considering it a bastion of democracy and a close ally.

The U.S.-Israel relationship plays a crucial role in mediating the Israel-Palestine conflict, stemming from the UN’s adoption of Resolution 181, which partitioned Palestine in 1947. Territorial disputes escalated after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and the 1967 conflict, leading to the occupation of disputed territories by Israel. The U.S., while broadly supporting Israel, has opposed the full absorption of disputed land. It has actively pursued diplomatic solutions, leading diplomatic efforts after the 1967 and 1973 wars. Through the United Nations Security Council, the United States was a key player in passing Resolutions 497 (1981), Security Council Resolutions 252 (1968); 267 (1969); 298 (1971); 446 (1979); 445 (1979), all of which condemned Israel’s territorial expansion. Moreover, the U.S. has been a leading actor in brokering compromises, hosting the 1978 and 2000 Camp David accords. The overall commitment remains to a “two-state solution,” advocating for a fair division of land between Israel and Palestine for peaceful coexistence.

Modern U.S.-Israel Relations

In the modern era, the U.S.-Israel relationship has grown more complex. Critics within the United States argue that America’s defense aid to Israel contradicts its goals for Israel-Palestine, as U.S. weapons may be used against Palestinians. Despite this, military cooperation, particularly in cyberwarfare, information, and technology, has deepened. Israel’s democracy has faced challenges, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government adopting increasingly conservative views, leading to a weakening of the judiciary, reduced human rights, and restricted freedom of speech. Recent spikes in Israeli-Palestinian violence have heightened regional unrest. Consequently, recent meetings between U.S. officials like Secretary of State Blinken and President Biden and Israel have centered on democracy promotion and regional de-escalation, reflecting strains in the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

In a controversial foreign policy move in 2018, the United States, under the Trump administration, relocated its embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem and officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This decision sparked controversy as the international community considers East Jerusalem as occupied territory, and Palestinians aspire to have it as their capital. Critics argue that recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital undermines peace processes, while proponents contend that it supports Israel’s claim to Jerusalem as its capital.

Shared Israel-US Interests

Historically, the United States and Israel share a commitment to common values and goals, rooted in their democratic principles. This alignment forms the basis of their strong relationship, evident in the significant aid, trade, and support that Israel receives from America. This mutual understanding is crucial for both nations.

In terms of U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East, supporting Israel serves multiple purposes. Elevating Israel as a geopolitical power provides the U.S. with a democratic ally to promote its values in an unstable region. Israel’s status as a nuclear power also aligns with U.S. security interests, leading to a shared commitment to safeguarding Israel’s capabilities. Some liberal politicians find affinity with Israel’s historically progressive politics, although this sentiment has waned in recent years. Moreover, Israel’s advanced cyber defense technology and strong economy contribute to a symbiotic relationship, allowing the U.S. to leverage mutual economic growth through this partnership.

U.S. Response

U.S. involvement in Yemen is multifaceted. Primarily, Washington has been engaged in counterterrorism efforts in Yemen since the early 2000s, fighting AQAP, the Islamic State, and affiliate groups. Since 2002, the U.S. has launched nearly 400 air strikes associated with counterterrorism efforts in Yemen. Policymakers fear that the instability in Yemen will embolden transnational terrorist groups and thus are interested in supporting a government that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 

Regarding the conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, Washington’s support for the coalition is tied to the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership and concerns that the war threatens Saudi Arabia’s position vis-a-vis Iran. Additionally, the U.S. is interested in maintaining access to the Bab al Mandeb strait through which many of the world’s oil shipments pass. 

Both the Obama and Trump administrations provided logistical and intelligence support–weapons, military advice, and a coordinated planning cell–to the Saudi-led coalition. Both presidents scaled down support for the coalition as the humanitarian situation in Yemen worsened and human rights groups alleged the Saudi-led coalition of indiscriminately bombing civilians and critical infrastructure. 

In February 2021, President Joe Biden introduced a new initiative to end the conflict in Yemen, signaling a renewed focus on advancing diplomatic efforts and resolving the humanitarian crisis. The plan included ending U.S support for Saudi-led offensive operations in Yemen and appointing a special envoy for Yemen, career diplomat Timothy Lenderking. A week later, the State Department revoked the Trump administration’s designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). However, the Biden administration has sanctioned some Houthi leaders under Yemen-specific authorities. Despite his decision to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition, President Biden reiterated the United States’ commitment to helping Saudi Arabia defend itself from Houthi attacks. 

A small number of U.S. military personnel are stationed in Yemen to conduct operations against AQAP and the Islamic State. Amidst Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Biden administration authorized additional deployments of U.S. military personnel and equipment to the UAE in February 2022.

Perspectives on Washington’s Yemen Policy 

Although Congress has been divided on Washington’s Yemen policy since 2015, many lawmakers supported Biden’s Yemen plan due to increasing concerns that U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition has enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law and contributed to Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. However, some lawmakers and human rights organizations find Biden’s distinction between weapons systems used for offensive operations in Yemen and arms supplied for Saudi Arabia’s territorial defense vague. Some assert that the U.S. still enables coalition air strikes by providing spare parts and maintenance for the Saudi air force. This concern was echoed by 50 members of Congress who proposed a bipartisan War Powers Resolution in June 2022 to end U.S. involvement in the war entirely. The House has adopted the provision for three consecutive years, but the legislation has not been enacted.

Additionally, lawmakers and aid organizations supported the Biden administration’s reversal of the FTO designation. Many claimed that the FTO designation of the Houthis prevented the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid. However, critics of revoking the FTO designation claim that the decision fails to incentivize the Houthis to end attacks on coalition targets, halt advances, or participate in peace talks.

Recent Developments 

On April 1, 2022, the Houthis and the internationally recognized government in Yemen agreed to a two-month UN-mediated truce, which the parties renewed in June for an additional two months. The parties agreed to halt all military operations, open ports to fuel ships, and allow flights to and from the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport. Shortly after the parties reached an agreement, interim President Hadi stepped down and ceded his powers to an eight-member presidential council. According to some reports, Saudi officials arranged Hadi’s resignation. In August 2022, the parties agreed to renew the truce for another two months, although significant barriers to lasting peace remain. 

. 

Additional Policy Considerations  

Washington’s current priority in Yemen is to use the leverage from the current truce to advance a more permanent political settlement and improve the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Several experts and members of Congress have suggested that the Biden administration propose a plan to Saudi Arabia to further ease port restrictions at Hodeida or lift the air and naval blockade altogether. The current blockade prevents some delivery of fuel and supplies to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port, which threatens the delivery of aid, food, and water to Yemenis in areas under the Sanaa-based authorities’ control. Although the current truce has allowed more fuel ships to enter the port and opened flights from the Sanaa airport, President Biden’s Yemen team could push the Saudis to expand upon the current agreement. 

