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Category: Asia

  • Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia and the U.S. Response:

    Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia and the U.S. Response:

    Introduction:

    The BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) is a 2013 trade route plan aimed at improving China’s connectivity to the rest of the world. The plan seeks to stimulate China’s economy through investing in infrastructure projects including railways, bridges, and airports abroad. This project also strives to connect countries in the Global South and Eastern Europe to China via land and maritime networks in hopes of increasing trade and economic growth. It is estimated that over 150 countries are partnered with the BRI across six continents.

    The BRI in Southeast Asia

    Southeast Asia is a key region of the BRI. The plan’s extensive funding supports a range of urban development initiatives in Southeast Asian nations, making it difficult to pinpoint its specific effects on local policies. Projects under the BRI encompass everything from infrastructure development to special economic zones to cultural activities.

    In the Philippines, the BRI has led to many large-scale infrastructure projects, but has also been criticized for expanding illicit sectors and selectively benefiting economic elites. Indonesia plans to leverage the BRI to enhance connectivity between Java Island and its eastern regions, fostering cultural interconnectivity and economic opportunities. In Cambodia, BRI-funded transportation projects, like the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, have reduced travel time and improved safety between major cities. For landlocked Laos, the BRI presents a chance to boost its economy and global standing through enhanced transportation infrastructure. Malaysia has seen improvements in human resource development due to the BRI-funded Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) project.

    While the BRI has contributed to several developments across Southeast Asia, it also raises concerns about debt dependence and disregard for environmental health and safety. Countries borrowing from China for large infrastructure projects risk falling into “debt traps”, which can force them to favor the interests of their donor nation and hinder their ability to invest in local development. Forms of “debt trap diplomacy” such as the BRI have been found to spur long-term economic downturn in beneficiary nations. Environmental impacts are another major concern. In Thailand, a high-speed railway project threatens deforestation and community displacement, particularly near the culturally significant city of Ayutthaya. In Vietnam, the Vinh Tan 2 Thermal Power Plant is discharging excessively hot wastewater into the sea, negatively affecting marine life and local agriculture. There is also a coal ash dump site near Vinh Tan, and local households are complaining about nearby crops dying and withering as a result. In Indonesia, the rapid development at the Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) poses worker safety risks. These drawbacks have led critics to deem the BRI  “China’s belt and road to nowhere”.

    BRI’s Impact on US Foreign Policy

    Given ongoing criticism that the U.S. has struggled to match China’s vision for economic expansion, the U.S. plans to counter the BRI with a similar project. In 2022, President Joe Biden announced the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) at the G20 Summit. This project has similar goals to the BRI, such as increasing connectivity and economic integration with the rest of the world. While the IMEC is targeted at India, the Middle East, and Europe, China’s project extends mostly to countries in the Global South, especially Southeast Asia. 

    The split between Global North and Global South is relevant to the U.S. and China’s competing policies. While India and Saudi Arabia are the only countries in the IMEC that represent the Global South, China’s BRI puts special emphasis in expanding reach into Global South markets. While this marks a significant opportunity for China to expand its influence in developing nations, it also risks backlash from countries who feel the BRI is doing more harm than good to local economies. Since the IMEC emerged significantly after BRI, the U.S. aims to learn from its shortcomings as it launches a new strategy.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, the BRI has significantly impacted Southeast Asia, driving infrastructure development and economic growth while also raising concerns about debt dependency and environmental harm. The future of BRI in the region will depend on balancing development with local welfare and environmental considerations. As the U.S. responds with the IMEC, it will aim to learn from these challenges to foster sustainable partnerships in its target regions. 

  • Failures and Successes of the BRICS Alliance

    Failures and Successes of the BRICS Alliance

    Background

    Officially founded in 2009, BRICS is an informal, multilateral economic alliance between Brazil, Russia, China, India, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. The acronym “BRIC” (later adapted to include South Africa) was originally coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in a 2001 paper wherein he highlighted the potential for Brazil, Russia, India, and China to eventually rival the G7 (U.S., Canada, France, U.K., Germany, Japan, and Italy) economically. Today, the alliance is sometimes referred to as BRICS+. The overarching goal of BRICS is to create a system of transnational governance wherein countries of the Global South share equal representation in economic and political institutions historically controlled by Western nations. This involves establishing an international financial network that rivals the current dollar-based system, and promoting development in the Global South. 

    Structure

    Presently, BRICS is not a formal institution such as the UN or OPEC. The group meets annually, with the chairmanship rotating between member states, and all policy decisions made by consensus. It is currently chaired by Russia, where the annual summit will be held in October 2024. According to the summit’s official website, the group plans to discuss the potential inclusion of 30 new countries in some capacity, as well as strategies for the development of a more coordinated foreign policy platform.

