ACE

Category: Eurasia

  • Introduction to US Relations with Estonia

    Introduction to US Relations with Estonia

    Estonia, a small country at the northern end of the Baltic states, has received increased focus from Western media in light of the deepening divide between the West and Russia in Eastern Europe—exemplified by the war in Ukraine. Estonia, a NATO ally of the United States and member of the European Union, spent the Cold War under Soviet rule and two centuries as part of the Russian Empire. Today, Estonia is recognized for incorporating digital innovation with democratic governance and public services, leading some to refer to it as a “digital democracy”. 

    Estonia, located at the northern end of the Baltic states, has gained increased attention from Western media due to the growing divide between the West and Russia in Eastern Europe, particularly highlighted by the war in Ukraine. As a NATO ally of the United States and a member of the European Union, Estonia has a history of Soviet rule during the Cold War and centuries as part of the Russian Empire. Today, Estonia is known for blending digital innovation with democratic governance and public services, earning it the nickname of a “digital democracy.”

    Fact Sheet

    History of US-Estonia Relations

    Following the Russian Civil War and World War I, Estonia declared independence, leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Estonia and the United States in 1922. However, during World War II, Estonia faced occupation by both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, eventually falling under Soviet control. It wasn’t until the end of the Cold War in 1991 that Estonia regained its independence. Throughout the Cold War period, the United States never formally recognized Estonia as part of the Soviet Union. Instead, the U.S. maintained diplomatic relations with Estonia’s separate representatives, reflecting its continued support for Estonia’s independence.

    Estonia’s Tensions with Russia

    Since its independence, Estonia has grappled with tensions with Russia regarding the treatment of its sizable ethnic Russian minority. Many long-term Russian residents in Estonia, including those born there, were not automatically granted Estonian citizenship. Although some eventually obtained citizenship, those lacking proficiency in Estonian faced statelessness. Russia’s President Putin has cited discrimination against Russian minorities to justify actions in Ukraine, raising concerns of potential application of similar arguments against Estonia.

    Estonia’s admission to NATO in 2004, along with the other Baltic states, expanded the Western alliance up to Russia’s borders, contributing to increased tensions between Estonia and Russia. This westward shift is further evidenced by Estonia’s acceptance into the EU in the same year.

    US Strategic Interests

    • Strategy and conflict: Russia’s war in Ukraine has renewed America’s focus on its alliance with the Baltic states, including Estonia. As other Eastern European nations fear that they could be next to face Russian aggression, Estonia’s ambassador to the United States has remarked that the war represents “existential risks” to their nation and allies. The Baltic states are seen as the most strategically vulnerable part of NATO to a Russian invasion. Wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2014 and 2015 found that Russian forces could reach Tallinn and Riga in as few as 60 hours. Due to Estonia’s membership in NATO, a Russian attack on Estonia would likely compel its allies, including the United States, to respond.
    • NATO alliance: Estonia also has a unique role in NATO. Consistent with Estonia’s emphasis on digital innovation, the country hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence from which NATO’s cybersecurity operations are based. 
    • Aligned value system: Since the end of the Cold War, Estonia has exhibited increased alignment with America’s values on the world stage. Previously a communist republic, Estonia now has a free market and has made significant reforms towards liberal democracy, demonstrating a shift away from its historical ties with Russia and towards a Western alignment.
    • Economic ties: Over the same time, Estonia has developed closer economic ties to the United States, with the US moving from Estonia’s fourteenth largest trading partner to its fourth largest from 2017 to 2019. The two countries have also signed several economic agreements over the last few decades. 

    Future

    As concerns about the security of the Baltics increase, the addition of Finland and Sweden into NATO could contribute to enhanced security in the region. Since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Estonia has provided around $400 million in military aid to Ukraine. The Baltic states have been united in their support for Ukraine, and Estonia has called upon its NATO allies to increase their defence spending to 2.5% of their GDP to support Ukraine. The likely goal moving forward for Estonia and NATO is to deter further Russian aggression against its bordering states by preventing their success in Ukraine.

  • US Response to Putinist Ideology in Russia

    US Response to Putinist Ideology in Russia

    Introduction

    Amid Russia’s ongoing conflict and occupation of Ukraine, the underlying motives driving the war have become increasingly evident. A significant focal point has emerged around the personal aspirations and geopolitical perspective of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin’s authoritative leadership style has positioned him as a central figure in Russia’s actions and choices, where his personal beliefs and principles influence the direction of the nation he governs. Upon dissecting Putin’s ideology, it becomes apparent that his system is inherently antagonistic toward the United States and its allied nations. This hostility stems from the foundational principles on which his ideology is constructed, as well as the broader objectives it seeks to accomplish beyond the confines of Russia’s borders. 

    Characterizing Putinism:

    Vladimir Putin’s ideology, often referred to as Putinism, does not adhere to a rigid set of traits that dictate all of Russia’s actions. Putin’s nearly quarter of a century rule has seen Russian politics change drastically as the democratic system established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been gradually replaced by an authoritarian system headed by Putin. However, recurring principles in the domestic and international spheres can be identified.

    Domestically, Putinism’s most prominent characteristics are authoritarianism, political illiberalism, and social conservatism. In practice, this manifests as a political system in which Putin leads as a strongman with his party, United Russia—a loyal state security apparatus—and various allied oligarchs wield control over the media, internet, economy, and political process. Civil rights are curtailed while rights of marginalized groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community, are met with open hostility.

    Internationally, Putinism can be categorized by three characteristics:

    These principles are significant because all three characteristics build upon and sustain one another, and they are fundamentally opposed to and hostile towards the United States and its allies. Each of these principles offers a lens through which Russia’s foreign policy can be understood.

    Eurasianism

    Eurasianism is the concept that Russia, as well as the other former members of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, comprise a distinct civilization separate from Europe. This “Eurasian Civilization” has been the result of Russia’s history as a site of conquest for various nomadic empires including the Huns and the Mongols. A core principle of Eurasianism asserts that ideas originating in the West, including those stemming from the Enlightenment, are inherently detrimental to Russia’s Eurasian civilization. As a result, proponents of Eurasianism advocate for the rejection and active opposition to these Western-born concepts. 

    A significant aspect of Russian foreign policy is the Eurasianist perspective regarding the inevitable consolidation of states within the Eurasian civilization into a unified Eurasian state under Russia’s leadership. This viewpoint gained recent prominence, as evidenced by a foreign policy charter released by the Kremlin in March of this year. The charter identified Russia as a “unique country-civilization” and a prominent Eurasian power, asserting its role as the destined leader of the “civilizational community of the Russian world.”

