Economic sanctions refer to a policy of withdrawing customary trade and financial relations in response to a diplomatic or foreign policy challenge. Governments may choose to enact comprehensive sanctions on an entire country, or direct sanctions on institutions, groups, and individuals in order to impact a government’s actions or decisions. In the case of its foreign policy with Russia, the United States has used targeted economic sanctions to deter and alter Moscow’s aggressive military actions in Ukraine.
Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 sparked initial sanction measures imposed on Russian individuals, entities, and financial institutions by the U.S. and E.U. The recent recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk breakaway regions as independent and the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine have also been met with a harsh international response, most notably in the form of economic sanctions. These policies are intended to deter Russia from further military escalation against Ukraine and to publicly indict violations of international law. However, the new sanctions introduced in 2022 have the potential to be far more economically damaging and isolating for Russia than any previous measure.
In December of 2021, as Russian forces continued to amass on the Ukrainian border, the United States warned of new measures if Russia invaded Ukraine. Prior to and in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. and its European allies implemented sweeping economic sanctions on multiple sectors of the Russian economy as well as Russian individuals. In response to Russia’s claims of de facto control over Ukraine, an initial round was announced from February 21-23 to deter further action. After Moscow launched an armed invasion on February 24, another round of sanctions was introduced. The most recent, and arguably the most damaging, sanctions were introduced from February 26-28 as active fighting continued.
Although sanctions are extensively used in American foreign policy, their actual impact on Russia has been widely debated. Sanctions generally fall into two categories: those that seek to encourage a change in Russian state behavior and those that seek to impose costs without necessarily having a specific policy goal. The success of these sanctions is measured by their ability to influence another state to change its behavior in accordance with U.S. foreign policy goals. As Russia gathered troops at its Ukrainian border in the lead-up to the invasion, sanctions were introduced as economic deterrents to further aggressive military action. A best-case scenario may have been to avoid war altogether. As armed conflict is underway, however, it seems that this objective was either impractical or not well addressed by threats of sanctions. Sanctions now are focused on economic isolation to encourage disengagement or ceasefire in the region.
The 2022 sanctions have been more expansive than previous rounds and focus on five areas: financial institutions, export controls, personal sanctions against individuals, investment prohibitions, and energy and gas. Three of these expanded measures—preventing Russia’s central banks from using foreign currency reserves, termination of certification for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and blocking Russian banks from the SWIFT system—are significant escalations from past rounds and may be the most impactful in changing Russia’s behavior.
Financial Institutions
Financial institutions and banks were targeted the most heavily during this round of sanctions, measures which the U.S. Treasury called “unprecedented.” The most critical of Russia’s financial institutions were targeted, including its largest, Sberbank. Sberbank holds about a third of all Russian bank assets, is Russia’s biggest lender, and is majority-owned by the Government of the Russian Federation (GoR). These sanctions require all U.S. institutions to close Sberbank accounts and reject future transactions with Sberbank or its subsidiaries. Under these new measures, Sberbank is also barred from purchasing and making transactions with U.S. dollars. The European branch of Sberbank now faces failure in Europe in the fallout from the U.S. and E.U. sanctions.
Additional financial institutions—such as VTB Bank, Otkritie, Novikom, and Sovcom—were identified in new sanction measures. These institutions have been identified as systemically important to the Russian financial system; these sanctions aim to undermine the Russian financial sector and export economy from participating in the global market and using the U.S. dollar. Significantly, the full blocking sanctions on VTB Bank, which holds 20% of Russian banking assets, freeze assets from being accessed by the GoR and mark a measure on one of the largest institutions the U.S. Treasury has ever targeted. About 80% of the $46 billion daily transactions conducted by Russian financial institutions are conducted in U.S. dollars. By barring Sberbank and VTB from processing payments through the United States’ financial system, the foreign exchange transactions normally conducted by these institutions will be greatly disrupted.
Additionally, Russian politicians and oligarchs connected to Moscow were sanctioned personally, including President Vladimir Putin, foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, 351 members of the Russian parliament, financial actors such as the head of Promsvyazbank, and senior executives at state-affiliated banks. Personal sanctions include freezing foreign-held assets and travel bans. While personal sanctions are not the most effective on a global scale, undermining Russian elites’ power and credibility could have lasting effects on the country’s domestic politics.
The territory that the country of Georgia now occupies has seen human development since the Paleolithic period. Over the last few thousand years, the territory has been under the domain of Georgian, or Kartvelian, kingdoms and other regional empires. However, Georgia’s contemporary history began following the country’s absorption into the Russian Empire during the 19th century.
Following the Russian Revolution, Georgia became independent from the USSR and came to be known as the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) in 1918. However, in 1921, the DRG was forcibly integrated into the Soviet Union and would not regain its independence again until 1991. Georgia had an influential role in Soviet history. For example, the USSR was governed by Georgian-born Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili, better known as Joseph Stalin, from 1924 until his death in 1953.
The decade following Georgia’s independence, in 1991, was marked by significant political turmoil. Between 1995 and 2003, the country was led by President Eduard Shevardnadze. His eight-year rule as President was characterized by severe economic mismanagement and rampant institutional corruption. In response to Shevardnedze’s political failures, Georgians engaged in countrywide demonstrations demanding political transparency; these demonstrations were later termed the Rose Revolution. In the end, Shevardnadze vacated the presidency, and Mikheil Saakashvili was sworn in as President.
Saakashvili’s ascension to the presidency signaled that Georgia had chosen to resist Russian influence and fight corruption; however, Georgia’s position as a democratic state has become threatened in the last few months. After leaving office, Saakashvili moved to New York before ultimately moving to Ukraine, where he served as the Governor of Odessa, as well as other positions within the Ukrainian government. However, in 2018, he was tried and convicted in absentia for abuse of power. Saakashvili returned to Georgia in October 2021 and was subsequently arrested. After his arrest, Saakashvili went on a fifty-day hunger strike, which ended following his admittance to an intensive care ward after he fainted. Saakashvili asserts that his arrest and trial are purely political rather than based on any substantive issue. Regardless, the arrest of a former president does not bode well for democracy in Georgia.
