Category: Eurasia

What is Nagorno-Karabakh?

The landlocked, mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus has seen some of the most consistent, brutal fighting in the post-Soviet world. Although it is a small region, Nagorno-Karabakh has existed at the junction between many historic powers such as the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian Empires. Thus, the region has developed a great diversity in language, religion, and ethnicity, each of which has significantly contributed to its history. During the Soviet era, the region was known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) in the Azerbaijan Soviet Social Republic (ASSR). Although located within the ASSR, the NKAO was populated primarily by Armenians with Azerbaijani and Russian minorities. These groups coexisted peacefully until the late 1980s when the disintegration of the Soviet Union gave way to increased nationalist sentiment on both sides. By the late 1980s, the NKAO received aid from the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, and relations developed between the two groups. 

The territory is currently internationally recognized as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan, despite attempts by ethnic Armenians to unite the NKAO with the Armenian SSR and the successor state, the Republic of Armenia. The Republic of Artsakh is an internationally unrecognized state inside Azerbaijan that is predominantly ethnic-Armenian. It wields de facto control over parts of Nagorno-Karabakh from its capital Stepanakert.

Geographic location of Nagorno-Karabakh region – Image Courtesy of Al Jazeera

Mapping the Conflict

First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994): While citizens of the Soviet Union, ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived peacefully. However, as the USSR deteriorated, so did relations between the two groups. Subsequently, war broke out between the Armenian and Azerbaijani Soviet Republics in 1988 and ended in 1994, just a few years after both countries achieved independence from the USSR in 1991. The Armenian side was ultimately victorious and made significant territorial gains as the Republic of Artsakh gained de facto independence status and unification with the Republic of Armenia. However, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet (the body akin to Congress) rejected this status and gained recognition from the international community as the sole ruler of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (2016): The period between 1994 and 2016 saw some minor outbreaks of violence violence which did not comparable to the first war. This relatively peaceful period ended in early April 2016 when fighting broke out on a larger scale, with both sides asserting that the other instigated the fighting. Between April 2^nd and the 5^th, dozens of soldiers and several civilians were killed on both sides of the conflict. While there was no clear winner following the ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan won a symbolic victory as its success proved that it had become a match for Armenia since the previous conflict. 

Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020): September through November of 2020 saw the most intense and devastating fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh in the post-Soviet era. Azerbaijan’s superior military capability led to a decisive victory. Azerbaijan regained much of the territory it had lost in the previous conflicts, including five cities, four towns, and 286 villages. However, it did not take Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh, which remains in Armenian hands under the protection of Russian peacekeepers. While the territorial gains and losses were significant for both sides, the loss of life was also significant. Nearly 6,000 people were killed during the war, including 77 Armenian and 92 Azerbaijani non-combatants. Additionally, over 130,000 people were displaced, including approximately 90,600 people from Nagorno-Karabakh who moved to Armenia and approximately 40,000 from areas near the line of contact on the Azerbaijani side. Although the subsequent ceasefire was met with joy in Baku and anger in Yerevan, the human costs were extremely detrimental on both sides.

Territorial changes after the 2020 peace deal – Image Courtesy of BBC

Actors and Their Motivations

Republic of Artsakh: Self-determination is the driving motivator for the unrecognized state of the Republic of Artsakh. At present, Artsakh is not recognized by a single United Nations member, including Armenia. However, it is recognized by the non-UN member, unrecognized states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both located in Georgia, and Transnistria, located in Moldova. It suffered significant territorial losses to Azerbaijan during the 2020 conflict, and its reliance on Armenia for political, economic, and military assistance indicates that it may be unstable were it to achieve independence. 

Republic of Armenia: Armenia is motivated by the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. It is bordered by an unfriendly Turkey to the west and Azerbaijan to the east. A fellow ethnic-Armenian state in Artsakh makes for a critical ally, despite not formally recognizing its existence. Armenia may also view the Nagorno-Karabakh region as a historic piece of Greater Armenia, and retaining the territory would represent a victory for the Armenian diaspora.

