Category: International Organizations and Agreements

  • Successes and Failures of the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP)

    Successes and Failures of the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP)

    Background

    Humanitarian efforts have evolved in the 21st century, largely driven by the goal of aid organizations to optimize their impact and reduce costs. One significant change is the rise in the use of cash and voucher assistance (CVA) programs, which now constitute a larger portion of aid initiatives. CVA involves giving recipients direct cash or electronic funds as humanitarian aid, different from in-kind support that provides specific items like food and water. The shift towards more CVA and less in-kind aid reflects a shift towards a rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance, replacing the traditional charity-based model. This change in approach has also led nations like the United States to focus more on the humanitarian system.

    CVA’s expansion as a humanitarian aid approach has largely been driven by the Cash Learning Partnership (CALP) since 2005. CALP works to amplify CVA programs carried out by various humanitarian agencies. American government bodies responsible for U.S. aid programs, like USAID and the Department of State, collaborate with CALP directly, incorporating their guidance into the implementation of CVA. CALP has outlined its five main roles as follows:

    1. Capacity Building – Provide individual humanitarian organizations with training and workshops that will enhance their ability to deliver quality CVA programming.
    2. Coordination – Connect carriers of CVA programming and humanitarian organizations in order to improve the consistency and quality of cash aid provisions as well as solidify coordination mechanisms between actors.
    3. Knowledge Management – Establish a forum for CVA actors to exchange knowledge and experience about cash-based aid programming and solidify coordination efforts in information.
    4. Research – Conduct research regarding CVA and build an evidence base in order to provide the best policy recommendations and improve the quality of CVA programs.
    5. Policy – Generate policy recommendations with a primary focus on improving the efficacy and efficiency of CVA worldwide. Builds structured policy through conventions and debates between a diverse set of voices, much of which is highlighted in the State of the World’s Cash Report.

    Positive Attributes of CVA

    CVA offers beneficiaries more flexibility compared to in-kind aid. This reduces their vulnerability, as they can obtain needed resources faster. CALP studies show that recipients prefer cash because it provides choice and control, allowing them to buy what they need locally. In-kind aid may not always match their requirements, leading to less efficient humanitarian efforts as beneficiaries seek alternative means for necessary funds. CVA has been found to be effective across humanitarian aid types, including general and reproductive health, nutrition, poverty, gender, and labor market.

    Corruption and Misuse in CVA Aid Channels

    Opponents argue that CVA is uniquely susceptible to corruption. Corruption exists in regular aid distribution channels, but intermediary officials are more capable of siphoning liquid cash compared to physical resources. This problem is more pronounced in countries with higher corruption rates, which often require more assistance.

    Flexibility offers choice but also raises the potential for recipients to mismanage funds. Critics contend that people in need are more likely to misuse cash compared to in-kind aid. While opponents acknowledge that aid misuse exists in both CVA and in-kind aid, they assert that cash, being less controlled and more versatile, provides greater opportunities for recipients to mishandle resources compared to physical goods and services.

    Inflation Caused by CVA

    Some economists opposing the growth of CVA also highlight that increased flow of cash in local economies where CVA programs are prominent inflates the prices of popular commodities, thus countering the intended effect by making needed resources less accessible to low income residents. A study on CVA programs in the Philippines found that the cash inflow caused by CVA has a larger direct impact on the market and prices, creating negative spillover for non-beneficiary households.

    An alternative to CVA is Universal Ultra Basic Income (UUBI), which suggests providing reduced financial support to populations in remote or impoverished regions to avoid inflation. Instead, UUBI targets the poorest households, aiming to enhance economic conditions through targeted cash assistance.

    Efficiency of CVA

    CALP’s research underscores the current inefficiencies in implementing CVA programs. A primary cause is the lack of coordination among organizations involved in CVA and humanitarian aid as a whole. The current network for cash-based aid includes duplications and parallel projects, resulting in higher costs and wastage compared to in-kind aid. CALP acts as a bridge between humanitarian groups, working to streamline this network through agreements and improved communication among partners. This has enhanced the global efficiency, scalability, and sustainability of CVA as a form of aid. In the United States, despite some skepticism, government departments responsible for humanitarian aid, such as the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration in the Department of State (DOS), have shown support for CALP’s goals of more efficient and widespread CVA programming.

    Recent research is focusing on the cost-effectiveness of CVA, especially electronic CVA. Since aid distribution often occurs in-region, the electronic infrastructure may not be sufficiently advanced to manage the complex cash and large transactions required by certain CVA programs. To mitigate the cost inefficiencies resulting from inadequate technology, CALP suggests collaborating with local agencies prior to developing CVA frameworks to address regional variations. Therefore, there is a suggested connection between improving program efficiency and reducing costs by enhancing coordination and communication among organizations, which is in line with CALP’s operational priorities.

    Specific choices in CVA programming might affect the impact on beneficiaries. One area of contention is whether attaching conditions to cash assistance (called conditional CVA) is more effective than providing cash without conditions (known as unconditional CVA). A study of Mexico’s PROGRESA/Oportunidades, a well-established CVA program, challenges the notion that conditional CVA leads to significant economic growth. It points out that wealthier families, who are less in need but can meet the aid requirements, tend to benefit more than low and middle-income families who are in greater need. However, some critics argue that more precisely targeted conditional CVA programs could address this issue highlighted by the study.

  • Failures and Success of International Fisheries Management

    Failures and Success of International Fisheries Management

    International fisheries management is the combined efforts of nations across the globe to ensure long-term operational success of fisheries and marine resources. It depends on setting realistic policies and establishing regulations that take both marine conservation and the economies of fishing communities into account. International fisheries management is crucial to ensuring that the global ocean system remains healthy enough to sustain global fishery needs, from feeding citizens to maintaining conservation of natural resources.

