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Category: Central and Latin America

  • US-Brazil Relations Post-2022 Brazilian Presidential Election

    US-Brazil Relations Post-2022 Brazilian Presidential Election

    Brazil Before the Election, 2022 Presidential Election Results, & Aftermath

    From 2019 to 2022, Brazil was led by the popular conservative, President Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro publicly questioned Brazilian governmental institutions and drew upon religious and cultural identities in a way that many have criticized as weakening democracy in the country. Brazil’s foreign policy was also less predictable and less multilateral as Bolsonaro seemed skeptical of Western international institutions. Instead, Bolsonaro deepened Brazil’s economic and diplomatic relationships elsewhere, notably with like-minded conservative leaders such as China’s Xi Jingping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. U.S.-Brazil relations also strengthened during this time, with Bolsonaro and then-President Donald Trump sharing close political and personal alignment. 

    In the 2022 Brazilian presidential elections, Bolsonaro was challenged by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—a popular leftist who was president of Brazil from 2003-2011. In October, Lula beat Bolsonaro with 50.9% to 49.1% of the vote to win the presidency. Bolsonaro repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the election, despite Brazil’s Defense Ministry finding no evidence of manipulation in the votes. The political unrest culminated on January 8th, 2023, when his supporters stormed Brazil’s Congress. The attack was similar to, and arguably inspired by, the January 6th insurrection in the U.S..

    Recent reports reveal that President Biden’s administration was directly involved in protecting the peaceful transfer of power in Brazil. Senior U.S. officials formally and informally pressured Bolsonaro and his administration to accept the results in the months leading up to the election. Biden and his administration harshly condemned the January 8th attack and stated their support for Lula.

    A Changing Relationship with the U.S.

    Lula’s administration seems to be challenging the U.S.’s role in Latin America and the international sphere. He has publicly questioned the use of the U.S. dollar as the global currency of business and championed broader use of other currencies, specifically the Chinese Yuan. He has advocated for the strengthening of political power of the Latin American bloc in the international order while de-emphasizing the role of the UN Security Council countries (China, France, Russia, U.S., and U.K.). Lula also explicitly defied the U.S. by receiving Iranian warships over its objections. 

    Perhaps most notably, Lula has strengthened relations with the U.S.’s top rivals: Russia and China. Unlike the U.S. and most of its allies, Brazil has maintained a position of deliberate neutrality with regard to the war in Ukraine. While Lula condemned Russian president Vladimir Putin’s actions, he refused to enact sanctions and stated that some of the blame for the conflict falls on Ukraine and NATO. Instead, Lula has advocated for peace negotiations, suggesting that Brazil act as the lead negotiator. 

    At the same time, Brazil, like many countries, is increasing economic ties with China. Brazil is now the second-largest borrower of Chinese state loans and China has surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s biggest trading partner. During Lula’s high-profile visit to China in April, Xi stated that China-Brazil relations were “a high priority.” This is concerning to the U.S. as it attempts to curb China’s economic rise and maintain its own status as the world’s most important economy. 

    Along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa, Brazil is a founding member of the BRICS economic grouping. BRICS is widely seen as a rival to the U.S.-led group: the G7. Lula has been a strong advocate of expanding the influence of BRICS since he took office, and in August 2023, BRICS extended membership to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates, greatly expanding its reach and prestige. 

    Taken together, Lula’s actions since gaining the presidency seem to indicate a challenge to the U.S.-centric international status quo. Some experts argue that Lula is attempting to create a “multipolar world order” where Brazil is one of many countries that dictate international relations. 

    Promoting Democracy in Brazil

    Many countries are experiencing democratic backsliding, and Brazil is an especially important case. While it seemed that Brazil might become less democratic under Bolsonaro, Lula’s election might have reversed that trend. 

    The Biden administration considers promoting democracy a major goal. In 2021, Biden stated that safeguarding democracy is the most important challenge and initiated various actions to achieve this. During Lula’s 2023 visit to Biden, they mainly talked about democracy. They also covered topics like minority rights and safeguarding the Amazon Rainforest. Additionally, the State Department and USAID have started financially assisting “democratic bright spots” worldwide, including Brazil which was designated as one in 2022.

    Yet, the U.S. attempts to promote democracy often don’t yield desired results. For instance, in countries labeled as democratic bright spots, which the U.S. views as likely to stay democratic, there is no evident proof of this. Another criticism is that the U.S. should not meddle in other countries’ governments, particularly given its history of sometimes violent intervention in Latin American nations in the name of democracy. Some scholars additionally argue that focusing on promoting democracy is harmful to the U.S. as it draws attention away from the security concerns and economic competition that should dictate foreign policy. However, others say the opposite, arguing that democratic promotion is a critical aspect of this competition—especially in Latin America where the region has explicitly pledged to uphold democracy in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

    Security Concerns and Global Competition

    As an emerging global power, Brazil’s alignment with the U.S. or one of its rivals could alter the international balance of power. These states are termed by some academics as “global swing states,” and maintaining positive relations with such countries is important if the U.S. wants to maintain its influence in global politics.