Some analysts are skeptical of lifting the blockade, which the Houthis have historically identified as a prerequisite for peace talks. Some believe such action will allow Iranian weapons to reach the Houthis and provide them with more funds and aid, which the Houthis have withheld or diverted in the past. If the truce breaks down and hostilities continue, some fear that Ansar Allah could use newly acquired resources from port revenues to fund their offensive further. However, a United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects imports for illicit weapons, is already in place; the Saudi and Yemeni government-enforced vessel clearance process is a secondary measure. A possible solution to the anti-Houthi camps’ fears about port revenues is to allow the UNVIM to manage and direct port revenues while the parties negotiate a broader political settlement. 

The Republic of Yemen, a small country of 29 million on the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, has been torn apart by war since 2014. Separate but overlapping violent conflicts, exacerbated by a Saudi-led military intervention, have generated political fragmentation and the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Of the estimated quarter of a million people that have died in Yemen since 2014, over half of those deaths are the result of indirect causes such as hunger and inadequate access to medical services. As of 2022, 16.2 million people, over half the population, face acute hunger, and 4.3 million Yemenis are internally displaced. All parties to the conflict are accused of violating international humanitarian law. As the war in Yemen approaches its eighth year, many are hopeful that the recent UN-mediated truce will finally end Yemen’s crisis. 

Background 

Yemeni politics are complicated by historic divisions across cultural, religious, and geographic lines. The modern state of Yemen was established in 1990 through the unification of two regimes: the Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. Soon after, a military officer named Ali Abdullah Saleh became the country’s leader. Saleh remained president until the 2011 Arab Spring protests, when thousands of Yemenis took to the streets to demand his resignation following accusations of corruption. After his ousting, Saleh’s vice president, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, took over in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

Backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. and recognized as legitimate by the UN, Hadi’s interim government faced challenges from various groups, including a secessionist movement in south Yemen, former government loyalists, and Houthi rebels. Meanwhile, Yemen continued to be plagued by government corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity.

Yemen’s civil war began in September 2014 when the Houthis and Saleh loyalists took control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, demanding a new government and fuel subsidy reforms. Following failed negotiations with Hadi’s government, the Houthis and Saleh’s forces captured the city of Aden and seized the presidential palace, which led Hadi’s government to resign in January 2015. Subsequently, Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia and requested international intervention. In 2015, the Saudis formed a coalition backed by the United States and launched an offensive consisting of air raids and an economic blockade aimed at halting the Houthi advance and returning Hadi to power.

Who is Involved?  

The Houthis: The Houthi movement, named after its founder Hussein al Houthi, emerged in the 1990s as a Zaydi revivalist movement in Yemen’s northern region. Zaydis practice a form of Shi’a Islam and are a minority in Yemen and the global Islamic community. In the early 2000s, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), grew into a political and military movement opposed to then-president Saleh’s government. From 2004 to 2010, Saleh attempted to suppress the group using military force, but the Houthis maintained a presence in the north. 

Since capturing Sanaa in 2014, Ansar Allah has created a coalition–often referred to as the Sanaa-based authorities–with northern political, military, and tribal groups. The alliance, led by the Houthis, has cemented control of Yemen’s north-western highlands and Red Sea coast, where about 70% of Yemen’s population lives. Many Yemenis oppose the Houthis’ de facto governance and criticize the group’s repressive security system and its’ practices of firing missiles into populated areas and shelling cities. The Houthis’ primary goal is to gain international recognition of a Houthi-led government in Yemen. The group has increasingly attacked coalition targets, mainly critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the Houthis also face a web of adversaries inside Yemen, including the Southern Transition Council (STC), al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the Islamist party Islah. In February 2021, the Houthis launched an offensive to capture Marib, the last stronghold of the internationally recognized government. The group faced setbacks due to coalition airstrikes but made territorial gains in the Marib governorate in the final months of 2021. 

Iran: Shi’a-majority Iran has increasingly conducted irregular warfare against its adversaries, primarily through proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Iran is often accused of providing the Houthis arms, technology, training, and other forms of support. Tehran openly supports the Houthis politically but denies providing the Houthis arms or material aid. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the Houthis receive weapons or weapons components from Iran. Local media outlets assert that officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of Iran’s Armed Forces, are stationed in Yemen. However, the extent of coordination between Tehran and the Houthis is debated; some analysts maintain that Tehran’s decision-making power in Yemen is likely limited. 

The Saudi-led coalition: In 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition to reinstate Hadi’s government and reverse the Houthis’ territorial gains. The coalition includes Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco (until 2019), Qatar (until 2017), Senegal, Sudan, and the UAE; Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti have also lent logistical and military support to the coalition. Saudi officials’ perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy capable of launching cross-border attacks has fueled the coalition’s offensive. According to the Yemen Data Project, the coalition has conducted about 25,054 air raids, resulting in almost 9,000 civilian casualties. Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government also enforce a vessel clearance process on commercial shipments directed to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port. This blockade, intended to prevent the flow of illicit weapons, has impeded or delayed the delivery of fuel and other essential supplies to parts of Yemen and has contributed to Yemen’s economic crisis. 

United Arab Emirates: After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most prominent military role within the coalition. While Saudi Arabia has focused much of its operations in the north, the UAE has deployed ground troops and formed and backed local militias, including the STC, the Support and Backup Brigades, and the Hadrami Elite Forces, in Yemen’s south around key ports and shipping lanes. Some of these forces, notably the STC and affiliates, have come into conflict with the Yemeni government forces, which has weakened the anti-Houthi camp and created a rift within the Saudi-led coalition. Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical ambitions and desire to undermine Islah, a Yemeni Islamist party loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, are two objectives driving the Emirates’ intervention. The UAE scaled down its military involvement in 2019 but still maintains influence in southern Yemen.

Introduction 

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a Sunni jihadi group that seeks to establish a global caliphate and claim religious authority over all Muslims. The Islamic State has taken advantage of the instability and violence under the Assad regime in Syria and continues to mount attacks in the region despite the defeat of the caliphate in 2018. Apart from carrying out attacks in the region, the militant group exploits refugee conditions in Syria to radicalize and recruit individuals for its resurgence. Counter-terrorism and deradicalization efforts essential steps to combat the resurgence of the Islamic State in Syria. 

