ACE

Category: Asia

  • US Military in South Korea

    US Military in South Korea

    The presence of the American military in South Korea began at the end of WWII, when American and Soviet forces entered the peninsula to facilitate the removal of Japanese forces. The American military was positioned south of the 38th parallel whereas Soviet forces moved north. When North Korean forces invaded South Korea in 1950, triggering the Korean War (1950-1953), the US supported South Korea to oppose the communist regime. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 1.8 million Americans served in the war. The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, which ended hostilities and established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The Korean Peninsula remained divided at the 38th parallel in a perpetual state of war as the armistice agreement was not a permanent peace treaty. The Truman administration prioritized stability over reunification, and America and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. The American military has remained in South Korea ever since. 

    Financing the US Military Presence

    The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) establishes the obligations of the US and South Korea in maintaining American forces. The US is responsible for the maintenance of US troops in South Korea, and South Korea fund the facilities. The financial contribution of South Korea comes in the form of Special Measure Agreements (SMA’s). Eleven SMAs have been signed since 1991, with the 11th signed in 2021. 

    The Trump administration raised concerns over South Korean contributions. In the SMA signed in 2014, which was supposed to last until 2018, South Korea paid 920 billion won, or approximately $866.86 million USD. This was a 5.8 percent increase from the previous agreement. The increase was theorized to be from the decision to send more tanks and soldiers. In the 2019 SMA, South Korea paid 1.04 trillion won, or $921.5 million USD, which was an 8.2 percent increase from the previous agreement. The 2019 agreement was only for one year, while the agreements usually last for 3-5 years. In the negotiations for a 2020 SMA, President Trump rejected the South Korean offer of a 13 percent increase and requested a 5 billion dollar contribution. The delays that resulted from the disagreements resulted in furloughs for the first time since the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and increased tensions with South Korea. 

    The Biden administration signed the 11th SMA in 2021, and it will last until 2025. South Korea paid 1.1833 trillion Korean Won in 2021, and the amount will rise according to the contribution of the previous year by the ROK defense budget increase rate. The 2021 defense budget increase rate will be used for the 2022 contribution, the 2022 rate for 2023, and so on. The renewal rate was partially driven by the rift that had been created by the Trump administration, and Biden’s attempts to repair this. 

    Operation Control (OPCON)

    Operational control can be defined as “authority to perform functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission” and does not involve “authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.” In 1994, peacetime opcon was transferred to Korea, but wartime opcon is still maintained by the United States Forces Korea (USFK), under combined command of both the US and SK. The peacetime transfer means that the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff controls the operations during peacetime, and Combined Forces Command will control operations during wartime. 

    The controversy mainly lies in the transfer of wartime OPCON. Wartime OPCON was initially supposed to transfer to South Korea in 1996, but the discussion was postponed when North Korea threatened a nuclear attack. President Roh Moo hyun agreed with President Bush, in 2007, that wartime OPCON would be transferred over to South Korea by 2012. President Roh politicized the issue, and framed it as South Korea needing to retake sovereignty. The following president, Lee Myung bak postponed the discussion to 2015 because of the “evolving security environment”, most likely referencing the North Korean Cheonan incident in 2010. In the following presidential administration, Park Geun hye rejected the 2015 deadline, citing that it was too soon considering the increased nuclear threats and testing from North Korea, and President Obama agreed that it could be reconsidered. In the 46th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Joint Communique, article 11 details an implementation of a conditions-based approach in the transfer of wartime OPCON to Korea:

    • ROK will assume wartime OPCON when ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured (meaning the ROK military capabilities will need to be able to counter North Korean missiles, and confidently lead the combined defense posture) 
    • The security environment on the Korean peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable transition 

    This would delay the transfer to sometime in the 2020’s, but it was not clear precisely when. The following president, Moon Jae In, conversed with the Trump administration in order to speed up the process of transfer, and the Alliance Guiding Principles were drafted at the 50th SCM. Post-transition, the CFC would be a “separate standing entity” (therefore, not dissolved), and the ROK would appoint a General or Admiral to serve as Commander of the CFC, with a US General or Admiral as deputy commander. The current CFC command has a four star US general as Commander, and a four star ROK general as deputy commander. The Moon administration wished to undertake a Full Operational Capability (FOC) exam in 2021, but the Trump administration said neither side was ready. 

    The current president, Yoon Suk yeol, believest South Korea lacked sufficient readiness to operate intelligence assets, which suggests that the OPCON transfer may not happen in the immediate future. President Yoon maintains that he wishes for a speedy transfer, but only if it does not undermine the combined defense posture of SK and US. At the 53rd SCM, the joint communique lists the reaffirmation “that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before the wartime OPCON is transitioned to the F-CFC [Future-Combined Forces Command]”. They also pledged to do a FOC exam in 2022. There are speculations that the war in Ukraine and tension between the US and China may lead the Biden administration to hesitate to transfer wartime OPCON, but the 2023 54th SCM may yield more clear answers.