    The Eurasianist component of Putinism contributes to its adversarial stance toward the United States. Through the Eurasianist perspective, opposition to the United States and its allies is seen as crucial to safeguarding the integrity of the Eurasian civilization against the encroachment of Western influence. Consequently, this viewpoint transforms the rhetoric of conflict with NATO from mere propaganda into a genuine ideological belief held by Putin’s Russia.

    Russian Nationalism

    Putin’s nationalism draws heavily from the veneration of two predecessors of the Russian Federation: the historical Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The prestige, power, and legacy of both states are central to Putin’s particular brand of nationalism. 

    Having served as a former officer of the Soviet KGB, Putin holds a distinct reverence for the legacy of the Soviet Union, even describing its collapse as the most significant calamity of the 20th century. This sentiment has left a lasting impression on Putin’s Russia. Notably, the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany remains a pivotal aspect of the new national narrative Putin aims to construct. During Putin’s leadership, this triumph has been integrated into the core identity of contemporary Russia, serving as a cornerstone in framing the nation’s present actions. This was particularly evident in Putin’s initial justification for Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, which he described as an effort to “denazify” the country. By branding adversaries as Nazis or Fascists, support for Russian actions is spurred through an emphasis on Russia’s Soviet legacy. This narrative positions these actions as a continuation of the Soviet struggle against Nazi Germany, thereby generating support for Russia’s activities.

    Russia’s historical antecedents have been leveraged not only for domestic propaganda but also as a rationale for its aggressive actions towards neighboring countries. Notably, Russia’s actions concerning Ukraine and other nations like Georgia can be interpreted as components of a wider aspiration to regain the status and influence once held by the Russian Empire. Putin himself has articulated this sentiment on various occasions, drawing parallels between his leadership and historical figures such as Peter the Great. In these instances, he draws analogies between Peter the Great’s extensive territorial expansion of Russia in the 17th century and his own engagement in the conflict in Ukraine, illustrating a perceived continuum of Russia’s pursuit of power and territorial influence.

    Anti-Americanism

    While the Soviet Union’s anti-Americanism and broader anti-Western sentiment were rooted in the ideological contest between capitalism and communism during the Cold War, Putin’s Anti-Americanism within Putinism adopts a unique character influenced by the Eurasianist perspective on the West. Under this framework, Western Europe and the United States are perceived as embodying inherent malevolence that demands a defensive posture. It is notable that despite this departure from the Soviet era, Putinism maintains the Soviet anti-imperialist narrative within its Anti-Western standpoint. In practice, Putinism adeptly integrates both Eurasianist rhetoric and anti-imperialist arguments to rationalize Russian actions. By referencing previous interventions in regions like Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, this form of Anti-Americanism portrays Russian actions as a counterforce to American imperialism, positioned to safeguard the interests of the developing world.

    Putinism’s anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism inevitably places Russia on confrontational grounds with the United States and its allies. The centrality of hostility towards the United States and its allies in the ideology of a robust military power which has already demonstrated aggressive action in Ukraine makes the real world implications of Putinism a particularly relevant threat. 

    Charting the Implications for the United State’s and the American Response

    In broad strokes, Putinism aims to dislodge the current world order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the most direct implementation of this aim. However Russia is also seeking to accomplish this goal by sowing internal discontent in the United States and its allies as well as expanding influence in states and regions with animosity towards the United States and the West. West African states which were previously French colonies have been the strongest examples of this method. Amidst coups and increasing hostility towards France, various states in West Africa have become increasingly aligned with Russia. The Wagner Group, a mercenary group with links to the Russian government, has established a presence in countries such as Mali. 

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine has stood out as a prominent realization of Putinism’s objectives. However, the American response to this invasion can be viewed as a notably successful strategy for countering Russia’s ambitions. Specifically, the provision of consistent military assistance to Ukraine before and during the ongoing invasion has yielded favorable outcomes. The resilient resistance put forth by Ukraine has significantly strained Russia’s capacities and triggered a weakening of its military legitimacy. This setback has hindered Putinism’s objectives.

    The persistent pressure stemming from Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Ukraine has introduced substantial challenges to the nation’s stability. Consequently, this strain has impeded Russia’s ability to pursue other avenues for advancing its objectives, including efforts to destabilize regions and cultivate relationships with countries harboring tensions towards the United States or its allies.

    Future Outlook

    Perhaps the most peculiar outcome of Putinism so far is its potential impending self implosion. Failure to secure a swift victory in Ukraine has delegitimized the aims and rhetoric of Putinism internationally. More damningly, the strain which the war has put on Russia internally is perhaps the biggest sign that Putinism is already in decline. The lack of response by Putin to the Wagner Group rebellion in June of this year demonstrated how significantly Putin’s rule, and by extension Putinism, has been weakened by Ukraines steadfast resistance. Thanks in large part to the continuing material support to Ukraine, which enabled Ukraine to fend off Russia’s military, the initial actions necessary to defeat Putinism have perhaps already been put into place by the United States and its allies.

  • Successes and Failures of U.S Sanctions on Russian Oligarchs

    Successes and Failures of U.S Sanctions on Russian Oligarchs

    Introduction

    Following the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the nation’s oligarch class came into the spotlight as the United States and its allies implemented sweeping sanctions on Russia. In the context of Russia, oligarchs refer to individuals with immense wealth and influence in the Russian political system. The interdependent relationship between the oligarchs and the government of Vladimir Putin made the latter a viable target for sanctions against Russia, and a major aspect of the United State’s sanctions strategy.

    Background

    The origins of Russia’s oligarchs begin with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the newly established Russian Federation’s transition from a socialist to capitalist economy. Under President Boris Yeltsin, the Russian government sought a rapid transition to capitalism. In pursuit of this, a policy program known as “Shock Therapy” was introduced to rapidly privatize the Russian economy. Shock Therapy involved two waves of mass privatization in which state owned assets and enterprises were handed over or sold to the newly established private sector. Russia’s oligarchs first emerged within these circumstances. 

    During the first wave of privatization, the Russian government distributed vouchers to citizens which could be used to buy shares of companies being privatized across the country. The individuals who would go on to become part of Russia’s first generation of oligarchs enthusiastically accumulated vouchers, allowing them to secure massive stakes in newly privatized industries. The second wave of privatization began amidst Yeltsin’s bid for reelection in 1995. Facing declining support and a government lacking money, the Yeltsin government made a deal with Russia’s emerging oligarchs. In exchange for billions of dollars in loans and support for Yelstin’s reelection, the oligarchs were given massive stakes in remaining state enterprises. Conducted through fraudulent auctions, vast swathes of essential industry fell under the control of oligarchs, further solidifying their position and power. Yeltsin was successfully reelected.

    Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was elected President in 2000, which marked the beginning of a new era for Russia’s oligarchs. Although he campaigned on promises to uproot the oligarchs, following his inauguration, only oligarchs opposed to Putin were targeted. In their steed, the present class of Russian oligarchs solidified—those loyal to Putin including oligarchs who had emerged under Yeltsin as well as new upstarts who benefitted from their loyalty or personal connections to Putin. 

    In the more than two decades since Putin first became President of Russia, the oligarchs and Putin’s government remain intrinsically linked by their shared history and reliance on one another for support and protection. Prominent oligarchs sit within the Russian government, at the helm of state corporations like Gazprom (a major energy company), and enjoy beneficial government contracts for their companies under the auspices of Putin’s government. 

    Policy Success

    Evaluating the success of sanctions against oligarchs can be gauged on two metrics: 

    • Impact on wealth, assets, and lifestyle
    • Changes in attitudes towards Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Russian government

    The sanctions against the oligarchs can be considered to have yielded successes in both areas. Immediately following the initial implementation of sanctions, several prominent oligarchs with close ties to Putin came out in public opposition to the war despite the repercussions for doing so. Various oligarchs were also reported to have experienced significant losses in wealth, and the seizure and freezing of assets abroad has been estimated to have resulted in $67 billion in losses by the first anniversary of the war for the 23 wealthiest oligarchs in Russia.

    Policy Setbacks

    The primary setbacks in the current sanctions policy against the oligarchs are:

    • Insufficient level of impact on their wealth 
    • Inadequate impact on the relationship between the oligarchs and the Russian government. 

    Despite considerable losses since the initial implementation of sanctions, oligarchs were able to recover some of the losses. As a collective, Russia’s oligarchs lost 13% of their total wealth more than a year after Russia’s invasion began. Impacting the wealth of the oligarchs is further complicated by difficulties with identifying their assets abroad. For example, it is challenging to know with certainty which real estate in the United States is owned by oligarchs. As a result of policies favoring privacy over transparent disclosure of ownership, real estate in the United States has become a particularly effective means for oligarchs to hide their wealth abroad. New legislation and policy revisions have enabled more effective investigation into real estate ownership and other assets, but challenges associated with identifying the assets of oligarchs continue to be a hurdle to maximizing the impact of sanctions on oligarch’s wealth. 

    Some research indicates the sanctions have had a limited impact as instead of dividing the oligarchs, sanctions have instead united Russia’s oligarchs to fend off the external threats to their collective wealth. In turn, the sanctions against oligarchs have struggled to manifest sufficient opposition among the Russian elite to the conflict. The Russian government has responded to any opposition with rapid and intense action. Since the beginning of Russia’s war, critics of Putin as well as multiple oligarchs have died under suspicious circumstances raising the likely possibility that opposition at even the highest levels is being liquidated, further limiting the impact of opposition of oligarchs to the war as a result of sanctions. 

    Future Outlook

    There is one emerging option: targeting the wealth managers of the oligarchs. The wealth managers utilized by the oligarchs represent new viable targets for sanctions for several reasons:

    • Oligarchs can rely on a few elite financial managers who possess the necessary qualifications, making their identification easier.
    • The majority of these wealth managers are located in Europe, making their sanctioning logistically easier.
    • The position, responsibility, and knowledge held by these wealth managers makes them a particularly weak point in the financial networks of the oligarchs.

    Focusing on these individuals could pose a substantial threat to the oligarchs. The United States can ensure that oligarchs are unable to bypass the impacts of sanctions by maintaining and expanding cooperation with foreign partners in Europe and other regions. This can be achieved by implementing sanctions and restrictions to deny them viable safe havens.

    These approaches in tandem would create an evolved approach to the United State’s sanction regiment against Russia’s oligarchs, with the potential to yield greater long term impacts that will contribute to the aims of the sanctions. These strategies may in turn yield the necessary pressure to instigate sufficient high-level opposition to Russia’s war which Putin’s government can not afford to ignore or attempt to silence. 

  • Policy Options: U.S. Response to Shifts in India-Russia Relations

    Policy Options: U.S. Response to Shifts in India-Russia Relations

    India is at a crossroads between its historical relationship with Russia and its growing relationship with the United States. Shifts in the global security order, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strengthening bond between Russia and China, and India’s cooperation with the U.S. on trade, technology, and security, are changing the dynamics of these relationships. India’s unique position gives the U.S. options in its approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the trajectory of Indo-Pacific affairs.

    India-Russia Relations

    During the Cold War, India and Russia pursued mutually beneficial ties built upon three pillars: arms sales, a preference for the role of the public sector in the economy and the role of Soviet foreign aid towards India, and countering the alignment between the U.S., Pakistan, and China. The enduring aspect of this historical relationship that remains crucial in Russia-India relations today is the sale of arms. Russia continues to be India’s primary source for arms imports, while the other two factors have lost their significance in the post-Cold War era.

    Another key component of the two countries’ economic relationship is oil. More than a third of India’s oil comes from Russia, and this share has increased in the past year. Additionally, starting from April 2023, India has initiated trade talks with Russia, aiming to broaden their economic cooperation beyond defense and oil sectors.

    However, certain geopolitical trends may compel India to reevaluate the nature of its relationship with Russia. Russia increasingly looks to China as its top strategic partner against the West and is seeking opportunities to grow closer to Pakistan on economic and security issues. India has a history of conflict with both neighboring countries, and current tensions persist. As Russia strengthens its ties with these nations, India might consider seeking alliances with other partners. 

    Despite these shifts, India’s relationship with Russia remains strong due to its dependence on arms sales, which would take time to diminish, and an oil trade that India finds advantageous due to Russia’s competitive prices. Russia also continues to place importance on this partnership, considering bilateral collaboration with India and participation in institutions like the SCO and BRICS as integral to its broader Eurasian strategy.

    The Impact of the Ukraine War

    Though India has not taken the same punitive measures toward Russia that the West has, it has not expressed support for Russia’s invasion either. At a summit for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization last year, India’s Prime Minister Modi spoke openly to President Putin, urging him to rely on diplomacy rather than war to resolve the conflict. Modi’s comments, though not a condemnation of the war, indicate a growing frustration with the strain it has caused around the world. 

    In the midst of the war, India’s economic ties with Russia persist. While the West sought to economically isolate Russia at the outset of the war, India’s imports from Russia grew substantially with Russia’s share of India’s oil imports increasing from 1% to 18% in the hundred days after the invasion started. 