Mikheil Saakashvili and George W. Bush—Image Courtesy of NATO
Background on Georgian Politics
Georgia’s capital is located in the central city of Tbilisi. Georgia’s government is a semi-presidential republic. Currently, the head of state is President Salome Zurabishvili, and the head of government is Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. Unlike the United States, which has two chambers in its legislature, Georgia has a unicameral legislature: the Parliament of Georgia. In total, one hundred and fifty members are elected to represent the nearly five million people living in Georgia. One hundred and twenty members are elected through proportional representation, while the remaining thirty are elected through a single-member district plurality system; that is, a representative is elected to a parliamentary seat after reaching a majority vote. Presently, the political party Georgian Dream—Democratic Georgia forms the government with eighty-four seats. The United National Movement party, initially founded by Mikheil Saakashvili, sits on the opposition side with thirty seats.
Labor-intensive occupations drive the Georgian economy, with the two most important sectors being agricultural production and manufacturing. Due to its smaller population, Georgia’s workforce includes roughly 686,000 citizens. Despite relying on agriculture and manufacturing, the Georgian economy is transitioning towards a service and tourism-based economy. Between 2016 and 2017, the country’s GDP grew 5%, indicating positive economic development. However, Georgia still deals with significant unemployment, 11.8% by 2016 figures, and poverty, as nearly 20% of all Georgians lived below the poverty line in 2019.
International Issues
Georgia mainly exports raw materials and manufacturing products. The country’s primary exports are copper, iron alloys, cars, packaged medicine, and wine. Despite them having a tense interstate relationship, Russia is the most common destination of Georgian exports. In 2019, 12% of Georgian exports went to Russia, followed by 12% to Azerbaijan and 9% to Armenia.
Although Georgia derives 65% of its electricity from hydroelectric sources, according to 2017 statistics, it still relies heavily on natural gas imports. Turkey is Georgia’s primary import partner, accounting for 17% of Georgian imports, followed by 11% for China’s, and 9% for Russia’s. The United States is a minor trade partner and only accounts for 5% of Georgian imports.
Georgia’s geographic position on the border of Europe and Asia yields some economic advantages. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline allow Georgia to play a significant role in the movement of oil and natural gasses from Central Asia to the Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad positions Georgia in the middle of the transcontinental movement of goods.
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline—Image courtesy of Silk Road Studies
Territorial Issues
Although Georgia has made significant economic and political gains following their emancipation from the Soviet Union, this sovereignty is not without problems. Two regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are breakaway regions, and multiple wars of independence have been fought over them.
Abkhazia is an autonomous region in northwestern Georgia. Apart from Russia, the breakaway region is only recognized by five UN-recognized states. Between 1992 and 1993, Georgian forces fought against Abkhaz separatists in a thirteen-month war. A ceasefire subsequently ended the conflict, but the political ramifications remain. Abkhazia eventually declared its independence in 1999.
South Ossetia is a breakaway state in North-Central Georgia, which makes up the southern half of the traditional homeland of the Ossetian people. The Russian republic of North Ossetia-Alania borders it to the north. Like Abkhazia, South Ossetia receives minimal recognition from the international community, outside of a few states. Russia recognizes South Ossetia and maintains a military presence in the region. In 2008, President George W. Bush campaigned for Georgia’s membership to the Membership Action Plan, designed to set Georgia on the track for NATO membership. In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin argued that any attempt to enlarge NATO was a national security threat and began preparing for an invasion. The Russo-Georgian war then took place once Russia invaded Georgia, where Georgian and Russian soldiers, as well as Russian-backed Ossetian separatists, fought against each other. This led to Russia occupying South Ossetia in an attempt to prevent Georgian ascension into NATO.
Cultural Dynamics
Many political dynamics serve as catalysts for conflict between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia; the different groups that live in the region being one of them. During the Soviet era, Abkhazia was populated by a mix of Abkhazians, Georgians, Russians, and Armenians; however, now the region is predominantly Abkhazian. Georgians are an isolated ethnolinguistic group, whereas Ossetians are an Eastern Iranian ethnolinguistic group, and Abkhazians are a Northwest Caucasian ethnolinguistic group. These groups, despite living together as part of the Soviet Union and being native to the Caucasus, are not related, and their ethnolinguistic differences became salient once the Union collapsed.
Georgian-American Relations
The United States and Georgia officially established diplomatic relations in 1992. Given the economic and political disparities between the two countries, Georgia certainly relies more on the United States. The United States has committed significant amounts of aid to Georgia, in order to advance democratic and economic growth within the country. However, the United States does rely on Georgia’s geographic position to advance its “competition” with Russia.
Multiple attempts to integrate Georgia into NATO have occurred, but none have been successful, especially after Russia’s 2008 invasion, whose likely goal was to prevent Georgian ascension into NATO. Georgia, although it lacks official membership, is a member state in the Partnership for Peace, which aims to build trust between NATO members and regional non-members.
Georgian and American soldiers in a joint training exercise, 2008—Image courtesy of NBC News
“Information has become a destructive weapon just like a bayonet, bullet or projectile.” – Vladimir Slipchenko, Russian military academic
Introduction
The accessibility of online information has allowed Russian state and nonstate actors to parasitically inject misleading and false information with the intention of manipulating a target audience. Disinformation is false information that is deliberately created and intentionally spread with the intention of causing harm. Russia weaponizes disinformation to achieve a key strategic objective: the subversion of the West. In the case of Russian Information Operations (IO), target audiences include the American population and the populations of other Russian adversaries.
When a democratic society no longer agrees upon a common set of facts, citizens begin to question firmly held truths and lose faith in their public institutions. Russian information operations administer damaging narratives against politicians, political parties, and/or hot-button issues like the COVID-19 vaccine into the American media space. By doing so, Russia provokes the American electorate. Russia has material weakness relative to the United States, the Kremlin has managed to stave off its waning global influence through its superior use of information as a tool of “asymmetric statecraft.”