  • American Attitudes on Korean Reunification

    American Attitudes on Korean Reunification

    History of the 38th parallel split

    Prior to World War II, the Korean peninsula was a Japanese colony. When Japan surrendered following WWII, the US and USSR agreed to split the peninsula at the 38th parallel to oversee the removal of Japanese forces. The USSR occupied the northern region, while the US occupied the south. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People’s Army invaded South Korea at the 38th parallel to install a communist regime. The US, abiding by the containment policy and influenced by Cold War tensions, deployed the American military with United Nations forces to aid defend South Korea. The war ended in 1953 in a stalemate at the 38th parallel. China supported North Korea by supplying troops, aiding in war strategy, and handled the repatriation of ethnic Koreans back to Korea. The Truman Administration gave up on reuniting North and South Korea and instead made stability the priority in East Asia to avoid further conflict. South Korea and the US signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, leading to a more official military partnership, and a number of American forces remained in South Korea. In 1961, North Korea and China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (not to be confused with the Warsaw Pact of the same name).   

    When the DPRK and the First Republic of Korea were created in 1948, both governments wished for reunification, but only on their own terms. In this context, reunification is defined as the DPRK and ROK joining as one to be a single, sovereign state. Whether it happens through engaged diplomacy or the sudden collapse of North Korea, the US and China are expected to play a role in the reunification process.

    American response to Korean reunification efforts by presidential administrations

    At a press conference for US-ROK relations in 2015, Obama stated “President Park has articulated a better vision—a unified Korea free from the fear of war and nuclear weapons—and that’s a vision that we very much support,” which has been the most explicit show of support for reunification thus far. The main US priority is a denuclearized North Korea. Further, America desires a peaceful transition towards a democratic nation with a market-oriented society that avoids state collapse, civil war, or general unrest. The ROK’s membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty limits their own involvement in the denuclearization process, so this role will most likely be upheld by the US, foreign institutions, and other NPT states.

    In 2018, President Trump and North Korean Dictator Kim Jong-Un met for the first time at the Singapore Summit to discuss peace on the Korean peninsula, US-NK relations, denuclearization, and recovery of US soldier remains. This summit was only partially successful with 55 bodies repatriated, and 5,300 still remaining. The main failure of the Singapore summit was the lack of agreement over the denuclearization timelines and expectations, where the US and NK both failed to operationalize the agreed upon terms of the joint statement and disagreed on what denuclearization would look like. In 2019, Trump and Kim Jong-Un met at their second summit in Hanoi, which was cut short after the first day without signing a joint statement, as Kim believed sanctions would be lifted in exchange for a halt on nuclear and missile testing and Trump believed that North Korea could be convinced to cut their nuclear programs immediately. The two could not progress past that impasse. This reduced the chances of future repatriation of remaining bodies, but showed North Korea’s desire for a decrease in sanctions while America continues to push for the dismantling of NK’s missile and nuclear development. While reunification was not explicitly discussed at these submits, the reasons why these summits failed could be a signifier of the difficulty of future American efforts of demilitarization and denuclearization during the reunification process.

    Under the Biden administration, President Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae In reaffirmed their nations’ strong relations in a 2021 joint statement. Both nations share a commitment to denuclearization efforts, and plan to explore diplomatic efforts with the DPRK to promote peace. When Moon Jae In was elected in 2017, he states that Korea must be the one to lead peace efforts in the peninsula and foster connections with regional neighbors. This shows a commitment to diplomatic efforts, like the inter-Korean summits in 2018, and with South Korea leading the process.

    The role of America and foreign nations in the reunification process

    The other nations involved will affect how peacefully and easily Korea reunifies, and the main nations the US will take into account are Russia, China, and Japan. Regardless of these nations’ support or enthusiasm of reunification prospects and the future, it is generally agreed that the process cannot happen peacefully without their support and cooperation. The US may be the only state in a position to balance the influence of the other, powerful nations. In the Park Geun Hye administration, South Korea hoped for a three-way dialogue between Korea, US, and Japan/China to enable stronger regional cooperation in the denuclearization process. China may prefer the status quo to the military power a unified Korea may bring, especially with the current South Korea-US military alliance. The US must accept the possibility that a unified Korea may choose neutrality and/or opt out of the current relationship.

  • What Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership?

    What Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership?

    The Trans-Pacific Partnership(TPP) is a free-trade agreement created as an extension of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership which contained Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. More well-known free-trade agreement examples are NAFTA and USMCA. In a free trade agreement, parties are usually not able to tariff, tax, or discriminate against the other agreeing parties. Parties are usually required to follow specific rules, regulations, and laws involving their economic trade and internal legal system in regard to matters such as copyright and labor protections. Proponents of free trade agreements often argue they cause economic growth and expand a country’s environmental and labor protections to other countries which may have worse or no protections. Opponents often argue that jobs are lost and companies will exploit cheaper labor supply to benefit from the new low trade taxes, contributing to wealth inequality.

    Benefits and Goals of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership

    The Trans-Pacific Partnership was a major part of Barack Obama’s foreign and economic policy. Two main benefits include: 

    1. Growth in middle-class jobs and therefore the United States economy: Most US economic growth has come from international trade in the past decade and Asia’s importance and share of the world economy is predicted to continue growing. In addition, the deal included stronger environmental regulations, protection of American companies from discrimination, and stronger union and labor protections. Obama saw these benefits and protections as a major boost to the United States economy by making trade an equal playing field. This equal playing field was supposed to emerge due to the combination of smaller goals helping to prohibit companies from stealing American intellectual property and out-competing America with cheaper labor.
    2. Competition with China: The Obama administration was concerned that if the United States did not create a deal with these countries they would turn to China. An overarching goal of the Obama administration was to use economic connections and influence from the TPP to contain China. If China created its own free trade agreement, Chinese-style laws and economic regulations would proliferate in the region rather than American-style policies.