    At the root of international fisheries management is the challenge of reducing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. 

    • Illegal fishing directly breaches international or regional fishing law
    • Unreported fishing is a lack of reporting or intentional misreporting of fishing activities to Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs).
    • Unregulated fishing is fishing that occurs in areas outside of the vessel’s nationality, or in areas where conservation and management measures are not in place. 

    IUU fishing threatens economic and environmental damage to the global ocean system and global fishing economy. Countries currently employ similar strategies to combat IUU fishing, and join forces to do so by forming Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). The European Commission writes that RFMOs are “open both to countries in the region (‘coastal states’) and countries that have interests in those fisheries (‘distant water fishing nations’).” Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) allow for countries to work together toward common goals in their fisheries.

    The European Union (EU), United States (US), and Canada are three big players in current management strategies, with similar strategies, policies, and regulations to combat IUU fishing. The EU verifies marine fishery products with catch certificates and the correct flag state—only these verified products are allowed to enter the EU. The European Commission acts as the governing enforcement body on behalf of the EU Member States of illegal fishing activities, carding countries and states that fail to regulate IUU fishing. The Interagency Working Group belongs to the US, and combines 21 government agencies for a cohesive and comprehensive approach to combating IUU fishing. The group is developing a five-year strategy to decrease IUU fishing through a combination of increased surveillance, encouragement of sustainable fishing practices, and assurance that only legal and reported seafood enters trade systems. Lastly, in Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) is working to combat overfishing, with the long-term goal of creating and maintaining sustainable fisheries. They have stopped overfishing in the North Atlantic Ocean, and are working toward doing so in the North Pacific Ocean. The DFO is focused on increasing surveillance and monitoring at sea, specifically on traceability and certification. The fisheries enforcement agencies of the EU, US, and Canada have made surveillance, certification, and conservation the focal point of their approach to international fisheries management. However, through time, many have critiqued their management strategies. 

    Critiques of Fisheries Management Strategies

    The paradox of fisheries management is balancing conservation/environmental needs with social/economic needs. Much of environmental and public policy is dynamic, including international fisheries management—however, many critiques have remained consistent since fishery management entered mainstream public policy in the 1970s. These issues are “the innovativeness of fishermen in seeking ways to improve their harvests” and “changing social priorities that are largely unpredictable and outside the control of fisheries managers.” This suggests that the challenges faced nearly 50 years ago are still present today, and that there is a stasis in management strategies.

    Countries that fail to combat illegal fishing sufficiently in the eyes of the EU can receive a red or yellow card from the Commission. Failures include legal gaps, a lack of control over vessels, poor conservation measures and management structures, failure in cooperation with regional and multilateral bodies, and failures in traceability and fish processing. Individual countries have the responsibility to ensure that laws against illegal fishing are clear, and consistently enforce them through fleet surveillance. Furthermore, they must base conservation methods on scientific fact. 

    Conservationists argue that there are causes beyond overfishing and the environment impacting crises in the world’s fisheries. They argue that a conservationist approach that is “less sensitive to the inadequate results of fisheries science” must be employed to ensure future success of fisheries.

    Successes of Fisheries Management Strategies

    Clear and direct rules that outline best practices for transshipment (the transfer of catch between vessels at sea) will ensure that IUU fishing cannot occur, and the seafood supply chain can be monitored every step of the way, providing accurate data to countries about transshipment processes at sea. Global Fishing Watch’s Carrier Vessel Portal is a further success that speaks to the worldwide effort to increase transparency and surveillance at sea. This online tool uses “satellite data, machine learning technology and information provided by RFMOs to identify and display potential transshipment activity in near real time.” The challenge in regulating and encouraging best practices for transshipment is oftentimes the distance between land and the transshipment process, which is occurring out at sea. This tool provides surveillance and transparency in the transshipment process, removing some of that mystery. 

    Increased conservation measures are a success in international fisheries management. The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) has set a quota for blue sharks, which are often caught in tuna fisheries, and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) have completely prohibited capture and retention of manta and mobula rays in the Indo-Pacific ocean region.

    Successful international fisheries management depends on the collective effort and collaboration between nations in order to achieve a future ocean that is sustainable and healthy. Recent advances in technology have allowed for increased surveillance, thus decreasing IUU fishing. While many of the challenges that face international fisheries management strategies have not changed in decades, RFMOs and UNCLOS are making positive strides in creating legislation that acknowledges global dependence on fisheries, while also keeping conservation and longevity in mind.

  • Understanding Critical Resource Extraction in the Arctic

    Understanding Critical Resource Extraction in the Arctic

    The Arctic Region

    The Arctic is the northernmost region of the Earth, centered on the North Pole. Most scientists define the Arctic as the area within the Arctic Circle, a line of latitude approximately 66.5° north of the Equator. The Arctic is home to more than 4 million people, including indigenous people such as the Saami, Aleut, and Yupik. The harsh climate and sparse population of the Arctic limited economic development until the impacts of climate change began to transform the environment. The effects of climate change in the Arctic are sobering. Scientists estimate the Arctic region is warming 4 times faster than the lower latitudes. The Arctic Report Card from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration warns that climate change is transforming the Arctic dramatically.

    Climate Change Makes Critical Resource Extraction Possible

    As the permafrost of the Arctic region softens and the ice that normally covers the Arctic sea melts, it has become more feasible to access the resources of the Arctic. Currently, oil, natural gas, and coal are being extracted in the Arctic. The Arctic States are all signatories to the Paris Agreement, which seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, governments are supporting efforts to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. Renewable energy technologies run on critical minerals. The US Geological Survey has listed 50 critical minerals necessary to the renewable energy, technology, medical, and defense sectors. 