Republic of Azerbaijan: While Armenia and Artsakh are motivated by their shared ethnic background and desire for self-determination, Azerbaijan is motivated by its desire to maintain its territorial integrity. Nagorno-Karabakh, which accounts for roughly five percent of Azerbaijani territory, is internationally recognized as Azerbaijan. Despite this distinction, Nagorno-Karabakh is populated almost exclusively by ethnic Armenians, with a few hundred ethnic Azerbaijanis and Russians. However, with the territorial changes resulting from the war in 2020, it is likely that ethnic Azerbaijanis will move into the territory retained by Azerbaijan.

January 2021 Meeting between Armenian PM Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Aliyev, and Russian President Putin – Image Courtesy of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Republic of Turkey: Turkey has been a fervent supporter of Azerbaijan and contributed to its military buildup since the early 1990s. The nationalistic government in Ankara has utilized the common Turkic background shared by the two countries to strengthen their interstate relationship and garner support for the Azerbaijani cause in Turkey. In addition, relations between Turks and Armenians have been historically hostile and are officially non-existent. President Erdogan of Turkey has insisted that Armenia withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territory.

Russian Federation: Although Russia has been a traditional ally to Armenia, it is a neutral actor and has actively supplied weapons to each side since the 1990s. Despite this, Russia does not want a conflict near its borders. It leveraged its position as the regional hegemonic power to become an arbiter during negotiations between the warring parties and deployed its forces as peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh may depend on how long Russia stays in the region as a peacekeeping force.

Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh – Image Courtesy of Reporters Without Borders

United States of America: Unlike Russia, the United States is not particularly involved in the region. However, both the Biden and Trump administrations attempted to secure peace between both sides. While the United States is not a regional actor, it does have a vested interest in securing peace. The United States’ NATO ally Turkey is closely aligned to Azerbaijan. If the conflict were to grow, the United States could find itself at odds with an Armenia-aligned Russia.

Future of Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations

Lachin Corridor : The Lachin Corridor is a narrow swath of land which connects Armenia and Artsakh. The corridor is a significant economic factor in Nagorno-Karabakh because it allows for the movement of people and goods from Armenia to Artsakh, although much of the surrounding territory was retaken by Azerbaijan in 2020. Presently, the Lachin Corridor is under the control of Russian peacekeeping forces per the 2020 armistice agreement.

Nakhchivan: Although located outside of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Azerbaijani autonomous exclave of Nakhchivan is not immune to interstate fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 2021, armed forces from Armenia and Azerbaijan clashed along the border of Nakhchivan and Armenia, resulting in one injury on both sides. The situation in Nakhchivan is only just developing, and further clashes could trigger a more significant regional conflict.

Lachin Corridor and Nakhchivan – Image Courtesy of Eurasian Geopolitics

Also known as the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ in Ukraine, Euromaidan began in November 2013 with civil protests in Kyiv demanding closer integration with Europe, and culminated in February 2014 with the ousting of President Yanukovych and the creation of a new government. The effects of the revolution are still felt in the region and globally today, particularly in relations between Russia and the West.

Key Events

Protests began when Ukrainian President Yanukovych suddenly and unexpectedly refused to sign a European Union Association Agreement due to Russian pressure. Ukraine and the EU had worked on the agreement for several years. Protests began because citizens demanded increased integration with Europe, but they soon shifted to call out corruption in the country. Ukraine ranked 144th globally in the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2013. The Yanukovych government was unable to discourage protesters, only making them more angry through the use of violence and anti-protest laws.

Euromaidan came to an end when Yanukovych fled the country for Russia. This allowed a new government to take over, with Petro Poroshenko elected as the new president in May 2014. Shortly after Yanukovych fled and was officially removed from his position, Russia used demonstrations against the new Ukrainian government, along with the significant ethnic Russian population in the region, as justification to annex Crimea.

Aftermath of Euromaidan

Russian Annexation: since the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine began, there have been more than 13,000 casualties, including over 3,000 civilians. Recent escalations of tensions between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the West, do not indicate that this conflict is likely to come to an end soon.