    The Drawbacks and Collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership

    Opponents argued that the TPP would lead to greater income inequality and an overall loss of jobs. These opponents often argued that the TPP would not help GDP growth, destroy close to half a million jobs, and mainly help large companies. Americans were reminded of current trade deals such as WTO-China and NAFTA where opponents also disputed the economic benefits and claimed they would destroy jobs and raise income inequality. President Trump was a vocal opponent of the agreement, and the US withdrew from the TPP in 2017 when Trump took office. Trump favored a targeted approach with each individual country. The other countries moved forward without the United States, and new members join the agreement each year. However, the US has struggled to negotiate individual agreements with a diverse set of countries.

    Future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership

    With another recent change in administration, the Trans-Pacific Partnership has resurfaced as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF). This partnership has risen at a time when Americans have a record low opinion of the Chinese government on a host of issues. Americans have developed negative opinions toward China due to Covid-19, the Hong Kong crackdowns, and the Uyghur genocide. Americans previously held a neutral perspective on China, and this fall in opinion has transformed tariffs and other economic restrictions placed on China by President Trump from a controversial and partisan issue into a commonly supported idea by members of both parties. 

    Data from a 2019 survey and a separate 2022 survey 

    At the same time, American opinions toward foreign trade and trade agreements have grown greatly and reached all-time highs.

    Data from https://www.pollingreport.com/trade.htm

  • China’s Role in the Ukrainian Crisis and Sino-Russian Relations Viewed from Washington D.C.

    China’s Role in the Ukrainian Crisis and Sino-Russian Relations Viewed from Washington D.C.

    Following the 2014 Donbas War and the military intervention in Syria, Russia has been facing isolation in the international community. However, amid the enmity of the international community, China has grown closer both economically and politically with Russia in the second decade of the 21st century, particularly through the trading of natural resources and cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. As Dan Coats, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, noted in the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, “China and Russia are more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s”. During the 2022 Ukrainian crisis, China has been considered by U.S. officials as the largest potential aid towards Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. Directly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry described China as one of Russia’s key remaining friends, and Moscow hoped that Beijing would continue to provide rhetorical and substantive assistance. As Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister announced, China and Russia “will always maintain strategic focus and steadily advance our comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”

    China-Russia Defense and Economic Cooperation

    China and Russia appear to be moving toward a higher level of defense cooperation in recent decades. Since the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the two countries have engaged in close military interactions from cooperation in training and arms trade. Suffering from the western arms embargo after 1989, China saw Russia as a crucial source of advanced military equipment and technologies. In 1996, Beijing and Moscow began a “strategic partnership of coordination” that established high-level dialogues on a range of issues, including security and military affairs. The military ties between the two countries reached a higher level in the past decade. Since 2012, the PLA and Russian Armed Forces have conducted 14 joint military exercises. The Russian government also approved the selling of some of its most advanced military equipment to China, including the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense system and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet.

    The two countries’ converging economic interests also incentivized them to engage in further cooperation in trade and financial strategies. Since the 2014 Dunbas war, state firms and banks in Russia have faced sanctions from the Western powers, hindering the ability of Russia to raise financing in Western markets. After the trade war with the U.S. in 2018, China also began seeking greater independence from the global financial market. Consequently, in order to reduce their reliance on the U.S. dollar and Western capitals, both China and Russia began to embrace the possibility of dedollarization. In 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang signed 38 agreements on a visit to Moscow deepening cooperation on energy and establishing a three-year currency swap deal worth 150 billion yuan (about $24.5 billion). This deal was renewed for another three years in 2017, marking the joint effort for the two countries to pursue financial autonomy. The trading relationships between the two countries received more attention from the public. China and Russia both recognized each other as one of the most important trading partners in the world. China considered oil and natural gas imported from Russia as major substitutes for imports from the OPEC countries and was thus crucial to the energy safety of China. 

    Impact of the Ukraine Invasion on Sino-Russian Relations

    Despite the shared economic and security interests between China and Russia, China remained ambiguous about providing support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Following the invasion, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi restated China’s understanding of “Russia’s legitimate security concerns” and criticized NATO’s five consecutive rounds of eastward expansion for threatening the national security of Russia. However, China gradually abandoned its anti-west narrative and its emphasis on national security. Although the Chinese leaders continued to reaffirm the close ties between the two countries, China intended to establish itself as a mediator of the Ukrainian crisis and thought to mitigate the conflicts by facilitating peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. 

    While China hoped to expand its influence in Europe by mitigating the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. On the other hand, the military cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies also reached higher levels. The possibility of a Russian invasion contributed to more defense spending across the NATO countries. While the Russian military is proved to be depleted from the war in Ukraine and European countries are willing to increase investments in their defense, the United States can now relocate limited resources to Asia.