    At the same time, the war has strained Russia’s arms trade with India. Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have forced it to delay shipments and suspend contracts with India as it seeks to cover its losses in Ukraine. India has expressed worries about the dependability of the Russian weapons it uses, and the Russian military’s issues in Ukraine only make these concerns worse. India started gradually diversifying its defense exports before the war, and the war could potentially encourage it to expedite this process. 

    The Role of the U.S. 

    While India has maintained some elements of its historical relationship with Russia, it has also strengthened ties with the U.S. As security issues in the Indo-Pacific, including the rise of China, become a priority in U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. and India both seek to develop a stronger partnership. Along with Japan, Australia, and the U.S., India is a member of the Quad, a pact through which these four countries engage in dialogue regarding security concerns in the Indo-Pacific. Though not a formal alliance, the Quad expresses a vision for a rules-based order in the region. Additionally, the formation of AUKUS, a security pact among Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., underscores the U.S.’s heightened attention to the Indo-Pacific region and its alignment with India on key concerns, although India is not included in the pact. The Russian Defense Minister has criticized both initiatives as measures to “contain” Russia’s partner, China.

    These expanding security connections are evident in the enhanced military collaboration between the two nations. A recent instance is the joint military drill conducted by the U.S. and India near India’s disputed border with China. Should India’s rapport with Russia encounter challenges, and considering Russia’s strong alliance with China, alongside India and the U.S.’s shared focus on China, this cooperation indicates that the U.S. could potentially serve as a security ally that India can rely on.

    In turn, as China continues to pursue its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to overtake the U.S.-led order through its Global Security Initiative, the partnership between the U.S. and India—including military cooperation—could provide an alternative for the region. 

    The opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. and India extend to the economic sphere as well. The bilateral initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) between the two countries aims to strengthen cooperation on technological innovation, defense industry, space, and education. The U.S. and India are also pursuing trade ties separate from the iCET arrangement. 

    However, India and the U.S. are still at odds over India’s arms trade with Russia. India’s decision to purchase S-400 missile systems from Russia could leave the nation open to CAATSA sanctions from the U.S. Although Congress granted authority to the President to waive these sanctions, it is not yet clear whether he will do so. 

    Obstacles to U.S.-India Ties

    India’s unique position between the U.S. and Russia is consistent with its historical preference for non-aligned foreign policy. Dating back to the Cold War, India pursues an independent foreign policy, establishing ties based on maximizing autonomy and protecting strategic interests, and is wary of permanent alliances based on shared ideological values. This allows India to maintain ties with both Russia and the U.S. when the interests of each nation seem contradictory. This could mean that India will be hesitant to sever ties with Russia as long as it deems the arms trade and economic relationship beneficial. 

    Despite India’s concerns about the quality of Russian systems, the majority of its arms imports come from Russia. This is partly because Russia provides favorable terms that support India’s defense industry growth, and moving away from this reliance would be a lengthy process.

    In addition to possibly subjecting India to U.S. sanctions, India’s purchase of S-400 systems from Russia poses an obstacle to increasing military cooperation between the U.S. and India. U.S. officials are concerned that through the S-400, Russia could breach U.S. systems and collect intelligence on the U.S and other allies. 

    For some U.S., policymakers, further alignment with India is not viewed in a positive light. Though India is a democracy, Prime Minister Modi often faces criticism for human rights abuses in the country. Among the reported abuses monitored by the U.S. State Department are suppression of the freedom of the press through arrests of journalists, mistreatment of prisoners (including torture), and policies discriminating against religious minorities. This could lead to hesitancy to strengthen ties with India and compel foreign policy leaders in the U.S. to make requests for reform. 

    Future Options

    As the war in Ukraine forces Russia to halt some of its arms sales to India, the U.S. has an opportunity to sell more defense systems to India to fill the void. This would decrease India’s reliance on Russian arms sales while strengthening ties with the U.S. During his visit to Washington, D.C. in June 2023, Modi emphasized the significance of defense cooperation and innovation U.S.-India relations. He mentioned the idea of uniting the defense industries of both nations. However, the challenge lies in the time required for this initiative. Despite India’s efforts to expand its defense suppliers, it is improbable to completely sever its arms trade with Russia, given its reliance on Russian systems.

    On the issue of the war in Ukraine, U.S. officials have expressed hope that India could use its unique relationship with Russia to pursue a resolution to the conflict. With the U.S. supporting Ukraine and India’s ties with both Russia and the U.S., India is in a position to attempt to negotiate peace between the two sides, and it would be consistent with a non-aligned foreign policy. In the press conference with President Biden, Modi reiterated support for diplomacy as the means to resolve the conflict. If the U.S. is open to the idea and India is willing to undertake the task, this could be an opportunity to resolve the war and strengthen relations. However, Putin seems reluctant to pursue peace, so it is unclear what it would take to bring Russia to the table in this situation. 

    Although India is unlikely to abandon its relationship with Russia, there remain other opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. and India. Tensions with Russia do not necessarily need to be an obstacle to cooperation on trade and technology between the U.S. and India. President Biden elaborated on the importance of trade, technology, and education between the two countries during Modi’s visit. Beyond Russia, there are also other security concerns, such as China, that are of interest to both the U.S. and India in the Indo-Pacific, and will likely lead the countries to continue to cooperate even while India’s relationship with Russia persists. 

  • Effects of War in Ukraine on the Global Space Industry

    Effects of War in Ukraine on the Global Space Industry

    The space industry is a collaborative, international field of study. Space agencies rely on states’ diplomatic efforts to establish and sustain partnerships that facilitate manned and unmanned missions to space. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 had significant diplomatic ramifications, particularly because Russia is a major player in the space industry. Waves of US and EU sanctions led states to reduce their reliance on Russia for essential equipment and technology, and establish domestic space capabilities. Days before Russia’s invasion began, European Union (EU) astronauts published a manifesto pushing for Europe to pursue a domestic crew launch vehicle to ensure its independent access to space.

    Impacts on Space Missions

    The European Space Agency (ESA) is experiencing the consequences of depending on the US and Russia for human launch capabilities. With the unavailability of Russia’s Soyuz, the US Dragon spacecraft remains the only option for EU astronauts to travel to the ISS. Additionally, ESA had to cancel its Soyuz launches and delay flagship missions after Russia withdrew its crews from launch sites in response to EU sanctions.The US is taking steps to ensure its own launch capabilities by replacing Russian engines and Ukrainian designs in its fleet with domestic alternatives. In the past, the US had bought Russian engines known for their performance and reliability as part of a space partnership between the two countries. However, in response to Russia’s invasion and the subsequent US sanctions, there is now a shift towards a more nationalistic approach in the space industry. Since the war, Russia has adopted a nationalist approach, creating challenges in NASA’s collaboration with Roscosmos on the ISS. The relationship between the two space agencies has been strained due to heightened tensions, issues with spacecraft, and ambiguous statements from Moscow regarding Russia’s commitment to the station. Russia now claims that it will withdraw from the ISS in 2024, adding to the complexities of the partnership.