    Minerals include lithium and manganese, used in electric batteries, and tellurium, used in solar panels. The International Energy Agency projects that critical mineral demand will rise 6 times the current level by 2040. Many critical minerals are located in the Arctic. Although Arctic resources have many potential benefits, resource extraction in the Arctic can pose threats to indigenous people and the environment, disrupting cultures and ecosystems. The United Nations is working to mitigate those threats with an initiative called Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment by limiting marine litter and encouraging sustainable tourism and economic development in the region. 

    The American Arctic

    The state of Alaska is located in the Arctic, and geologists believe Alaska has deposits of 49 critical minerals. The Biden Administration published the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which focuses on security, critical resources, climate, and society in the American Arctic. On March 13, 2023, President Biden authorized Conoco-Philips to drill for oil on land leased from the Federal Government. The Willow Project, located on the North Slope of Alaska, drew attention from Americans concerned about the environmental consequences of oil and gas extraction in Alaska. More than 5 million people signed a petition circulated by change.org to urge President Biden to halt the project. Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska defended the project, and cited its potential for creating jobs for Native Alaskans.

    The Canadian Arctic 

    Nearly 40% of Canada’s territory is in the Arctic. The Canadian Arctic is rich in natural resources, including critical minerals and vast uranium deposits which can help increase nuclear energy to replace electricity generated by fossil fuels. The Canadian government produced a comprehensive critical mineral strategy and provided funding to support critical minerals projects. Together with its allies, Canada is committed to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and to mining the Arctic sustainably. 

    The European Arctic

    The European Arctic States, along with the European Union, are planning to increase mining, shipping, and fishing activity in the Arctic to meet their climate and security goals. It is estimated that Greenland has 25% of the global reserves of critical minerals. In January 2023, LKAB, a Swedish mining company, announced it had discovered Europe’s largest deposit of critical minerals in Kiruna, Sweden. The European Union proposed the Critical Raw Materials Act to expedite critical minerals mining. Increased mining activity in the European Arctic has been criticized by the Saami, an indigenous population in the region, who fear it will disrupt their way of life. The University of Queensland in Australia developed an online tool to respond to these concerns and gather input on Arctic resource extraction from indigenous people, community leaders, scholars, and industry practitioners. 

    The United States and Allies Share Values and Goals in the Arctic

    New European Union Regulatory regimes like the Just Transition Fund, EU and the Critical Raw Materials Act help protect the environment and indigenous communities in the Arctic. Josep Borell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union’s counterpart to the Secretary of State of the United States, stated, The impact of climate change, security issues, and rivalries are growing in the Arctic regions. So is the need for cooperation and multilateral agreements.” Similarly, the US Arctic Strategy emphasizes the need to uphold international law and norms in the Arctic. The United States’ security framework in the Arctic helps the European Union and NATO achieve security in the region. Finally, the EU-Canada recent agreement on securing critical mineral supply chains supports developing critical raw material projects in Canada and the EU. It aligns European and Canadian financial support for critical mineral projects to leverage and de-risk private investments. Although some citizens have objected to resource extraction in the Arctic, the United States and its allies are partnering with private industry to speed extraction of rare earth elements, minimize environmental impact, and protect indigenous citizens. The growing importance of the Arctic is an example of how climate change is impacting foreign policy and necessitating closer cooperation between the United States, Canada, and the European Union to reduce harm to the region caused by climate change and increased activity.

  • Pros and Cons of 2023 NATO Military Aid to Ukraine

    Pros and Cons of 2023 NATO Military Aid to Ukraine

    Introduction

    The North Atlantic Trade Organization, NATO, has maintained a strong relationship with Ukraine since the 1990s. NATO allies uphold that Ukrainian sovereignty is a shared security goal. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 furthered cooperation, especially through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP). This aid package has aimed to improve Ukraine’s security and defense sectors through military improvement programs. Since Russia’s February, 2022 invasion, NATO has been a crucial partner in organizing support and aid for Ukraine. Aid includes both lethal and non-lethal aid, from medical aid to bullets to armed troops. However, the scope of aid from NATO lies mostly in weapons as Ukraine cannot invoke the necessary articles to request troops because it is not a NATO member. Individual countries have also provided substantial aid and implemented sanctions against Russia. 

    NATO Aid in 2023

    • January 20th: NATO announced a joint effort with the United States to provide air defenses and armored vehicles. This is seen as crucial support to counter frequent Russian missile attacks.
    • February 7th: Denmark, Germany, and Netherlands announced the Leo A5 Initiative to give Ukraine 100 Leopard 1 A5 battle tanks and training. This in addition to recent agreements from Germany to supply Leopard 2 tanks. Both Leopard tanks are easy to use and train soldiers to operate. 
    • February 8th: NATO leadership disclosed in a press conference that NATO allies are sending additional aid including armored infantry vehicles, Javelin anti tank missiles, artillery, ammunition, and rockets for HIMARs, an American rocket launcher.

    US and Other Support

    The United States has given the most aid thus far to Ukraine. The Biden Administration has announced three major military aid packages:

    • January 6th: The Biden Administration committed to a $3.075 billion security package including artillery rounds and ammunition, air defense capabilities, and armored vehicles. The package includes financing towards capacity building and modernization of Ukraine’s Army.   
    • February 3rd: The Biden Administration authorized a Presidential Drawdown of $425 million and $1.75 billion in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). USAI allows the federal government to procure materials or weapons from industry rather than Department of Defense supplies, allowing the government to maintain support without depleting US military supplies.     
    • March 3rd: The Secretary of State announced a $400 million aid package to Ukraine including ammunition, equipment, and air defense capabilities. 