The dissemination of deceptive content online has proved to be more advantageous than engaging in conventional kinetic warfare: it is cost effective, can be executed without casualty, can be finely targeted and can be achieved clandestinely. Information operations operate in the gray zone “short of declared war” and allow Russia to engage in asymmetric warfare in which it can inflict damage on the United States by sowing social discord and political fragmentation. Kremlin-based disinformation campaigns are carried out by Russian state and nonstate actors. Some are employed directly by Russian security services whereas others are carried out by non government entities such as the Internet Research Agency. Additionally, disinformation campaigns target states across the globe, not just the United States. These campaigns are not designed to change public opinion or convince a population of any one particular thing. They are meant to generate enough ‘noise’ in the online space to the point where societal divisions threaten the stability of a democracy ruled by a citizenry that no longer knows what is objectively true. In the words of a senior FBI official, “To put it simply, in this space, Russia wants to watch us tear ourselves apart.”
The Goal of Russian Information Operations
The primary goal of Russian information-based warfare is to undermine the legitimacy of democratic governments by aggravating societal cleavages including racial, religious, political and ideological differences. By blurring the line between fact and fiction and intentionally fanning the flames of certain societal divisions, causes Americans to question their firmly held beliefs. This confusion and distrust across the U.S. population has threatened the stability of America’s democratic institutions.
For Russia, employing informational and propagandistic campaigns is nothing new. During the height of the Cold War, Soviet “dezinformatsiya” campaigns were at the forefront of the Soviet Union’s strategy for undermining and discrediting the United States. The Soviets funded communist newspaper outlets and radio stations that were broadcasted in the United States, along with publishing books written by authors paid by the Committee for State Security (also known as the KGB). KGB-funded publishing houses were even among the first to cast doubt on the Warren Commission’s findings that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in the assassination of President Kennedy. As technological capabilities have become more sophisticated in the digital age, so too have information warfare tactics used by Russia against the United States. Russia can no longer directly compete with Washington’s military might and world influence, but it can cost-effectively influence America’s democratic institutions by infusing distrust and confusion into the U.S. media space.
Russia can secure its strategic objectives against the West without having to invest in costly military operations or resort to physical force. The Kremlin can take advantage of the viral nature of internet platforms to exploit existing political fault lines and target specific subgroups of the American population with tailored messages that are designed to further polarize them. Steven Wilson, a political science professor at Brandeis University, eloquently describes the consequence of Russia’s information warfare:
In 2020, the U.S. Department of State characterized the Russian disinformation and propaganda ecosystem as having five key pillars: state-funded global messaging, cultivation of proxy sources, weaponization of social media, official government communications and cyber-enabled disinformation. The first three pillars listed above are the central means by which Russian sows discord in the United States. State-funded global messaging includes campaigns mounted by Russian intelligence agencies like the FSB, a security service that succeeded the KGB, that spreads falsehood with the intention of undermining confidence in American leaders, institutions and further polarizing debates around hot-button issues. Russian intelligence agencies have targeted Western vaccines like Pfizer by publishing exaggerated reports of the risks that COVID-19 vaccines pose and their long-term side-effects. This fear-mongering taps into vaccine skeptics by exploiting deep-seeded anxieties over the safety of the vaccine and promotes the success of Russia’s own vaccine, Sputnik V.
Another key element of Russian IO is the cultivation of proxy sources. Proxy sources are news outlets that are funded by the Kremlin, but attemptto maintain a veneer of separation to keep their connections to the Kremlin unclear, and thus dupe American readers into thinking that these sites publish independent work. They publish the works of fringe Western thinkers and make the outlets appear to be based in the United States or Europe. Sources like Global Research, The Strategic CultureFoundation, Geopolitica.ru, New Eastern Outlook and News Front are all publications that are heavily immersed in Russia’s disinformation ecosystem. The Strategic Culture Foundation, for example, is an online journal registered in Russia and directed by its Intelligence Service (SVR). These outlets publish conspiratorial content; recent examples include pieces blaming the U.S government for spreading COVID-19 or questioning Al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the 9/11 hijackings. According to the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), Global Research, a conspiracy site operating out of Canada, received an estimated 12.370 million page visits between February 1 and April 30 of 2020. The Strategic Culture Foundation received nearly 1 million in the same period. Russia’s disinformation ecosystem is diverse and the lack of a central avenue of disinformation for their deceptive dissemination lets the information appear more credible and widespread.
Russia’s weaponization of social media is also pervasive and cost-effective. It is important to note the connection between the business model underlying social media platforms and Russia’s disinformation campaigns, as the two go hand-in-hand. The underlying economic logic of platforms like YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter is the monetization of user engagement.These large technology firms rely on data collection in order to create detailed behavioral profiles on individuals and their preferences, interests, likes, dislikes and beliefs. Sophisticated algorithms use this information to provide users with dynamically optimized stimuli and curated content. User data is sold to advertisers to create targeted advertising regimes that are tailored to each individual. By keeping users engaged, this business model has proved highly profitable.
However, nefarious actors like Russia can use this regime of targeted advertising, user data collection, and sophisticated algorithms to identify pockets of the voting population that are susceptible to false information. Russian disinformation works on both sides of the aisle, inflaming both conservatives and liberal Americans. By using behavioral profiles of online users, Russian internet-agitators can find specific subgroups that share similar beliefs and target these groups with evocative social media posts or send them invitations to join Facebook groups centered on divisive topics like police brutality or immigration. For example, low-income populations were targeted with immigration and race-related advertisements, whereas middle-income populations were shown advertisements to join groups centered around nationalism. This demographic targeting stokes hyperpartisanship and furthers Russia’s strategic objective to weaken.