    Satellites and Space in the War

    Russia’s invasion has featured the use of satellites and space infrastructure from the beginning, a unique aspect of modern warfare. Just before the invasion, the Kremlin attempted a large-scale hacking operation targeting satellites used by Ukraine. As the war has unfolded, the balance of satellite power has shifted in favor of Ukraine. Companies worldwide have stepped up to provide various satellite services to Ukraine. Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet constellation has been instrumental in providing connectivity and countering communication infrastructure disruptions caused by Russia. Additionally, satellite imagery companies like Maxar and Planet Labs have offered high-resolution imagery from their Earth-observing CubeSats for free online. This not only documents the progression of the war but also equips Ukraine with valuable tactical information for troop positioning, monitoring enemy movements, and countering Russia’s misinformation campaign about the war.

    Future of Space Collaboration

    Despite disruptions to global cooperation in space, there have been promising collaborative developments. NASA and Roscosmos successfully negotiated a seat swap during the conflict, with two Russian and two American astronauts flying to the ISS on Dragon and Soyuz spacecraft, respectively. Americans flying on the Soyuz returned home safely in compliance with international laws. After leadership changes in both space programs, tensions have eased, and there is hope that this niche of cooperation will continue despite diplomatic tensions.

    While the war continues, predicting the future of this East-West space partnership remains uncertain. However, space will undoubtedly remain an important aspect of the relationship between these two countries.

  • Successes and Failures of US Response to Ukrainian Refugees

    Successes and Failures of US Response to Ukrainian Refugees

    Background

    In February of 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, a continuation of Russian expansion that began with their annexation of Crimea in 2014. The invasion was not localized—like the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula—and Ukrainians were forced to leave the country on a large scale (8.1 million fled as of March 2023) in order to escape the Russian bombardment of Ukrainian cities. In response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis, multiple countries have admitted Ukrainian refugees, including the US. In addition, the UN estimates that 17.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance as a direct result from the war.

    The Biden Administration announced its plan to help Ukrainian refugees on April 21, 2022, two months after war broke out. The plan, “Unite for Ukraine,” involves US citizens who volunteer to sponsor and host Ukrainian refugees. Unite for Ukraine grants Ukrainian refugees an expedited immigration process and makes government assistance available to them while on parole. This program is set to last for two years. Through Unite for Ukraine, the Biden administration promised to admit 100,000 Ukrainian refugees, a mark reached in five months after the program’s launch.

    The US response to Ukrainian refugees was unprecedented in recent history. The United States played a major role in establishing the international refugee system after World War II and admitted vast numbers of refugees, especially from Vietnam, Soviet states, and Kosovo. However, since the early 2000s the US had pursued a more restrictive refugee policy. The current response to the refugee crisis is significant, both because the US mobilized to quickly accept a large number of refugees, and because this response includes generous humanitarian aid to those displaced. The White House announced, “we are prepared to provide more than $1 billion in new funding towards humanitarian assistance for those affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine and its severe impacts around the world, including a marked rise in food insecurity, over the coming months. This funding will provide food, shelter, clean water, medical supplies and other forms of assistance.”

    Policy as a Success

    Many view the program as a success of public-private partnerships, because it reached the stated goal of resettling 100,000 refugees so quickly. The supply of US citizens volunteering to host Ukrainian refugees outstripped demand, demonstrating the support and enthusiasm of US citizens. Additionally, the Cato Institute argues that the policy empowered ordinary US citizens  because it largely removed the government from the refugee policy. The Cato Institute further argues that this policy should be a model for US refugee resettlement. Unite for Ukraine has limited bureaucracy and the form to apply to host a Ukrainian refugee is on one website, making the process easy for those willing to host.

    In the usual regular refugee resettlement system, displaced people register with the United Nations and are screened and vetted for security risks. The President decides on an annual refugee cap, and the UNHCR works with nine national nonprofit organizations in the US to resettle the agreed-upon number of refugees across the country based on factors such as medical needs, local support (i.e. family or community in the area), and linguistic resources. Refugees are put on a path to qualify for permanent residence in the US. The entire process, from registering with the UN to reaching the US, takes on average two years. In contrast, Unite for Ukraine moved more quickly.

    Policy as Weakness

    Some criticize the Biden Administration’s response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis as too slow. The plan was announced two months after war broke out. Some Ukrainians attempted to reach the US before the plan was announced via the border with Mexico. They now must go through the regular US immigration process rather than Unite for Ukraine because there is no provision in the policy to allow for Ukrainian resettlement from ports of entry. Some argue the response to Ukrainian refugees is hypocritical, when displaced people from Central and Latin America are not given the same treatment. At Unite for Ukraine was announced, the US-Mexico border was closed to asylum seekers due to Title 42. Similarly, the US has not mobilized to take in displaced people from other countries, like Venezuela, Sudan, and Afghanistan. One anonymous Democratic aide stated, “You see the president really highlighting how many refugees Poland has taken, and then on the same day, there’s a rollout to very actively reduce the number of people who can even access our asylum system.”

    In addition, the two year duration of the program has been met with some critique. The future of Ukrainian refugees resettled to the US through Unite for Ukraine is unknown. As a result, some companies are hesitant to hire refugees, which makes it difficult to find employment. In addition, Ukrainians qualify for one year of government assistance, which some also believe is too short when accounting for the numerous challenges refugees face when finding their feet in a foreign country.

    The Future

    As the war in Ukraine continues, the Biden Administration will need to make hard decisions about the future of the Ukrainian refugee program. Current provisions have a two year expiration, and the debate continues over whether the US should take in more Ukrainian refugees or focus on displaced people from other conflicts.

  • The West Sanctions Russian Energy

    The West Sanctions Russian Energy

    West Sanctions Russia to Deter Aggression Against Ukraine

    The United States and its allies imposed sanctions on Russia when the country annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. The US believed annexation threatened to reverse post-Cold War borders in Europe and endangered security, the rule of law, and human rights in Europe and beyond. However, the sanctions were limited in scope, and President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later on February 24, 2022. This time a much stronger package of financial, trade and travel sanctions was imposed to curtail Russia’s ability to wage war and deny it access to finance and technology to upgrade its military capabilities. The sanctions froze much of Russia’s foreign reserves held abroad and targeted  oligarchs, financial institutions, export-oriented companies, and state actors. The energy sector was not sanctioned. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), oil and natural gas exports made up 45% of Russia’s federal budget.

