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Category: Eurasia

  • Introduction to Russia-West Africa Relations

    Introduction to Russia-West Africa Relations

    The “New Scramble for Africa” is a phrase newly adopted by many in the field of foreign policy, defining the latest form of colonialism where global powers seek control of strategic resources on the African continent. The phrase derived from the 1884-5 Berlin Conference, in which thirteen European countries and the United States met in Berlin to divide African territory and take power and control from existing African states and peoples. Russia was excluded from the process, but now, in a time of tension with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia is a top contender in the “New Scramble for Africa” and its strategy for influence in West Africa is comprehensive and carefully calculated. 

    Trade/Economy

    The 2019 Russia-Africa Sochi Summit, co-hosted by President Vladamir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was a major economic forum “for peace, security, and development.” The summit was attended by 43 African heads of state and developed plans for future cooperation between Russia and Africa. Russia-Africa trade has generally shown a steady upward trend, especially in West Africa. 

    Ghana and Nigeria were the main African destinations of Russian non-commodity exports in 2020, with export industries like agriculture, mechanical engineering, timber, and chemicals leading the charge. The Russian Export Center (the Russian government’s central trade department) has recorded an increase in interest in Russian exports in many West African countries. The total 2020 trade revenue (USD million) was upwards of 2.04 billion dollars between West African countries and Russia. The primary contributors were Senegal (480 USD million), Nigeria (461 USD million), Ivory Coast (291 USD million), and Togo (283 USD million). 

    The Russian Export Center is also involved in infrastructure development projects in the region, including a major railway in the region and supplying energy resources and equipment to West African companies and governments. Russia is also a top arms seller to countries including Mali and Nigeria. Many experts believe Russia is pursuing economic relations to expand military influence in West Africa. 

    Intra-African Conflict

    Russia’s outsider apparatus and its evolution as a partner to West African government and military organizations allow the country to step in when power vacuums occur in the African region. West African citizens in countries such as Mali or Burkina Faso are increasingly opposed to intervention from western states, including former colonial powers like France and the UK. This strengthens the possibility of Russian involvement in those countries. 

    In Mali, a vacuum opened for Russia following the gradual withdrawal of French troops after years of conflict with Islamist militant groups in the Sahel. Operation Barkhane was a French military operation in northern Mali to oust Islamist groups. Russian mercenaries are slowly beginning to substitute French troops, specifically with increased involvement from the Wagner Group—a Russian mercenary organization. The Wagner Group has been identified as a part of several operations in the counter-insurgency mission in Northern Mali. These missions frequently produce human rights abuses and atrocities, such as the alleged Wagner Group-backed massacre of more than 300 civilians in the town of Moura in April 2022. Several experts claim The Wagner Group is closely tied to Russia’s military intelligence agency, GRU although political intentions remain unclear. The Wagner Group has been linked to unpopular military coups and regimes deemed ‘undemocratic,’ such as those in Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic. 

    Some West African countries feel neglected by the West, and jihadist militants in the Sahel are increasingly threatening state security. This has produced an environment ripe for Russian influence. Burkina Faso and Guinea recently underwent coups as a result of growing instability and insecurity in the Sahel, and the potential for further Russian-based expansion in West African military conflicts is looming. 

    Russian military presence in Africa

    Climate/Energy

    The 2019 Sochi Summit did not go into depth about the implications of climate change in West Africa and the rest of the continent. However, there are prospects of addressing the issue in future summits including the impending 2023 Russia-Africa Forum.

    The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine faced global backlash and has caused international food shortages, and caused knock-on effects in Africa Disrupted gas exports from Russia have limited economic activity and the ability of people to heat homes, cook food, and use transport. Countries like Senegal currently rely on oil for half of their electricity generation. In the entirety of West Africa, diesel generators account for more than 40% of total energy consumption. The cost of diesel in Nigeria has increased by 200% and increased prices of electricity generation in Ghana and Ivory Coast.

    Immigration/Education

    Russia is home to a population of 70,000 people of African descent. There is a high population of Nigerians and Cameroonians living in Russia, and many have allegedly been deceptively lured to Russia for false jobs. The language barrier, prejudice, and discrimination have steered many Africans away from living in Russia. The Russian government has shown, however, efforts to integrate African immigrants into their communities, labor market, media, and politics, and recently established Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. The university was named after Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, and aims to provide an opportunity for young people from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to acquire an education. 

    Conclusion

    Nearly 150 years since the Berlin Conference, Russia is now one of the top influencers in African trade, conflict, climate, energy, and society as a whole. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has drastically shifted relations within the new global order. For West Africa, citizens will be heavily relying on democratic institutions to initiate change in the quest for a secure future in the region and a benign relationship with Russia. 

  • The Future of Nord Stream 2

    The Future of Nord Stream 2

    Background

    Despite a large-scale effort to transition Europe’s energy output to more environmentally friendly sources, the ties between capitalist economies and natural gas have proved too strong to cut entirely at this time. The ongoing necessity of natural gas has tied Europe and Russia together. Russia, the world’s largest exporter of petroleum, has long benefited from being the EU (the third largest economy in the world)’s greatest supplier of crude oil due to its geographic proximity and political ties. This was made more efficient through the construction of Nord Stream, an underwater pipeline completed in 2012 to carry oil from western Russia to northeastern Germany under the Baltic Sea. A second pipeline under construction, which was expected to double Russia’s supply of oil to the EU, has been suspended due to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The Biden administration was staunchly opposed to the second pipeline due to concerns over the EU’s reliance on Russian energy, and this position has strengthened due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

    Importance of Oil to Russia 

    Prior to Nord Stream, Russian oil companies paid billions of dollars in transit taxis annually to transport petroleum through neighboring Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream allowed Russian companies to eliminate the middleman, so to speak, and transport petroleum without paying transit taxes. This reduced the importance of friendly relations between Russia and its former Soviet satellites in the eyes of the Russian government, and impacted Ukraine’s economy. The first pipeline was key in strengthening Russia’s economy while allowing the state to avoid international cooperation.

    The original Nord Stream pipeline also created an important bond between Europe and Russia, especially between Russia and Germany, where the European side of the pipeline ended. In 2020, Europe was Russia’s top trading partner, importing over €150 billion worth of goods (mainly oil) from Russia.

    Relation to Ukraine Crisis 

    This relationship became strained in 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine, marking the beginning of its Westward expansion into neighboring countries. This aggression made EU member states question Russia’s intentions in eastern Europe, and created conflict between two powers aiming to maintain influence in the region. Since the annexation, Russia has continued to encroach on its neighbors’ autonomy, culminating in the invasion of Ukraine. The EU paused construction of Nord Stream 2 and enacted damaging sanctions in an effort to curb Russian aggression. 