    Successes and Potential

    • Creation of Banks and Funds: The most ambitious programs enacted by the BRICS alliance thus far have been the creation of the New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Agreement. Founded in 2015 with an initial capital base of $50 billion, the New Development Bank (NDB) will fund infrastructure and development projects in BRICS countries and other nations in the Global South. The Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA) is a $100 billion fund established to provide liquidity for BRICS during economic crises. Both of these institutions were created to combat the influence of US-led economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
    • Addressing Development in the Global South: BRICS has successfully implemented policies pertaining to one of their slated goals: development in the Global South. Examples include: Improving access to clean water in Guwahati, India, river restoration and ecological protection projects in China, and establishing the BRICS Agriculture and Rural Development Forum, which aims to address poverty and food insecurity. 
    • Attracting New Member States: Membership in BRICS has proven attractive to developing nations worldwide, including several Asian countries. Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam have all taken the necessary steps to apply for membership, while other Asian nations such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka are openly considering applying. 
    • Potential for Peacebuilding: The inclusion of rival countries in the Middle East such as Iran and potentially Saudi Arabia indicates that BRICS membership may be used to facilitate peace and development in a region historically preoccupied with US sanctions and military involvement. The expansion of BRICS would challenge the heavy U.S. influence in developing countries, which BRICS member states see as a successful step towards equalizing power on an international scale. 

    Failures and Critiques 

    • Intra-group Disagreements: Differing cultural values, contrasting political ideologies, and competing economies all pose obstacles for BRICS to strengthen cohesion and thus influence. The group’s two largest members in terms of population and GDP, India and China, disagree about whether or not the group should expand, and have also engaged in armed border disputes in recent years. 
    • Lack of Global Economic Influence: Despite efforts to “de-dollarize” by promoting trade between member states in local currencies, the USD still dominates international trade. The dollar was present on at least one side of nearly 90% of all international trade transactions in 2022. The dollar was on one side of 97% of all trades involving the Indian rupee, and 94% of all trades involving the Chinese renminbi. Furthermore, much of the world’s international commodity trading is priced by the dollar, and the dollar frequently comprises the foreign currency reserves of many countries’ central banks. Globally, 58% of foreign exchange reserves were held in dollars, including an estimated 50% in China and India. 
    • Risk of Unilateralism: While the growth of all BRICS members has slowed since its conception, China’s economy is larger than any other economy within the agreement, and trade within the alliance mostly flows through China. This runs the risk of BRICS becoming an exclusively China-led group as opposed to a mutual power-sharing alignment of non-Western nations. With China now being the United States’ major rival globally, China’s de-facto leadership within the agreement will necessitate a strong U.S. response. Whether U.S. foreign policy will take a continued adversarial approach, or a new, collaborative effort remains to be seen. 
  • Failures and Successes of the Phase One Trade Agreement with China

    Failures and Successes of the Phase One Trade Agreement with China

    Introduction

    In recent decades, trade between China and the US has significantly grown, with China being a major source of imports for the United States and a top market for American goods and services. Despite the economic interdependence, the relationship is complex. The trade war that initiated in 2018 exemplifies the complexities in this dynamic.

    Background Information Of Trade Between China and US

    For about three decades following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, trade between China and the United States was nearly nonexistent due to severed relations. The situation changed in 1979 when diplomatic ties were restored, leading to a significant surge in trade from a few billion to hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the late 1970s played a pivotal role, with the Chinese government, under his leadership, easing fiscal restrictions and promoting business expansion. As part of efforts to boost trade and investment, China applied to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor to the WTO, in 1986.

    As a condition of entry, Beijing pledged to execute a wide variety of economic reforms, including major import tariff reductions, IP protections, and improved law and order transparency. At this time, President Bill Clinton and his advisors argued that incorporating China in the international trading system would be advantageous for both the US and China, helping to foster economic and eventually democratic transition. However, American labor unions and many congressional Democrats rejected the idea, claiming that China’s inadequate environmental and worker standards would inspire similar behavior elsewhere and lead to a “race to the bottom.” 

    Even before China joined the WTO, trade between the two countries began to grow. WTO membership ensured “permanent normal trade relations,” providing further security for American and foreign companies to produce in China and export to the United States. Trade expanded significantly; the value of American goods bought from China increased from about $100 billion in 2001 to $500 billion in 2021. This rise in imports is partially explained by China’s significant contribution to global supply chains, since Chinese businesses assemble products for export to the United States using materials from all around the world.

    Trade War

    The trade war between China and the United States was launched nearly five years ago by then-President Donald Trump. The US levied duties on approximately $350 billion in Chinese imports, and China countered by imposing taxes on an additional $100 billion in imports, as permitted by WTO rules. President Trump’s goal was to put pressure on Beijing to change what was perceived by some as unfair trade policies and decouple the US economy from China’s economy. To avert a trade deficit, President Trump levied hefty tariffs on China. Following the tariffs, China’s access to high-tech US products was restricted, as were foreign investments with security concerns, as well as claims of unfair Chinese business practices.

    Summary and Results of the Phase One Trade Agreement

    The Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China: Phase One went into force on February 14, 2020. China committed to expand its purchases of particular US goods and services by $200 billion beyond baseline levels set in 2017 for 2020 and 2021. The impact can be summarized as follows:

    Positive Aspects

    • Between January 2020 and December 2021, China imported $235.3 billion in covered products from the US, while the US exported $210.1 billion to China. In the end, China bought 62% (for imports from China) or 60% (for exports from the US) of all the goods covered by the phase one agreement.
    • Goods made from Covered Manufacture Products went beyond the phase one commitment by 61 percent (for imports from China) or 59 percent (for exports from the US).
    • China’s phase one commitment was spent on purchases of covered agricultural products to the tune of 77 percent (for imports from China) or 83 percent (for exports from the US).
    • China’s purchases of covered energy products accounted for 47 percent (for imports from China) or 37 percent (for exports from the US) of the phase one commitment.
    • All uncovered products, which in 2017 made up 29% of China’s total imports from the US and 27% of the US’s total exports to China, were not expressly covered by the phase one agreement. In 2021, China imported unlimited goods worth $42.0 billion from the US, down 8% from 2017. The total value of all unreported US exports to China during that time was $35.0 billion, up 1% from the prior year.