U.S. Department of State
Russian IO utilizes a variety of channels to manipulate American audiences via social media. The St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), for example, is financed by allies of Putin and engaged in online influence operations by spreading conspiracy theories and incendiary messages to stoke discord on issues like race or religion in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election. The Kremlin-backed group, often called a “troll farm” – a professionalized group that coordinates the posting of provocative content using fake identities– employed an army of trolls to inject extreme content into the American media space and create an illusion of support for radical ideas. Russian troll groups like the IRA bought and ran ads on Facebook and Instagram during the 2016 election, which according to MIT’s Tech Review, “was reaching 140 million US users per month – 75% of whom had never followed any of the pages. They were seeing the content because Facebook’s content-recommendation system had pushed it into their news feeds.” Social media algorithms tend to boost evocative and sensational information, and Kremlin-backed troll farms exploit this to proliferate disinformation in the American information space. Troll farms and online bots pump out social media posts that are slogan-dependent, include heavy visuals and often utilize memes and humor.
Known Russian Information Operation Example
Up until 2017, apopular Facebook account called ‘Blacktivist’ used racial issues – particularly police brutality – to stoke outrage online. The account collected over 350,000 followers – surpassing the number of followers on the verified Black Lives Matter account at the time. Posts included videos of violent police arrests and messages such as “Black people should wake up as soon as possible.” In late 2017, it was discovered that Blacktivist was actually operated by Russia and designed to stoke racial tensions in the United States.
House Intelligence Committee, Facebook
House Intelligence Committee, Facebook
Preventative Measures and the Road Ahead
Countering Russian information warfare is like a game of whack-a-mole: nobody knows when or where Russian disinformation will pop up, as it elusively resurfaces again and again. Online agitators can change their IP addresses and create new webs of bot accounts. Whereas Russian-sponsored posts were previously riddled with grammar and syntax errors that were specific to native Russian speakers – often omitting or misusing “a” or “the” because these indefinite articles are not used in the Russian language – Russian-sponsored posts have become more sophisticated in order to avoid detection. Russian troll farms will now copy and paste chunks of text directly from other sources, use fewer hashtags and remove watermarks on images that had been previously taken down. Future disinformation campaigns may employ deep fakes – fake video and audio that appears convincingly real – that make it far easier to mislead audiences and create new suspicions about everything we watch. The possibilities for asymmetric information warfare are clear, but there are measures that can be taken to mitigate the impact of disinformation.
Preventative Measures/Solutions
Artificial Intelligence (AI): Emerging AI capabilities and machine learning may be able to discern and flag fake news on a large scale across multiple platforms.
Education: The American education system needs to emphasize digital literacy. Citizens need to be able to discern the truth by navigating and evaluating an increasingly muddled online information space. Researchers at Stanford University recently published a study revealing that more than 80 percent of students had a hard time discerning the credibility of the news they read. A citizen capable of differentiating an ad from an article or real news from fake news will be less susceptible to disinformation.
Regulate Social Media Companies: The United States comes far behind the EU when it comes to its regulatory apparatus for social media companies. The General Data Protection Regulation is a regulation in EU law that is designed to protect data privacy and apply pressure on big tech companies like Google and Facebook with fines for privacy violations. In terms of developing a minimally invasive method for monitoring social media content, the Czech Republic has come up with a sustainable model. There, a small unit of 15 social media analysts actively monitor platforms like Facebook, Twitter and other proxy sources that circulate disinformation. The analysts simply flag the content as inauthentic – they don’t censor or remove it. This type of content moderation respects America’s veneration for freedom of the press and would not equate to content censorship.
Sources:
Alba, Davey. “How Russia’s Troll Farm Is Changing Tactics before the Fall Election.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 Mar. 2020.
Allen, T.S., and A.J. Moore. “Victory without Casualties: Russia’s Information Operations.” Parameters, vol. 48, no. 1, spring 2018, pp. 59+. Gale Academic OneFile.
Alvarez, German, et. al. “Good News, Bad News: A Sentiment Analysis of the 2016 Election Russian Facebook Ads.” International Journal of communications [online], May 2020, pp. 3027+. Gale Academic OneFile.
Domonoske, Camila. “Students Have ‘Dismaying’ Inability to Tell Fake News from Real, Study Finds.” NPR, NPR, 23 Nov. 2016.
Fung, Brian. “Russia Is the King of Disinformation on Facebook, the Company Says.” CNN, Cable News Network, 26 May 2021.
Ghosh, Dipayan. “It’s all in the Business Model: The Internet’s Economic Logic and the Instigation of Disininformation, Hate, and Discrimination.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 1, fall 2020, pp. 129+. Gale Academic OneFile.
Giannetti, William. “A Duty to Warn: How to Help America Fight Back Against Russian Disinformation.” Air & Space Power Journal, vol. 31, no. 3, fall 2017, pp. 95+. Gale Academic OneFile.
Gordon, Michael R., and Dustin Volz. “WSJ News Exclusive | Russian Disinformation Campaign Aims to Undermine Confidence in Pfizer, Other Covid-19 Vaccines, U.S. Officials Say.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 7 Mar. 2021.
Joscelyn, Thomas. “How Effective Is Russia’s Disinformation?” FDD, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 6 Jan. 2021.
Hao, Karen. “Troll Farms Reached 140 Million Americans a Month on Facebook before 2020 Election, Internal Report Shows.” MIT Technology Review, MIT Technology Review, 20 Oct. 2021.
McGeehan, Timothy P. “Countering Russian Disinformation.” Parameters, vol. 48, no. 1, spring 2018, pp. 49+. Gale Academic OneFile.
Thompson, Terry L. “No Silver Bullet: Fighting Russian Disinformation Requires Multiple Actions.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 1, fall 2020, pp. 182+. Gale Academic OneFile.
Wilson, Steven. “What Are Russia’s Goals with Disinformation on Social Media?” BrandeisNOW, Brandeis University, 22 Oct. 2020.