    US Position 

    Russia is not the main supplier of oil for the US. For that reason, among others, the US does not have a similar relationship of economic interdependence with its former Cold War rival. However, the US has a strong and lasting partnership with the EU spanning a host of economic, social, and international interests. For this reason, the EU’s reliance on Russia and EU energy security have an impact on US interest. The EU’s economy depends on energy generated through oil and gas, so Russia has the ability to destabilize the European economy. For the US, Nord Stream 1 and 2 represent a threat because they give Russia, an adversary in many areas of the foreign policy, influence over the US’s strongest diplomatic and economic partners. 

    US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken represented the Biden administration’s stance on the project, stating, “this pipeline is a Russian geopolitical project intended to divide Europe and weaken European energy security.” He concluded, “Nord Stream 2 is a bad deal—for Germany, for Ukraine, and for our Central and Eastern European allies and partners.” 

    Suspending Nord Stream 2 and Impact on the US

    The suspension of Nord Stream 2 is a victory for the US in some ways, as it reduces further cooperation between the EU and Russia. The EU is in the process of rethinking its energy economy, which involves reducing reliance on oil and natural gas in favor of greener energy sources like wind and solar power. However, this transition is expensive and will happen over the course of decades. In the meantime, moving away from Russian energy puts increased importance on oil and gas producing states like Saudi Arabia. The US and the EU have taken a stronger stance against human rights violations by the Saudi government in recent years, and may now be forced to backtrack. 

    The US has felt the effects of suspending progress on the pipeline through soaring gas prices and inflation. While Russia is not the US’ main supplier of oil, the suspension of Nord Stream 2, along with other moves to punish and deter Russian aggression, has thrown off the balance of supply and demand in the domestic and global energy market, forcing the US to cooperate with other oil producing states, like Saudi Arabia, while also ramping up domestic energy production. Many domestic energy sources, like fracking and offshore drilling, have a significant environmental cost.  

  • China’s Role in the Ukrainian Crisis and Sino-Russian Relations Viewed from Washington D.C.

    China’s Role in the Ukrainian Crisis and Sino-Russian Relations Viewed from Washington D.C.

    Following the 2014 Donbas War and the military intervention in Syria, Russia has been facing isolation in the international community. However, amid the enmity of the international community, China has grown closer both economically and politically with Russia in the second decade of the 21st century, particularly through the trading of natural resources and cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. As Dan Coats, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, noted in the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, “China and Russia are more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s”. During the 2022 Ukrainian crisis, China has been considered by U.S. officials as the largest potential aid towards Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. Directly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry described China as one of Russia’s key remaining friends, and Moscow hoped that Beijing would continue to provide rhetorical and substantive assistance. As Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister announced, China and Russia “will always maintain strategic focus and steadily advance our comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”

    China-Russia Defense and Economic Cooperation

    China and Russia appear to be moving toward a higher level of defense cooperation in recent decades. Since the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the two countries have engaged in close military interactions from cooperation in training and arms trade. Suffering from the western arms embargo after 1989, China saw Russia as a crucial source of advanced military equipment and technologies. In 1996, Beijing and Moscow began a “strategic partnership of coordination” that established high-level dialogues on a range of issues, including security and military affairs. The military ties between the two countries reached a higher level in the past decade. Since 2012, the PLA and Russian Armed Forces have conducted 14 joint military exercises. The Russian government also approved the selling of some of its most advanced military equipment to China, including the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense system and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet.

    The two countries’ converging economic interests also incentivized them to engage in further cooperation in trade and financial strategies. Since the 2014 Dunbas war, state firms and banks in Russia have faced sanctions from the Western powers, hindering the ability of Russia to raise financing in Western markets. After the trade war with the U.S. in 2018, China also began seeking greater independence from the global financial market. Consequently, in order to reduce their reliance on the U.S. dollar and Western capitals, both China and Russia began to embrace the possibility of dedollarization. In 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang signed 38 agreements on a visit to Moscow deepening cooperation on energy and establishing a three-year currency swap deal worth 150 billion yuan (about $24.5 billion). This deal was renewed for another three years in 2017, marking the joint effort for the two countries to pursue financial autonomy. The trading relationships between the two countries received more attention from the public. China and Russia both recognized each other as one of the most important trading partners in the world. China considered oil and natural gas imported from Russia as major substitutes for imports from the OPEC countries and was thus crucial to the energy safety of China. 

    Impact of the Ukraine Invasion on Sino-Russian Relations

    Despite the shared economic and security interests between China and Russia, China remained ambiguous about providing support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Following the invasion, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi restated China’s understanding of “Russia’s legitimate security concerns” and criticized NATO’s five consecutive rounds of eastward expansion for threatening the national security of Russia. However, China gradually abandoned its anti-west narrative and its emphasis on national security. Although the Chinese leaders continued to reaffirm the close ties between the two countries, China intended to establish itself as a mediator of the Ukrainian crisis and thought to mitigate the conflicts by facilitating peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. 

    While China hoped to expand its influence in Europe by mitigating the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. On the other hand, the military cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies also reached higher levels. The possibility of a Russian invasion contributed to more defense spending across the NATO countries. While the Russian military is proved to be depleted from the war in Ukraine and European countries are willing to increase investments in their defense, the United States can now relocate limited resources to Asia.

    However, a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis is still necessary for securing U.S. strategic interests in national security and ideology. Firstly, Ukraine has proven to be an important ally of the United States in nuclear proliferation in the past decades. The partnership between Kyiv and Washington D.C. in nuclear proliferation eliminated the large Soviet nuclear arsenal. Second, the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 established Ukraine as a buffer state between the United States and Russia. Therefore, an escalation of the Ukrainian crisis into total war between Russia and the West is a further violation of the Budapest Memorandum and damages the public images of both sides. Third, as two major autocracies in the world, an ideological tie is forming between China and Russia in their collective interests against the United States and the democratic values it represents. Therefore, any direct confrontation between the United States and Russia in Ukraine may turn the Ukrainian crisis into a proxy war like North Korea and Vietnam and eventually lead to a new cold war between the East and the West. In order to protect Ukraine, prevent potential nuclear threats against the U.S. and its European allies, and prevent the conflict between the East and the West from escalating into a new cold war, the United States is likely to seek a peaceful resolution of the on-going war rather than escalation of the conflicts in Ukraine.

    Conclusion

    For Russia, the cost of losing the war in Ukraine may be too high for the Putin regime. The possibility of further Western sanctions and losing public support encouraged Putin to rely on China for further support. Although China is taking cautious steps to position itself in the Ukrainian crisis, a potential Sino-Russian alliance is the last thing the United States wants to see. On the other hand, as a rising power, China is seeking to increase its political and economic influence across Eurasia through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As a result, China is hoping to initiate peace talks, and establish itself as a mediator of the conflict.

  • Introduction to US-Azerbaijan Relations

    Introduction to US-Azerbaijan Relations

    Fact sheet

    History of relations

    The United States recognized Azerbaijan as an independent state in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union and established diplomatic relations the following year. Shortly after independence, fighting escalated between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. USAID provided humanitarian assistance to those fleeing the conflict. In 1997, the first official visit to the United States by the President of Azerbaijan took place. 