    The Phase One transaction achieved some success despite notable restrictions and challenges. It contributed to crucial structural reforms in China’s intellectual property laws, facilitated easier access for U.S. agricultural exports, and improved market entry for U.S. financial services firms. Notably, goods made from Covered Manufacture Products surpassed the Phase One commitment by 61% for imports from China and 59% for exports from the United States. Although crude oil prices briefly turned negative in April 2020, impacting sales value, they had rebounded by the fall of 2021.

    Negative Aspects

    The Phase One deal is largely seen as unsuccessful, with China only fulfilling about 60% of the specified goods trade amount. The ambitious purchasing targets, perceived as unattainable by many, were further hindered by the Covid-19 pandemic disrupting trade flows.

    If U.S. services exports to China had expanded at the same rate as exports to the rest of the world from 2018 to 2021, and U.S. goods exports to China of Phase One products had increased at the same pace as China’s purchases of those products globally, the overall U.S. goods and services sent to China would have decreased by approximately 19% from 2018 to 2021 due to the trade conflict and the Phase One deal. These projections suggest that the U.S. could have avoided trade war export losses of $24 billion (16%) in 2018 and $30 billion (20%) in 2019. Under Phase One, exports would have increased by a combined $27 billion (18%) in 2020 and $40 billion (23%) in 2021. Without the export losses, American taxpayers would not have paid tens of billions of dollars in agricultural subsidies in 2018–19.

    Phase Two

    Although the details of phase two have not yet been finalized, it was said that the Phase One agreement only addressed the most straightforward issues in regard to US-China trade. If the agreement is to have any meaning, phase two will need to address more complex topics. During United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s confirmation hearing, Senator Ben Sasse stated that the Phase Two agreement should address “critical issues” like excess capacity, state-owned firms, state-sponsored cyber-enabled intellectual property theft, restrictions on cross-border data transfers, and regulatory transparency that weren’t adequately addressed or achieved in Phase One. Similar to this, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several business associations mentioned issues that should be addressed in a Phase Two agreement, including subsidies, cybersecurity, digital trade and data governance, and competition policy. 

    A Phase Two agreement has also been sought by business organizations. In accordance with a report from the American Chamber of Commerce in South China from the previous year, “Phase One will go down as one of the biggest political and economic failures in a generation unless the U.S. and China immediately return to the negotiating table to start Phase Two, a step that China has also indicated is not imminent.” The National Association of Manufacturers has additionally argued in favor of a Phase Two deal “to improve trade certainty.”

  • US Response to Iran’s Space Program 

    US Response to Iran’s Space Program 

    Amid US concern over Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the Middle Eastern nation’s space programs have also come under scrutiny. Tehran’s interest in space dates back to 1957, when the country joined the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Iran’s recent technological achievements have raised concerns about the potential for expanded space development to accelerate the country’s acquisition of a nuclear arsenal.

    History of Iran’s Space Program 

    Since joining COPUOS, Iran has participated in several international discussions regarding Space, including the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Iran has maintained a state-run space program, the Iranian Space Agency (ISA), since 2003. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also runs a separate space program within the country as part of the IRGC Aerospace Force. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the IRGC is more heavily involved than the ISA in the development of solid-fuel rockets, which have the potential to be converted into missiles. 

    In 1998, Iran showcased its satellite capabilities with the Mesbah satellite program, established through a partnership with the Russian Federation. The Mesbah was intended for civilian image capture but was often speculated to have potential spy satellite features. While the Mesbah was never launched, the agreement marked an early sign of ongoing cooperation between Russia and Iran in space and military technology endeavors.

    US-Iran Relations 

    The relationship between the United States and Iran has been marked by a history of diplomatic struggles. During the Trump administration, tensions escalated when the IRGC was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The IRGC has been a state sponsor of Shia terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, as well as the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. The Iranian government has also been responsible for numerous cyber attacks on foreign governments and private corporations. Eutelsat, a French satellite operator, reported in October that Iranian state actors had intentionally jammed two of its satellites. 

    Washington has made clear its intention to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capabilities. This objective is reflected in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed in 2015 by Iran, the EU, and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The JCPOA includes specific stipulations to prevent the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, but both President Biden and Tehran have publicly supported resuming the deal. 

    Iran’s space programs have also raised concerns for US officials regarding the dual-use nature of space program technologies and the potential for their application in advancing the nation’s nuclear capabilities. There is a recognized correlation between the growth of space programs and weapons programs. Space technology holds the potential for application in missile development, particularly evident with IRGC solid-fuel rockets and space launch vehicle technologies. These connections played a role in the US-imposed sanctions on Iran in 2019. US intelligence indicates the expansion of Iran’s missile program through rocket launch tests, and the successful 2020 launch of the Noor-1 satellite by the IRGC suggests advancements in Tehran’s ability to develop and deploy missiles.  