    Dependence and Disunity: the Challenge in Implementing Sanctions

    Infographic on US and EU energy dependence on Russia

    The United States is not a major consumer of Russian oil and gas, but decided not to implement energy sanctions because European allies depend on energy supplies from Russia. When asked whether the US was considering energy sanctions, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Duleep Singh acknowledged at a White House press briefing, that “our measures were not designed to disrupt in any way the current flow of energy from Russia to the world.” At that time, rising domestic inflation and spiraling energy prices threatened the post-Covid economic recovery. The US Treasury prohibited financial transactions with Russian financial institutions, but included an exception for fossil fuel exports from Russia through “a general license to authorize certain energy-related transactions with the [Russian] Central Bank”.

    European countries were divided on energy sanctions. The EU as a bloc is highly dependent on Russian energy and receives 25% of its oil imports and 45% of its gas imports from Russia. European nations have found it more difficult to achieve energy independence because supplies from Russia are integrated into their energy infrastructure. Many EU members receive energy via pipelines connected to Russia, which take years to build.

    President Biden signed an Executive Order in March  2022, which broadened sanctions to the energy sector. He recognized that “we’re moving forward on this ban, understanding that many of our European Allies and partners may not be in a position to join us.” The US measures took immediate effect, prohibiting the import of Russian crude oil, petroleum and petroleum products, liquified natural gas and coal as well as any new US investment in the Russian energy sector. 

    On March 2, the European Commission applied sanctions against Russian financial institutions, but omitted two of the largest banks—SBERbank and Alpha Bank. The decision was likely taken to allow energy import payments. The US, on the other hand, sanctioned both banks and their subsidiaries. On June 3, the Council of the European Union adopted its 6th package of sanctions which targeted Russian oil and additional Russian banks, including SBERbank. EU members agreed in the 6th package to prohibit “the purchase, import or transfer of crude oil and certain petroleum products from Russia to the EU.” However, the sanctions will not be applied immediately, they will be implemented gradually; within six months for crude oil and eight months for other refined petroleum products.

    Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia raised concerns over the proposed energy embargo and urged the EU to extend the timeline or to allow other flexibilities. These countries negotiated an exception for the continued use of the Druzhba pipeline. Germany and Poland agreed to stop using oil from the Northern branch of the same pipeline. The EU noted that “as the majority of the Russian oil delivered to the EU is seaborne, these restrictions will cover nearly 90% of Russian oil imports to Europe by the end of the year.” So far, Russian gas has not been sanctioned.

    Impact of Sanctions

    The sanctions imposed after the invasion impacted the Russian economy immediately. The rouble plunged as overseas assets held by the Russian Central Bank were frozen. Key machinery and technology needed to maintain industrial production could not be imported. More than 1,000 foreign companies left the country, creating a vacuum of goods and services. Inflation grew, and prices for scarce items kept rising. The long-term forecast for the Russian economy was dire. However, the economy did not collapse, the rubble recovered after its initial dip, boosted by earnings from energy exports, because the majority of payments were done in rubles. Restrictions on Russian energy also impacted the economies of sanctioning countries. Reuters reported from Moscow on July 18 that President Putin claimed that “it was impossible to cut Russia off from the rest of the world, and that sanctions imposed by Western countries would not turn the clock back on Russia’s development.” 

    Russia withstood sanctions because the energy sector, its biggest source of export revenue, was able to operate freely for months following the invasion. Oleg Ustenko, the Chief Economic Adviser of the President of Ukraine, in an article in the Financial Times, criticized the energy sanctions since Russia still “can sell oil, gas and coal directly to every country except the US.” He added that “the measures the West has taken so far cover less than 5% of Russia’s pre-war crude oil exports.” In spite of this criticism, the energy sanctions have stopped new foreign investments in Russia’s energy sector, disrupted the flow of critical technology from the West that supports the fossil fuel industry, and caused a slow but gradual drop in Russian energy export volume. However, higher energy prices mean Russia can earn more from its energy exports than before the invasion.

    Increasing the Effectiveness of Sanctions

    Several strategies have been proposed and/or implemented.

    • The sixth EU package of sanctions prohibited EU operators from insuring and financing the transport of oil to third countries. This came into effect at the end of 2022. The United Kingdom and Norway joined the EU sanctions. The maritime insurance industry is concentrated in these two countries and Luxembourg—an EU member. If oil tankers are uninsured, Russia will be unable to ship oil by sea to major third party customers such as China, India and Turkey.
    • The US Treasury Department is considering implementing a price cap on Russian oil to ensure that revenue from energy exports goes down while global supplies remain stable. This has not gained traction among the G7 and EU countries. 
    • It would be possible to implement secondary sanctions on countries which purchase Russian energy. However, this strategy has also failed to gain traction.

    Despite their limitations, the current sanctions will have long-term impacts on the Russian economy. The West is counting on the sanctions to gradually bring Russia to the negotiating table, while the Russian government is counting on waning public support in the West.

  • Ukraine and the Changing Transatlantic Security Order

    Ukraine and the Changing Transatlantic Security Order

    The Shadow of War Returns to Europe

    The post-Cold War security environment in Europe was characterized by the diminishing influence of Russia, which saw its former Warsaw Pact allies gradually integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Russia under President Vladimir Putin considered this expansion detrimental to its security interests. Russia attempted to stop Georgia and the Baltic Republics from establishing closer security ties with NATO, even going to war with Georgia briefly in 2008. Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution (2014) overthrew a pro-Russia regime and the country aspired to democratize and draw closer to the European Union. In response, Russia forcibly annexed Crimea in 2014 and aided separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region—which borders Russia—in seceding. 

    The United States and its allies considered this a threat to democracy and pluralism in Europe. The allies implemented sanctions against Russia in 2014 with the intention of forcing Russia to negotiate a withdrawal. However, Russia’s economic and military capabilities were not significantly affected by the sanctions. Critical sectors like energy were not sanctioned because European countries like Germany depended on Russian oil and natural gas. Putin demanded a guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO or the EU and, when an agreement was not reached, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The full-scale Russian invasion threatens to reverse post-Cold War borders in Europe, destabilize the trans-Atlantic security order, and affect countries far removed from the theater of war.