    Aid from Europe

    • The European Union has provided lethal aid for the first time in its history. Recent aid has included arms and military training. 
    • Other individual countries have sent aid and support to Ukraine. Finland, a country seeking to join NATO, announced a $400 million package on January 20th which included heavy artillery and munitions.

    Key Benefits

    US support for Ukraine indicates to American allies that the United States upholds its security promises. The war in Ukraine has revitalized defense efforts from European countries and caused them to increase their contributions to NATO. The increased cooperation has strengthened both diplomatic and military trust between European nations through organizations like NATO and the EU. In addition, as European nations turn away from Russian oil and gas imports, nations are potentially increasing the use of alternative, low emission energy sources like solar and wind that are better for the environment. As a result, European nations may achieve their climate and clean energy goals sooner than expected.  

    Key Concerns 

    There are noted concerns from policymakers and the larger American population, alike, about funding a war without a clear end. 

    • With fears of a recession, some may believe the current flow of aid may be unsustainable for the US government long term. American military spending annually outpaces any other government, and continued aid may be unsustainable politically.  
    • The greatest concern for NATO allies is the implications of escalation. US and Russian leaders have discussed nuclear weapons. Concerns about avoiding escalation informed the decision not to enact a no-fly zone over Ukraine. A no-fly zone would have effectively prevented air strikes but global leadership feared risking nuclear retaliation from Russia.   
    • US spending on Ukraine could have implications for other potential conflicts such as the ability to respond if China moves to forcibly reclaim Taiwan, which remains a national security concern.    

    The Future 

    The end of the war in Ukraine is so far uncertain, but there are moments for hope for peace in Ukraine. There are many calls for peace talks and a ceasefire as casualties continue to rise, which include a recent UN resolution that calls for an immediate Russian withdrawal from Ukraine. The General Assembly has voted to successfully pass the resolution, which may carry political consequences for Russia and their allies. The resolution is a declaration of the General Assembly’s will or opinion, and not legally binding. However, the resolution may be used to encourage a ceasefire, peace talks, or even justify continued aid in the future. 

  • Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    AUKUS Partnership Outline

    The AUKUS Partnership was one of the first major foreign policy actions of President Biden’s Administration. On September 15, 2021, AUKUS partners released a joint statement announcing the agreement. The goal of the partnership is to promote information and technology sharing, and integrate security and defense measures by increasing cooperation on a variety of capabilities, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific Region.  

    The AUKUS Partnership has three pillars 

    1. Provide Australia with “conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capabilities (SSN)”. Prior to this agreement, this technology was limited to six nuclear capable states (U.S.,UK, France, Russia, China, and India). The U.S. previously shared SSN technology with the UK, and AUKUS now extends this to Australia, a non-nuclear state. As such, this partnership is set to revolutionize Australian naval capabilities, which have struggled to travel longer distances due to limitations of electrically powered submarine fleets. 
    2. Advance military capabilities “to promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region”. The AUKUS partnership outlines objectives to expand and develop technologies, such as: AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS, the development of robotic undersea technologies), AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA, development of quantum technologies), cooperation on Artificial Intelligence (AI), collaboration on hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and the development of cyber capabilities and security measures. 
    3. Commit to information exchange. As of February 8, 2022, The Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA) came into effect, resulting in AUKUS partners sharing nuclear propulsion intel trilaterally, the first agreement to do so with a non-nuclear capable state.

    U.S. Favorability of UK Partnership 

    Prior to the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the UK had limited influence or presence within the Indo-Pacific Region, with the only formal international agreement being their membership in the Five Eyes security alliance. However, this new partnership indicates a significant shift in UK foreign policy , confirming the UK’s intention to align with U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

    Figure showing the Overlap of Defense, Intelligence, and Security Groups in the Indo-Pacific Region.

    The AUKUS Partnership presented significant political fallout in U.S.–Europe relations, because it prioritized the UK security partnership over a broader European security pact.

    France was the most affected by the establishment of the AUKUS partnership as Australia withdrew from a previously agreed Franco-Australian Submarine deal to join AUKUS. This led to an increased strain on the U.S.–France Relations, due to both the loss of a multi-billion Euro agreement and the creation of a new security alliance formed without major European allies. Following the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, the new alliance took significant attention away from the European Union’s (EU) own policy plans for the Indo-Pacific Region. Given the contentious relations between the UK and the EU in a post-Brexit Europe, this partnership highlighted a perceived favoritism of U.S.–UK relations as loyal security partners, over a united Europe. In addition, with the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the agreement has strengthened an EU-independent UK as the only European state with significant security partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region.

    Ramifications of the AUKUS Partnership

    The response to the AUKUS partnership has been mixed. As discussed, the pact strained U.S.-French relations, and distanced the U.S. from Europe in terms of Indo-Pacific cooperation. Some believe this may lead to the EU pursuing its own independent security strategy when dealing with contentious U.S. and China relations, a position that has been publicly supported by French President Emmanuel Macron.

    The AUKUS partnership, however, will have the most on-the-ground impact within the Indo-Pacific region. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reactions have been divided on the new security partnership present in the region. Recent analysis shows that 36.4% of ASEAN respondents say AUKUS would help “balance China’s growing military power”, yet 22.5% say the deal could spark “a regional arms race”. Overall there is a worry of what the broader consequences of agreements such as AUKUS may be, and their effects on the stability of the region.   