EU Integration: the government that came into power following Euromaidan signed the EU Association Agreement in June 2014, and it came fully into force in September 2017. Many Ukrainians are optimistic that Ukraine will join the EU in the future.

Russia, Ukraine, and the West: the two Ukrianian presidents since the revolution, Poroshenko and Zelensky, have weaker ties to Russia than past Ukrainian presidents. Both expressed future hopes that Ukraine will join the EU and NATO in the future. This has brought Ukraine and Russia, neighbors and longtime allies, into opposition. The conflict between Russia has also caused significant damage to relations between Russia and the West at a time when tensions are already high.

Images from Euromaidan

Photo source

Photo source

Photo source

Photo source

Photo source

There have been several opponents and critics of the Russian state whose deaths are believed to be connected to the Russian state. Russia tends to deny responsibility for actions against their political opponents, despite there often being a large amount of evidence linking them to the events. Their refusal to acknowledge responsibility makes it difficult to make a definitive statement as to what happened, and gives the Russian state plausible deniability on the world stage. It also allows for a lack of remorse – if no one can say for sure that they did something, then why should they apologize for it? The following examples are significant because they speak to the Russian Federation’s commitment to a leadership strategy which is entirely at odds with the United States and the rules-based international order. Dissidents and whistleblowers vanish and the government acts with impunity. The Russian Federation is not the only state to implement this strategy, but brazenly abducting political opponents, combined with Russia’s attacks on democracy in other countries, indicate the type of world and systems Russia aims to create.

Here are a few significant examples of presumed Russian state action against political opponents:

Anna Politkovskaya

Anna Politkovskaya was a journalist who made much of her career reporting on Chechnya and was critical of the Putin regime. A 1980 graduate of the Moscow State University journalism school, Politkovskaya worked for several papers before she began to write for Novaya Gazeta in 1999—a newspaper known for its investigative reporting and criticism of the post-Soviet regime. 

While writing for Novaya Gazeta, Politkovskaya conducted a series of trips into the warzone in Chechnya, and her reporting on the conflict angered the authorities, leading to her detention and expulsion from the region in 2001. Despite her arrest and the threats to her life, Politkovskaya continued to write on both Chechnya and the Putin regime, publishing articles in Novaya Gazeta, as well as multiple books, and receiving many awards for her work. 

In September 2004, she believed herself to have been poisoned while on a flight to help with a hostage negotiation in North Ossetia. On October 7, 2006, she was found dead in the elevator of her apartment block in Moscow, having been shot repeatedly at point-blank range. There was widespread international outrage following her murder. 

Multiple arrests have been made in the years since her death, but her former colleagues at Novaya Gazeta believe her case is not solved and the culprits have not been brought to justice. (Here is the original Russian article and video.)

Alexander Litvinenko

Alexander Litvinenko was a former FSB (successor agency to the KGB, approximately comparable to the American FBI) officer who was critical of the Putin regime. Originally an officer in the MVD (Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) beginning in 1980, Litvinenko was later recruited to join the KGB, and then became a part of the FSB.

In late 1998, Boris Berezovsky (an oligarch and another suspected victim of Russian state action) accused several senior FSB officers of ordering his assassination. Litvinenko, along with four other officers, held a press conference in support of this claim a few days later. He was the only one to show his face. Following the press conference, he was dismissed from the FSB.

In October 2000, Litvinenko fled to London, disregarding orders not to travel, in order to seek asylum, which he received on humanitarian grounds. He was convicted in absentia while in Britain on charges of corruption and sentenced to 3 ½ years in jail, but instead spent his time writing and cooperating with non-Russian security services (allegations he made included an accusation that Putin ordered the assassination of Politkovskaya).

On November 1, 2006, Litvinenko fell suddenly ill after meeting with two former KGB agents. On November 3, he was admitted to a hospital, and his illness was later attributed to polonium-210 poisoning. He died on November 23. 