     Strategic Interests

    Role of the Armenian-American lobby

    The United States has a large and politically active Armenian-American population that has influenced US policy towards Azerbaijan. The Armenian National Committee of America, which is the largest and most influential Armenian-American political organization, has advocated prohibiting the sending of U.S. military equipment or technology to Azerbaijan and opposition to any preferential trade or tax treatment to Azerbaijan. They have also achieved political successes such as legislative limits on U.S. defense sales or transfers to Azerbaijan and stopping a nomination for the position of U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Some US politicians such as Congressman Adam Schiff are critical of Azerbaijan. Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act limited U.S. assistance for Azerbaijan. The large Armenian population in the United States has led Azerbaijan to view the United States as a biased negotiator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    State of relations today

    Despite the common interests, relations between Azerbaijan and the United States along with other Western countries have become more strained recently. One reason is criticism of Azerbaijan’s human rights record. Azerbaijan has been criticized by the U.S. State Department for various violations such as its attacks on media freedom and suppression of political opposition. Azerbaijan is also in dispute with the OSCE Minsk Group, which helps to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For example, Azerbaijan has been frustrated that the OSCE Minsk Group hadn’t demanded the full withdrawal of Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States has recently become more disengaged from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The U.S. co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group was not afforded the rank of Ambassador during the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration’s actions regarding the recent fighting was criticized by then-candidate Biden during the presidential campaign in 2020. Azerbaijan’s swift retaking of Karabakh and the shelling of civilians during the recent fighting in the region has caused unease particularly in the U.S. Congress. Although the U.S. was predicted to curtail security assistance to Azerbaijan, the Biden Administration recently waived Section 907 and allowed for security assistance. The fact that the U.S. has not played an active role in the conflict is claimed to have benefitted Russia and damaged its relationship with Azerbaijan, as shown by the fact that Russia brokered a ceasefire agreement that halted the recent fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and allowed for the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the region.  

    Differing perspectives

    Azerbaijan’s relations with the United States have received criticism. One criticism is that Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev is a dangerous figure due to his cooperation with and tolerance towards Jihadis in Syria as well as his hostile views towards Armenia, which could serve as a destabilizing factor in the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The country is also criticized for its close foreign policy ties with Turkey’s president Recyp Tayyip Erdogan, which could undermine the ability of the U.S. to use Azerbaijan for its strategic interests. Turkey and Azerbaijan share a close relationship with each other that has been referred to as “two states, one nation”. The United States along with other Western countries have been criticized for ignoring the corruption and political repression of Azerbaijan’s government in favor of close cooperation, which is referred to as “caviar diplomacy”.

    On the other hand, supporters claim that Azerbaijan has contributed positively to the national security of the U.S. and is a pro-Western country that serves as an ideal partner for security issues in the region due to the aforementioned cooperation on security and counter-terrorism. Azerbaijan has also been praised by supporters for its friendly relations with Israel and for being a secular Muslim country in contrast to neighboring Iran. This is in contrast to Armenia, which is aligned with Russia as an economic and military partner and Iran, which shares a common distrust towards Azerbaijan’s friendly relations with Israel and the West. 

  • The Southern Gas Corridor and European Energy

    The Southern Gas Corridor and European Energy

    This brief was originally written by Nick Griffin. Before its publication, it was updated by Arielle Romm.

    As Europe transitions away from fossil fuels and towards green energy, natural gas has filled the gap between what existing fossil fuel generators are permitted to produce and clean energy sources are capable of providing. Natural gas generates about 22% of Europe’s energy supply, of which Russia supplies 33%. Russia’s influence over Europe’s energy supply poses a security threat for the continent. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the West’s ensuing sanctions have disrupted the supply of essential fuel. Many target Russia’s lucrative energy industry, which U.S. President Joe Biden has called “the main artery of Russia’s economy” and the U.S. banned imports of Russian oil, gas, and coal entirely. As Russia becomes more aggressive, European leaders have begun to recognize the necessity of diversifying energy imports and look elsewhere for natural gas supplies. In light of this, Central Asia and the Southern Gas Corridor have become key players as a counterbalance to both Russian energy power and strategic considerations regarding China’s influence in the region. 

    The Invasion of Ukraine and Impact on Energy Supply

    After Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, the United States, Europe, and other allies imposed sanctions to punish the nation for invading and deter further escalation. Though these sanctions aim to target the Russian economy, Europe and the West face steep energy prices as a result and may have to pay exorbitant gas prices if the conflict does not end quickly. Immediately following the invasion, gas prices rose 36% due to fear of sanctions impacting the European markets’ natural gas supply. The ongoing conflict has resulted in the destruction of pipelines and threatens to disrupt the flow of energy to European homes. In March of 2022, Putin set an ultimatum to Western nations that had previously been recipients of Russian gas and resources, requiring payment for gas in Russian rubles, rather than US dollars or euros. In the aftermath of this announcement, gas prices in the West jumped even further, and governments scrambled to find alternatives. Already, Russian energy giant Gazprom has halted the flow of gas to Bulgaria, Poland, and Finland, who refused to capitulate to the demands. Damaged Russia-West relations could impact the energy supply well into the future. Germany has canceled the certification of an important pipeline, Nord Stream 2, and sanctions could persist for years. 

    Building and Expanding the Southern Gas Corridor

    The ongoing war in Ukraine has highlighted the necessity of diversifying, but plans to connect Central Asian energy with Europe have been in the works for more than a decade. In 2012, an agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey resulted in a new, Trans-Anatolian pipeline to transport Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian Sea gas fields to European markets. Construction began in 2015 and was completed in 2018. The existing Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) was expanded to connect with Greece, Italy, and Southeastern Europe. Known as the Southern Gas Corridor, this energy source has become essential in recent weeks and could be the future of European energy. Further expansions are underway; the Gas Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria will connect to the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline in Stara Zagora. When the expansion is complete, Bulgaria is projected to import ⅓ of its natural gas from Azerbaijan.

    Understanding Europe’s Dilemma

    Although plans are currently in the works to fully transition to green energy (eliminating the need for gas pipelines altogether), Germany’s carbon emission reduction goals are currently set to a 65% reduction by 2030 and an 88% reduction in carbon emissions by 2040. The EU, recognizing the urgency of this energy shift, has pledged to spend €210 billion ($222 billion) to wean itself off Russian oil and gas through the REPowerEU plan. works to reduce its consumption of Russia’s gas by 66% before the end of this year, but may only be able to break its dependence completely before 2027 even at the best-case scenario. However, the most ambitious plans still require Europe to import natural gas at least a few more years, if not decades. Continued reliance on Russia is a security risk while changing suppliers to Turkey and Azerbaijan would shift the risk and support two regimes that have been accused of human rights violations. 