Rise of the Islamic State 

The Islamic State, also known as the Daesh, emerged from the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a local affiliate of Al Qaeda under the leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. With the start of the Arab Spring and the growing instability and violence in Syria, AQI grew to carry out attacks and bolster its strength and expand its caliphate to Syria to establish a fundamentalist Sunni Muslim state in Greater Syria. In June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi changed the group’s name to ISIS and formally declared the ISIS caliphate.

The militant group’s ideology stems from Salafism and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia (Islamic Law). The group developed a global jihad network by expanding to different geographic areas and establishing affiliates in Libya, the Sinai Province, Afghanistan, West Africa, and the Greater Sahara. They have further expanded affiliates into Congo, Mozambique, Philippines and Bangladesh. The primary targets of the Islamic State include the West and regimes in the Arab world which it does not view as upholding Islamic values. The Islamic State’s primary strategy includes territorial control and expanding its position in the world. 

The Islamic State’s preferred attack types are a reflection of the tactics evolved from the civil wars in Syria and Iraq. In the height of their strength, the militant group deployed artillery, massed forces, and tanks to expand territorial holdings. In the territories that they do hold, they have carried out public executions, rape, and symbolic crucifixions to terrorize the populations into submission. 

Islamic State’s Current Presence in Syria 

Presently, the Islamic State continues to be active in the regime-controlled territory in the Syrian desert and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF)-controlled northeast. Attacks include small-arm assaults, ambushes, roadside bombings, kidnappings, and acts of sabotage. According to the United Nations, there are presently approximately 10,000 Islamic State fighters across Iraq and Syria. The militant group faces a more challenging operating environment than before in light of Assad’s resurgence as well as the presence of international forces. 

One of the most significant concerns is the radicalization occurring within the al Hol detention facilities in SDF-controlled territory. The camp holds approximately 60,000 men, women, and children that have links with the Islamic State, and remains a site of recruitment and radicalization. Recently, the Islamic State mounted an attack on a prison in Northeastern Syria that held Islamic State fighters. U.S.-backed SDF forces fought the Islamic State fighters for 10 days, eventually retaking the prison—but not before the escape of approximately 100 Islamic State prisoners. 

In February 2022, the U.S. carried out a covert operation in February that resulted in the death of the former leader of the Islamic State, al Qurayshi. This special operation demonstrated a high degree of sophistication in U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism operations. While it was a significant blow to the terrorist organization, it is unlikely to change the Islamic State’s current trajectory. 

Past U.S. Policies to Combat the Islamic State in Syria

In 2014, the U.S. The Department of Defense (DoD) established the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF – OIR) to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The aim of this operation was to advise, assist, and enable partnered forces in the defeat of the Islamic State. 

Under CJTF-OIR the U.S. adopted a limited liability and limited risk strategy to defeat the Islamic State. This included air power, which played a crucial role in the defeat of the global caliphate in 2018. The U.S. and partner nations used precision strikes which eventually affected the militant group’s ability to control resources through its oil business in Syria. Airpower also played a critical role in gathering intelligence on the group’s whereabouts and resources. Overall, airpower played an essential role in blunting the Islamic State’s momentum in Syria, targeting its cash resources, and countering vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks in Mosul. Combined, these operations eliminated the militant group’s hold on large swaths of territory in Syria which was crucial to the caliphate’s survival. 

Under CJTF-OIR, the DoD also focused on training, equipping, and advising local forces in Syria—namely, the U.S. backed Syrian Democratic Forces which played a significant role in the defeat of the Islamic State in Kobani and Raqqa. In 2019, the U.S.-backed SDF forces besieged the Islamic State in Baghouz which was the Islamic state’s last territorial enclave, ending the Islamic State’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria. 

Continued U.S. Policies to Counter the Islamic State in Syria 

The U.S. is likely to continue its multilateral counter-terrorism efforts to diminish any resurgence of the Islamic State. Developing a comprehensive security plan to reassess ISIS’s threat capabilities in the Northeast of Syria is vital to counteract any resurgence. This includes gathering cross border intelligence-sharing between the colaution, SDF and Iraqi authorities. In addition, the U.S. can provide more security personnel and technical equipment to secure prison systems that house former jihadi fighters. These measures can cause significant  blows to the resurgence of the Islamic State and prevent former jihadi fighters from re-joining the Islamic State. 

In addition, the U.S. may address the sources of Islamic State resilience. This includes countering the radicalization occurring within the refugee camps in al-Hol. This would include a combined effort from the U.S. and allied nations to develop rehabilitation centers to de-radicalize individuals. This measure will address the grievances that factor into radicalization and address the pathways to de-radicalization. However, there are significant challenges to the implementation of this policy. It requires cooperation by the Assad regime to house individuals within rehabilitation centers in Syria, which would mean normalizing relations with a regime responsible for war atrocities. 

Among the myriad groups battling for control of Yemen, the Houthi movement is of particular interest to international policymakers due to its ties to Iran and its destabilizing effect on Yemen since civil war broke out in 2014 resulting in a  humanitarian crisis.

Who are the Houthis?

The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), is a group of Zaydi Shi’as, a minority community in Yemen historically concentrated in the northern region. Shi’a Muslims are a minority in the global Islamic community, and Zaydis are a Shi’a group with beliefs distinct from Shi’as in Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere. The Houthi movement, named after a religious leader of the Houthi clan, emerged in the 1990s as an effort to revive the Zaydi tradition. Some Zaydis, including families that were influential in northern Yemen before unification, felt that their religious and cultural traditions were  threatened by state-funded efforts to establish Salafi leaders in Zaydi areas in the 1980s. Political and religious marginalization led the Houthis to question the Yemeni government’s authority.

The Houthis’ relationship with the Yemeni government

The Houthis became politically active in 2003 when the group’s leader, Hussein Badr al Din al Huthi, opposed then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and openly criticized government corruption. The Houthis gained support from anti-Saleh Yemenis around the country. In response, Saleh initiated a military campaign against the Houthis, and, in 2004, Saleh’s forces killed Hussein al Houthi. Subsequently, the Houthis waged six uprisings against Saleh’s government between 2004 and 2010. Saudi Arabia, which shares a long border with Yemen, aided Saleh’s troops in attempting to suppress the Houthi uprisings. 

During the 2011 Arab uprisings, the Houthis participated in the national protests against President Saleh, who eventually ceded power to his deputy, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi. During the transition, the Houthis criticized Hadi and the UN-sponsored National Dialogue Conference created to address the political future of Yemen. During this period of weak leadership, government transition, and intense political competition, the Houthis seized territory and gained support in the north. In a dramatic reversal, Saleh allied with the Houthis against his former political ally, Hadi, and in 2015, the Houthis and Saleh loyalists ousted Hadi, who subsequently fled to Saudi Arabia. However, in 2017, Saleh withdrew his support for the Houthi coalition, which killed him a few days later. 