    A major concern of the AUKUS Partnership is the potentially dangerous precedent an agreement of this nature could set for nuclear proliferation. While all three partners emphasized their commitment against nuclear proliferation, this agreement is the first to allow a non-nuclear capable state to access nuclear technology. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear states to declare all nuclear material, with the IAEA verifying the material is not being used for weaponry development, thus acting as a deterrence for nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT relies on states to self-monitor naval nuclear reactors because of practical issues with access. Australia is setting a precedent as the first non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear materials the IAEA is not monitoring. It could be dangerous if other countries follow this path, and derail the current global nuclear nonproliferation system. While Australia may not prove to be an exploitive threat to nuclear weapons development through the AUKUS partnership, a future agreement of this nature could serve as the perfect cover for potential would-be-proliferators to advance nuclear development programs under the guise of access to nuclear material through naval reactors, no longer checked by the IAEA. 

    US–UK Relations and Nuclear Proliferation

    A 2020 report by Pew Research demonstrates that nuclear nonproliferation is a major foreign policy issue in the United States; 73% of Americans perceive the “spread of nuclear weapons” as a major threat to the U.S. This position attracts bipartisan support, with both Democrats and Republicans responding in equal measure to the perceived international threat. Moreover, 80% of respondents favor state cooperation with other countries as “very important” when navigating the spread of nuclear weapons.

    The United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK) have a long history of alignment on foreign policy objectives towards nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear war. Much of the existing U.S.–UK agreements on nuclear cooperation between both states derive and build upon the original 1958 “Atomic Energy. Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes” agreement, which bound both countries in a united front against other state development of atomic weapons. As such, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Partnership is yet another foreign policy step the U.S. and the UK have taken to further their allied cooperation to address the international security threats of today.

  • The Euro and its impact on the European Union

    The Euro and its impact on the European Union

    This brief was originally published by Francesca Reynolds on July 15, 2021. It was updated and republished by Larissa Cursaro on June 22, 2022.

    History

    Although it took until 2002 for the Euro to become a physical currency, the idea of a common currency alongside a united monetary and fiscal policy was an ambition of the European Union since the 1960s. Then on January 17 1989, two decades later, the European Parliament declared the free circulation of goods, capital, services, and people to be the “four fundamental freedoms” of the European Union, thus officially encouraging the adoption of a single-currency. The purpose of the common currency was to support economic activity between states, stabilize economies, and enhance options for consumers.  

    The Euro is now the currency of 19 nations, leaving only 8 EU countries that use an alternative currency (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden). 

    The European Central Bank (ECB) was established simultaneously in order to coordinate monetary policy (policies relating to interest rates and money supply, used by central banks to influence the level of demand in an economy e.g. management of interest rates) between countries. This necessary measure also further integrated the economies of many EU countries, leaving national governments with only fiscal policy (policies relating to the amount spent by a government e.g. levels of taxation) to manage their country’s economy. 

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    Benefits

    • The Euro enables trade to operate far quicker by removing the need and risk of currency exchanges when operating across eurozone countries. Currency exchanges cost money to complete and are a risk to businesses as fluctuations in rates lead to uncertainty about the cost of the exchange. Therefore, by removing this barrier, trade has flowed easier between countries. 
    • Having a single-currency economy also incentivizes trade between the EU and other countries. The stability of a single-currency economy is attractive to potential trade partners as it ensures a relatively consistent exchange rate. This stability, paired with prudent economic management makes the Euro an attractive reserve currency for non-Euro countries, thus giving it a more powerful voice in the global economy. Fun Fact: The Euro is the world’s second most popular reserve currency
    • In theory, a combined currency should also incentivise countries to support each other and thus promote greater stability. There are a few reasons for this. First, countries with larger economies tend to be more stable as they are able to spread risk. For example, a natural disaster in a small country can ruin their economy and currency. On the other hand, a natural disaster in one US state will likely have an insignificant impact on the currency. Second, more successful countries have an incentive to help out less successful countries, otherwise known as “cohesion policy”. This is because the value of the currency impacts all countries using it, so if countries want to prevent harmful impacts to their own country, they need to support others. This benefit was realized during the 2020 Coronavirus Crisis. Although there was initially insufficient support for a collective measure, the ECB consistently bought debt in severely impacted countries to keep interest rates low. Eventually, the Next Generation EU recovery plan was put in place. It is the largest stimulus package ever from the EU and is worth around €750 billion. 

    Issues

    The most significant issue facing the adopters of the Euro is the coordinated monetary policy that often fails to fit local economic conditions. The economies of the countries currently using the currency vary significantly. Germany is the world’s third largest exporter but has to use the same monetary policy as Lithuania whose export value is 67th globally. Without tailored monetary policy for each economy, countries can struggle to solve issues impacting their populations, as was the case during the eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis.

    There is also concern regarding the economies of some member states that have already adopted the Euro. In order to become a member of the eurozone, countries must meet certain economic standards called “convergence requirements”, one of which requires the country’s debt ratio to be under 60% debt to GDP.  Considering that this is a non-negotiable prerequisite to join the eurozone, many economists wonder if the European Commission should start holding current eurozone members to the same standard. Some of the largest countries in the European Union—such as Italy, France, and Spain—fail this requirement with the average percent debt to GDP in the Euro area being 100 percent. If left unchecked, they may cause the Euro to lose value, which could be devastating for the Euro area’s economy.