    • Azerbaijan, the source of the gas, has been called an authoritarian state by organizations like Freedom House. The leader of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has ruled since a 2003 election that featured accusations of repression and intimidation of opposition candidates and rallies. Azerbaijan has been accused of violating its citizens’ human rights, including those of opposition leaders and journalists by Human Rights Watch. The country is also purported to have committed war crimes during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, including decapitations and mutilations of Armenian soldiers as well as the use of cluster bombs against civilian targets. 
    • Similarly, Turkey has been accused of clamping down on civil rights, limiting the free speech rights of dissidents and journalists, and criminalizing criticism of Turkish President Erdogan. Erdogan’s government has been charged with torturing political dissidents in prison.

    China’s economic presence in Central Asia has grown in recent years. Already, China poses a counterbalance to the West’s efforts to use energy as leverage against Russia. In February of 2022, Russia and China signed a 30-year contract to supply gas to China via a new pipeline, agreeing to do so in euros, and increase their relationship since the 2019 signing of the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline between the two. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, imports of Russian oil have risen by 55% from a year prior, taking Saudi Arabia’s place as China’s biggest oil supplier. This energy alliance is a distinct concern in the face of growing Western sanctions on Russian energy, leading to fears of a so-called “gas pivot” to China. China has also developed energy relationships with both Turkey and Azerbaijan, leading to increased fears of its growing influence in the region. The region is undergoing a geopolitical shift that continues to diminish ties to the Euro-Atlantic states and elevates China’s influence in Central Asia. Beijing and Moscow are the region’s principal economic, political, and security partners, a marker of declining U.S. influence.

    United States Role and Consideration

    The United States has long been concerned about Russia using energy supplies as a political tool to influence other nations. A recent report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations states that U.S. interests lay in “alleviating Russian gas-fueled pressure against NATO allies” and “bolstering bilateral relations in the Caspian Sea region.” U.S. diplomacy was critical in developing this project, and has opened doors for U.S. engagement in Central Asia, strengthening ties with Azerbaijan as an alternative to its relationship with Russia, and opened doors to advancing rule-of-law and climate investment issues. Even in the United States, domestic considerations have come into play as gas prices reach record highs. Although the U.S. does not import large amounts of Russian oil (and has now banned it), the lower supply caused by the conflict has prices rising as Europe seeks to find other sources, raising demand and cost globally.

  • Introduction to Kazakhstan

    Introduction to Kazakhstan

    A Brief History

    Pre-Soviet Union

    The Kazakh steppe has been a traditional homeland of nomadic tribes that stand as the early ancestors of the modern Kazakh people. Though Kazakhs are Turkic people, their culture and way of life are greatly influenced by the surrounding civilizations that they have come into contact with. Modern-day Kazakhstan’s path became more apparent as the Russian Empire conquered the steppe as the country expanded eastward in the 18th and 19th centuries.

    Kazakh SSR

    Following the dissolution of Imperial Russia, Kazakhstan became a Soviet republic in 1925. The Kazakh SSR had an initially tumultuous past as forced agricultural collectivization under Joseph Stalin led to more than a million deaths in the 1930s. Moreover, the republic was the destination for many political and social opponents to Stalin’s regime exiled to Central Asia. However, due to positive agricultural programs in the 1950s and 60s, Kazakhstan was an attractive destination for agricultural workers from around the Soviet Union. Like much of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, Kazakhstan experienced significant upheaval. In late 1986, many young ethnic Kazakhs protested for the replacement of First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR Dinmukhamed Konayev. Government soldiers were deployed to suppress the unrest leading to several deaths and many arrests. These events subsequently became known as the Jeltoqsan protest. In October of 1990, Kazakhstan declared sovereignty over its territory as a republic within the USSR, and in December of 1991, it officially declared independence as the last Soviet republic to do so.

    Post-USSR

    When Kazakhstan gained its independence in 1991, ethnic Kazakhs found themselves as a minority group in their own state. However, many non-Muslim ethnic groups moved to their respective states, while many Kazakhs living in other former Soviet states were repatriated. Between 1990 and 2019, Nursultan Nasarbayev, a holdover from the Soviet era, served as Kazakhstan’s president. In 2019, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev succeeded Nasarbayev.

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    Image Courtesy of Britannica

    Modern Kazakhstan

    The modern-day Republic of Kazakhstan is a linguistically, ethnically, and religiously diverse state. Although Kazakhstan is predominantly populated by ethnic Kazakhs, there are many ethnic Russians living within its borders. Moreover, along with Kazakh, Russian is an official language and the language of interethnic communication.

    Kazakhstan is a presidential republic led by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and acting Prime Minister Alihan Smaiylov. Although Almaty, a city of nearly two million people located in southeast Kazakhstan, is the country’s largest city, Nur-Sultan, a city of just over a million residents, is the capital. Kazakhstan has a bicameral parliament with an upper house, the Senate, and a lower house, the Majilis. Despite its outwardly democratic system, Kazakhstan is considered a consolidated authoritarian regime where free and fair elections are not provided. 

    Kazakhstan’s economy is primarily driven by the exportation of natural resources to partners in China, Italy, and Russia. Alternatively, Kazakhstan relies heavily on Russia and China for manufactured imports such as packaged medicine and cars. The average Kazakh citizen earns roughly 268,000 Tenge per month. Although an initially staggering number, this only amounts to about 620 USD, as $1 is worth approximately 432 Tenge.

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    Nazarbayev (left) and Tokayev (right) Image Courtesy of The Astana Times

    January 2022

    What happened?

    For about a week and a half in early January, thousands of Kazakhs participated in violent protests. The situation was very volatile, and in many cities in the country, such as Almaty, a state of emergency was declared. On January 7th, President Tokayev ordered security forces to “shoot to kill without warning.” This undoubtedly escalated the situation and caused more violence.

    What caused the events?

    The primary catalyst for the mass protests was the government lifting price caps on liquefied petroleum gas. This gasoline is a low price, low-carbon fuel used by many Kazakhs to power their cars. By lifting the price cap, the cost of liquefied petroleum gas doubled. However, this was not the only cause of the demonstrations. Significant social and economic inequalities, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the autocratic nature of the Tokayev regime motivated many Kazakhs to demonstrate.

    What was the result?

    Although the accurate number is somewhat unclear, officially, 225 people were killed during the demonstrations, and many more were injured. Kazakh authorities said that roughly 10,000 people were detained. Of the many thousands of people detained, approximately 700 criminal cases are open against protesters whose charges range from terrorism, murder, and seeking to overthrow the government.

    President Tokayev appealed to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization for assistance in ending the demonstrations. This is notable as it was the first time CSTO soldiers had been deployed. These soldiers were effective in securing airports and government buildings, although their deployment was very short.