The Houthis role in Yemen’s civil war 

Since capturing Yemen’s capital Sanaa in 2014, the Houthis have built an alliance with a network of northern political, military, and tribal groups. The coalition, referred to as the Sanaa-based authorities, have cemented control over state institutions, sidelined political rivals, and steadily gained territory in the north. The alliance, led by the Houthis, currently control almost all of northern Yemen and remain the dominant force in Yemen’s most populated areas. However, the Houthis also face pressure from a web of armed groups within Yemen, including the Islamist party Islah, a southern separatist movement, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Many Yemenis oppose the Houthis’ de facto governance and criticize the group’s practices of shelling cities, firing missiles into populated areas, and allegedly recruiting child soldiers. 

The Houthi-Saudi Conflict 

In 2015, Saudi Arabia feared a rise in Houthi support from Shia-majority Iran. In response, the Saudis assembled a coalition of states—Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco (until 2019), Qatar (until 2017), Senegal, Sudan, and the UAE—with the goal of stopping Houthi advances and returning Hadi to power. The coalition, backed by the United States, enforced a naval blockade and targeted the Houthis with air strikes, which pushed the Houthis and their allies out of southern Yemen and the city of Aden. This made way for Hadi to establish a temporary government in Aden. However, the government was unable to provide basic services and security to the city and surrounding areas, and Hadi himself primarily lived in Saudi Arabia.

In response to the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive, the Houthis have launched unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missile attacks into Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including air strikes on Saudi oil fields and storage facilities. The Houthis target critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent, the UAE, to force an end to the coalition’s military operations. In 2021, the Houthis launched an offensive to capture Marib, the last northern stronghold of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. The Saudi-led coalition has responded to Houthi attacks with increased airstrikes, and data from the Yemen Data Project tallies 25,054 airstrikes conducted by the Saudi-led coalition since 2015, resulting in over 8,983 civilian deaths. 

Internal conflict, divided political loyalty in southern Yemen, and divided military loyalty throughout the country all contribute to religious, political, and geographic tensions in Yemen. AQAP and a local branch of the Islamic State have capitalized on the instability and attempted to gain ground in the south. 

International influence and rivalries deepen the complexity of the internal conflict. With continued Sunni-Shia tensions within and between countries, Shia-majority Iran backs the Houthis while the U.S., Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states back Yemen’s internationally recognized government. This Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen is but one dynamic driving conflict in the country.

What do the Houthis want?

The Houthis’ goals have shifted throughout eight years of conflict, but the movement’s primary aim is to gain international recognition of a Houthi-led government in Yemen. Additionally, Ansar Allah seeks to secure military control in the north and the oil rich-eastern region and establish a government that is more favorable to its political and ideological views and goals. In 2021, the Houthis presented a plan to end the war to Saudi officials. The proposal includes a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Yemen, and a transitional period followed by a peace agreement. 

The Houthis’ relationship with Iran

Iran is often accused of providing the Houthis with weapons, training, and funding. Saudi Arabia’s perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy capable of launching cross-border attacks near its southern border has driven the Saudi kingdom’s offensive. The degree of Iranian support to the Houthis is contested although the U.S., United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have provided evidence of Iranian military involvement in Yemen and support from Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed group based in Lebanon. The Saudi naval blockade has intercepted various Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis since 2015, and Iran has trained Houthi fighters within its borders. In January 2021, the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen released a report citing a growing body of evidence confirming that individuals or entities in Iran provide weapons or weapons components to the Houthis; however, it is unclear whether there are direct command-and-control links between Tehran and the Houthis.

Tehran denies providing arms and military training to the Houthis, asserting that Iranian assistance is confined to “advisory and spiritual support”. Iran and Hezbollah openly support the Houthis politically and the Houthis’ television channel, Al Masirah, is broadcast from Beirut with the assistance of Hezbollah. Some analysts characterize Iranian influence on the Houthis as limited and emphasize the Houthis adhere to a different Shi’a tradition than Tehran. Others counter that the Houthis’ formation, ideology and political aspirations are largely influenced by the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic. 

The Houthis’ relationship with the U.S.

After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Houthi movement assumed an anti-American stance, and the group often characterizes its mission as a resistance to Saudi, Israeli, and American influence in the region. 

The U.S. opposes the Houthis’ military campaign, and supports the internationally recognized government, formerly led by President Hadi and now led by a presidential council as of April 2022. The Obama and Trump administrations backed the Saudi-led coalition and provided weapons, military advice, and logistical support to offensive operations in Yemen. However, after criticism from Congress and humanitarian groups over indiscriminate bombing of civilians, both Presidents scaled down support to the coalition. 

In 2021, U.S. President Biden ceased providing support for the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive operations, including relevant arms sales. The Biden administration also appointed U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking to encourage cooperation through diplomacy. In addition, Biden reversed former President Trump’s categorization of the Houthi movement as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) as this designation disrupted humanitarian aid to Yemen.

Recent Developments

On April 1, 2022, the Houthis and the internationally recognized government in Yemen agreed to a two month UN-mediated truce. Shortly after committing to the ceasefire, the Houthis signed an action plan with the UN pledging to end using children as soldiers, attacks on schools and hospitals, and killing children. In June 2022, the parties agreed to renew the truce for another two months, although significant barriers to lasting peace remain.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, home of the two holiest sites in Islam and the world’s second-largest oil reserves, is an important regional power and a long-standing partner of the United States. Abdul Aziz ibn Saud founded the kingdom in 1932 and established an absolute monarchy. King Ibn Saud’s rule drew its legitimacy from an 18th-century pact between the Al Saud family and the founder of Wahhabism, a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam that has dominated the kingdom’s religious establishment. The discovery of vast oil fields in the country in the 1930s and the formation of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) transformed Saudi Arabia’s economy as the kingdom became a major oil exporter. Saudi Arabia is a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and a member of several regional organizations, including the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

The kingdom’s financial power, religious significance, and geostrategic position lend Saudi Arabia global influence. However, the Saudi government faces regular criticism for violating human rights and enforcing discriminatory practices toward women and religious minorities. To quell these criticisms, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, has implemented new social reforms. Despite the crown prince’s modernizing ambitions, his increasingly aggressive domestic and foreign policies have undermined these reforms. The kingdom’s leadership transition, MBS’ role in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and a changing regional landscape have prompted the Biden administration to reassess the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship long defined by energy and security interests. 