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    Future

    • There are frequent reports of the potential collapse of the Euro, however, at least in the near future, this seems unlikely. The Euro was able to survive in Greece despite both economic and political crisis after the 2008 financial crisis, so it seems likely to continue through comparatively steadier times. 
    • The number of countries using the Euro could be set to increase. Since 1991 any country joining the EU has had to adopt the Euro and meet the “convergence requirements” (excluding Denmark). With a number of countries in the pipeline to joining the EU, it is no surprise that the eurozone is set to expand. On June 1st, 2022, the European Commission determined in its convergence report that Croatia has fulfilled the convergence requirements for the adoption of the euro on the first of January, 2023. However, many countries have been on the path to EU accession for many years without having been deemed to fulfill the convergence criteria.
  • The Vienna Talks: Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal

    The Vienna Talks: Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal

    Background

    As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden pledged to reenter the Iran nuclear deal that the Obama administration brokered in 2015. The deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), offered international sanctions relief in exchange for limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, which the Iranian government insists is for peaceful purposes. In 2018, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and implemented  a “maximum pressure” campaign consisting of harsher sanctions, new designations of terrorist organizations, and travel restrictions, among other measures. In response, Iran committed significant breaches of the JCPOA including enriching uranium to higher concentrations, exceeding uranium stockpile limits, developing advanced centrifuges, and restricting international monitoring. 

    In an op-ed written in September 2020, President Biden expressed his desire to “strengthen and expand” the deal to include provisions addressing Iran’s regional activities and ballistic missile program, among other concerns expressed by critics of the original deal. A month into his presidency, Biden made three preliminary moves to jump-start negotiations with Iran. First, the U.S. accepted an invitation from the EU to attend a meeting with the other JCPOA signatories, the P5+1–Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany–and Iran to discuss a path forward. The Biden administration also reversed former President Trump’s decision to reinvoke all United Nations sanctions when Iran initially violated the terms of the agreement (known as “snapback sanction”). Finally, Biden removed travel restrictions on Iranian diplomats based at the United Nations in New York. Despite such overtures, Tehran rejected the invitation to meet and diplomacy initially stalled over disagreements about which country should make the next move. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif refused to engage directly with the U.S. until Biden agreed to lift all sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. However, after weeks of discreet negotiations, Tehran committed to indirect talks with the P5+1. 

    “On the Right Track” 

    The first round of negotiations began in Vienna on April 6, 2021. European envoys acted as intermediaries, shuttling between the Iranian and U.S. delegations. In initial meetings, the Joint Commission formed two expert working groups: one charting Washington’s timetable for lifting sanctions, the other discussing Iran’s plan for reversing nuclear breaches inconsistent with JCPOA guidelines. At the third round of talks, another working group formed to address the sequencing of measures necessary to bring the U.S. and Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA. Enrique Mora, the EU coordinator for the talks, reported  “good progress,” a phrase echoed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov. However, after the sixth round of talks concluded on June 20, 2021, negotiations reached an impasse. 

    Challenges 

    Two events aroused suspicion during the talks, although it is unclear to what extent these events impacted negotiations. After the first round of talks in Vienna, an explosion hit Natanz, Iran’s key uranium enrichment facility. Iran blamed the act of “nuclear terrorism” on Israel, and in retaliation, increased its uranium encirchment level from 20 to 60%, a step closer to weapons-grade (90%). Although some JCPOA signatories expressed “grave concern” about Iran’s enrichment activities, Foreign Minister Zarif emphasized that Iran “will not allow this act of sabotage to affect the nuclear talks.” Shortly after the explosion at Natanz, a taped interview with Zarif was leaked to the press. In the recording, Zarif, who helped negotiate the original deal in 2015, alleged that Russian officials conspired with Iranian General Suleimani to sabotage the JCPOA before it was brokered in 2015, suggesting that Moscow sought to prevent Tehran from normalizing relations with the West. Iran’s Foreign Ministry characterized the leak as “illegal” and the Russian Foreign Ministry refused requests for comments. Despite skepticism from outside observers and JCPOA signatories, negotiations continued seemingly unaffected by the revelations, although the explosion in Natanz pressured the delegations to expedite the negotiation process.  

    Aside from external controversies, Iran’s domestic politics played a substantial role in delaying negotiations. Throughout the talks, Iran’s outgoing president Hassan Rouhani faced pressure from a hardline parliament hostile to the JCPOA.  Rouhani blamed a law passed by the Iranian parliament and Guardian Council in December 2020 for hindering diplomatic success. The law, which required the Atomic Energy Association of Iran to accelerate its nuclear development if certain sanctions were not lifted, raised concern from other JCPOA participants and cast doubt regarding Iran’s commitment to the deal. Additionally, some observers including Ali Raibee, a spokesperson for the Rouhani government, contended that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sought to postpone a final agreement until Iranian elections in June, which promised a hardline victory. After a controversial vote on June 18, the new hardline president Ebrahim Raisi requested time to consolidate a new government before continuing negotiations in Vienna. Raisi’s decision was no shock, as Zarif and other JCPOA signatories previously expressed a desire to reach an agreement before Raisi’s election. Since Raisi’s election, no date has been set to resume talks in Vienna.

    Future Prospects 

    Despite speculation, the Biden administration stated that the new Iranian government would not significantly alter Tehran’s negotiating position. However, President Raisi has held firm that regional and missile issues are “non-negotiable,” complicating Biden’s plan to open discussions related to these matters. Although the Biden administration and the other JCPOA signatories have confirmed their willingness to resume negotiations after Raisi forms a new government, White House officials have warned that the option will not remain open “indefinitely.” Aside from disagreements over the lifting of U.S. sanctions, members of the JCPOA are concerned that Tehran’s nuclear escalation resulting from the 2020 law has shortened Iran’s breakout window—the time it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb. If Iran’s recent nuclear developments are irreversible, the one-year breakout period envisioned in the 2015 accord may be null and JCPOA signatories may be less willing to restore the 2015 deal as it stands if the intended nonproliferation benefits are weakened. 

    Although the U.S. and its JCPOA partners have expressed a desire to resume talks in Vienna immediately, Iranian officials have requested bilateral meetings with EU officials in Brussels to find “practical solutions to the current deadlock in Vienna.” The Biden administration views this step as unnecessary and recently announced its willingness to explore a “Plan B” with Israel. The current path forward remains unclear, as questions regarding U.S. sanctions relief and Iran’s breakout time complicate the prospect of future diplomatic negotiations. Presently, Tehran is not ready to resume a seventh round of talks in Vienna, and the Biden administration’s current rhetoric indicates increasing impatience over the deadlock.