    In response to the economic concerns voiced by the demonstrators, the Kazakh government imposed a 180-day state regulation on fuel and food prices. The demonstrations also led to some political shifts as Tokayev’s cabinet, led by the former Prime Minister Askar Mamin, resigned.

    American Response

    The United States’ response to the upheaval in Kazakhstan was expected. Given the geographic distance between the two states, the U.S. could do little more than condemn the violence and ask all sides to work towards a peaceful resolution. However, the United States and Kazakhstan have a close political relationship as the U.S. was the first state to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence. Moreover, the two states have a close economic relationship. The United States has invested heavily in Kazakhstan’s energy potential, and nearly $54 billion has been invested into the Kazakh economy over the last thirty years. 

    Russian Response

    Compared to the United States, Russia had a greater stake in calming the situation. Were the Kazakh protests successful, they may have provided a blueprint for anti-Putin actors in Russia. In many ways, Russia had a responsibility to assist the Tokayev government. Both states are CSTO members, and Russia had to assist when called upon. The unrest in Kazakhstan posed a tangible security concern for Russia as the two states share a massive border. Long-lasting unrest in Kazakhstan could have provided another problem for Russia along its borders, in addition to the concerns in the South Caucasus and Ukraine.

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    Kazakh protestors Image Courtesy of Financial Times

  • Turkey’s Strategy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    Turkey’s Strategy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    Turkey shares complicated relationships and maritime borders with both Russia and Ukraine, and it has taken a dual approach to maintain distance from either neighbor. Turkey’s status as a NATO member and an economic partner with both Russia and Ukraine puts it in a unique position to serve as a place of negotiation and a communicator to the West. As Turkey balances its NATO responsibilities and strategic considerations, Ankara has worked to avoid alienating either side as it attempts to secure its own international and domestic position as a regional decision-maker.

    Early Stages of the Conflict

    In late March of 2022, Turkey served as the host of the first of three-way talks between Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba of Ukraine and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov of Russia, along with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu. During these talks in the town of Antalya in southern Turkey, Cavusoglu described Turkey’s role as more of a “facilitator” than a “host”. As part of the talks, Turkey brought up critical issues to the conflict, including free access to humanitarian corridors and the violence occurring in the city of Mariupol. Although no agreement was reached, Turkey has strengthened its position as a diplomatic actor in dealing with a developing conflict with two of its major economic partners. On a more personal level, President Vladimir Putin himself was reported to have called Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to outline his demands throughout the negotiations process. Finding himself in a difficult position, Erdogan has sought to optimize Turkey’s ability to pivot strategically while maintaining a distance from the current conflict. 

    Initially, Turkey’s position on the current conflict favored the Ukrainian cause. Erdogan criticized the West’s response as weak and joined NATO in condemning Russia by voting for the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine. This isn’t the first time that Turkey has publicly denounced Russia’s actions in the region—Ankara criticized Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and has been outspoken in support of Ukraine’s claim over Crimea and for Crimean Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group that has been persecuted under Russian control. Additionally, Turkey has joined Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives such as the August 2021 Crimea Platform summit.

    Naval Response

    Ankara changed its rhetoric after the beginning of the conflict. Erdogan and other Turkish figures in the government and media have called the invasion “unacceptable,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “courageous,” and the Ukrainians “helpless civilians.” However, when Ankara began describing the conflict as a “war” rather than repeating the Russian term “special operation,” it was able to invoke the articles of the 1936 Montreux Convention, at Zelenskyy’s request. Invoking the Articles of the Montreux Convention allowed Turkey to close the Bosphorus Strait to warships and thus block warring states from accessing the Black Sea (Figure 1). This has effectively limited Russia’s ability to move ships from other fleets into the region. Before the invasion of Ukraine, 16 Russian warships sailed through the strait to conduct military exercises in the Black Sea and now are engaged in the conflict. Due to the closing of the Bosphorus Strait, two of Russia’s Slava-class cruisers, the RTS Marshal Ustinov and the RFS Varyag were unable to move into the Black Sea from other operating areas. This move has earned Ankara praise from NATO and EU allies.

    Figure 1 

    Military and Economic Response

    Turkey has also sent aid to Ukraine in the form of weapons. Turkey sent a number of Bayraktar TB2 armed drones to Ukraine. These weapons have been deployed in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh and have been extremely effective in other conflicts. Although Ukrainian officials have repeatedly underlined this contribution and its success, possibly to publicly pressure Turkey to take a more active pro-Ukrainian stance, Ankara has stopped short of claiming the transaction as a form of military aid. Rather, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Sedat Onal has publicly emphasized that the transfer of Bayraktar TB2 drones was instead an agreement made between the Ukrainian government and a private Turkish company. This attempt to distance the Turkish government from any overt lethal aid to the Ukrainian cause underlines the strategic considerations leading Turkey to avoid alienating Russia. 

    Turkey’s commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity has avoided outright alienating Russia. Erdogan’s response to the current invasion has stopped short of other measures pursued by other NATO members. Ankara has continuously declined to join sanctions on Russia, calling them “useless,” and it has refused to close its airspace to Russian aircraft. Through this, Turkey has become a “haven,” becoming the base of Russia’s connection to the rest of Eurasia. Some oligarchs and citizens have fled there as the effects of Western economic sanctions take hold of the Russian economy, leading to fears that it will undermine the effectiveness of the measures. However, this strategy is risky for Turkey. If the United States and the West decide to ramp up secondary sanctions, Turkish banks and businesses could be greatly affected. 

    Russian-Turkish Security Relationship

    Turkey’s strategic hedging of its actions during the current crisis has much to do with its complex security and economic relationships with Russia. Russia and Turkey are historical competitors in multiple security areas and have fought on opposite sides of multiple regional conflicts, such as Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Geography and politics play a major part in Turkey’s decisions. As both a NATO member and a close neighbor to Russia and Ukraine, with economic ties to both countries, Turkey risks becoming deeply involved in a conflict with both security and economic partners.

    There has been an increasing security relationship between Ankara and Moscow in the past few years. Despite their opposing stances in regional conflicts, Turkey has increasingly viewed Russia as a “counterweight” to the West’s powers and pressures in the international sphere and seeks a deepened relationship with Russia to diversify its security strategy. In regional conflicts such as Syria, the countries cooperate. For example, they arranged a 2020 ceasefire agreement, and mutually brokered a security corridor and joint patrols. Criticism over the human rights abuses and the rule of law in Turkey has increased from the West, leading Erdogan to turn to alternative allies. Putin hasn’t questioned any of Erdogan’s domestic human rights crackdowns, and he extended his support during the 2016 failed coup in Turkey. A shared goal of legitimating their role in the regional order outside of Western-led institutions has provided a platform on which the two nations have begun to cooperate.