    The US State Department has publicly expressed concern over Iranian rockets and their potential for use in delivering nuclear weapons. Members of Congress have supported Biden’s promise to reenter the JCPOA, but are critical of Biden’s lack of progress on the deal. During a visit to Israel, President Biden committed the US to use “all elements of its national power” to prevent Iran from developing nuclear capabilities. American officials are also worried about Iran’s significant alliances forged via its space programs, notably with Russia and China. Iran provided drones and missiles to Russia during its conflict with Ukraine, and some scholars are concerned about the potential expansion of Russian and Iranian influence into Latin America as well.

    Future DevelopmentsIn June 2023, analysts reported that Washington and Tehran are coming to an informal agreement to limit Iranian uranium enrichment to 60%. The level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon is 90%. In exchange for a cap on enrichment, Washington will work to unfreeze Iranian assets. Nuclear deal talks have grown stagnant in part due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but analysts speculate that an informal agreement may open the door for further diplomatic talks.

  • Introduction to the India-China Space Race

    Introduction to the India-China Space Race

    Introduction 

    India and China have heavily invested in their respective space programs since the 1960s, with both countries vying to become a leading space power. The space race between the United States and the Soviet Union had a major influence on China and India, leading the two Asian nations to make space development a priority. Both countries see space development as a means to achieve national development goals, maintain political power, increase national pride, and gain international respect. In recent years, the Asian space race has shifted away from an ideological superpower rivalry to focus on economic and national security benefits. 

    The Chinese Space Program 

    The Chinese space program is run by the China National Space Administration (CNSA), a civilian agency focused on defense-related technology. The CNSA does not oversee China’s astronauts. China’s manned space program is the China Manned Space Engineering Office (CMSEO), part of China’s Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department (CMDED).

    The People’s Republic of China (PRC) sent astronauts into space for the first time in 2003 and has since conducted several other manned missions. The Chinese Manned Space Agency has been a source of great national pride for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with President Xi Jinping closely associating himself with the program’s success. China has also developed a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) that rivals the American Global Positioning System (GPS). In May 2023, the PRC announced several expansions to its current space program, including updates to its existing Tiangong space station and a plan to land astronauts on the moon by 2030.

    China has also rapidly expanded its arsenal of space technology for military purposes, including anti-satellite (ASAT) technologies. The PRC’s expanding ASAT capabilities have drawn concern from American national security experts. Many Chinese satellites are directly run by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which some American national security analysts fear could pose a security risk. 

    The Indian Space Program 

    India’s national space program is made up of the civilian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the military Defense Space Agency (DSA). The DSA oversees India’s ASAT technology, which the Indian space program demonstrated with a successful test in 2019. The founding of the DSA in 2018 has shifted India’s space focus towards military applications. 

    India has also seen a rise in space technology companies and currently contains over 140 space tech start-ups. In June 2020, Indian PM Narendra Modi publicly pushed for private sector involvement in space technology. In 2022, Indian space start-ups garnered around $120 million in private investments, with investments predicted to increase in the coming years. 
    India’s space sector has also benefited from US tensions with Russia and China, which are major providers of satellite launches that geopolitical tensions have closed off to American customers. A 2021 report from the American intelligence community labeled China’s space program a major security concern. NASA also plans to retire the International Space Station in 2031; China’s Tiangong space station remaining in orbit would allow the PRC significant influence in space, a major concern for the US intelligence community. In June 2023, India emerged as a new American ally in space by signing the Artemis Accords, a non-binding agreement with the United States to set space exploration and use norms. India has also announced its plans for an ISRO space station and sent a joint mission with the US to the International Space Station in July 2023.

  • Pros and Cons of US Aid to Afghanistan

    Pros and Cons of US Aid to Afghanistan

    Providing Aid Since 2002

    After the attacks against the United States on September 11th, 2001, the U.S. launched a “war on terror,” a global counterterrorism campaign to combat al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, as well as to topple the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The United States invaded Afghanistan as a part of this campaign. In 2002, after the surrender of the Taliban, President George W. Bush called for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and compared his plan to rebuild the country to that of the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Europe after World War II. Since 2002, the United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and has provided billions of dollars in reconstruction, security assistance, civilian assistance, and humanitarian aid to the country.

    The U.S. Withdraws, The Taliban Takeover 

    In August 2021, the United States withdrew its last remaining troops from Afghanistan, ending the 20-year-long war in the country. Shortly after, the Taliban seized control of the Afghan government. Since their takeover of the government, there have been numerous reports of the Taliban violating the civil and human rights of the Afghan people. In response, the U.S. has changed its approach in Afghanistan to focus on providing humanitarian aid rather than reconstruction. 

    Since August 2021, the U.S. has provided more than $1.1 billion in assistance to meet the basic needs of the Afghan people and to prevent an economic collapse. However, the current Taliban control of Afghanistan raises the question: Should the United States continue to provide aid to Afghanistan with the risk of funding the Taliban?