  • An Introduction to Human Rights and Armed Conflict

    An Introduction to Human Rights and Armed Conflict

    There are two bodies of law that guarantee the protection of human rights for individuals and groups on a universal scale, international human right laws and international humanitarian law.

    Defining Laws that Protect Human Rights

    International human rights law (IHRL) is a set of international standards, enforced via treaty and customary law, that ensure that certain rights must be respected and protected by their states and state actors. Customary law are the legal norms that have been established via a historical pattern of behavior and expectations of states, and many expectations under IHRL fall under the category of being “customary”.  International humanitarian law (IHL) is a set of humanitarian protections put in place to help protect civilians in times of armed conflict. The ultimate goal of IHL is to limit the effects of armed conflict and protect individual human rights during war time. IHL is binding to all parties in an armed conflict and holds them to a standard of equality of rights and obligations to states involved in the conflict. IHL is integrated with jus in bello (law governing the conduct of war) and jus ad bellum (law allowing the use of armed force). These latin terms have been around since Medieval times when thinkers such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas began propagating theories surrounding “just war”. Some of these requirements for “just war” created the foundation for the modern laws governing when war and use of force is permitted. 

    According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN, it was historically held that the difference between international human rights law and international humanitarian law was that the former applied only in times of peace and the latter in situations of armed conflict. Contemporary international law now recognizes that this distinction is less clear than originally believed to be. It is widely recognized by the international community that since human rights obligations derive from the recognition of the inherent rights of all human beings under IHRL that these rights should come into play during both times of peace and war because of the fact that nothing in human rights treaties indicates that they should not be applicable in times of armed conflict. These two bodies of law are thus complementary in nature and at their core establish the same goal of securing the dignity and safety of all individuals.

    International Humanitarian Law

    IHL is also known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LAOC) and operates under two primary principles, which are defining legitimate means and legitimate targets during wartime. IHL, through international agreements such as The Geneva Conventions and the Hague Commissions, lays out ground rules that define what practices of war are acceptable to use during wartime. “Legitimate means” refers to the fact that certain types of weapons or military tactics are prohibited if they violate the principle of  unnecessary suffering and all acts of perfidy, defined as deceitful tactics or acts of deception,  are generally prohibited. When it comes to defining what a legitimate target is, protecting civilians and non-combatants is the priority. Any non-military objective should be protected, such as schools, hospitals, and places of worship. Customary law within the international community also implies that certain universal standards of armed conflict should be respected and not militarily targeted such as Prisoners of War (POWs), wounded soldiers, the white flag indicating surrender and anything marked with a red cross or a red crescent symbol indicating humanitarian aid. 

    It is widely accepted that war will inevitably take place and although the use of force is prohibited under the Charter of the United Nations, Article 51 allows for use of force in specific cases of self-defense when the threat is imminent, and Chapter VII spells out instances when use of force can be authorized via approval by the UN Security Council. These two exceptions are both cases in which IHL would come into full force and govern the conduct of the states engaging in armed conflict. 

    The laws of armed conflict have human rights standards at their core; the problems arise when enforceability is brought up. Because IHRL and IHL reside at the international level and there is no true international governing body, these laws of war rely on the fact that it is in each nation’s best interest to abide by these standards.

  • Treatment of POWs and Civilian Captures: Background on the Geneva Conventions

    Treatment of POWs and Civilian Captures: Background on the Geneva Conventions

    The Geneva Conventions are a series of international treaties whose development began in 1864 and culminated in 1949. The goal of the first convention was to protect and preserve the health and dignity of captured persons during armed conflict. After the events of WWII, the 1949 convention took on new humanitarian importance and managed to gain ratification by every UN member state. The standards set forth by the Geneva Conventions remain the preeminent guidelines for international human rights during war. Additional protocols were added to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 which have not been ratified by the United States.

    Key Provisions

    The first exemplary component comes from article three, section one of the 1949 treaty. Regarding people who took no action in the hostilities, including soldiers who laid down their arms, were injured, or were detained, this clause prohibits acts such as:

    a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.

    As these restrictions show, the conventions prioritize the twin pillars of physical health and moral dignity. Another excerpt from article twenty-seven of the 1949 treaty asserts a similar goal in stating:

    Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

    Though well intentioned, these protections only apply during periods of armed conflict. This is just one of the many limitations that affect the ability of the Geneva Conventions to adequately protect the safety and dignity of people affected by violent conflict. 

    Weak Enforcement of Policies

    The main body of enforcement for the Geneva Conventions is the International Criminal Court (ICC) which was established in 2002. For more specific information on the ICC, check out the ACE brief here. The ICC’s creation was an important step towards enforcement, however its effectiveness in holding violators to account has been constrained by its ties to the United Nations. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) have used their veto power to constrain the ICC’s ability to investigate potential war crimes, even if the nations are not party to the ICC themselves. The UNSC influence has played a major permissive role in recent violations of the Geneva Conventions, as the following examples will highlight. 

    Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, British soldiers were accused of war crimes violations related to their treatment of Iraqi detainees. A report from ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda confirmed that “there is a reasonable basis to believe that members of the British armed forces committed the war crimes of wilful killing, torture, inhuman/cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape and/or other forms of sexual violence.” Nonetheless, Bensouda concedes that British authorities lacked the necessary forensic evidence needed to secure convictions for the offenses. The UK did not directly prevent the ICC from investigating the conduct of its armed forces. However, the geopolitical influence wielded by the UK exempted it from the level of international scrutiny often faced by other states. 