    Turkey’s pivot towards Russian partnership is exemplified in the highly controversial 2019 purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which led to a downturn in relations with the United States. The U.S.’s response included a sanctions package against Turkey’s defense industry, Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and the resulting cancellation of a large transaction of U.S. F-35 fighter jets. This is indicative of a larger Turkish policy trend of reducing dependence on NATO and the West, looking to alternative allies. Turkey’s pivot to ​​Russian weapons platforms has led to concerns about its future unity with NATO.

    Domestic Considerations

    Aside from its international strategic considerations, Ankara’s domestic economic considerations are a central determinant in the ongoing conflict. Both Russia and Ukraine are key economic partners to Turkey. Turkey, whose energy needs are import-dependent, especially depends on Russia: Russian natural gas made up 45% of Turkey’s gas purchases last year. Rosatom, a Russian conglomerate, began building a nuclear plant at Akkuyu in southern Turkey. Ankara has a very profitable free trade agreement with Ukraine, which it does not want to lose. As the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, Turkey’s security and defense sectors are tied up with Ukraine’s as well. For example, a new drone manufacturing factory has been planned to co-produce the long-range tactical Bayraktar TB2 system with Ukraine, further promoting the Turkish drone brand and expanding it to other markets. Turkey is also a major importer of sunflower oil and wheat, and in 2021 it imported 64.6 percent of its wheat from Russia and 13.4 percent from Ukraine—78% of a critical import overall. Turkey’s exports to Russia have been measured at 4.5 billion dollars in 2020, and to Ukraine at 2.24 billion dollars, figures that are expected to be disrupted as the crisis continues. Additionally, Ukrainians and Russians make up 23% of Turkey’s tourism sector revenue, a large share of an industry that represents about  4% of Turkey’s overall GDP. 

    Hit hard already by the ripple effects of Western sanctions, Turkey also knows well what a cooling economic relationship with Moscow would look like. In 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet on the Turkish-Syrian border area, the subsequent sanctions and downturn in relations proved devastating to the Turkish economy. The impacts of tensions with Russia caused double-digit inflation, high unemployment, and a rising current account deficit. Russia cracked down on tourism to Turkey, imposed import restrictions on Turkish goods, and even suspended the building of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. The ten-month sanctions eventually ended when Erdogan personally apologized for the downing of the Russian bomber. This example of Russia’s status as a close economic partner to Turkey may explain Ankara’s hesitation to join harsher sanction measures.

    The conflict, as well as Western-imposed sanctions, has already compounded Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis. Since sanctions were introduced, Turkey’s economy has taken a turn for the worse, including surging inflation at a 20-year high of 54%. The tourism industry has taken a hard hit from the loss of Ukrainian and Russian visitors, losing Turkey billions in revenue. As supply chain disruptions affect imports and exports, grains, oil, and gas prices have skyrocketed. With national elections coming in 2023, worries about civic dissatisfaction due to economic losses have been at the forefront of Erdogan’s mind.

    Ankara’s position as a mediator in the talks has so far seemed to work more than any other measure. The only signs of diplomatic progress have emerged from the three-way discussions, as Russia said it would significantly scale back its military activity around Kyiv and northern Ukraine, a confidence-building “de-escalation” step. Whether this step will be carried out, however, is unclear. In this way, Ankara has worked to solidify itself as a key independent international intermediary to both the West and Russia while avoiding endangering either of its critical partnerships.

  • Introduction to the OSCE

    Introduction to the OSCE

    Introduction

    The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is an intergovernmental group made up of 57 European, North American, and Asian nations and 11 “partners for cooperation” in Africa and Oceania. Founded during the Cold War as a neutral forum for discussion between the Western and Eastern blocs, the mandate of the OSCE has evolved from one of discussion between great powers into an organization that defends human rights, oversees elections, and monitors active combat zones.

    Even as the OSCE’s mandate has evolved, the core mission of “promoting stability, peace, and democracy” has remained constant. The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to all conflict in the broader Eurasian area, and the OSCE has been involved in mediating conflicts in recent decades. More recently, the OSCE has been involved in everything from a mission to monitor ceasefire violations in Ukraine to collaborating with its member countries to “strengthen cooperation on environmental issues.”

    History of OSCE

    The OSCE was created in 1975, at the signing of the Helsinki Accords. At the time, the United States and the Soviet Union were in a “détente,” a period of warmer relations between the two historic rivals. The Nixon presidency and the Brezhnev premiership was an era of decreased tension, eventually leading to both powers attending the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the early 1970s. After years of deliberations, the nations represented at the conference agreed to sign a document entitled the Helsinki Final Act, commonly referred to as the Helsinki Accords. This document outlined a set of politico-military, economic, environmental, and human rights commitments. This was the first time the USSR made explicit human rights commitments.

    After the signing of the Accords, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe continued to serve as a forum for meetings and began certifying whether states were meeting the commitments they made in Helsinki. After the end of the Cold War, the group’s name was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its role began to expand beyond its original purpose. The organization has come to play a large part in mediating inter-state disputes, overseeing elections, and even maintain missions in certain regions to prevent conflicts.

    How Does the OSCE Work?

    The OSCE maintains a policy of neutrality, so serves a different purpose and operates differently from organizations like NATO and CSTO. Harkening back to its past as a forum for discussion and mediation, much more emphasis is placed on summits: meetings where heads of state and ambassadors from member countries make long-term decisions and set goals for the entire organization. Other representative bodies include the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, made up of representatives from every member state. The Parliamentary Assembly passes resolutions about issues like human rights, democracy, and environmental issues in order to ensure member states are meeting the commitments they made in Helsinki.

    The Permanent Council is the primary OSCE decision-making body. This Council contains delegates from every member state and representatives from each of the OSCE’s Partners for Cooperation. All decisions at the Permanent Council are made by consensus. The OSCE also has multiple executive structures, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and Representative on Freedom of the Media. These institutions are another method the OSCE uses to ensure member states are fulfilling their commitments.

    What Does the OSCE Do?

    The OSCE has an active presence in a dozen countries, mostly former Soviet and Yugoslav states. These field offices “assist host countries in putting their OSCE commitments into practice” and “enable the OSCE to tackle crises as they arise.” The key goals of these missions are to restore trust between former rivals and build lasting peace in regions that have faced conflict and war. Field operations also focus on helping states control crime and terrorism, transition to democracy, clear minefields from past wars, and negotiate settlements of conflicts as they develop on the ground.

    The OSCE maintains a large presence in Ukraine, deploying both a monitoring mission focused on the Donbas region and a coordinator that is helping Ukraine with issues from the transition to democracy to cybercrime and human trafficking. The OSCE’s monitoring mission is an “unarmed, civilian mission” whose task is to “observe and report in an impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine.” This work is integral as tensions escalate in the region and all parties attempt to reach a peaceful settlement.

    OSCE field offices are also active in former Yugoslav republics such as Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo, helping them build resilient institutions and repair the damage of conflicts in the 1990s. The OSCE helps these nations clear land mines, run counter-terrorist operations, and defend their democratic institutions. In states and regions with ongoing conflicts like Moldova and the South Caucasus, the OSCE facilitates discussions between all parties and is working to resolve their respective territorial disputes.