Factsheet:

• Population: 35,354,380
• Capital: Riyadh
• System of governance: Absolute Monarchy
• Head of state: King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman   
• Majority language: Arabic
• Majority religion: Sunni Islam
• GDP per capita: $44,300 
• Global Freedom Score: 7/100
• GINI Index: 45.9 (2013)

Brief History with the U.S.

The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strategic partnership for almost 80 years despite tensions over Saudi Arabia’s Islamic conservatism and human rights record. The U.S. oil industry has had close ties with Saudi Arabia since the discovery of oil in the kingdom in 1938, and a 1945 meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud solidified government ties. Since then, cooperation in the energy and defense sectors has been the cornerstone of the bilateral partnership. Nevertheless, the oil-for-security pact has been challenged periodically, most notably in 1973 when Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members embargoed oil exports to the United States and Europe in retaliation for their support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The subsequent rise in global oil prices caused fuel shortages and high gas prices in the U.S., and U.S.-Saudi relations deteriorated for a brief period.

Several events in 1979 triggered a drastic shift in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 

1. The Shah of Iran, one of two Twin Pillars that formed the backbone of Washington’s Middle East policy at the time, was ousted. The subsequent creation of an Islamic Republic in Iran sparked a regional competition with Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Islamic community and was a strategic loss to the U.S.
2. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Washington responded by committing to defend the Persian Gulf and its oil fields as a vital U.S. security interest. The war also marked the beginning of Washington and Riyadh’s joint policy of arming and training anti-Soviet forces known as the mujahideen. Many Saudi men traveled to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviets, including Osama bin Laden. 

Defense cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia continued throughout the 1980s and increased in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and 550,000 U.S. troops and coalition forces flooded the region to protect the Kuwait-Saudi border. About 5,000 U.S. troops remained in Saudi Arabia after the war, which prompted criticism from Bin Laden and less extreme Saudi conservatives who opposed Western influence in the region. 

In 2001, after the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks on the U.S., relations between Washington and Riyadh frayed. The attacks sparked anti-Saudi sentiment among Americans because 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi-born and allegedly supported by Saudi officials. Saudi opinions of the U.S. also soured due to the Bush administration’s criticism of Saudi Arabia’s monarchical rule and conservative Wahhabi establishment as well as Washington’s broader regional policy of promoting democratic reforms antithetical to the kingdom’s system of governance. 

The relationship continued to sour during the Obama administration given its resolve to decrease U.S. involvement in the region, which led Riyadh to question Washington’s reliability as a partner. Several instances, including President Obama’s call for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down during the Arab uprisings, Washington’s unwillingness to intervene in Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s exclusion from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) deepened the kingdom’s suspicions.

Riyadh’s concerns about Iran’s regional activities increased in 2014 as civil war broke out in Yemen and the Iranian-backed Houthi forces made territorial gains in the country. Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition to launch offensive operations. The U.S. initially provided logistical and intelligence support for operations in Yemen, but eventually suspended some weapons transfers to the kingdom amidst high civilian casualties from Saudi airstrikes and a growing humanitarian crisis.  

Current Status of Relations 

U.S.-Saudi ties warmed under President Trump, who reinstated the arms sales and withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Issues that previously caused tensions in the partnership, including U.S. support for Israel,  elicited a less forceful response from the kingdom during the Trump presidency. Saudi Arabia tacitly accepted Bahrain and the UAE’s recognition of Israel under the Abraham Accords, despite the kingdom’s commitment to conditioning normalization with Israel on the establishment of a Palestinain state. Saudi Arabia’s military operations in Yemen and MBS’ role in the murder of Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi evoked concerns from Congress and brought the kingdom’s domestic policies to the fore of disucssions about the future of U.S.-Saudi relations. 

On the campaign trail, President Biden pledged to treat the Saudis as the “pariah that they are,”  and since assuming office he has sought to reassess the underpinnings of the U.S.-Saudi partnership in line with his commitment to pursue a human rights-centered foreign policy. In 2021, President Biden ceased U.S. support for offensive operations in Yemen and restarted nuclear negotiations with Iran. The White House also released the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment that MBS approved the operation to kill Jamal Khashoggi, and Biden has refused to deal with the crown prince directly. In return, Saudi Arabia has rejected U.S. requests to increase oil production in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent surging oil prices. In an effort to ease rising oil prices and manage current tensions, Biden broke from his previous policy and met with MBS during a trip to the kingdom in July 2022.

U.S. Strategic Interests:

• Energy: Providing close to half a million barrels of oil per day to the U.S., Saudi Arabia is the third largest source of imported oil to the U.S. Although the United States is the world’s largest producer of oil due to the “shale boom,” Washington and Riyadh continue to cooperate in the energy sector due to Saudi Arabia’s ability to quickly adjust production levels and therefore price and stabilize the energy market. Washington and Riyadh have also explored civil nuclear cooperation for electricity production, but action stalled in 2020 because the kingdom has wavered on its commitment to forego nuclear weapons development. 
• Defense: Saudi Arabia is the largest recipient of U.S. arms, with sales totaling $100 billion. The kingdom’s armed forces have relied on U.S. military training and education assistance for decades. As of May 2022, there are about 700 U.S. military and civilian personnel in Saudi Arabia. Congress has typically supported U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia for the purposes of reducing U.S. troop presence in the region, supporting the U.S. arms industry, and containing Iran. Although Washington and Riyadh maintain long standing defense ties, Saudi Arabia has recently sought to diversify its defense supply lines, and in 2021 signed a defense cooperation agreement with Russia and received ballistic missile production technology from China. Washington has refused to sell Riyadh ballistic missiles due to proliferation concerns.
• Counterterrorism: Since al Qaeda launched a series of attacks inside the kingdom in 2003, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have cooperated closely on counterterrorism efforts. Saudi Arabia faces terrorist threats from the Islamic State (IS), al Qaeda and affiliates, and the Yemen-based Houthi movement. To improve information sharing and reduce cross-border attacks, the kingdom cooperates with regional and international partners like the U.S. Through the Office of the Program Manager-Ministry of Interior Program and the Interior Military Assistance Group, U.S. military advisors assist the Ministry of Interior develop critical security capabilities and train the Saudi Ministry of Interior security forces. Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism strategy focuses on combatting radicalization, recruitment, and terrorist financing within the kingdom through monitoring religious activites, rehabilitating prisoners, and regulating travel to conflict zones.
• Trade and Investment: The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a Trade and Investment Framework in 2003, and the countries enjoy strong financial ties. The kingdom is one of the United States’ top trading partners in the MENA region and a top destination for U.S. exports. Although oil, arms, and machinery have historically defined the U.S.-Saudi trade relationship, the kingdom is working to diversify its economy through its Vision 2030 program, launched in 2016. Under Vision 2030, the kingdom has sought to attract foreign direct investment, mainly through selling shares of Saudi Aramco, but concerns over Saudi Arabia’s political risk and questions about the valuation of Saudi Aramco jeopardize the kingdom’s ability to meet its 2030 goals. Nevertheless, Saudi investment in U.S. companies remains robust. Saudi’s sovereign wealth fund has stakes in U.S. tech companies, including Uber and Tesla, and many American businesses have operations in the kingdom.
• Regional and Geopolitical Competition: The U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the common goal of countering Iran’s regional influence. Washington and Riyadh seek to increase regional stability, curb Iran’s support for aggressive non-state actors, and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. As Washington attempts to wind down commitments in the region, Saudi Arabia remains a strategic partner committed to balancing and countering Iran. In April 2022, Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in the fifth round of talks (which began in 2021) intended to manage tensions and restore diplomatic relations, although the two parties have not reached a formal agreement. To Washington’s consternation, Saudi Arabia has established stronger relations with Russia and China since MBS was appointed crown prince in 2017. The kingdom maintains an OPEC+ agreement with Russia to manage global oil production and has deepened trade and investment ties with China.