From the United States’ perspective, Russia and China represent competitors on the international stage. Experts argue that the relationship between Russia and China has strengthened in recent years due to their shared perceived threat of US power and influence. Russia and China signed the “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation” in 2001. In 2021, Russia and China signed a five-year extension of the treaty, symbolizing their close ties. The treaty initially allowed the two countries to develop a “strategic partnership” based on economic cooperation and strong military collaboration. Russian politicians have asserted that Western actors, such as those from the US and the EU, have made consistent efforts to disrupt competition stemming from Russia-China relations.
The two nations are also members of BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. This group includes the five major emerging economies in the world. It is unclear whether BRICS has viable political leverage as some contend that the nations differ too much in ideologies and economic growth to maintain robust cooperation. Although Russia is arguably not the most influential player in the alliance, some have debated that it has been able to uphold its interests despite China’s evident dominance.
In the Western view, Russia seeks to expand and maintain its influence on the former Soviet Union states through its political, military, and economic forces. This first became evident in 2008 when Russian troops invaded Georgia and sparked the Russo-Georgian War. The act of aggression left lasting consequences, including sustained Russian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia further exhibited aggression through the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent ongoing Ukrainian Conflict. In 2014, the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed and established the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The EAEU, which now includes Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, organized free trade agreements amongst member states. Although formed as an apolitical union, the EAEU has become politicized in recent years due to the rising tensions between the West and Russia, and Belarus. The border conflict between Russia-backed Belarus and NATO/EU member Poland has recreated East-West Cold War tensions. A host of migrants have fled into Belarus’ bordering countries following the reelection of Alexander Lukashenko and democratic backsliding. The relationship between Russia and Belarus is critical as they formed the Union State, an agreement between the two countries to commit to the integration of their economies, defense, and other policies.
Russia is also a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). CIS is an assembly of former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and Asia that collaborates on economic, military, and political policies. Likewise, CSTO is a military alliance between Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
The involvement in African politics began with the Soviet Union’s support of African independence and promotion of education as many African students fled to study in Soviet universities. In the contemporary world, Russia has made aims to regain and expand its influence in Africa, which is now one of its major military allies. Many argue that Africa is a political priority for Russia as it disrupts US interests that seek to champion the spread of democracy and stability in the region.
Following the Covid-19 pandemic, vaccine diplomacy—the use of vaccines to influence the diplomatic relations between nations— constitutes one tool Russia attempted to utilize in upholding its interests in Africa. However, experts argue that the rollout of the Sputnik V vaccine failed in its original purpose due to factors like delayed deliveries and high costs, which resulted in many concerns from African officials.
When the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2015, Russia provided military aid on the side of the Syrian government, showing support for the Assad regime. The Kremlin’s decision to interfere in the civil war stemmed from concerns that the fall of the Syrian government would threaten Russian interests and endanger global stability. Many argue that Russia’s military intervention in Syria and overall involvement in the Middle East demonstrate its efforts to assume a greater role on the global stage and disrupt US dominance in the region. As a result, experts fear Russia’s involvement in key countries in the Middle East can pose challenges to the American foreign policy agenda under the Biden Administration.
From 1979-1989, the Soviet Union waged a war with mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan to support the unpopular communist government. The Geneva Accords of 1988 later facilitated the end of the conflict and withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, the mujahideen became fragmented in the early 90s, which sparked a civil war that prompted the Taliban to gain control in the country. Consequently, regime changes led to decades of conflict and ongoing instability. In the summer of 2021, the Biden Administration began pulling troops to end the war in Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban to regain control at the fall of the government. As the world watched a humanitarian crisis emerge in the region, Russia and China’s expanding influence became evident; the flexible alliance leveraged potential new economic and political opportunities in the country. Recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has had success, unlike the US, in hosting talks with the Taliban.
Why is Russian Foreign Policy Relevant to Americans?
Understanding Russia’s general foreign policy strategy allows one to gain a deeper, more nuanced interpretation of the US’ own foreign policy goals. The two countries have a complicated history of both cooperation and conflict that continue to influence how they act on the international stage.
A country’s foreign policy refers to the general objectives that guide its activities and relationships with other nations. The concept often becomes a point of contention in political campaigns; candidates disagree over how to forge their nation’s image and interests on the international stage. In the Russian Federation, foreign policy is a major part of the Kremlin’s political agenda. Experts describe Putin’s foreign policy as a bulwark against the West, particularly through measured efforts to curtail US hegemony or global dominance. Through flexible alliances and involvement in the major geopolitical regions of the world, many argue Russia has taken steps to dismantle the status quo and change the international order to allow other world powers to emerge and govern.
Military intervention is just one way countries can implement their foreign policy initiatives. Countries now have other foreign policy tools at their disposal. In recent years, Russia has continually made headlines due to accusations of disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and interference in foreign elections. Moreover, Russia’s state-owned oil and gas companies provide the economic resources and influence to help shape and carry out foreign policy goals throughout Europe. This is most notably evidenced by the Russian company Gazprom’s ownership of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline, which runs from Russia to Germany. Many argue it will allow Russia to yield greater geopolitical power in Europe.
Marred by a history of volatility, the relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation is critical to international security. Both nations maintain nuclear capabilities and powerful militaries. After deteriorating peaceful diplomatic relations following the fall of the Soviet Union, the dynamic between the countries has evolved with each administration. During the Clinton years, the US and Russia maintained a friendly relationship; President Clinton supported President Yeltsin’s policies and commitment to Russian democracy. Despite President George W. Bush’s preoccupation with the War on Terror, the Bush Administration sought to embrace a cautious but cooperative relationship when President Putin came into power. By the the end of Bush’s second term, however, relations became strained. In the Obama Era, US-Russia relations grew more tense. Furthermore, accusations of collusion with the Kremlin, which led to an official investigation, tainted the image of the Trump Administration. In recent years, the complicated relationship has continued to deteriorate, with some experts claiming that it mirrors Cold War tensions. The US has accused Russia of systematic efforts to disrupt American interests both domestically and abroad. Prompted by Russia’s role in the Ukrainian crisis and increased aggression, the US has reduced its political relationship with Russia. Alongside its EU partners, the US has also imposed economic sanctions and travel restrictions on Russia and key Russian policymakers.