    However, a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis is still necessary for securing U.S. strategic interests in national security and ideology. Firstly, Ukraine has proven to be an important ally of the United States in nuclear proliferation in the past decades. The partnership between Kyiv and Washington D.C. in nuclear proliferation eliminated the large Soviet nuclear arsenal. Second, the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 established Ukraine as a buffer state between the United States and Russia. Therefore, an escalation of the Ukrainian crisis into total war between Russia and the West is a further violation of the Budapest Memorandum and damages the public images of both sides. Third, as two major autocracies in the world, an ideological tie is forming between China and Russia in their collective interests against the United States and the democratic values it represents. Therefore, any direct confrontation between the United States and Russia in Ukraine may turn the Ukrainian crisis into a proxy war like North Korea and Vietnam and eventually lead to a new cold war between the East and the West. In order to protect Ukraine, prevent potential nuclear threats against the U.S. and its European allies, and prevent the conflict between the East and the West from escalating into a new cold war, the United States is likely to seek a peaceful resolution of the on-going war rather than escalation of the conflicts in Ukraine.

    Conclusion

    For Russia, the cost of losing the war in Ukraine may be too high for the Putin regime. The possibility of further Western sanctions and losing public support encouraged Putin to rely on China for further support. Although China is taking cautious steps to position itself in the Ukrainian crisis, a potential Sino-Russian alliance is the last thing the United States wants to see. On the other hand, as a rising power, China is seeking to increase its political and economic influence across Eurasia through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As a result, China is hoping to initiate peace talks, and establish itself as a mediator of the conflict.

  • The KORUS Free Trade Agreement

    The KORUS Free Trade Agreement

    Historically, the United States and South Korea have had a strong military alliance, and moved to expand economic relations through the KOR-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which entered into force in 2012. An FTA is an economic agreement between two nations setting expectations and obligations in terms of the exchange of goods and services, protection of investors, etc. For the US, the aim is to protect US economic interests abroad and to aid US exports. Key provisions in the FTA include:

    • Consumer and industrial products became duty free and 95% would be expected to be duty free within three years.
    • Textiles and apparel—“yarn forward” treatment allowing for apparel that uses materials from US/SK qualifies for preferential treatment.
    • Trade remedies (actions taken in response to import surges, fair value sales, etc.) which allowed for US to exempt SK imports if it did not endanger the US domestic industry, and established a third-party committee— Medicines and Medical Devices Committee— to review government reimbursements and pricing on pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 
    • Some provisions for digital trade, but they are less extensive than other agreements, and some have called for updates to this specific provision. 

    The KORUS Free Trade Agreement is the United States’ second-largest FTA by trade-flows, only surpassed by NAFTA, now called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). US-SK exports were $80.5 billion, imports were $88.1 billion, totalling an estimated $168.6 billion (2019) in trade flows. 

    Challenges to the Free Trade Agreement

    When negotiating the final agreement, the beef and auto sectors were two major sticking points. South Korea had banned American beef after the outbreak of mad-cow disease in 2003, and there was significant debate about lifting that restriction. The issue of beef was perceived as a public health issue and became highly politicized. In the initial 2007 agreement, beef was avoided entirely because of its sensitive nature in South Korea, but eventually restrictions were lifted on boneless beef under 30 months old. On the US side, the auto industry had concerns over the rising imports and a weakening domestic market—General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler sales in 2007 fell 7.3% while U.S. sales of foreign brands (U.S.-based production plus imports) rose about 3%. Because of these conflicts, President Bush did not submit legislation to ratify the agreement 

    The Obama Administration took office focused on improving terms for the US auto industry in the FTA, leading to a supplemental trade agreement. The new terms expanded on Korean safety standards and allowed for 25,000 cars per US automaker to be imported into Korea as long as they meet US federal safety standards, and more leniency for small-volume importers (up to 4500 vehicles) in terms of environmental standards. The letter also specifies under Section A that there would be a reduction in duties (taxes), and in Section B desires more transparency from South Korea in preventing delays and barriers to trade while establishing an early-warning system. The beef issue was resolved when South Korea eliminated its 40 percent tariff, which was projected to save $1,300 per ton of beef imported to Korea and would approximately total $90 million annually for US beef producers at 2010 sales levels.

    Recent Developments and Critiques

    According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, as of 2019, South Korea is the US’ 6th largest goods trading partner with $134.0 billion in total (two way) goods trade during 2019, and the US is South Korea’s 2nd largest trading partner. However, under the Trump Administration, the US threatened to leave the agreement, leading to increased economic tension between the two countries. Trump blamed Korea for an increase in trade deficit, and wanted Korea to reduce policies which disadvantage American firms so that trade would be more balanced, with the current trade deficit at 29 billion (2021). He also raised concerns over non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the steel and auto industry that disadvantaged American markets by protecting Korean manufacturers. Non-tariff barriers are restrictions in trade that arise due to sanctions, domestic laws, quotas, etc. and are outside the agreed upon terms of an FTA. Minor revisions were made to the FTA in 2019 to address these concerns. 

    • The previous limit of 25,000 cars per US automaker imported by Korea was raised to 50,000 cars.
    • The 25% tariff on Korean trucks that was supposed to expire in January 2021 was extended to 2041.
    • The US restricted imports on steel and washing machines (Section 201 and 232). 
    • Minor changes were made to pharmaceuticals, customs, and investor-state dispute settlement.

    When Trump threatened to leave the agreement in 2017 due to the deficit, 2017 (Jan-May) data showed that US merchandise exports to Korea were up 23% year over year and and US imports from Korea were down 2%. It was suggested that trade diversion (where imports shift from lower cost nations to higher cost nations, something that can follow free trade agreements) may have contributed to the trade deficit, but ended up leaving the global trade balance largely unchanged in the long term. From 2012, the date of implementation, the US trade deficit in goods with Korea increased by 75% from $13.2 billion to $23.1 billion in 2017. 