    The OSCE’s primary function is to serve as a forum for discussion. In this capacity, the organization operates forums like the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been the main diplomatic process attempting to bring an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus. The group has published assessments of the situation and hosts infrequent meetings between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to discuss the conflict. The OSCE is also involved in the “5+2” format that is currently mediating the Transnistrian territorial conflict and the Geneva International Discussions, a forum for mediating the crisis in Georgia. OSCE successfully mediated discussions between multiple states in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Peace Accords, resulting in more transparency and arms control between the former rivals.

    The OSCE Minsk group is one of the most visible and prominent examples of OSCE mediation today. The group has been focused on reaching a peaceful settlement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended in 1994. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a region of Azerbaijan populated by Armenians declared independence and sought to join Armenia. Following a bloody war, the Armenians were able to secure de-facto autonomy and an uneasy status quo began. Despite winning the war, the newly established Republic of Artsakh was not recognized by any U.N. member states, including Armenia. For the next few decades, OSCE sponsored a forum for the two sides to come to a permanent solution that would respect the rights of refugees from both sides and the self-determination rights of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh. The group continuously worked to facilitate a settlement, hosting multiple conferences between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders and monitoring the situation on the ground from their offices in Yerevan and Baku.

    Criticisms

    Although the Minsk group was one of the best avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, it also demonstrated some of the structural issues with OSCE and was the subject of criticism. The group moved very slowly—little came of the talks held between the two rivals and frequent border clashes killed dozens of Armenian and Azerbaijani servicemembers. In 2020, a war broke out between the two sides, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of thousands of Armenians and allegations of war crimes by both sides. The Minsk group was unable to facilitate a peaceful settlement and now risks being cast aside by both nations in favor of a more violent solution to the crisis.

    The reasons for the Minsk Group’s apparent failure in Nagorno-Karabakh reflect criticisms of the organization. The ery structure of the organization is focused on neutrality—by definition, OSCE is a pan-European security organization. Multiple post-Soviet nations, including Azerbaijan, have attempted to cripple OSCE’s ability to monitor their compliance with the Helsinki Accords, attacking the organization in the press and even closing down OSCE offices. Much like many other international organizations, OSCE has no way of enforcing resolutions and only operates with the consent of its member states. The Permanent Council is made up of nations with conflicting national interests, making it difficult for the organization to agree on and implement policy. OSCE’s consensus approach to making larger political decisions makes this task even more difficult, as all members must agree on a path forward to resolve disputes between nations that are often at odds with each other and both sit on the council. 

    OSCE also faces financial challenges. The organization’s annual budget is only €138 million, less than 3% of the UN’s. This has left OSCE overstretched and unable to carry out its mandate. As of 2017, OSCE was only able to deploy 6 monitors to the 200-kilometer line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops in Nagorno-Karabakh. For comparison, the United Nations maintains a peacekeeping force of 15,000 in South Sudan, with a budget of $1 billion.

    These challenges come at a time when Europe is becoming increasingly politically divided, and old divisions between east and west are on the rise. The new situation in Europe requires an organization like OSCE to mediate future disputes, coordinate international responses, and monitor conflicts to ensure peace and stability.       

  • Russian Foreign Agent Laws: Protecting Civil Society, or Preventing It?

    Russian Foreign Agent Laws: Protecting Civil Society, or Preventing It?

    Amidst the variety of international criticism expressed about Vladimir Putin’s administration, we frequently hear about the Russian state’s suppression of political dissent, most often through the shutting down of oppositional media organizations or cracking down on protests. Most recently, the issue of Russia’s “foreign agent” law has come to the forefront of this criticism, with a plethora of international groups deriding its use as retaliatory, oppressive, and a means of censorship. The Russian government and adjacent media, on the other hand, view the law as necessary for the protection of the political process, and compare it to other countries’ restrictions on individuals acting in the interest of foreign governments. While there are instances where the law has legitimate standing, it is often utilized as a tool to suppress political goals that are against the administration’s wishes. 

    What is the Russian law on foreign agents?

    Under the law, nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive any funding from foreign sources must report said foreign funding, and also be included on a registry of agents acting in the interests of foreign entities. These organizations can still publish materials if they report their funding properly, but must do so under the stipulation that they explicitly indicate “[the materials] are published … by a foreign agent.” In late 2017, a law was passed that allowed foreign agent laws to extend beyond NGOs, by also including media organizations on their own foreign agent register. 

    Failing to report funding from foreign sources can result in heavy fines for an organization. Creating or working for an organization which receives international funding can have consequences too, especially if the organization is perceived to be encouraging citizens to “refuse to perform civil duties or commit other illegal acts.” An individual who fails to report their foreign agent status, or proliferates propaganda in service of a foreign agent, may: be fined up to one year of salary or wage,  do “corrective labor” for up to two years, or serve jail time for up to two years. Article 3 offers more details on punishment.

    Examples of foreign agents on the registry, and the debate around them

    The law has been applied to several obvious “foreign agent” mass media, such as Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. These two organizations aim to promote Western and American ideals abroad and receive most, if not all, of their funding from non-Russian sources. 

    More contentious examples have involved Russian NGOs focusing on election processes, such as Golos, which has twice been branded a foreign agent, and the Levada Center, a sociological research center that surveys public opinion. Golos was designated as a foreign agent leading up to the 2021 State Duma election, because the local vote-monitoring organization received a donation of 200 roubles from an Armenian citizen. The Levada Center was designated a foreign agent in 2016 after the Ministry of Justice claimed to have found hidden sources of foreign funding, a claim which the director disputed. 

    Supporters of the foreign agent law cite the need to prevent foreign influence and protect Russian sovereignty. When the law was passed in 2012, Pravda described it as “… not prohibitive—as some critics would like to interpret it,” claiming that “thousands” of foreign agents operate in Russia through uncontrollable cash payments. In 2013, President Putin outlined his beliefs to officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service, alluding to some NGOs as “structures financed from abroad and serving foreign interests.” This law, then, is framed as an attempt to regulate these foreign agents, as well as uncontrollable money, in an effort to prevent interference in Russian affairs. 

    Opponents of the law have decried the discriminatory effects a foreign agent designation holds. The director of the Levada Center emphasized that the term itself, inostrannie agent, has a historical connotation “synonymous with ‘spy’ or ‘saboteur.’” Therefore, citizens are less likely to trust organizations labeled as foreign agents. While Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has stated that “the department must follow the spirit and letter of the law” in response to criticism about Golos’ registration, opposition figures argue that the stigma of being a foreign agent is a disproportionate response to, in this case, a $3 donation. 

    IMAGE BELOW: Press secretary Dmitry Peskov with President Putin. Only one day before classifying Golos as a foreign agent, Putin said he would review the “fuzzy criteria” surrounding the law. 