    UNSC veto power has allowed Geneva violations stemming from the Syrian civil war to go unpunished. The Russian-backed Assad regime has been accused of intentionally targeting civilians throughout the conflict. While this should have provided the basis to refer Syria to an ICC investigation, Russia and China have both used their veto power to prevent this from happening. The Syrian government benefits immensely from its alliance with Russia because the regime has been able to commit war crimes and atrocities with limited accountability. Therefore, the ICC’s affiliation with the UN restricts its ability to enforce the Geneva Conventions because the P5 nations seek to protect their respective alliance commitments.

    Since the state’s creation in 1948, Israel has beena accused of trying to solidify its physical and cultural security by displacing the Palestinian Arab population in order to permit the settlement of Jewish immigrants from around the world. This could represent a violation of article forty-nine of the fourth Geneva treaty, which states that an occupying power may not transfer its own civilian population into the occupied territory. The same article also prevents the forceful transfer or deportation of protected persons from the occupied territories, an offense of which Israel has also been accused of. It is important to note that these arguments are highly disputed. Earlier this year, the ICC stated its ambition to investigate war crimes committed in Israeli and Palestinian territories since 2014. Israel’s Prime Minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu, issued a statement that the nation would not cooperate with an ICC investigation because he viewed it as rooted in antisemitism. The investigation is planned to move forward with or without Israeli support. It is unclear whether Israel’s Western allies, namely the United States, would leverage their influence to prevent the imposition of major punishments. 

    ConclusionAs these examples have shown, the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions by the ICC has been limited substantially by UN associations and other geopolitical relationships among states. The result has been that not every instance of violation is treated the same. Investigations can proceed freely, as long as they do not interfere with the interests and alliances of influential nations, such as Russia, the United Kingdom, or the United States. It is this conflict between humanitarian justice and national interests that continues to stunt the effectiveness of the Conventions in dealing with modern conflict. The United States’ refusal to ratify the additional protocols and the ICC represents an effort to distance national interests from court proceedings. In other words, leaders tend to favor flexibility (and the ability to avoid accountability) over binding commitments in the name of abstract values. As a non-party, the US is able to avoid direct scrutiny of its wartime conduct by bodies like the ICC. In recent years, the US government has gone so far as to take up a confrontational posture towards the court. The Trump administration attempted to further limit the court’s ability to investigate US activity, and even imposed sanctions on ICC officials (these have since been ended by the Biden administration and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken). While the current administration has seemed more favorable towards the ICC, full endorsement and ratification remain unlikely. While the Geneva Conventions remain an important component of international law and global human rights, competing domestic and international commitments have undermined enforcement on numerous occasions.

  • Zapad 2021—Eastern Europe’s Military Alliance and NATO

    Zapad 2021—Eastern Europe’s Military Alliance and NATO

    Overview of Zapad 2021

    What is it?

    Zapad 2021 was a week-long joint military exercise between Russia and Belarus. Zapad, Russian for “west,” took place in Russia’s Western Military District, Belarus, and areas under the Northern Fleet’s Joint Strategic Command in the Baltic Sea. Zapad was proceeded by drills in the geographic regions of Vostok, “east,” in 2018, Tsentr, “center,” in 2019, and Kavkaz, “Caucasus,” in 2020. The exercise consisted of a three-day defensive phase simulating an invasion by Western actors, referred to as the Polar Republic, and a four-day counter-offensive to regain lost territory. Zapad essentially represented a show of Russian-Belarusian military solidarity and served as a staging ground for new doctrine, strategy, and weapons systems.

    Diagram

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    Image Courtesy of the ISW

    Important Actors

    Russia and Belarus were the primary states involved in the exercise, although military representatives from India and states in the Caucasus and Central Asia were present. Despite unreliable statistics, it is believed that a total of 200,000 military personnel participated in the exercises, and roughly 80 aircraft and helicopters, up to 15 ships, and nearly 300 tanks were used.

    A helicopter flying over a field

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    Image Courtesy of Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

    Significant Developments from the Exercise

    Overall, Zapad was hailed as a success by the participating states. By the end of the exercise, the combined military force had defeated the Polar Republic, which served as a fictitious representation of NATO. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin expressed satisfaction with the exercise’s results and hailed his military for its capabilities. The most intriguing technological success was the performance of Russia’s newly developed autonomous tanks, which represent the Russian military’s success in developing new autonomous weaponry.

    Although not a direct result of the exercise, Vladimir Putin had to recuse himself from viewing the exercise due to being exposed to the Covid-19 virus. Putin tested negative for the virus but isolated himself as members of his staff had tested positive.

    Implications for NATO and Eastern European Geopolitics

    The exercise was meant to serve as a show of unity between Russia and Belarus, and a show of force directed towards NATO. To the first point, Russia and Belarus’ close military relationship was apparent even before the exercise, as Belarus had recently purchased over $1 billion in Russian weaponry. This significant purchase signals that Belarus is concerned about its security. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko asserted that Zapad was practice for preventing a western-backed color revolution in Belarus in response to the 2020 mass protests against his regime.

    Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko

    Image Courtesy of The Guardian

    Zapad caused significant concern in Ukraine, a country currently in conflict with Russian-backed separatists in the eastern part of the country. In response, the United States, Ukraine, and several other NATO countries plan to hold a joint military exercise in late September 2021 in response to Zapad named “Rapid Trident—2021.”

    Before the exercise, NATO officials advised Russia to be transparent and warned that any miscalculations could ignite a potential conflict. However, it is clear that Zapad was used to demonstrate Russia’s new military capabilities and project strength rather than serve as a pretense for an invasion of a neighboring state.