    After U.S.-Brazil ties weakened during Lula’s first presidency, both the Biden and Trump administrations pursued close relations with Brazil. Trump and Bolsonaro were close due to their political similarities. In 2019, the U.S. designated Brazil a “Major Non-Nato Ally,” further solidifying ties between the two countries. Biden has also attempted to keep close relations with Brazil, emphasizing his shared liberal values with Lula. However, Biden has criticized Brazil when its agenda does not align with the U.S.’s own, but has taken no further punitive steps. 
    Some have argued that this approach has made the U.S. look weak compared to Brazil, particularly with regards to Lula’s blatant defiance of U.S. goals regarding the Iranian warships. Others say that the focus on ideological cooperation with Brazil is leaving an economic vacuum, allowing China to strengthen trade relations with Brazil and gain more influence in the country and region. Some experts recommend a more nuanced approach where the Biden administration would focus on specific areas of concrete cooperation with Brazil, instead of expecting Lula to match Biden’s broader agenda.

  • 2022 Brazilian Presidential Election: Implications for US-Brazil Relations

    2022 Brazilian Presidential Election: Implications for US-Brazil Relations

    Brazil Before the Election, 2022 Presidential Election Results, & Aftermath

    From 2019 to 2022, Brazil was led by the popular conservative, President Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro publicly questioned Brazilian governmental institutions and drew upon religious and cultural identities in a way that many have criticized as weakening democracy in the country. Brazil’s foreign policy was also less predictable and less multilateral as Bolsonaro seemed skeptical of Western international institutions. Instead, Bolsonaro deepened Brazil’s economic and diplomatic relationships elsewhere, notably with like-minded conservative leaders such as China’s Xi Jingping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. U.S.-Brazil relations also strengthened during this time, with Bolsonaro and then-President Donald Trump sharing close political and personal alignment. 

    In the 2022 Brazilian presidential elections, Bolsonaro was challenged by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—a popular leftist who was president of Brazil from 2003-2011. In October, Lula beat Bolsonaro with 50.9% to 49.1% of the vote to win the presidency. Bolsonaro repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the election, despite Brazil’s Defense Ministry finding no evidence of manipulation in the votes. The political unrest culminated on January 8th, 2023, when his supporters stormed Brazil’s Congress. The attack was similar to, and arguably inspired by, the January 6th insurrection in the U.S..

    Recent reports reveal that President Biden’s administration was directly involved in protecting the peaceful transfer of power in Brazil. Senior U.S. officials formally and informally pressured Bolsonaro and his administration to accept the results in the months leading up to the election. Biden and his administration harshly condemned the January 8th attack and stated their support for Lula.

    A Changing Relationship with the U.S.

    Lula’s administration seems to be challenging the U.S.’s role in Latin America and the international sphere. He has publicly questioned the use of the U.S. dollar as the global currency of business and championed broader use of other currencies, specifically the Chinese Yuan. He has advocated for the strengthening of political power of the Latin American bloc in the international order while de-emphasizing the role of the UN Security Council countries (China, France, Russia, U.S., and U.K.). Lula also explicitly defied the U.S. by receiving Iranian warships over its objections. 

    Perhaps most notably, Lula has strengthened relations with the U.S.’s top rivals: Russia and China. Unlike the U.S. and most of its allies, Brazil has maintained a position of deliberate neutrality with regard to the war in Ukraine. While Lula condemned Russian president Vladimir Putin’s actions, he refused to enact sanctions and stated that some of the blame for the conflict falls on Ukraine and NATO. Instead, Lula has advocated for peace negotiations, suggesting that Brazil act as the lead negotiator. 

    At the same time, Brazil, like many countries, is increasing economic ties with China. Brazil is now the second-largest borrower of Chinese state loans and China has surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s biggest trading partner. During Lula’s high-profile visit to China in April, Xi stated that China-Brazil relations were “a high priority.” This is concerning to the U.S. as it attempts to curb China’s economic rise and maintain its own status as the world’s most important economy. 

    Along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa, Brazil is a founding member of the BRICS economic grouping. BRICS is widely seen as a rival to the U.S.-led group: the G7. Lula has been a strong advocate of expanding the influence of BRICS since he took office, and in August 2023, BRICS extended membership to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates, greatly expanding its reach and prestige. 