    Arguments for Continuing Aid: Afghanistan is a Country In Need 

    In Afghanistan, a humanitarian crisis looms over the country. As of 2021, 42% of the population faces acute food shortages, and there is a risk of an economic collapse as the prices of food rise. One analysis by the World Bank found that the price of goods had increased by 42% between 2021 and 2022. The World Bank further states that Afghanistan will need continued international support to fund basic services, support faster economic growth, and consolidate and sustain any potential reduction in violence following a political settlement with the Taliban.

    There are moral arguments that the United States should continue to provide aid. In a statement, the United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, called upon countries to provide funding for the people of Afghanistan. Calling it their “darkest hour of need.” In terms of the United States, Afghans For A Better Tomorrow, an activist group, claims the United States has a moral obligation to continue to provide aid to Afghanistan after its 20-year war and due to its “messy and irresponsible” withdrawal from the country that has put millions of lives at stake. 

    Arguments Against Continuing Aid: Mismanagement

    According to research and reports, previous aid and reconstruction projects by the United States in Afghanistan lacked collaboration between agencies and had insufficient monitoring, with U.S. agencies rarely coordinating their efforts in the country. Many U.S. officials believed the solution to the insecurity in Afghanistan was pouring more resources into Afghan institutions. However, the lack of progress with the increased resources made it clear that fundamental problems in Afghanistan would not be solved by changing resource levels. According to a SIGAR report, a combination of these issues led to billions of dollars wasted on projects in Afghanistan. Many believe that sending taxpayer dollars without oversight or quantifiable results is irresponsible, and that these aid projects must be accountable to taxpayers as part of the social contract.

    Furthermore, there is no guarantee the Taliban is not diverting the aid money. Since the takeover by the Taliban, the U.S. can not guarantee that the Taliban is not misappropriating the aid money provided to the country. John Sopko, the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction, testified, “Nor can I assure you that the Taliban are not diverting the money we are sending for the intended recipients, which are the poor Afghan people.” In fact, there are accusations that the Taliban has already diverted aid money to itself and has begun using it as another revenue stream. This also has moral implications for the U.S., as the Taliban government has significantly rolled back protections for women in the country, as well as committed numerous human rights violations. Foreign aid is a main form of income for the country, and indirectly funding the regime, intentionally or not, may empower the Taliban to continue its violent crackdown.

    The situation in Afghanistan has put the United States in a challenging situation. The United States must decide whether to continue providing aid to Afghanistan, which might increase the likelihood of financial loss and unintentional funding of the Taliban, or to stop such assistance, which could result in a serious humanitarian crisis in the nation.

  • U.S. Relations With China Regarding Technology

    U.S. Relations With China Regarding Technology

    Introduction

    Over the last four decades, China’s remarkable growth has shaped the world. With an average annual GDP increase of 9% since its economic reforms began in 1978, the country has lifted 800 million Chinese citizens out of poverty. Today, China is responsible for close to 5% of the world’s production. Now, China has shifted gears towards technological developments. With its dominance stretching from advancements in space robots to artificial intelligence, China is now in a position to become the world’s top technology leader.

    China’s Political Influence 

    According to reports submitted under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), China has invested $280 million to influence U.S. politics. This investment has led to a significant presence of Beijing-backed individuals in American Chinese-language print, broadcast, and online media. According to research from the Hoover Institution, virtually all Chinese-language media in the U.S. is controlled by Beijing or by business people who support China. This could allow for the Chinese government to feed propaganda to consumers in the U.S. Beijing sees Chinese Americans as part of a global Chinese diaspora and assumes they still have political, cultural, and even religious ties to the so-called Motherland in addition to having an interest in the well-being of China. 

    Such actions affect people’s right to free expression in the U.S. and have an impact on their political views and voting decisions. Much of the demographic in the affected areas are in competitive congressional areas such as New York or California. Thousands of fake Chinese accounts that targeted Americans were found on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, according to a Freedom House Organization report from 2019. These accounts seem to ignite Americans’ rage on contentious topics such as social justice laws or the right to bear arms. In September 2022, Meta—owner of Facebook and Instagram—revealed that before the midterm elections, a China-based influence operation targeting American users with biased political content was found and removed. The following month, Google claimed to have discovered Beijing’s use of trolling and other strategies to try to polarize Americans leading up to the 2022 midterm elections.

    Social Media: TikTok

    Worries about the Chinese government’s access to user data have emerged regarding TikTok and other major social media platforms. While it remains uncertain if the software poses a security threat, TikTok has been prohibited on government-owned devices in several countries, including the U.S. A report from the Internet Governance Project suggests that techniques for gathering computer-based data from publicly available sources could potentially collect extensive information about users of various networking apps, as well as TikTok. A former employee of ByteDance, the parent firm of TikTok with headquarters in Beijing, has provided explicit allegations that the Chinese Communist Party accessed user data on a large scale and for political purposes.

    US Response

    Over the last four years, the United States has become more cautious about China. The Justice Department established the China Initiative to address national security concerns related to China. This initiative aimed to intensify efforts to identify Chinese agents in the U.S., particularly in academic and research fields. However, despite initiating numerous investigations, it allegedly relied on unreliable information too often, resulting in failure to substantiate accusations against the targets. Eventually, the initiative was terminated due to concerns that it unfairly singled out Chinese nationals and Chinese Americans without gathering substantial evidence against them. However, the Global Engagement Center (GEC) of the State Department and the FBI have improved their ability to spot Chinese misinformation online. Major IT firms have also identified evident state media online and have improved their ability to remove questionable posts. 