Russia and the European Union Image Courtesy of Financial Times
Unlike US-Russia relations, the relationship between the Russian Federation and European Union is more nuanced. In geopolitical terms, Russia and its European neighbors consider each other potential threats, forcing key flexible working relationships. France and Germany–the two countries with the most economic influence in the EU–have made clear their intentions to “reset” their relationships with Russia to foster stability in the region and achieve mutual political goals. This has been met with stark criticism due to accusations of Russia’s efforts to induce democratic backsliding throughout eastern Europe and unchecked corruption. The Kremlin has claimed that the current EU-Russia relationship lacks aspects of a truly equal partnership and continues to be influenced by past actions during the Cold War. Thus, Russia and its European neighbors maintain an uncertain future in their diplomatic relationships.
The relationship between Russia and NATO, an international organization considered an extension of the West, has always been strained. Many argue that NATO views Russian aggression as a threat to its objectives of maintaining peace and democracy. On the other hand, Russia views NATO expansion into the post-Soviet space as a direct threat to its sovereignty with aims to curtail Russia’s sphere of influence.
As with many of Russia’s other current diplomatic relationships, the Soviet Union’s role in the Cold War continues to influence relations between Russia and strategic Latin American countries. Russia maintains its post-Cold War sphere of influence in Cuba, where the two have managed both an economic and military partnership. Recently, the US has imposed sanctions for the mishandling of demonstrators during protests. In contrast, Russia, united with the communist regime, has called for non-interference from outside actors. Russia has also sent aid to protect its influence with the shifting regime. Venezuela constitutes another Russian ally as Maduro depends on Cuban military forces backed by Russian aid and weaponry. Many argue that Russia has made a strategic alliance with Venezuela to create instability with the US in the region. Russia’s intervention in Latin America has benefited from political transitions, which some claim exhibit the Kremlin’s efforts to prove Russia as a global rather than a regional power. In the 2021 presidential election in Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega won his fourth consecutive term amid controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the results. In turn, the US announced sanctions against Nicaragua. Russia has condemned the US and others who have rejected Nicaragua’s election results as a Russia-Nicaragua partnership holds weight in Russia’s foreign policy ambitions in Latin America.
The Gosudárstvennaya duma, or Gosduma, refers to the State Duma of Russia. The Gosduma is the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, while the Federation Council is the upper house. Since October 2016, Vyacheslav Volodin (UR) has served as chairman of the legislative body. The Gosduma consists of 450 members, referred to as “deputies,” who serve 5-year terms. To achieve an electoral majority in the Gosduma, a party must occupy 226 seats.
Comparison to U.S. Congress
Compared to the United States’ legislative system, the Gosduma shares more similarities to the House of Representatives. Both are the lower houses of their respective legislative bodies, and both consist of more members than the upper house. Additionally, the number of representatives each federal subject receives is not uniform. However, their differences are striking.
In the Gosduma, all 85 federal subjects are represented; this includes oblasts, republics, krais, autonomous okrugs, federal cities, and autonomous oblasts. However, while the number of representatives a U.S. state receives is contingent on its population, the number of representatives a federal subject receives is contingent on the number of constituencies, or sub-regions within it. For example, Adygea, a republic, has one constituency, while the Rostov Oblast has seven constituencies. Thus, the two federal subjects are represented by one and seven representatives in the Gosduma, respectively.
A second significant difference between the U.S. House and Russian Gosduma is how they behave politically. In the case of the U.S. House of Representatives, the House is a significant legislative body. The Gosduma is as well, but compared to the House, the Gosduma is more executive-focused. Rather than serving primarily as a legislative body, the Gosduma is a reliable ally of the executive and works to forward the policy goals of the Putin Administration.
United Russia (UR) is the largest and most influential political party in Russia. Former President Dmitry Medvedev has chaired the party since 2012, and the party is the legislative backbone for President Vladimir Putin. Although it is a centrist, big-tent party, UR is definitively conservative and promotes nationalist positions like building up Russia’s military, staunch Euroscepticism, and further ties between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church.
Of the parties that occupy seats in the Gosduma, the LDPR is unquestionably the most ultra-nationalist, right-wing party. Vladimir Zhirinovsky has led the party since the 1990s, but despite being far more hardline and conservative than UR, the LDPR poses virtually no threat to the Putin regime.
The Communist Party traces its roots back to the early revolutionary movement in imperial Russia and built upon Marxist-Leninist ideology. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the independent Russian Federation, communist parties were banned between 1991 and 1993. However, in 1993, the Communist Party officially registered as a legal political party with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.
Compared to UR, the LDPR, and the Communist Party, A Just Russia is relatively new, having been founded in 2006. The party is considered to be center-left while being a moderate supporter of the Putin regime. It backed him during the 2018 presidential election after opting not to nominate any of its members for election.
Of the four aforementioned political parties, “Yabloko” is perhaps the most unique. It is a social-liberal, center-left party with favorable views on the European Union and the United States. These views make it an outlier compared to most Russian parties, including liberal and left-wing parties.
Political Spectrum of Russian Political Parties
Election Results
Election Background
Between September 17th and 19th in 2021, Russians across the country turned out to vote for their constituency’s representative to the Gosduma. It is estimated that approximately 51.7% of eligible voters cast their ballots.
Results
In total, United Russia won just under 50% of the vote. This signaled that despite losing 19 seats, resulting in 324 seats, the pro-Putin United Russia party is still undoubtedly in control. The closest competitor to UR was the Communist Party which amassed just under 19% of the vote and gained 15 seats, increasing its total to 57. Although the LDPR won over 7.5% of the vote, the party experienced a net loss in seats resulting in only 21 seats occupied by its politicians. A Just Russia won 7.46% of the vote but experienced positive growth as the 4 additional seats won by the party resulted in a total of 27 occupied seats. Lastly, “Yabloko” won a mere 1.3% of the vote, resulting in the party occupying 0 seats in the Gosduma.