    Western Allies Respond

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine was met with strong reactions from the United States and its allies. In his statement on February 26, President Joe Biden declared, “Putin chose this war. And now he and his country will bear the consequences.” The United States coordinated with the G7, the world’s leading industrial nations, to launch a new round of sanctions on Russia to curtail its ability to finance the war, and held an emergency NATO summit to map out the next steps.

    The United States has also been urging allies to increase their defense spending, a long-standing US policy objective. In response to the invasion, Germany announced a shift in its defense policy, including re-armament. During his February 27, 2022 speech to parliament, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged an additional €100 billion for the armed forces and committed Germany to spending 2% of its GDP on defense, in line with NATO expectations. Other European countries have taken similar steps to strengthen their military capabilities. Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced that Poland will allocate 3% of its GDP to defense from 2023. The Netherlands has committed an additional €5 billion to defense over the next few years. This is a 40% increase from its 2022 defense budget and meets NATO’s 2% GDP target in 2024 and 2025.

    The invasion has reignited talks of an EU common defense policy. On February 28, 2022 the Council of Europe, the highest decision-making body for EU member states, approved a historic €500 million package for Ukraine. This includes €450 million in military supplies and an additional €50 million for fuel and protective equipment. This is the first time the EU has pledged lethal equipment to a non-EU member through the European Peace Facility (EPF). The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) Josep Borrell explained that the EU “wants peace in Europe, but we have to be prepared to defend this peace.” 

    EU heads of state and government pledged on March 10, 2022 to take more defense responsibility which several US Presidents had urged. EU leaders also endorsed the Strategic Compass soon after, a plan of action to increase the EU’s ability to respond to crises with rapid deployment capacity, increased defense investment, and better preparedness for hybrid threats. The European Council subsequently met in May and June to reiterate its commitment to increase military and financial support for Ukraine and to advance Ukraine’s EU membership request. EU members also approved the latest round of EU sanctions on Russia which included crude oil and refined petroleum products as well as Russian-origin gold.

    Despite the EU’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, fulfilling some promises may be challenging. For example, the EU pledged to provide fighter jets, but the Ukrainian air force is trained to fly Russian-made  MiG-29s and Su-24s. Only Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia have that type of jet, and those states have been hesitant to send their aircraft to Ukraine due to supply shortages and fear of escalation However, when Poland finally proposed to do so, provided the US accelerates its delivery of F-16s to Warsaw, the United States decided against this move by concluding that the proposal was not tenable. On March 8, in a statement by the Pentagon, Press Secretary John F. Kirby expressed concerns over dispatching American aircrafts into contested airspaces.

    Deepening Transatlantic Ties

    The United States provided leadership to create a coordinated response to the invasion. This included imposing stricter and broader sanctions on Russia than in 2014, providing military aid to Ukraine, and increasing defense coordination. US Foreign Secretary Anthoney Blinken stated, “The strategy that we’ve put in place, massive support for Ukraine, massive pressure against Russia, solidarity with more than 30 countries engaged in these efforts, is having real results.”

    The sanctions imposed on Russia are changing Europe’s economic dependencies, particularly in the energy sector. To restructure these dependencies, Europe is establishing new partners and alternative technologies. The United States is trying to fill in the gap and has seen demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) rise by over 50% in Europe compared to the same period the year before. A protracted war in Ukraine could bolster the significance of the new US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) formed in June 2021 and eventually lead to closer transatlantic cooperation on energy, trade, technology and innovation. This emerging collaborative spirit helps in overcoming the tensions generated by Eurosceptic security and trade positions held by the Trump administration. This shift makes it easier to take coordinated steps for addressing the long-term economic impact of the war.

    Reviving NATO

    Finland and Sweden are traditionally non-aligned countries, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced the two Nordic nations to reassess their security interests and apply for NATO membership on May 18, 2022. Although experts believe an attack on Finland and Sweden is unlikely while Russia is focused on Ukraine, Finland and Sweden remain vulnerable until they are included in NATO’s mutual defense guarantees. Ahead of their formal application, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Finland and Sweden to sign security guarantees. President Biden expressed support for the two countries’ NATO bids and welcomed Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson at the White House.

    Swedish and Finnish NATO membership has a number of advantages. Sweden has naval bases on the Baltic Sea and a navy with experience operating in confined waters, which adds key capabilities in the Baltic region. Gotland is a strategically important Swedish island which can act as a staging ground for naval operations in the region. Finland shares a long border with the Kola peninsula, which is Russia’s Arctic navy and nuclear submarine base. This puts NATO in a position to isolate the peninsula from mainland Russia.

    NATO has functioned as an instrument for United States security interests and conflict leadership, but lost credibility by mishandling conflicts in Libya (2011) and Afghanistan (2015-2021) under US leadership. NATO’s reemergence provides the US a chance to strengthen its relationship with its longest allies and exert US influence on the European continent.

    Ending Aggression Through a United Front

    Some speculate that Trans-Atlantic solidarity will not hold if the war turns into a protracted, localized conflict, with Russia forcibly occupying parts of Eastern Ukraine. There are concerns that the economic toll of the conflict on sanctioning nations, declining public interest, and other international priorities will lead to disunity in the alliance. However, a destabilized Ukraine will remain a source of insecurity for the entire continent.

  • Introduction to US-Serbian Relations

    Introduction to US-Serbian Relations

    Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

    Serbia, a country of over ten million people with a unique cultural background and ties to two different global powers, is a key player in US foreign policy. Serbia is a country that has existed as the battleground between Europe and Asia. Serbia was part of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia and the following Yugoslav wars saw the US intervene through NATO and the United Nations. Relations following the war were strained due to the US-led support for the independence of Kosovo, a region full of Albanians who declared independence in 2008. Relations are also strained with the west due to Serbian ties to Moscow and the drawn-out process of joining the EU.  

    Fact Sheet

    • Population: 10,533,871
    • Capital: Belgrade
    • System of Government: Parliamentary republic
    • Chief of state: President Aleksandar Vucic
    • Head of government: Prime Minister Ana Brnabic
    • Primary Language: Serbian (official) 88.1%, Hungarian 3.4%, Bosnian 1.9%, Romani 1.4%, other 3.4%
    • Ethnic demographics: Serb 83.3%, Hungarian 3.5%, Romani 2.1%, Bosniak 2%, other 5.7%,
    • Religious populations: Orthodox 84.6%, Catholic 5%, Muslim 3.1%, Protestant 1%, atheist 1.1%, other 0.8%
    • Real GDP: $125.8 billion (2021 est.)/ GDP per Capita: $18,200 (2020 est.)
    • Gini index: 34.5
    • Freedom score: 62-Partly Free

    Brief History with the U.S.