This brief was originally written by Rylan Forester. It was updated and published by Sahara Snizek.

Jordan plays a central role in the Middle East, as an oasis of stability in a region full of conflict, making it a key ally of the U.S., U.K., and the EU. Militarily, Jordan has been a U.S. partner since it was designated as a Major Non-NATO ally in 1996. Most recently, Jordanian military forces have worked in frequent collaboration with regional and international allies, like the U.S., to combat ISIS in Syria, specifically in the south along the Jordanian-Syrian border.

Fact sheet

• Population: 10,998,531
  • Palestinian Refugees: 2,307,011
  • Syrian Refugees: 675,040
• Capital: Amman
• System of Governance: Constitutional Monarchy (with a parliamentary system)
• Leader: King Abdullah II
• Majority Language: Arabic
• Majority Religion: Sunni Islam
• GDP Per Capita: $4,282.8 (USD)
• Global Freedom Score: 33/100
• GINI Index: 33.7

Source: The World Fact Book CIA

History of Jordan’s Relations with the U.S.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan became an independent state in 1946, when the nation ousted British control. Abdullah I was the first king of Jordan and his family, the House of Hashim, is believed to be ancestors of the Prophet Muhammad. Jordan’s interactions with the U.S. have historically been tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When Palestine was officially partitioned by the 1947 UN Resolution and war broke out a year later, Jordan annexed the West Bank, yet 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled their homes and headed between the West Bank and Transjordan because of the violence. Today, there are more than two million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, not to mention the millions of Palestinians who are now Jordanian citizens. Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel in the 1967 Six Day War and as a result, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), then led by Yasser Arafat, fled to Jordanl.

More than twenty years later in 1994, President Clinton orchestrated the signing of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, making the Hashemite Kingdom the second Arab country, after Egypt, to normalize ties with Israel. After almost fifty years in power, King Hussein of Jordan passed away in 1999 and his son Abdullah II ascended to the throne. Under King Abdullah II’s reign, Jordan increased ties with the West which has boosted its economy. The 2008 financial crisis worsened the Jordanian economy as well as exacerbated civil unrest which came with Arab Spring protests in the country in 2011. Abdullah II ushered in a series of economic and political reforms which satisfied protesters, but an influx of Syrian refugees has overwhelmed Jordan’s public services. 

Challenges for Jordan

• Lack of Water Resources: Jordan is the 15th most water-stressed country in the world, according to the World Resources Institute. The factors increasing water scarcity in the country are population growth, reduction of flow in the Yarmouk River due to the creation of dams in Syria, lack of rainfall due to climate change, and overuse of groundwater. Private wells that have been illegally constructed by residents have also contributed to unsuitable groundwater extraction. In the north part of the region, a substantial influx of Syrian refugees have heightened the demand for water as well. According to a study by Stanford University, a combination of dwindling water resources and a continually growing population are predicted to halve per capita water use in Jordan by the end of the century. 
• Devoid of hydrocarbon resources: Unlike its oil rich neighbors, the Hashemite Kingdom is devoid of hydrocarbon resources. Jordan’s stability has made the country a refuge for displaced neighbors when wars force residents to abandon their homes. Jordan is hosts more than two million Palestinian refugees and the majority of Jordanian citizens are Palestinian (including the current Queen Rania Al-Abdullah), so Israeli-Palestinian issues are Jordanian issues and politics. The Hashemite Kingdom remains one of the most ardent defenders of Palestinian rights and adocates for Palestinian demands such as the right to return or its claim to East Jerusalem. Nevertheless, since 1994, when Jordan normalized ties with Israel, Amman has expanded trade and engagement with the Jewish state to the dismay of some Palestinians in Jordan.
• Islamic State (ISIS): The instability in Syria, caused by the civil war, brought 700,000 Syrian refugees to Jordan and fueled ISIS’ rise. To date, 3,000 Jordanians have joined the terrorist group, the third most from any country in the world. King Abdullah is no friend to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad but the war has disrupted Syria’s trade with Jordan and brought terrorism to Jordan’s border. The Hashemite Kingdom has cooperated with regional allies like the UAE along with international partners like the United States to combat ISIS. 
• Iran: Iran’s rising influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen poses a potential threat to Jordan and has pushed the Kingdom into further cooperation with like-minded Sunni Arab states throughout the region. The Hashemite monarchy is wary of the Iranian regime which has been out-spoken in its support for the overthrow of Sunni monarchs. As Iran expands its presence in the region, Jordan may seek closer ties with its Sunni-Arab partners as a counterbalance. 
• Building Relations with China: Although U.S.-Jordanian relations remain strong, Amman has increasingly engaged with China through Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since the project launched in 2013, Jordan has become a key member of the BRI. PRC officials hope to build on progress in Jordan to connect the rest of the Levant with projects in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the Mediterranean, and Eurasia. 