    Taken together, Lula’s actions since gaining the presidency seem to indicate a challenge to the U.S.-centric international status quo. Some experts argue that Lula is attempting to create a “multipolar world order” where Brazil is one of many countries that dictate international relations. 

    Promoting Democracy in Brazil

    Many countries are experiencing democratic backsliding, and Brazil is an especially important case. While it seemed that Brazil might become less democratic under Bolsonaro, Lula’s election might have reversed that trend. 

    The Biden administration considers promoting democracy a major goal. In 2021, Biden stated that safeguarding democracy is the most important challenge and initiated various actions to achieve this. During Lula’s 2023 visit to Biden, they mainly talked about democracy. They also covered topics like minority rights and safeguarding the Amazon Rainforest. Additionally, the State Department and USAID have started financially assisting “democratic bright spots” worldwide, including Brazil which was designated as one in 2022.

    Yet, the U.S. attempts to promote democracy often don’t yield desired results. For instance, in countries labeled as democratic bright spots, which the U.S. views as likely to stay democratic, there is no evident proof of this. Another criticism is that the U.S. should not meddle in other countries’ governments, particularly given its history of sometimes violent intervention in Latin American nations in the name of democracy. Some scholars additionally argue that focusing on promoting democracy is harmful to the U.S. as it draws attention away from the security concerns and economic competition that should dictate foreign policy. However, others say the opposite, arguing that democratic promotion is a critical aspect of this competition—especially in Latin America where the region has explicitly pledged to uphold democracy in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

    Security Concerns and Global Competition

    As an emerging global power, Brazil’s alignment with the U.S. or one of its rivals could alter the international balance of power. These states are termed by some academics as “global swing states,” and maintaining positive relations with such countries is important if the U.S. wants to maintain its influence in global politics.

    After U.S.-Brazil ties weakened during Lula’s first presidency, both the Biden and Trump administrations pursued close relations with Brazil. Trump and Bolsonaro were close due to their political similarities. In 2019, the U.S. designated Brazil a “Major Non-Nato Ally,” further solidifying ties between the two countries. Biden has also attempted to keep close relations with Brazil, emphasizing his shared liberal values with Lula. However, Biden has criticized Brazil when its agenda does not align with the U.S.’s own, but has taken no further punitive steps. 

    Some have argued that this approach has made the U.S. look weak compared to Brazil, particularly with regards to Lula’s blatant defiance of U.S. goals regarding the Iranian warships. Others say that the focus on ideological cooperation with Brazil is leaving an economic vacuum, allowing China to strengthen trade relations with Brazil and gain more influence in the country and region. Some experts recommend a more nuanced approach where the Biden administration would focus on specific areas of concrete cooperation with Brazil, instead of expecting Lula to match Biden’s broader agenda.

  • US Involvement in the Lithium Triangle

    US Involvement in the Lithium Triangle

    Lithium, also known as white gold, is an important component in rechargeable batteries. These batteries are used in portable technology such as cell phones and laptops, as well as large scale electrical components. Specifically, Lithium-ion batteries store energy for solar panels, electric vehicles, and wind turbines making the resource essential for shifting away from fossil fuels. As a result, demand for lithium is on the rise, and the global consumption of lithium increased by over 40% in 2022.

    Lithium is mostly extracted from brine lake deposits or salares, as these locations have the highest concentration of the mineral. While there are several salares in the United States, the most lithium-rich salares are in Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. In fact, the overlapping area between these countries is home to over half of the world’s lithium, garnering this region the title of the “Lithium Triangle.”

    The US has several domestic lithium projects such as Abermale’s mine in Silver Peak Nevada or Lithium Americas’ upcoming Thacker Pass mine on the Oregon-Nevada border. Even so, these mines cannot match domestic demand, hence why the US has already started working with Lithium Triangle nations and imported over 90% of its lithium from Argentina and Chile between 2016-2019. 

    Demand for Clean Energy and Lithium

    The Biden Administration recently passed legislation investing in clean energy and the lithium industry. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law included an emphasis on electrical vehicles and clean energy technologies. Specifically, the deal contained a $65 billion investment in innovations within the sphere of clean energy as part of the overall goal to become a zero-emissions economy. The following year the administration passed the Inflation Reduction Act which provided funding to domestic-based clean energy projects and battery production. These two bills represent a conscious effort to enhance US energy production, thus requiring more lithium.

    Several Republicans are skeptical of the Inflation Reduction Act, claiming that the subsidies for battery production would end up supporting Chinese companies. Republican Frank Lucas wrote a letter to the Department of Energy questioning a grant for Microvast, a company with Chinese ties. These concerns highlight the larger issue of competing with China for control of the lithium industry.