    Following World War I, the United States under President Woodrow Wilson helped to establish the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, known as Yugoslavia. The United States was the first major power to establish relations with Yugoslavia on February 6, 1919, which lasted until the country was invaded in 1941. The United States along with the United Kingdom unsuccessfully pressured Yugoslavia to side with Allied forces, despite Germany being Yugoslavia’s main trading partner. Yugoslavia eventually joined the Axis. The rise of Communist leader Joseph Tito, caused the US to distance itself from Yugoslavia. Tito eventually distanced Yugoslavia from the USSR, and the US provided some military and economic aid.

    Following Tito’s death, the different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia struggled to find a balance of power, eventually leading to the Yugoslav wars and the dissolution of the country. The United States intervened through NATO and the United Nations initiatives. Clinton oversaw the first use of NATO force which was a controversial decision, as NATO up until that point had behaved as a defensive, not offensive military alliance. President Clinton oversaw the Dayton agreement which ended the conflict and led to the creation of independent nations out of former Yugoslavia around ethnic and linguistic identities.

    Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević lost power (he was later convicted of war crimes), and the United States began providing development aid amounting to 1.1 billion dollars to stimulate economic development and support democratic institutions. Relations began to improve until 2008 when Kosovo, with backing from the US and EU, declared independence under a new constitution. Modern-day US-Serbian relations focus mainly on the issue of Kosovo, and its close ties to Moscow 

    U.S. Strategic Interests:

    • Trade: The United States has a total trade and investment relationship with Serbia amounting to $1.6 trillion every year. Major US businesses invested in Serbia include Coca-Cola, Microsoft, and Panasonic. Much of this investment and growth is thanks to US and EU efforts following devastating periods including the end of the Yugoslav wars, the great recession of 2008, and a crippling storm season in 2014 that ended in negative GDP growth. The United States can leverage this economic reliance on foreign investment to help ensure Serbian cooperation with US interests, such as providing economic benefits in exchange for recognizing Kosovo or implementing sanctions against Russia. 
    • Military: The US has recognized Kosovo as an independent nation since 2008 and relations between Kosovo and Serbia have been slowly improving. However, recent Kosovan policies have exacerbated tensions. A new set of laws requires those traveling from Serbia to Kosovo and Serbs living in Kosovo to carry identification documents to separate themselves from Serbia. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) made an official statement that it would intervene if the stability of the region is threatened. The US is in a difficult position as it wants to keep strong relations with Serbia due to its strategic position in the Balkans.

    Diplomatic: Serbia criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but has not implemented sanctions against Russia. Serbia has also been on a slow EU accession process, and may be less enthusiastic about siding with the US and EU allies because the prospect of joining now feels remote and onerous.

  • Russia-Ukraine invasion and Southeast Asian Responses

    Russia-Ukraine invasion and Southeast Asian Responses

    Russia-Ukraine invasion explained

    The Russia-Ukraine conflict began in early 2014, and tensions have slowly escalated ever since. Last year, the Russian government started sending troops and placing resources in proximity to Ukraine’s border. In December 2021, Russia issued a set of demands calling on NATO to cease expansion to Eastern and Central Europe and reject Ukraine’s application to join the treaty organization. NATO did not accept these demands and implemented sanctions on Russia in response. The United States and other NATO member states also supplied Ukraine with weapons. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has displaced eight millions of people internally and caused thousands of deaths.

    In response, President Biden declared Putin’s actions “unprovoked and unjustified.” The United States and NATO nations implemented further sanctions, and the U.S and other G7 countries committed to continue military support. In an United Nations emergency session, 141 out of 193 states voted to condemn Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine and called for immediate ceasefire. Caught between Russia, China, and the United States, many Southeast Asian nations remained in the minority that stayed neutral and/or supported Russia.

    ASEAN’s relationship with China and the United States

    Southeast Asian countries have historically had to balance interests with China and the United States. The ASEAN block is the fifth biggest economic region in the world. Since 2010, trade between China and ASEAN has doubled from $235.5 billion to more than $507.9 billion. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China has projected influence while investing in the infrastructure and digital economy of ASEAN nations. 

    The United States considers ASEAN a crucial partner for trade and strategic cooperations in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden Administration has brought relations with ASEAN to the forefront, hosting the first U.S-ASEAN summit and prioritizing ASEAN states as the first destination for high profile members of the administration like Vice President Kamala Harris.

    In the past decades, most ASEAN nations sought to remain neutral between the United States and China, maintaining good relations with both great powers. However, this is not always possible and conflicts like the Russian invasion of Ukraine have forced ASEAN to publicly take a side as China has maintained support for Russia while the United States has led the efforts to support Ukraine and punish Russia.

    ASEAN’s relationship with Russia and its variety of responses to the Russian-Ukraine conflict

    Economic ties between Russia and the ASEAN pact are modest, and Russia is ASEAN’s 9th largest trade partner. The Russian-Ukraine conflict is predicted to have a low impact on ASEAN’s economic prospects. However, shortages from Russian sanctions and rising gas prices are likely to impact many ASEAN’s economies. Russia is a leading supply for arms sales in the region since Putin rose to power. In general, ties between Russia and Southeast Asian nations are weak and vary from nation to nation. However, since Russia and China are important strategic partners, negative sentiments towards Russia might affect relations with China. This places ASEAN nations in a difficult position in deciding whether to condemn Russia’s violation of international law or to appease an important partner. 

    At the United Nations session discussing the Russian attack, eight out of ten ASEAN nations voted to condemn Russia, while Vietnam and Laos abstained. Singapore has voiced the strongest opposition to the Russian invasion, and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked that if politics were based on “might is right”, such as the recent attack, the “world would be a dangerous place for small countries like Singapore”. This aligns with Singapore’s past reactions to international violations. In the 1980s, Singapore condemned China’s attack at Gac Ma in Vietnam as well as the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. 

    Meanwhile, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei condemned Russia’s attack but were less outspoken. These countries voted against Russia at the United Nations session. However, they did not name Russia as the “aggressor” and focused on advocating for respect for international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. 

    The countries with the most muted responses were Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. With their proximity to both China and Russia, it is more difficult for these countries to use strong language to condemn Russia’s actions. Here, both Malaysia and Thailand used neutral language such as “concerned” or “deeply concerned” to refer to the conflict, rather than specifying that Russia was at fault. Vietnam refused to use any language to condemn Russia, likely because Russia is its most important defense partner. In the past several decades, Vietnam has relied heavily on Russian imported weapons for national defense, especially in the South China Sea conflict.