U.S. Strategic Interests

• Promote Peace between Israel and Palestinians: Behind Israel, Jordan is one of the U.S.’ key regional allies. The U.S. and Jordan share the goal of creating peace between Israel and Palestine. In recent talks between President Biden and King Abdullah II, Biden asserted his support for a two-state solution. Jordan can be a key mediator in resolving the conflict due to its geographic position, cooperation with Israel’s military, shared intelligence with the U.S., the U.K, and Israel, and global collaboration to end the war on terror. Jordan also belongs to several multilateral organizations such as the Arab Quartet, Munich Group, and the Jerusalem Committee at the Organization for the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which can assist in facilitating a two-state solution.
• The War on Terror: Amman shares the U.S.’ goal to combat terrorism, and actively participates with the U.S. and other Sunni Arab states in missions to combat ISIS in Syria. Jordan is a regional leader in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Intelligence collaboration between the U.S. and Jordan continues to contribute to the U.S.’ counterterrorism and countering violent extremism efforts in the Middle East.
• Counter Iran’s Influence in the Region: Jordan, like many of its neighbors, has grown increasingly concerned about Iran’s involvement in the region. Iran has pursued the production of nuclear weapons without full adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards, and supports militant splinter groups across the region which have an overall destabilizing influence. Jordan collaborates with the U.S. and Sunni neighbors to limit Iran’s influence and promote stability. 

House Refugees: Jordan’s role as a safe haven for Middle East refugees contributes to regional stability and more broadly, global stability. More than 700,000 Palestinians fled to Jordan in 1948. Instability in Iraq, triggered by the 2003 U.S. invasion of the country has displaced more than 750,000 Iraqi refugees currently residing in Jordan. The Syrian civil war has caused 700,000 Syrians to seek refuge in Jordan as well.

Egypt is a key strategic partner of the United States in the Middle East and North Africa. The country is historically influential across the Arab world, and is one of the few in the region to have established  long-lasting peace with Israel. The Egyptian government is also staunchly anti-Islamist extremeism and is part of key counter-terrorism partnerships with the U.S. along with the Arab/U.S. alignment against Iran. As a result of their support of major U.S. regional interests, Egypt has become the second largest recipient of U.S. military and financial aid. However, the Arab Spring in 2011 led to volatility in the country, and the first democratically elected President was assassinated. The subsequent rise to power of President Kalil el-Sisi has paralleled a rise in human rights violations and the suppression of free speech and journalism. These issues have called into question the decision of the United States to continue sending a large volume of military aid to the country.

Fact Sheet

Population: 102,334,403 (2020 est.)

Capital: Cairo

System of Governance: Republic

President: Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi (since: 2014)

Majority Language: Arabic 

Majority Religion: Sunni Islam

GDP Per Capita: 12,607.0 (2020 est)

Freedom House Rating: Not Free

History of U.S.-Egypt Strategic Relations

Modern relations with Egypt began in 1922, after Egypt gained independence from the British Empire. In the post-World War II era Egypt grew to be a key strategic partner for the United States. At the time, Egypt was influential in the Arab League through cultural, media and social diffusion across the region. Egypt’s influence was especially important to the U.S.’ efforts towards achieving a Arab-Israeli peace. Egypt and Israel signed a landmark peace agreement in 1979, facilitated by the United States during the Camp David Accords. This established a long-lasting peace between the two nations and solidified Egypt as a vital U.S. ally in the Middle East. Since then, the U.S. has provided over $50 billion dollars in military aid and $30 billion dollars in economic aid to Egypt. Egypt has also become one of the U.S.’ largest export markets. With the assistance of American aid, the Egyptian military has grown to be one of the most powerful institutions in the country and heavily influences the government.

Though Egypt has remained a partner for U.S. strategic interests, the political conditions of the country have been volatile in the 21st century, including a revolutionary period between 2011 and 2013 during the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring led to political unrest in Egypt with revolutionary forces ousting the former President, Hosni Mubarak. The first democratically-elected President, Mohammed Morsi, represented the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamist organization with peaceful and violent factions. He was soon deposed by the defense minister, Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi. President Sisi, a counterrevolutionary, has since come down hard on civil liberties in Egypt and perpetrated severe human rights violations. The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs estimates that between 70,000-100,000 political prisoners are imprisoned as of March 2021. In addition, Egypt’s rate of executions tripled from 32 to 107 executions between 2019 and 2020 under President Sisi.  

President Trump worked closely with President Sisi, even calling him his “favorite dictator,” and made policy changes that advantaged Egypt. For instance, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has been a critical geopolitical issue in the region amidst Egypt’s fears that the Ethiopian dam project will negatively impact the flow of water downstream and allow Ethiopia to effectively control Egypt’s water flow. The Trump administration withheld. aid to Ethiopia in an attempt to persuade them to meet Egypt’s demands. Trump also used inflammatory rhetoric when discussing the issue, claiming that Egypt will “end up blowing up the dam.” These actions cumulatively led to damaged relations between Ethiopia and the U.S.

President Biden did not call President Sisi when he entered office in 2020, despite Egypt being one of America’s closest allies in the region. However, renewed conflict between Israel and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in 2021 brought U.S. attention back to Egypt. President Biden made two calls to President Sisi, and credited Egypt for helping to end the violence. He also stated the U.S. would review the GERD issue with renewed effort but underscored the importance of improving the human rights in Egypt. In February of 2021 the U.S State Department confirmed a $200 million dollar arms sale to Egypt.

U.S Strategic Interests

• Arab and Israel conflict: Egypt was influential in the Arab League, which made them an important ally in the U.S.’ goal to broker peace between the Arab world and Israel. As mentioned above, Egypt mediated a cease fire between Israel and Palestine during the 2021 conflict on the Gaza strip. In the call with President Sisi, President Biden committed to working with Egypt to create lasting peace in the Gaza Strip with Egypt’s help.
• Counterterrorism: Egypt and the U.S. share an interest in combating Islamic extremism. The Sinai Penninula is home to an active ISIS sect, and all major Egyptian terrorist attacks in 2020 occurred in the region. Egypt joined the U.S. backed coalition against ISIS; however, Egypt only committed to combating ISIS within its own borders. American aid to Egypt is contingent on counterterrorism cooperation. Egypt also coordinates with Somalia and Sudan on counterrorism issues. However, Egypt’s approach to counterterrorism is violent, and the government engages in human rights abuses in the name of stopping Islamic extremism.

Ongoing policy debates

Arguments against continuing the U.S.-Egypt partnership:

1. Egypt is no longer as influential in the Arab league and the current relationship is based on the impression that it maintains that same influence;
2. The relationship is one-sided: The United States has provided a significant amount of aid with limited return from Egypt. Egypt continues to trade with North Korea, Russia, China and Iran while Egypt’s counterterrorism operations have had limited success in tackling radicalism in the country due to the violence the government uses to try to suppress it;
3. Human rights: The protection of human rights in the country has rapidly disintegrated since the rise of President Sisi. Numerous reports from human rights groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International  record extreme conditions of torture and violence in Egyptian prisons against political prisoners. Religious freedoms and free press have also been undermined during President Sisi’s time in office.