    Conclusion

    FBI Director Christopher Wray claimed that China has a “breathtaking” strategy to steal information from the United States and influence American politics. The FBI has also claimed that Beijing poses a greater threat to political influence than Russia, however Chinese authorities have strongly objected to this characterization. Nevertheless, Chinese influence in American politics, media, and society seems to be growing and is expected to increase over the next few years. Despite efforts and claims to the contrary, it appears that the U.S. lacks an effective plan to prevent China from using a variety of media to gather information on U.S. citizens for their own purposes.

  • Policy Options: U.S. Response to Shifts in India-Russia Relations

    Policy Options: U.S. Response to Shifts in India-Russia Relations

    India is at a crossroads between its historical relationship with Russia and its growing relationship with the United States. Shifts in the global security order, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strengthening bond between Russia and China, and India’s cooperation with the U.S. on trade, technology, and security, are changing the dynamics of these relationships. India’s unique position gives the U.S. options in its approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the trajectory of Indo-Pacific affairs.

    India-Russia Relations

    During the Cold War, India and Russia pursued mutually beneficial ties built upon three pillars: arms sales, a preference for the role of the public sector in the economy and the role of Soviet foreign aid towards India, and countering the alignment between the U.S., Pakistan, and China. The enduring aspect of this historical relationship that remains crucial in Russia-India relations today is the sale of arms. Russia continues to be India’s primary source for arms imports, while the other two factors have lost their significance in the post-Cold War era.

    Another key component of the two countries’ economic relationship is oil. More than a third of India’s oil comes from Russia, and this share has increased in the past year. Additionally, starting from April 2023, India has initiated trade talks with Russia, aiming to broaden their economic cooperation beyond defense and oil sectors.

    However, certain geopolitical trends may compel India to reevaluate the nature of its relationship with Russia. Russia increasingly looks to China as its top strategic partner against the West and is seeking opportunities to grow closer to Pakistan on economic and security issues. India has a history of conflict with both neighboring countries, and current tensions persist. As Russia strengthens its ties with these nations, India might consider seeking alliances with other partners. 

    Despite these shifts, India’s relationship with Russia remains strong due to its dependence on arms sales, which would take time to diminish, and an oil trade that India finds advantageous due to Russia’s competitive prices. Russia also continues to place importance on this partnership, considering bilateral collaboration with India and participation in institutions like the SCO and BRICS as integral to its broader Eurasian strategy.

    The Impact of the Ukraine War

    Though India has not taken the same punitive measures toward Russia that the West has, it has not expressed support for Russia’s invasion either. At a summit for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization last year, India’s Prime Minister Modi spoke openly to President Putin, urging him to rely on diplomacy rather than war to resolve the conflict. Modi’s comments, though not a condemnation of the war, indicate a growing frustration with the strain it has caused around the world. 

    In the midst of the war, India’s economic ties with Russia persist. While the West sought to economically isolate Russia at the outset of the war, India’s imports from Russia grew substantially with Russia’s share of India’s oil imports increasing from 1% to 18% in the hundred days after the invasion started. 

    At the same time, the war has strained Russia’s arms trade with India. Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have forced it to delay shipments and suspend contracts with India as it seeks to cover its losses in Ukraine. India has expressed worries about the dependability of the Russian weapons it uses, and the Russian military’s issues in Ukraine only make these concerns worse. India started gradually diversifying its defense exports before the war, and the war could potentially encourage it to expedite this process. 

    The Role of the U.S. 

    While India has maintained some elements of its historical relationship with Russia, it has also strengthened ties with the U.S. As security issues in the Indo-Pacific, including the rise of China, become a priority in U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. and India both seek to develop a stronger partnership. Along with Japan, Australia, and the U.S., India is a member of the Quad, a pact through which these four countries engage in dialogue regarding security concerns in the Indo-Pacific. Though not a formal alliance, the Quad expresses a vision for a rules-based order in the region. Additionally, the formation of AUKUS, a security pact among Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., underscores the U.S.’s heightened attention to the Indo-Pacific region and its alignment with India on key concerns, although India is not included in the pact. The Russian Defense Minister has criticized both initiatives as measures to “contain” Russia’s partner, China.

    These expanding security connections are evident in the enhanced military collaboration between the two nations. A recent instance is the joint military drill conducted by the U.S. and India near India’s disputed border with China. Should India’s rapport with Russia encounter challenges, and considering Russia’s strong alliance with China, alongside India and the U.S.’s shared focus on China, this cooperation indicates that the U.S. could potentially serve as a security ally that India can rely on.

    In turn, as China continues to pursue its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to overtake the U.S.-led order through its Global Security Initiative, the partnership between the U.S. and India—including military cooperation—could provide an alternative for the region. 

    The opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. and India extend to the economic sphere as well. The bilateral initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) between the two countries aims to strengthen cooperation on technological innovation, defense industry, space, and education. The U.S. and India are also pursuing trade ties separate from the iCET arrangement. 

    However, India and the U.S. are still at odds over India’s arms trade with Russia. India’s decision to purchase S-400 missile systems from Russia could leave the nation open to CAATSA sanctions from the U.S. Although Congress granted authority to the President to waive these sanctions, it is not yet clear whether he will do so. 