    After its addition to the registry, the Levada Center conducted a poll on the term “foreign agent.” Among the 1,800 Russian adults surveyed, notable results were as follows:

    • Out of the 25% of surveyed adults who had heard of the law, 56% view the law as an attempt to limit Western influence, while 26% see it as an attempt to “clamp down on independent social organizations”.
    • 45% associate the term with espionage, “infiltrators”, and double agents; an additional 7% associate the term with an “enemy of Russia”.
    • 66% believe an organization who receives foreign money will work in the interests of their foreign sponsor.

    By including certain political opposition and media dissidents on the Foreign Agent Registry, the government has found a way to mitigate the proliferation of these organizations’ ideas by legally invalidating their conclusions as the products of foreign sponsorship. By labeling an organization like Golos as a foreign agent, the Russian government delegitimizes their vote-monitoring capabilities to a large chunk of Russians citizens. If, for example, Golos claimed to have evidence of election tampering done by the ruling party, their conclusion would be met with skepticism. The government sees this law as a buttress for Russian unity and stability, while dissidents see it as yet another tool in preventing a civil society outside of the government’s parameters. 

  • Ukraine Crisis and U.S. Sanctions Part 2

    Ukraine Crisis and U.S. Sanctions Part 2

    Russian Central Bank

    In coordination with European allies, the United States has also targeted investment in Russian funds. It has prohibited any U.S. individual or entity from engaging with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and frozen any assets of the Bank held in the United States or by Americans elsewhere. On a larger scale, the G-7 countries announced that Russia will be restricted from accessing its reserve holdings in G-7 jurisdictions, freezing about half of Russia’s foreign reserves. 

    The measures the United States has taken against the Central Bank are most significant in the imposition of limits on employing international reserves, which otherwise would be used to bolster the Russian economy in the face of U.S. sanctions. Moscow’s financial defense system against international economic sanctions has been referred to as a “fortress Russia” economy. Moscow’s efforts to sanction-proof the Russian economy have included amassing $630 billion dollars in foreign currency reserves. The foreign currency reserves were built up by over 75% since 2015, intended to enable Russians to exchange rubles for foreign currencies in the case of foreign sanctions. Despite a concerted attempt to shift towards the Chinese yuan, 45% of those assets were held in Western currencies. Preventing Moscow from selling foreign currency reserves to stabilize the ruble curtails its ability to protect its domestic economy from international economic sanctions.

    Nord Stream 2

    A significant development in the sanctions against Russia is within the energy and gas sector: Germany’s agreement to halt certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, worth $11 billion. After Russia recognized two breakaway regions in Ukraine, the United States terminated a previous waiver that exempted Nord Stream 2 AG, the parent company of the natural gas pipeline project, and its CEO from sanctions under U.S. law. Nord Stream 2 AG is a company under Gazprom, a Russian state-owned gas company. Despite pressure from the United States to reduce energy reliance on Russian suppliers, Berlin has resisted discontinuing the Nord Stream 2 project. Russia produces about 10% of the world’s oil, and concerns have arisen over the dependence of Europe on Russian gas. Europe’s significant economic interdependence on Russia’s gas companies has made this sector difficult to sanction as concerns emerge about rising gas prices. However, sanctions stopped short of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which is operational and has transferred gas to Germany since 2011. 

    SWIFT Sanctions

    The most recent sanctions blocking Russian banks from the global financial network SWIFT have the potential to cripple the Russian economy. Just days before Russia invaded Ukraine, disconnection from the SWIFT financial system was not included as a potential sanction, and the move seemed unlikely. A measure restricting banks from SWIFT has only been used once before against the Iranian government in 2012. SWIFT, or “Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication” is the world’s primary international payment network and is central to participation in the global financial system. Restricting banks from using SWIFT blocks international trade flow and undermines transfers and messaging across borders. Cutting Russia off from SWIFT was floated as a potential economic sanction in the aftermath of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, but it was ultimately not implemented because these sanctions could hurt the economies of the U.S. and its allies by stymying Russian participation in the global financial system. However, a day after the invasion, a joint statement by the U.S., European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, U.K., and Canada announced that certain Russian banks would be subject to a disconnection from SWIFT, marking an approach that would allow further expansion of SWIFT sanctions and protect against outsized economic harm in the rest of Europe. This measure marks a distinct escalation in sanctions against Russia.

    Consequences

    Isolating Russia economically in this way may put pressure on Moscow to temper or halt its actions in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. As the situation in Russia and Ukraine continues to develop, additional sanction measures may be introduced by the United States and the EU as a deterrent and political punishment for Russia’s violations of the Minsk Protocol and international law regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty, especially the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by the U.S., U.K., and Russia. Under that agreement, the United States provided assurances that it would not only respect Ukraine’s conditions to denuclearize but respond if Russia were to violate its security. By providing military assistance and imposing sanctions on Russia, it fulfills those assurances. 

    The economic consequences of the sanctions have already begun to take effect on Russia’s domestic economy. The Kremlin’s “fortress economy” has been put to the test: after sanctions were introduced there was a run on central banks as Russians attempted to withdraw foreign currencies. The Russian rouble collapsed against the dollar, depreciating to record lows—losing more than 40% of its value, settling at less than a U.S. penny. This depreciation has accelerated inflation in Russia; the central bank has more than doubled interest rates (to 20%), introduced capital controls, and blocked interest payments to foreign investors. 

    Image 1 

    While sanctions on Russian financial institutions and industries imposed by governments have damaged the Russian economy in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, economic consequences are emerging from the private sector as well. Disruptions in the supply chain and the volatility and depreciation of the ruble have created an unattractive and risky business environment. As the Russian economy begins to face the repercussions of a swift Western response, it has become increasingly difficult for private companies to operate there. Those who stay risk violating sanctions, reputational damage, and logistical complications. American credit rating agency Fitch downgraded its evaluation of the Russian economy from ‘B’ to ‘C’, indicating that a sovereign debt default is “imminent.” Many Western investors and companies have pulled out of Russia or announced their intentions to do so, severing sometimes decades-long business ties. This includes multinational corporations such as Paypal, ExxonMobil, BP, Visa, Mastercard, IBM, Amazon Web Services, Goldman Sachs, Apple, and Disney. In addition to the loss of consumer goods trade, many of these entities have significant financial and industrial clout. The loss of international business has more long-term implications than sanctions imposed by Western governments; private trepidation to operate in Russia could last far longer after sanctions have been lifted.

    However, it is unclear whether sanctions and their economic ramifications will be effective in swaying Moscow’s decision-making regarding Ukraine. Just as the economic impact of sanctions in the past has been debatable in altering Russia’s behavior, it is difficult to evaluate how much of an effect the 2022 sanctions will have. As of this moment, the fighting continues to escalate, as does the intensity and urgency of the international response to the conflict. Whether the economic damage will influence the Kremlin to back away from military action is yet to be seen.