Arguments for continuing the U.S.-Egypt partnership/alliance:

1. The concern that Egypt will turn to Russia for support
2. Despite the arguments criticizing the U.S. partnership with Egypt, policy advisors are not suggesting pulling out of Egypt. Instead, these policymakers recommend that the U.S. aid package to Egypt should focus on the people rather than strengthening the military and government. 
   1. For instance, Egypt faces a growing water crisis and needs increased investment in its water treatment processes to protect its access to basic necessities. 
3. Investing in the Egyptian people would promote a message that American attention is focused on human rights concerns in the country and not on bolstering the perpetrators.

Within academic and policy circles, the below arguments are further discussed as strong motives to continue investing in the U.S.-Egypt relationship:

1. Egypt still plays a leading role in regional diplomacy despite concerns their influence has weakened as evidenced by their impact during the 2021 Gaza strip conflict.
2. It is essential to keeping order in the Sinai, Gaza and Egyptian-Israeli border.
3. If U.S. military action in the region is necessary, Egypt is a possible partner. As they were in the 1990 Gulf War during the UN coalition against Iraq.
4. Egypt is part of a broad regional alignment countering Iran.

Promoting human rights and democracy was also a major election promise made by current President Joe Biden; he stated that his intention was to “revitalize our national commitment to advancing human rights and democracy around the world.” However the extent of this promise is yet to be seen. Observers note that there has been a general shift in U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East which deprioritized Egypt in U.S. strategic interests, as is evidenced by Biden’s delayed call to President Sisi, supporting the President’s election promise. However the $200 million arms sale and his praise for Egypt during the Gaza strip conflict indicates that the relationship may also remain largely unchanged. 

There is vocal opposition against the U.S.-Egypt partnership amongst the Egyptian population. This is likely due to the American support of the Egyptian military, which has been an oppressive force in Egypt. Should the United States decouple from the Egyptian government, it may result in the creation of a power vacuum, enabling the rise of opposition in an attempt to revive the aims of the 2011 Arab Spring.

Introduction

The United States’ longest war came to an end with the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban’s swift and hostile takeover of Afghanistan’s government following the U.S. withdrawal left the country once again in the hands of the Taliban. The Taliban takeover is a significant development in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and raises questions about the unforseen consequences of the war against terrorism. 

The GWOT is an international, American-led coalition campaign launched in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. Following the attacks, then-President George W. Bush launched a comprehensive plan to eliminate and disrupt all terrorist organizations around the globe. He stated, “Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” 

The U.S. employed every instrument of national power including diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial and military tools to disrupt and defeat not just Al-Qaeda but to extend the fight to other militant groups around the world. Nations around the globe joined the U.S. in the battle against global terror. The GWOT led to the disruption of violent extremist organizations, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, the disruption of terrorist financing, the advancement and transformation of global security, and the elimination of the immediate terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. Simultaneously, the GWOT also fueled radicalization and laid the foundation for the rise of extremist groups with similar ideological sympathies that can spread violence.

Successes of the GWOT

Military and intelligence operations including offensive strategies and covert operations proved successful in the fight against terrorism. These operations have been shown to deter transnational terrorist groups from conducting logistically complex attacks in the face of limited resources as a consequence of U.S. and international led-military forces. U.S. military action succeeded in ousting the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in December 2001. While Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies once controlled 95% of Afghanistan, U.S. military campaigns succeeded in seizing large swaths of Al-Qaeda-held territory including its center of gravity near the Afghan-Pakistan border in Afghanistan and reduced its ability to carry out large-scale terrorist attacks. This impacted Osama Bin Laden’s immediate communications with the organization. This disconnect eventually reduced Al-Qaeda’s ability to plan until 2004 when Osama Bin Laden reconnected with Al-Qaeda after years of hiding. 

Targeted killings proved effective in dismantling terrorist groups that followed a hierarchical bureaucratic structure. However, Al-Qaeda was still able to conduct attacks despite leadership decapitation. Thus, while leadership decapitation was a major blow to the terrorist organization, the bureaucratization of Al-Qaeda allowed the group to formulate contingencies for a leadership turnover. However, the GWOT succeeded in eliminating key terrorist leaders of Al-Qaeda, including Osama Bin Laden. 

Additionally, the U.S. made domestic advancements by developing more efficient technology and law enforcement processes and establishing the Transportation Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security to prevent further attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Failures of the GWOT

According to the Costs of War project at Brown University, nearly 20 years after the 9/11 attacks, the financial costs of the GWOT stand at $8 trillion and the death toll stands at 900,000 people. Casualties include U.S. military members, allied fighters, opposition fighters, journalists, humanitarian aid workers, and civilians. Of the total number killed, 287,000 are categorized as civilians, 207,000 as members of the national military and police forces, and another 301,000 as opposition fighters. 

In the aftermath of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Iraq was destabilized without an effective bureaucratic system to provide basic goods and services to its citizens. The absence of adequate law enforcement and military forces to secure Iraqi borders, and the absence of extensive monitoring led to the country being infiltrated by former jihadist foreign fighters. 

Following the Iraqi invasion, the provisional government led a de-Baathification process to rid the government and military of Ba’ath influence. The Ba’ath political party had previously led the country and top officials perpetrated human rights violations, but many had joined the party because it was the only way to gain many roles in the government sector. The de-Baathification gave rise to grievances that extremist groups started to exploit. Former Iraqi soldiers with no jobs were susceptible to radicalization. Grievances in the Sunni regions remained strong as there was little progress made with regards to reconstruction while security forces targeted former Ba’ath party members through unjust anti-terrorism laws. The use of unjust anti-terrorism laws, lack of security and services, and the length of displacement of these communities all led to an environment that extremist groups such as the Islamic State could exploit. All these conditions fueled radicalization and laid the foundations for the rise of other extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq. 

GWOT moving forward

Moving forward, the U.S. will likely continue to carry out special operations in regions that witness the rise of jihadi groups, to disrupt and eliminate terrorist organizations, disrupt terrorist financing, and prevent radicalization. U.S. military doctrine retains the essential elements to plan and execute successful operations against conventional and irregular opponents. Recently, the U.S. successfully executed a covert operation that killed the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader Abu Ibrahim al–Hashimi al-Qurayshi. This operation demonstrates a high degree of sophistication in U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism efforts. 

Most importantly, the U.S. is incorporating countering violent extremism into the U.S. National Security Strategy to prevent the radicalization of individuals as radicalization and recruitment remain threat multipliers. Thus, preventing radicalization remains essential to countering extremism, especially in internally displaced camps where extremist propaganda is widely being spread.