    Obstacles to U.S.-India Ties

    India’s unique position between the U.S. and Russia is consistent with its historical preference for non-aligned foreign policy. Dating back to the Cold War, India pursues an independent foreign policy, establishing ties based on maximizing autonomy and protecting strategic interests, and is wary of permanent alliances based on shared ideological values. This allows India to maintain ties with both Russia and the U.S. when the interests of each nation seem contradictory. This could mean that India will be hesitant to sever ties with Russia as long as it deems the arms trade and economic relationship beneficial. 

    Despite India’s concerns about the quality of Russian systems, the majority of its arms imports come from Russia. This is partly because Russia provides favorable terms that support India’s defense industry growth, and moving away from this reliance would be a lengthy process.

    In addition to possibly subjecting India to U.S. sanctions, India’s purchase of S-400 systems from Russia poses an obstacle to increasing military cooperation between the U.S. and India. U.S. officials are concerned that through the S-400, Russia could breach U.S. systems and collect intelligence on the U.S and other allies. 

    For some U.S., policymakers, further alignment with India is not viewed in a positive light. Though India is a democracy, Prime Minister Modi often faces criticism for human rights abuses in the country. Among the reported abuses monitored by the U.S. State Department are suppression of the freedom of the press through arrests of journalists, mistreatment of prisoners (including torture), and policies discriminating against religious minorities. This could lead to hesitancy to strengthen ties with India and compel foreign policy leaders in the U.S. to make requests for reform. 

    Future Options

    As the war in Ukraine forces Russia to halt some of its arms sales to India, the U.S. has an opportunity to sell more defense systems to India to fill the void. This would decrease India’s reliance on Russian arms sales while strengthening ties with the U.S. During his visit to Washington, D.C. in June 2023, Modi emphasized the significance of defense cooperation and innovation U.S.-India relations. He mentioned the idea of uniting the defense industries of both nations. However, the challenge lies in the time required for this initiative. Despite India’s efforts to expand its defense suppliers, it is improbable to completely sever its arms trade with Russia, given its reliance on Russian systems.

    On the issue of the war in Ukraine, U.S. officials have expressed hope that India could use its unique relationship with Russia to pursue a resolution to the conflict. With the U.S. supporting Ukraine and India’s ties with both Russia and the U.S., India is in a position to attempt to negotiate peace between the two sides, and it would be consistent with a non-aligned foreign policy. In the press conference with President Biden, Modi reiterated support for diplomacy as the means to resolve the conflict. If the U.S. is open to the idea and India is willing to undertake the task, this could be an opportunity to resolve the war and strengthen relations. However, Putin seems reluctant to pursue peace, so it is unclear what it would take to bring Russia to the table in this situation. 

    Although India is unlikely to abandon its relationship with Russia, there remain other opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. and India. Tensions with Russia do not necessarily need to be an obstacle to cooperation on trade and technology between the U.S. and India. President Biden elaborated on the importance of trade, technology, and education between the two countries during Modi’s visit. Beyond Russia, there are also other security concerns, such as China, that are of interest to both the U.S. and India in the Indo-Pacific, and will likely lead the countries to continue to cooperate even while India’s relationship with Russia persists. 

  • Russia-Ukraine invasion and Southeast Asian Responses

    Russia-Ukraine invasion and Southeast Asian Responses

    Russia-Ukraine invasion explained

    The Russia-Ukraine conflict began in early 2014, and tensions have slowly escalated ever since. Last year, the Russian government started sending troops and placing resources in proximity to Ukraine’s border. In December 2021, Russia issued a set of demands calling on NATO to cease expansion to Eastern and Central Europe and reject Ukraine’s application to join the treaty organization. NATO did not accept these demands and implemented sanctions on Russia in response. The United States and other NATO member states also supplied Ukraine with weapons. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has displaced eight millions of people internally and caused thousands of deaths.

    In response, President Biden declared Putin’s actions “unprovoked and unjustified.” The United States and NATO nations implemented further sanctions, and the U.S and other G7 countries committed to continue military support. In an United Nations emergency session, 141 out of 193 states voted to condemn Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine and called for immediate ceasefire. Caught between Russia, China, and the United States, many Southeast Asian nations remained in the minority that stayed neutral and/or supported Russia.

    ASEAN’s relationship with China and the United States

    Southeast Asian countries have historically had to balance interests with China and the United States. The ASEAN block is the fifth biggest economic region in the world. Since 2010, trade between China and ASEAN has doubled from $235.5 billion to more than $507.9 billion. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China has projected influence while investing in the infrastructure and digital economy of ASEAN nations. 

    The United States considers ASEAN a crucial partner for trade and strategic cooperations in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden Administration has brought relations with ASEAN to the forefront, hosting the first U.S-ASEAN summit and prioritizing ASEAN states as the first destination for high profile members of the administration like Vice President Kamala Harris.

    In the past decades, most ASEAN nations sought to remain neutral between the United States and China, maintaining good relations with both great powers. However, this is not always possible and conflicts like the Russian invasion of Ukraine have forced ASEAN to publicly take a side as China has maintained support for Russia while the United States has led the efforts to support Ukraine and punish Russia.