    The rising trade deficit has led to concerns over the FTA, but many economists argue that the balance of trade is not an accurate way to measure the benefits of a trade agreement. For example, high US imports indicate consumers have access to products at lower prices, or better-quality goods at similar prices. Currency value also plays a major role in trade deficits; when the dollar is strong American consumers can afford to buy more imported goods, but American goods on foreign markets are comparatively more expensive. 

    Future Developments

    During a May 2021 summit, President Biden and President Moon Jae-in announced plans for greater cooperation to address trade and industry developments, but the Trump-era restrictions remained in place. The Korean government urged the Biden administration to ease the steel restrictions, but they remain in place as of July, 2022. South Korea recently elected a new president, so the future of the FTA could change. In their joint statement, both leaders reaffirmed their support for the FTA and discussed close cooperation on foreign exchange market developments. It is important to keep an eye on the renewable energy, semiconductor, and auto industries for the future, especially considering Biden’s $5 billion investment in an electric vehicle plant. 

    Reopening the FTA discussion would affect current steel restrictions and open conversations about the auto industry again, but also provide an opportunity to fill in the gaps of the digital industry which currently exist in the FTA, and add updated provisions about climate change. President Biden also recently launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), which includes South Korea, that aims to address supply-chain issues, climate change, business ethics, and more. As the IPEF develops and more details are finalized, it may create more opportunities for cooperation between the US and South Korea. 

  • Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    AUKUS Partnership Outline

    The AUKUS Partnership was one of the first major foreign policy actions of President Biden’s Administration. On September 15, 2021, AUKUS partners released a joint statement announcing the agreement. The goal of the partnership is to promote information and technology sharing, and integrate security and defense measures by increasing cooperation on a variety of capabilities, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific Region.  

    The AUKUS Partnership has three pillars 

    1. Provide Australia with “conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capabilities (SSN)”. Prior to this agreement, this technology was limited to six nuclear capable states (U.S.,UK, France, Russia, China, and India). The U.S. previously shared SSN technology with the UK, and AUKUS now extends this to Australia, a non-nuclear state. As such, this partnership is set to revolutionize Australian naval capabilities, which have struggled to travel longer distances due to limitations of electrically powered submarine fleets. 
    2. Advance military capabilities “to promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region”. The AUKUS partnership outlines objectives to expand and develop technologies, such as: AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS, the development of robotic undersea technologies), AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA, development of quantum technologies), cooperation on Artificial Intelligence (AI), collaboration on hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and the development of cyber capabilities and security measures. 
    3. Commit to information exchange. As of February 8, 2022, The Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA) came into effect, resulting in AUKUS partners sharing nuclear propulsion intel trilaterally, the first agreement to do so with a non-nuclear capable state.

    U.S. Favorability of UK Partnership 

    Prior to the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the UK had limited influence or presence within the Indo-Pacific Region, with the only formal international agreement being their membership in the Five Eyes security alliance. However, this new partnership indicates a significant shift in UK foreign policy , confirming the UK’s intention to align with U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

    Figure showing the Overlap of Defense, Intelligence, and Security Groups in the Indo-Pacific Region.

    The AUKUS Partnership presented significant political fallout in U.S.–Europe relations, because it prioritized the UK security partnership over a broader European security pact.

    France was the most affected by the establishment of the AUKUS partnership as Australia withdrew from a previously agreed Franco-Australian Submarine deal to join AUKUS. This led to an increased strain on the U.S.–France Relations, due to both the loss of a multi-billion Euro agreement and the creation of a new security alliance formed without major European allies. Following the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, the new alliance took significant attention away from the European Union’s (EU) own policy plans for the Indo-Pacific Region. Given the contentious relations between the UK and the EU in a post-Brexit Europe, this partnership highlighted a perceived favoritism of U.S.–UK relations as loyal security partners, over a united Europe. In addition, with the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the agreement has strengthened an EU-independent UK as the only European state with significant security partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region.

    Ramifications of the AUKUS Partnership

    The response to the AUKUS partnership has been mixed. As discussed, the pact strained U.S.-French relations, and distanced the U.S. from Europe in terms of Indo-Pacific cooperation. Some believe this may lead to the EU pursuing its own independent security strategy when dealing with contentious U.S. and China relations, a position that has been publicly supported by French President Emmanuel Macron.

    The AUKUS partnership, however, will have the most on-the-ground impact within the Indo-Pacific region. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reactions have been divided on the new security partnership present in the region. Recent analysis shows that 36.4% of ASEAN respondents say AUKUS would help “balance China’s growing military power”, yet 22.5% say the deal could spark “a regional arms race”. Overall there is a worry of what the broader consequences of agreements such as AUKUS may be, and their effects on the stability of the region.   

    A major concern of the AUKUS Partnership is the potentially dangerous precedent an agreement of this nature could set for nuclear proliferation. While all three partners emphasized their commitment against nuclear proliferation, this agreement is the first to allow a non-nuclear capable state to access nuclear technology. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear states to declare all nuclear material, with the IAEA verifying the material is not being used for weaponry development, thus acting as a deterrence for nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT relies on states to self-monitor naval nuclear reactors because of practical issues with access. Australia is setting a precedent as the first non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear materials the IAEA is not monitoring. It could be dangerous if other countries follow this path, and derail the current global nuclear nonproliferation system. While Australia may not prove to be an exploitive threat to nuclear weapons development through the AUKUS partnership, a future agreement of this nature could serve as the perfect cover for potential would-be-proliferators to advance nuclear development programs under the guise of access to nuclear material through naval reactors, no longer checked by the IAEA. 