In a statement released posthumously the next day, he accused Putin of being behind his poisoning. His widow also accused Moscow of orchestrating the poisoning, although she did not believe Putin was directly behind the order. A British investigation into his death, released in 2016, found that Putin had ‘probably approved’ the poisoning, and that the Russian state was involved, contrasting the Russian media belief that the murder was linked to Berezovsky, the oligarch.

Sergei Skripal

Sergei Skripal was a part of the GRU (Russian military intelligence agency) and a double agent for British intelligence in the 1990s and 2000s. He first served in the Soviet Airborne Troops before becoming a GRU military intelligence officer in the early 1990s. 

While traveling for work in Spain in 1995, Skripal was recruited by British intelligence as a double agent. At this time he began to pass information to the British government, including, allegedly, the identities of over three hundred Russian agents. He was arrested in December 2004, convicted, and sentenced to thirteen years in a high-security facility.

In July 2010, Skripal was released as part of a spy swap. He moved to the UK, from where he continued to provide assistance and information to various Western intelligence agencies.

On March 4, 2018, Skripal and his daughter Yulia were found on a park bench slipping in and out of consciousness. It was found that they had been poisoned by a Novichok nerve agent. Both Skripals survived the poisoning, though they were in critical condition for a significant amount of time.

It has been reported that they are now in New Zealand under new identities, although this rumor is unconfirmed. When asked about the situation, Putin states that Skripal’s situation has been blown out of proportion, and that less attention should be focused on a traitor.

Others

These are not the only people believed to have been targeted by the Russian state. The most recent, widely publicized case is that of Alexei Navalny, who was poisoned in August 2020 – his case will be discussed in a separate brief. If you are interested in reading more, there are a few lists of other suspicious deaths and poisonings that many attribute to the Russian state.

Background

In 1993, two years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia adopted a new Constitution which outlined a separation of powers between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The legislative branch is the Federal Assembly, which consists of the State Duma and the Federation Council. The judicial branch has a multi-leveled court system and the executive branch is centered around the office of the President. In theory, this constitution allows for multiparty democracy, yet some experts believe that under the administration of President Vladimir Putin, a “managed democracy” has emerged. A “managed democracy” refers to a system where one “party of power” supports the state’s agenda and smaller, state-approved opposition parties work to divide true opposition.

Scholars have noted that Russia does not have a strong political party system, as seen in Western-style democratic systems such as the United States.The political spectrum in Russia differs from the political spectrum that defines the American political party system. Though there are a plethora of distinct Russian political ideologies, most embrace beliefs most akin to an American’s notion of social conservatism in regards to socio-cultural issues, valuing tradition and the traditional Russian sphere of influence. However, key differences emerge between the parties in regards to economic policy, with the economic left supporting collectivism and a return to Soviet-era renationalization of private industry, and the economic right advocating for a free market. Due to Russia’s long cultural and political history of autocracy, many modern Russian political parties tend to favor a more authoritarian government. Figure 1 illustrates the political leanings of the major political parties discussed in this brief. 

Figure 1. Political Typologies of Major Russian Political Parties

United Russia 

The “party of power” in Russia is United Russia (UR), which was founded in early 2000 after a merger of the Unity, Fatherland, and All Russia parties. It is the largest political party in the Russian Federation, holding 324 seats out of the 450 seats in the State Duma. The party’s leader is Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s former President and the Prime Minister under Putin’s third term as president. United Russia has been referred to as a “big tent party” because it lacks a singular, cohesive party ideology and favors backing specific individuals. It often has ideological leniency when developing and implementing new policies. However, the party’s actions whilst in power suggest it supports economic liberalism, strong state regulation, and Russian conservatism. Furthermore, United Russia has supported legislation expanding public assistance and social programs that include efforts to improve educational opportunities and stimulate the labor market, which reflects the party’s official goals. Party support has been on the decline in recent years, forcing Putin to bring favored politicians into party leadership. 