    ASEAN’s relationship with Russia and its variety of responses to the Russian-Ukraine conflict

    Economic ties between Russia and the ASEAN pact are modest, and Russia is ASEAN’s 9th largest trade partner. The Russian-Ukraine conflict is predicted to have a low impact on ASEAN’s economic prospects. However, shortages from Russian sanctions and rising gas prices are likely to impact many ASEAN’s economies. Russia is a leading supply for arms sales in the region since Putin rose to power. In general, ties between Russia and Southeast Asian nations are weak and vary from nation to nation. However, since Russia and China are important strategic partners, negative sentiments towards Russia might affect relations with China. This places ASEAN nations in a difficult position in deciding whether to condemn Russia’s violation of international law or to appease an important partner. 

    At the United Nations session discussing the Russian attack, eight out of ten ASEAN nations voted to condemn Russia, while Vietnam and Laos abstained. Singapore has voiced the strongest opposition to the Russian invasion, and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked that if politics were based on “might is right”, such as the recent attack, the “world would be a dangerous place for small countries like Singapore”. This aligns with Singapore’s past reactions to international violations. In the 1980s, Singapore condemned China’s attack at Gac Ma in Vietnam as well as the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. 

    Meanwhile, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei condemned Russia’s attack but were less outspoken. These countries voted against Russia at the United Nations session. However, they did not name Russia as the “aggressor” and focused on advocating for respect for international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. 

    The countries with the most muted responses were Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. With their proximity to both China and Russia, it is more difficult for these countries to use strong language to condemn Russia’s actions. Here, both Malaysia and Thailand used neutral language such as “concerned” or “deeply concerned” to refer to the conflict, rather than specifying that Russia was at fault. Vietnam refused to use any language to condemn Russia, likely because Russia is its most important defense partner. In the past several decades, Vietnam has relied heavily on Russian imported weapons for national defense, especially in the South China Sea conflict.

  • U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan and its effects on ASEAN relations

    U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan and its effects on ASEAN relations

    U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan in 2021

    In 2021, after twenty years of military occupation, the United States and international forces departed Afghanistan. President Biden remarked: “It’s time to end America’s longest war”. After the withdrawal event, the local Afghan government disbanded, and the Taliban, an Islamic extremist group that formerly took control of the nation, retook power. 

    Many experts supported the decision, calling it “a wise strategic choice that took significant political courage”. Despite continuous investments in Afghanistan, many believed the United States could not change the course of political dynamics in this country. For that reason, this withdrawal would result in the most efficient outcome for the U.S and its allies. 

    Other experts regard the U.S’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan as a sign of weakened American strength in the international arena. Experts speculate that a withdrawal from Afghanistan might potentially signal other withdrawals in other arenas of conflict in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Under the context of the South China Sea conflict, ASEAN countries might face a decline in U.S support, thus they have to find new ways to circumvent Chinese aggression. As a result, such withdrawals can have serious impacts on aspects of United States-ASEAN relations.  

    U.S support for ASEAN nations in the South China Sea conflict

    The end of America’s longest war had major implications for allies around the world, including in relation to U.S. foreign policy in the South China Sea conflict. Since the early 2010s, China has made authoritative claims in the South China Sea to strengthen its authority in the region. China claimed possession of the estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas under the sea. These claims and other militaristic actions antagonized relations with neighboring states including Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. According to the ASEAN countries and the United States, within the framework of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), many of China’s claims were invalid. 

    To ensure regional political security as well as to secure its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, the United States has supported its Southeast Asian partners to combat China’s aggression. U.S allies like Japan also sold equipment and combat ships to the Philippines and Vietnam. In a 2020 press release, Secretary of State Pompeo declared “the world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire. America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law”. The U.S’s proactive approach and continuous support within the span of this conflict signaled the United States’ strong advocacy for ASEAN allies in military conflicts with China.

    Future of U.S- ASEAN relations post-Afghanistan withdrawal

    In reality, most countries in Southeast Asia did not see this withdrawal as a major shift in U.S foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region. While it does signal a temporarily weakened America, it did not alter the U.S’s long term goals in the Indo-Pacific region. Some Southeast Asian policy experts believe the withdrawal might give Southeast Asia the full attention they believe it deserves given U.S-China’s competing interest in the region. 

    While the Afghanistan withdrawal seemed abrupt, most Southeast Asian nations did not see it as a surprise. In 2011, the Obama administration indicated the U.S. would withdraw from the Middle East to focus on the Asia-Pacific. This move was part of the United States’ foreign policy strategy to withdraw from “forever wars”. Overall, the withdrawal was the final result of a decade-long foreign policy. 

    The United States will likely continue and even strengthen its multi-lateral support for ASEAN, especially in disputes such as the South China Sea conflict. The United States will continue to be a strong advocate for other ASEAN claimants in the face of China’s assertive actions. Following Biden’s inauguration and Afghanistan’s withdrawal in 2021, Vice President Kamala Harris visited Singapore and Vietnam, two key ASEAN partners. The trip’s goal was to cement U.S relationships with ASEAN nations after the complications of the Afghanistan withdrawal. According to NPR, one senior administration official in the Biden administration remarked: “Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific are really important and that’s why she’s going”. In addition, during her visit, Harris confirmed that the United States will continue to “bolster economic and security ties with its Southeast Asian countries”. 

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