    US–UK Relations and Nuclear Proliferation

    A 2020 report by Pew Research demonstrates that nuclear nonproliferation is a major foreign policy issue in the United States; 73% of Americans perceive the “spread of nuclear weapons” as a major threat to the U.S. This position attracts bipartisan support, with both Democrats and Republicans responding in equal measure to the perceived international threat. Moreover, 80% of respondents favor state cooperation with other countries as “very important” when navigating the spread of nuclear weapons.

    The United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK) have a long history of alignment on foreign policy objectives towards nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear war. Much of the existing U.S.–UK agreements on nuclear cooperation between both states derive and build upon the original 1958 “Atomic Energy. Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes” agreement, which bound both countries in a united front against other state development of atomic weapons. As such, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Partnership is yet another foreign policy step the U.S. and the UK have taken to further their allied cooperation to address the international security threats of today.

  • US, China and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Part 2: Cooperation

    US, China and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Part 2: Cooperation

    This brief was originally published by Aerin Lee on September 21, 2021. It was updated and republished by Ethan McQueen on June 24, 2022.

    The Quad can cooperate in two ways to achieve their goals in the Indo-Pacific region: either with a narrow functional approach or a broader regional approach. A narrow functional approach would involve the Quad countries working together under a combined disaster relief policy to handle region-wide disasters. A broader regional approach would involve neighboring Indo-Pacific nations, not just the immediate members of the Quad, to handle such regional disasters and establish the Indo-Pacific as a coherent regional order. This Indo-Pacific regional order would serve as an organized body of nations aiming to contain Chinese influence. The potential consequences of attempting to contain China has made neighboring countries wary of taking an active role in the regional order.

    Quad-plus

    In 2020, the Quad countries held a teleconference with Vietnam, South Korea, and New Zealand to discuss how to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. These three nations have come to be known as participants in a Quad-plus dialogue because of their recent cooperation. Each of these three Quad-plus parties are Indo-Pacific powers with important relations with the Quad countries. For example, in 2018, Australia and Vietnam established a strategic partnership, pledging to increase political engagement with each other, deepen bilateral trade, and welcome intelligence and security cooperation. South Korea has been allied with the US under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, and the two nations have worked together to support inter-Korean cooperation and strengthen their respective economies. New Zealand formally adopted Indo-Pacific foreign policy in 2019, signaling its intent to deepen cooperation with the Quad countries due to increasing security concerns regarding China, as China has pushed its Maritime Silk Road into the Indian Ocean, militarized the South China Sea, and pushed into the Pacific islands.

    Complications to Cooperation

    India and the United States have a complicated trade relationship, leading to India drawing closer to Russia. In 1998 the United States sanctioned India over its nuclear tests, canceling all current orders for American military equipment and cutting off any future orders. India depends on imports for its military needs and is one of the largest arms importers in the world accounting for 10% of all worldwide arms imports. While these sanctions were appealed in just a few years, this isolation of India from western military companies helped lead to India becoming the biggest military importer of Russian military equipment in the world. This relationship led to a rift in the response of India and other Quad members towards the Russian-Ukraine war. The United States, Japan, and Australia placed aggressive sanctions but India increased oil imports from Russia to record levels and plans to enter into new contracts with Russian oil companies. In response, the United States sent convoys and threatened to sanction India. However, the United States has also been in discussion to provide military aid to India to help decrease their reliance on Russian arms. 

    Many US allies in the Indo-Pacific have been hesitant to join the effort, mainly due to the Quad’s clear intentions to oppose China. In particular, South Korea is reluctant to engage with the Quad because its foreign policy priority lies in improving relations with North Korea and sustaining peace on the Korean peninsula. Since China is North Korea’s primary benefactor, this also means that South Korea must maintain good relations with China. 

    A Binding Adversary

    Even with the complicated relationships between the Quad countries, India has remained mostly committed to the Quad. and the prospect of Korea joining a Quad-plus expansion has become a real possibility. With China’s behavior becoming more aggressive with its territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the Belt and Road Initiative, many nations’ attitudes toward the Quad and toward Chinese pressure have changed. These negative changes toward China have been further compounded by the Russian-Ukrainian war and China’s response.  Thus, the Quad and Quad-plus expansion are logical because these countries all share concerns regarding China’s aggressive behavior and have faced pressure from China in recent years.

  • Overview of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests

    Overview of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests

    Hong Kong’s Relationship with China

    Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of China that operates under separate systems and a different constitution than mainland China (see One Country, Two Systems brief). Hong Kong’s constitutional document, called the Basic Law, defines the ‘four pillars’ of success in Hong Kong as a common law system with an independent judiciary, the free flow of information, a level playing field between businesses, and an uncorrupted, respected civil service. 