Communist Party of the Russian Federation 

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is the far-left successor of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the second largest party. It favors strong state power and collectivism but often agrees with United Russia on social issues, such as the controversial “anti-gay propaganda bill”. Though the party acts as an institutional opposition to United Russia, it still often approves pro-Kremlin legislation. The party’s leader, Gennady Zyuganov, has run for president four times, campaigning chiefly on nostalgia for the Soviet Union, with the CPRF party platform urging for a reversal of the economic liberalization policies instituted following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many argue that Zyuganov can be considered a Russian nationalist due to his frequent attacks against the West and support of the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) is a far-right political party that opposes both economic liberalization and the Socialist economic policies of the Soviet Union, opting instead to support Russian ethnic nationalism. Though purportedly an oppositional party to United Russia, the LDPR often supports the actions of United Russia, while at the same time calling for more radical action. Its leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is perhaps best known for his brash and nationalistic rhetoric, often campaigning on outlandish promises, most often anti-West, racist, and completely unfeasible, including calling for the annexation of Alaska, the expelling of all Chinese immigrants from Russia’s Far Eastern territories, and the dissolution of all Russian political parties in favor of the establishment of a hereditary monarchy. Zhirinovsky remains a popular politician in the contemporary Russian political system, with LDPR often performing second or third best in nation-wide elections.

A Just Russia 

A Just Russia, known also as simply Just Russia, was founded in 2006 as a result of the merger between the Russian Party of Life, Rodina, and the Russian Pensioners Party. The party is center-left and supports socialism, considering itself an alternative to the more radical CPRF. Just Russia acts as another institutional opposition party because it competes against United Russia in elections. However, elected members of Just Russia often support the actions of Putin’s administration, and the party leader, Sergey Mironov, is a long-time ally of Putin. Mironov has advocated for the expansion of social programs, tax reform, increased investment in infrastructure, and protecting Russian interests abroad. While Just Russia is the most moderate of the established Russian political parties, Mironov and other party leaders have vehemently rejected climate change. Recently, Just Russia has announced its plans to merge with “For Truth” and “Patriots of Russia”, creating uncertainty in the future of the faction as the parties vary in their respective positions on domestic policy.

Russia of the Future 

Russia of the Future, also referred to as Navalny’s Party, strongly opposes Putin’s regime. It advocates for liberal reforms and the decentralization of Russian state power, with party support lying chiefly with younger demographics in the urban centers of St. Petersburg and Moscow. It has not been recognized by the Ministry of Justice as an official political party, due to opposition from the Putin Administration and the party’s purported inability to meet the 5% national threshold of support required. The face of Russia of the Future and its movement, Alexei Navalny, had attempted to run for President but was controversially disqualified from the presidential elections in 2018. He was charged with embezzling several hundred thousand dollars from a lumber company. Navalny has a history of involvement in xenophobic and nationalist circles that have spurred a debate on whether he should considered a liberal or a nationalist. Nevertheless, he is a symbol of opposition and an anti-corruption activist to foreign observers. Prior to his political involvement Navalny founded (FBK), a non-profit committed to exposing corruption amongst key Russian politicians. Recently, Russian courts have recognized FBK as an extremist group, and lawmakers have proposed what has been dubbed as an “anti-FBK law”. 

In August of 2020, Navalny allegedly suffered an assassination attempt with orchestrated by the Kremlin and its security services. However, Putin denies these allegations and blames the US for spreading this narrative. Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service asserted that Navalny violated his parole while abroad and receiving medical treatment, claiming Navalny had failed to routinely report to his parole officer at the available Russian consulates, granting them grounds to file a motion for his arrest on his subsequent return to Russia. In early 2021, upon landing in Moscow, Navalny was imprisoned for parole violations connected with his previous charges of embezzlement, motivating a series of internationally-covered protests by his supporters.

Significance

The inter-party actions that define the internal politics of the Russian Federation carry serious implications for how the country interacts with other nations, particularly those in the Western world. Understanding Russia’s political party relations allows for greater insight into how the government  determines its domestic and foreign policies, particularly as it pertains to its relationship with the United States.