Although the election results were unsurprising, they indicate that the Putin regime is still squarely in power. Despite losing 19 seats, UR has retained a supermajority and controls the legislative process. Despite UR’s significant victory, the election has been marred by controversy. Communist Party officials, candidates, and supporters alleged that the government had committed significant election fraud, and allies of imprisoned dissident Alexei Navalny echoed the CP’s objections.
Anti-corruption demonstrators at the Communist Party rally following the preliminary results
Implications for the United States
For the United States, the results of the Gosduma election mean very little. United Russia remains the most powerful party with an anti-western stance, and its victory signals that this position will continue. Moreover, it indicates that anti-American sentiment is still prevalent in Russian society, at least to some extent. The response by the U.S. government was unsurprising. In a press statement, Ned Price, a U.S. State Department Spokesperson, condemned the election and said that it “took place under conditions not conducive to free and fair proceedings.” Moreover, the U.S. criticized the Russian government’s use of laws that designate opposition political groups and movements as “extremist organizations” and “foreign agents.”
The Russian political system is often described as being a “top-down” structure, meaning that power is centralized in the presidency. Occasionally, the Putin regime is described as a dictatorship, evoking associations with Stalin-era Soviet repression and a “cult of personality.” However, to simplify Russian politics down to these terms undercuts the complexities of Russian society, its institutions, and its active voting populace. Despite Putin’s authoritarian-leaning actions related to protest and LGBTQ+ people, he has enjoyed an approval rating consistently over 60%, with an average rating of 74% over the last twenty years. This is not to say Russia is a democracy or to deny the government’s repression of political dissent. However, to better understand US policy towards the Russian Federation, it is important to take into account the nuances of Russian domestic society.
Government institutions
Adopted in December of 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federation established a semi-presidentialist political system. Executive power is shared between the president and a prime minister (premier) who is appointed “by the president with the consent of the State Duma,” the 450-member lower chamber of the Federal Assembly. If the Duma rejects the appointment three times, the president has the power to dissolve the Duma, call for new elections, and appoint the PM anyway. The upper chamber of the Federal Assembly is the Federation Council. Instead of being an elected position, its members are appointed by chief governmental officials in the region they represent, along with several appointed by the president.
United Russia Dominance: Russia’s political makeup
For nearly 20 years, the dominant force in Russian legislative politics has been the big-tent party United Russia. The results of the most recent State Duma election reinforces their primacy. Further, while the Federation Council is officially restricted from joining together by political factions, an overwhelming portion of its members are affiliated with UR. Casting itself as a party of unity and pragmatism, UR has consistently supported the current administration. Thus, with a large swath of control over legislative politics, the Federal Assembly has worked to meet the positions of President Putin.
President Putin and Russian National Identity
Voter fraud in Russian elections has been alleged by a variety of sources, including nongovernmental organizations, domestic rivals, and international media. Still, popular support for President Putin and UR should not be understated. In order to retain domestic approval, the current regime remains focused on the restoration of Russian national identity. This restoration revolves around a return to great power status, ensuring the primacy of the Russian language within the nation’s borders, and emphasizing an ethnically diverse Russia.
The 90s were a tumultuous period for Russia; the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ineffective and embarrassing leadership of Boris Yeltsin, and a financial downturn made citizens of the once great power feel humiliated and ignored in the international system. Recent polls have shown that about half of the Russian population feel ignored by the West, and a majority of Russians have perceived that “developed countries” treat Russia as either a rival or an enemy. Putin and United Russia have been sure to portray his time in power as stable, a sharp contrast to the Yeltsin era. Additionally, they emphasize a desire to restore Russia’s prominence in world affairs. Putin has also repeatedly lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union as a disaster. Appealing to the large percentage of Russians who desire a powerful, stable position on the world stage, as well as older citizens who may feel nostalgic for the Soviet era, bolsters the popularity of Putin and contributes to UR’s big tent.
Some political scientists consider language to be fundamental in forming a national identity. Putin has emphasized that “the unity of the country and the peoples of Russia directly depends on the knowledge of the Russian language by young people.” In 2015, the Ministry of Education began tracking the hours of instruction on the Russian language in all schools, ensuring that other regional or minority languages were not taught at the expense of the “state language.” Some have interpreted this as an encroachment on non-Russian ethnic groups, while others have seen this as a unifying idea intended to protect the Russian nation. For President Putin, a fundamental component of Russia’s national identity is multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. On multiple occasions, he has condemned the ultra nationalist slogan “Rossiya dlya russkiy” (lit. “Russia for Russians”). Russkiy has an ethnic connotation, as in ethnic Russianness; Putin has often opted to use the adjective “rossiyskiy” when referring to Russians. This has the connotation of a citizen within the Russian Federation, regardless of ethnicity. This has also allowed Putin to cast a wider net of support for his presidency.
In April of 2021, President Biden announced that U.S. troops would be removed from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, after 20 years at war. The Trump Administration came to a diplomatic agreement with the Taliban, a militant group in Afghanistan, and the Biden Administration decided to follow through with that agreement.
Terms of the Agreement
The agreement made between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, known as the Taliban, and the US declared that the United States was to scale down the number of forces to 8,600 within 135 days and withdraw from five bases. Within 9.5 months the United States was expected to remove all troops from Afghanistan. In response, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was to not allow any of its members to threaten the security of the United States, cooperate with any group in Afghanistan threatening the security of the US, or provide legal documents to those who pose a threat to the US and its allies.
Subsequent to President Biden’s speech in April, the Taliban released an official statement on their thoughts of the Biden administration delaying complete withdrawal from Afghanistan to September 11, 2021. The Taliban’s statement relayed that failure to completely withdraw all troops by May 1, 2021, “opens the way for the Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate to take every necessary countermeasure, hence the American side will be held responsible for all future consequences.”