    Political Context

    Hong Kong has a strong democratic tradition. Following its transfer of sovereignty on July 1, 1997 from Great Britain to the People’s Republic of China , the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promised that the region could keep its liberal, democratic and capitalist systems for at least 50 years. However, in recent years, as China more aggressively pursues unification, many Hong Kongers and international governments, including the United States, have accused China of attempting to systematically erode Hong Kong’s autonomy. These efforts, perceived as resulting in the “mainlandization” of Hong Kong, have resulted in feverous protests from Hong Kong citizens exemplified by the 2014 Umbrella Movement. The Umbrella Movement was sparked by the CCP introducing education reforms such as compulsory Mandarin classes (Hong Kongers mainly speak Cantonese) and a new “patriotic” curriculum, as well as refusing to allow the native people to directly elect their chief executive as previously promised. These protests ultimately failed to garner concessions from the CCP or the Hong Kong government as they did not significantly damage Hong Kong’s economy. However, they succeeded in setting the stage for the more impactful 2019 protests.

    Lighting the Powder Keg

    While tensions have remained high between a democratic Hong Kong public and an authoritarian CCP over the years, tensions reached a boiling point in 2019 when the government, pressured by the CCP, proposed a new national security law that would allow for extraditions to mainland China. This law is seen as corrosive to Hong Kong’s sovereignty as it gives the CCP the ability to arrest activists, seize assets, fire Hong Kong government workers, detain members of the press, and rewrite school curriculums. These reforms also introduced a new electoral system that requires candidates to be vetted for patriotic character, effectively allowing Beijing to control who takes office. 

    Protests & Goals of the Protestors

    Beginning on June 9, 2019, tens of thousands of Hong Kongers took to the streets to protest what they perceived to be encroachments on their liberties. As the Hong Kong Legislative Council gathered to vote on the bill, protestors surrounded the building, cancelling the session and resulting in a major victory for the protestors. A week later, on June 16, approximately 2 million Hong Kongers marched in protests around the city and were met with violent opposition from the CCP-controlled Hong Kong police. Protestors were beaten, tear gassed, pepper sprayed and shot with water guns and rubber bullets, despite being largely peaceful. This garnered widespread condemnation from the international community, especially the United States, with many politicians voicing public support for the protestors. 

    Conflict peaked on July 1st as anti-government Hong Kong activists broke into the Legislative Council building, occupying it, and vandalizing it with anti-CCP slogans before exiting late that night. Nine days later, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Lam dropped the extradition bill. While the protestors were successful in getting the extradition bill dropped, they did not achieve their other goals:

    • Convincing the CCP and Hong Kong government to stop referring to the protests as riots; 
    • An independent investigation of the use of force on civilians by police; 
    • The unconditional release of everyone arrested at the protests; 
    • And political reform towards universal suffrage. 

    This last goal represents the main tension between Hong Kong and China in the 2010s, first brought to the national spotlight by the 2014 Umbrella Movement. Although China has claimed that democracy was the eventual goal for Hong Kong, actions leading up to the protests proved otherwise in the eyes of many Hong Kongers. 

    Aftermath 

    After pro-democracy landslide victories in Hong Kong’s District Council elections and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the protests began to lose steam. However, tensions mounted again in May 2020 when the CCP pushed the previously defeated National Security Law through Hong Kong’s legislature. Since this law’s passage, many prominent activists and journalists have been arrested, and there has been mass emigration out of the city. Approval ratings for the Hong Kong government are now at their lowest points since the region was transferred to Chinese control in 1997, with approval for Lam at a dismal 19%. Overall, Hong Kongers’ confidence in the impartiality and efficacy of their institutions has dropped substantially in the past ten years.

    Implications for US, China and the International Community The CCP and Hong Kong government have received widespread international condemnation for their actions surrounding the protests. Taiwan, which is in a similar position to Hong Kong, is on high alert for similar provocations from the CCP following the Hong Kong protests. In the United States, then-President Donald Trump and Congress passed a series of acts sanctioning the Hong Kong government and Hong Kong-based businesses, and declared the situation a national emergency. For now, Beijing sees this new security law as substantial enough to prevent national security threats from Hong Kong and is focusing on economic projects which it believes will alleviate the social unrest that spurred the protests. The United States, on the other hand, sees China as having significantly eroded Hong Kong’s sovereignty over the past decade and remains on alert to see just how far China’s ambitions in the region extend. Hong Kong promises to be a flash point in a budding Sino-American rivalry and is poised to be a litmus test for Chinese desire to project regional hegemony and the resolve of the U.S. to resist it.

  • Overview of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement

    Overview of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement

    The Korean War (1950-53) was the first and largest proxy war of the Cold War. The defeat of the Japanese empire after World War II gave the United States control of the southern portion of the Korean peninsula, below the 38th parallel, while the Soviet Union controlled the northern portion. This war never officially ended, with the imperfect solution known as the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA) struggling to keep peace on the peninsula to this day. 

    The KAA is strictly a military document. It ensured a ceasefire long enough to answer the “Korea Question,” outlined in Paragraph 60, which asked how to reunite and bring lasting peace to the divided peninsula. Paragraph 60 called for a meeting to answer this question within three months, but, while the meeting took place, it was unsuccessful in establishing a framework to reunify the peninsula. Even though the armistice was signed on July 27th, 1953, it is considered a living document as Paragraph 62 allows for the KAA to be amended based on the current situation of the peninsula.

    The 1954 Geneva Conference addressed both the ongoing war in Indochina and the Korea Question. The US delegation was mainly focused on the Korea Question, and met with diplomats from the USSR, China, and North Korea. The main demand of North Korea and China was an “equal Korea,” and suggested an “all Korea commission be established.” South Korea declined this and countered with a 14-point plan that was seen as highly risky by the Americans. North Korea in turn declined the South Korean plan, to the relief of the US. The conference concluded with no solution and kept the KAA as the lone document keeping peace on the peninsula. 

    The KAA has seen its fair share of violations and incidents on both sides over the years.

    The fragility of the Korean Armistice Agreement is a critical issue for American foreign policy. South Korea remains a major ally of the U.S. politically, economically, militarily, and geographically given its close proximity to China and Russia. A significant amount of the U.S. military budget goes to maintaining troops and operating bases in South Korea. Between 2016 and 2019, U.S. military activity in South Korea cost $13.4 billion. The majority of this funding went to the U.S. army, with Camp Humphreys costing $9.2 billion alone. A military conflict between North and South Korea would potentially draw in China and Russia, in addition to the United States, creating a global conflict.

  • US Bilateral agreements with Japan and Korea

    US Bilateral agreements with Japan and Korea

    Bilateral Treaties are “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.” During the Cold War, bilateral treaties were the main way the United States created alliances in Asia. Bilateral treaties are important because they form the basis for the U.S. military relationship with both Japan and South Korea to this day. This alliance method meant the US would have separate treaties with each individual allied country in Asia (primarily Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), but those countries would not have treaties with each other. This gave the US a lot of power over its Asian allies, since the US had agreements with multiple countries in the region, while Asian countries only had agreements with the US. This arrangement shaped the balance of power and way alliances have generally worked in East Asia until present day. Many countries still have bilateral treaties, as opposed to multilateral treaties, which are agreements “between a large number of states, usually (though not always) denoting participation by a majority of the world’s states,” and therefore give more equal power to those signing the treaty.

    This alliance system the US created in Asia after World War II is called the “Hub and Spoke system,” also referred to as the “San Francisco System.” The United States was the “Hub” and countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan were the “spokes,” meaning these countries were all allied with the US at the center, but not with each other, like the spokes of a bike wheel. This allowed the United States to begin its rise to global supremacy by expanding its military reach across the Pacific.

    US-Japan Relations

    US-Japan relations were officially established at the San Francisco Conference in April 1945, after the conclusion of World War II. 46 nations plus four sponsors were invited to the conference because they had declared war on Germany and Japan. This conference was key because it was where the US wrote Japan’s constitution and disarmed their military, which “officially ended Japan’s position as an imperial power.” The 1951 United States-Japan Security Treaty established that the US would station soldiers on Japanese soil and have the exclusive right to defend Japan from threats even after Japan regained sovereignty, meaning Japan could not have its own standing military. The agreement was renewed in 1960 and created greater mutual security cooperation and reliance between the US and Japan by allowing the US to “establish bases on the archipelago in exchange for a commitment to defend Japan in the event of an attack,” which is still in effect today.

    Despite the fact that Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states that Japan is not allowed to have its own military, Japan created their own Self-Defence force (SDF) under Former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida of Japan in 1954. The SDF established Japan’s maintenance of military forces to settle international disputes as a result of US presence being reduced in East Asia at the time. Under former Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in 2013, a reformed Article 9 allowed for the SDF and foreign militaries to collaborate to protect Japan from threats.

    US-South Korea Relations

    South Korea and the United States also have deep military ties. In June 1950, the North Korean military invaded South Korea and started the Korean War. With the help of the United States and United Nations forces, the War tentatively stopped with a ceasefire in July 1953. The US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty was formed in October of 1953 to give South Korea security guarantees from the US after South Korea was weakened as a result of the tragic Korean War, since North Korea still threatened to invade and reunify the peninsula. This peace treaty allowed South Korea to rebuild with less threat of another invasion.

    During the Cold War, South Korea’s fear of US abandonment became apparent. President Nixon decided to relocate a majority of the US Forces Korea (USFK) stationed in South Korea to Vietnam to aid the ongoing war effort there, raising concerns about US dedication to protecting South Korean. US Troops in South Korea continued to decrease after the Cold War under the 1990 Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, known as the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI). EASI increased the United States’ relationship with East Asia and Japan mostly through heightened military ties. Tensions began to rise even more in the early 1990s as North Korea began to increase and exhibit its military capabilities and presence on the international stage. During this time, USFK remained in Seoul under the original US-ROK alliance in their largest and main base, Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul. 

    Present Day Consequences

    South Korea and Japan normalized relations in 1965, but despite this “friendship” treaty, they still have a lot of tensions stemming from Japanese Colonial rule over Korea. Before 1965, Japan and South Korea mainly cooperated with each other indirectly through their separate “hub and spoke” alliances with the US. This is important because these two alliances (plus Taiwan) are a strategic way the US can counter Chinese influence in the region today. 

    US Treaties with Asian allies have become increasingly important with the rise of a nuclear North Korea and an assertive Chinese stance. Furthermore, to this day the United States continues to maintain a large physical military presence in Japan and South Korea. The United States currently has 55,000 troops and over 80 military facilities stationed in Japan, more than in any other foreign country, and 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea. Additionally, due to the treaties the US has with Japan and South Korea, if war broke out in either of these countries, the US would be drawn into war, making these security agreements hugely consequential.