Events Leading up to the Withdrawal
In May of 2021, the Department of Defense Attorney General released a report stating the Taliban had increased its attacks against Afghanistan government forces in the first months of 2021. The Taliban had also appeared to be plotting with al-Qaeda for, “large-scale offenses.” The next month, a spokesperson for the Taliban stated that after the United States leaves Afghanistan the Taliban’s main goal will be creating an “Islamic government.” In July, the U.S. military withdrew from Bagram Airfield, the largest airfield in Afghanistan.
Withdrawal and Aftermath
On August 6, the Taliban gained control of Nimroz, its first province. Nine days later, Taliban fighters entered Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital. The President of Afghanistan fled the country to Tajikistan and the United States sent a helicopter to evacuate US diplomats. The next day, President Biden addressed the nation saying he did not regret his decision of removing the US troops out of Afghanistan. Biden elaborated, “I cannot and I will not ask our troops to fight on endlessly in another country’s civil war.” The last military plane left Kabul on August 30, 2021. Officially the 20-year war with the United States in Afghanistan has come to an end. An estimated 2,400 United States service members were killed, more than 20,000 injured, and 800,000+ served.
Zapad 2021 was a week-long joint military exercise between Russia and Belarus. Zapad, Russian for “west,” took place in Russia’s Western Military District, Belarus, and areas under the Northern Fleet’s Joint Strategic Command in the Baltic Sea. Zapad was proceeded by drills in the geographic regions of Vostok, “east,” in 2018, Tsentr, “center,” in 2019, and Kavkaz, “Caucasus,” in 2020. The exercise consisted of a three-day defensive phase simulating an invasion by Western actors, referred to as the Polar Republic, and a four-day counter-offensive to regain lost territory. Zapad essentially represented a show of Russian-Belarusian military solidarity and served as a staging ground for new doctrine, strategy, and weapons systems.
Russia and Belarus were the primary states involved in the exercise, although military representatives from India and states in the Caucasus and Central Asia were present. Despite unreliable statistics, it is believed that a total of 200,000 military personnel participated in the exercises, and roughly 80 aircraft and helicopters, up to 15 ships, and nearly 300 tanks were used.
Overall, Zapad was hailed as a success by the participating states. By the end of the exercise, the combined military force had defeated the Polar Republic, which served as a fictitious representation of NATO. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin expressed satisfaction with the exercise’s results and hailed his military for its capabilities. The most intriguing technological success was the performance of Russia’s newly developed autonomous tanks, which represent the Russian military’s success in developing new autonomous weaponry.
Although not a direct result of the exercise, Vladimir Putin had to recuse himself from viewing the exercise due to being exposed to the Covid-19 virus. Putin tested negative for the virus but isolated himself as members of his staff had tested positive.
Implications for NATO and Eastern European Geopolitics
The exercise was meant to serve as a show of unity between Russia and Belarus, and a show of force directed towards NATO. To the first point, Russia and Belarus’ close military relationship was apparent even before the exercise, as Belarus had recently purchased over $1 billion in Russian weaponry. This significant purchase signals that Belarus is concerned about its security. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko asserted that Zapad was practice for preventing a western-backed color revolution in Belarus in response to the 2020 mass protests against his regime.
Zapad caused significant concern in Ukraine, a country currently in conflict with Russian-backed separatists in the eastern part of the country. In response, the United States, Ukraine, and several other NATO countries plan to hold a joint military exercise in late September 2021 in response to Zapad named “Rapid Trident—2021.”
Before the exercise, NATO officials advised Russia to be transparent and warned that any miscalculations could ignite a potential conflict. However, it is clear that Zapad was used to demonstrate Russia’s new military capabilities and project strength rather than serve as a pretense for an invasion of a neighboring state.
The creation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 marked the first major shift towards nuclear disarmament that occurred on a global scale. The NPT is a landmark international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and achieving international disarmament. The treaty itself has culminated in a “grand bargain” between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers to ensure that no new nuclear weapons can be acquired, that nuclear energy use remains peaceful, and that nuclear materials stay secure. The creation and enforcement of the NPT by the United Nations prompted talks between the United States and Russia to create mutual arms control agreements and reduce nuclear stockpiles. Beginning in November of 1969 with the presentation of SALT I, which limited each countries’ strategic missile defenses, the two nations went on to engage in more than half a dozen other nuclear-focused disarmament treaties with one another.
The New START Treaty between Russia and the United States was renewed in 2021. The renewal was significant because it assured both countries’ continued commitment to regulating and limiting nuclear weapons and weapons technology, and because of the upcoming review of the NPT that occurred later this year. However, there is a growing concern that existing agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, are unraveling. Experts hope that because of the transparency in U.S.-Russian strategic relations that New START has provided, the rest of the world will follow suit and the NPT review conference will be a space to promote stability and strengthen commitments by signatories of the NPT. The New START treaty, which was signed in 2010, by the U.S. and Russia, legally binds each state to limit their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 on 700 strategic delivery systems, and limits each side to 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. This limit is 30% lower than the previously allowed 2,200 nuclear warhead amount agreed upon in the 2002 SORT Treaty and 50% lower than the 1,600 vehicle delivery limit established under the 1991 START 1 agreement. In addition to major limits on each country’s physical nuclear stockpiles, the treaty also commits each state to mandatory on-site inspections of nuclear storage and production facilities, data exchanges, and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by this treaty.
New START gives the U.S invaluable national security information by providing insights on the Russian nuclear arsenal, and maintains the international standard for nuclear non-proliferation by the world’s two largest nuclear powers. In a larger sense, the treaty creates a stable base on which to uphold the major international arms control treaties such as the NPT, Treaty on The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The renewal of New START by the U.S. and Russia is particularly important for the continued support and upholding of the NPT because although its global support is strong, statements by members of civil society confirm that its long-term viability needs to be continually addressed.
U.S. Department of State