    Competition with China 

    China is the US’s main rival in lithium battery technologies, as well as the electric vehicle sector. In a recent speech, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken reaffirmed that the US strategy towards China is based on economic competition, especially through technological production and foreign influence. Meanwhile, Chinese companies are at the forefront of battery production and several Chinese mining companies have purchased shares in Lithium Triangle operations.

    The Department of Energy recognizes a Chinese dominance on the lithium-ion battery supply chain. This power is increased through investment in the mining process. The DOE approved National Blueprint for Lithium Batteries highlights working with allies to ensure a steady supply of the critical mineral and create more domestic processing sites. Investing in the Lithium Triangle could help the US compete by counteracting China’s recent acquisitions. 

    Extent of Involvement

    In June of 2022, the US announced its Minerals Security Partnership in hopes of addressing the rising demand for critical minerals used in clean energy; however, the Lithium Triangle countries were not included in this partnership. Although the US recognizes a need for lithium importation, it is not set on partnering with these South American countries. This leaves involvement in the Lithium Triangle to the private sector through companies such as Abermale and Lithium Americas. 

    In examining this involvement, it is important to note that China has already beat out US involvement in Bolivia as the government has recently partnered with several Chinese firms to manage the country’s lithium mining. Meanwhile, Chile’s mining sector is heavily state controlled with only two companies allowed to operate, again limiting options. Argentina is more open to foreign companies with 36 projects as of 2023. The success of American owned company Livent demonstrates an opportunity for more private involvement in the region. Still, additional companies in Argentina may need US financial support because of the overall risk in doing business within the country. 

    The Inflation Reduction Act provides a potential for these partnerships. The plan includes tax cuts for foreign companies within the battery production industry. That being said, this financial support only applies to countries with US free trade agreements which neither Argentina nor Bolivia have. Several Republicans, on the other hand, prioritize supporting domestic mining projects rather than expanding these financial partnerships to the rest of the Lithium Triangle.   

    Ecological Damage

    Another issue to consider with these lithium mines is the local ecological threat. Throughout the Lithium Triangle, mining operations resulted in a decrease in the Flamingo population as well as general harm to the nearby wetland nature reserves. Additionally, the process of water evaporation needed to extract lithium is hurting transandean Indigenous populations by depleting their water supply. With increased US involvement in the region, the mining operations would only grow to match American demands and as a result the potential for further harming the environment and local communities would increase as well.

    The debate around American involvement in the Lithium Triangle boils down to whether the private and domestic sectors can provide enough to match US demands or if the government has to invest more. No matter what, the International Energy Association predicts that the demand for lithium will rise over 90% if countries hope to meet the Paris Agreement in the next couple of decades, so the importance of the lithium industry is not going away.

  • Introduction to US Relations with Panama

    Introduction to US Relations with Panama

    Source: GIS Geography 

    Panama was the first Spanish colony on the Pacific and is home to indigenous groups including the Guaymí, Kuna, and Chocó. The country is historically known for the Panama Canal, one of the world’s most used passages that cut down travel time between the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. In 1903 Panama gained its independence from Colombia and became the independent Republic of Panama. 

    Fact Sheet 

    History of US-Panama Relations 

    Following independence from Colombia in 1903, Panama and the US officially established relations when they signed the Bunau-Varilla Treaty, allowing the US to build and operate a canal vital to global trade and national security. The key location of Panama and the Panama Canal made it a critical partner to the US in battling illegal drug trade. The US would eventually give Panama control of the Canal zone in 1979 and control and responsibility for the Canal to Panama in 1999. 

    Panama was strategically important to the United States during the Cold War, due to its proximity to the US, influence over the Panama Canal, and role in combating the illegal drug trade between North and South America. In 1968, a military coup took place and a new dictatorship came to power, led by General Omar Torrijos. The dictatorship was accused of numerous human rights violations and electoral fraud in subsequent elections. Initially, the US worked with the military dictatorship as a partner in the region. However, widespread protests began in 1988, and the US eventually invaded in 1989 to unseat the government, which was condemned by the international community. Many thousands of people were displaced by the conflict. 

    A democratically-elected, coalition government came to power following the end of the invasion. The US and Panama have continued to cooperate since 1989.

    US Strategic Interests 

    Corruption: The US stepped up efforts in recent years to combat corruption especially when it affects business and trade with the U.S. and other international investors, and has found a partner in current President Laurentino Cortizo. Corruption in Panama affects the justice system and the highest levels of government. The US accused former President Martinelli of falsely awarding government contracts, and arrested Martinelli’s two sons in 2018 on US soil for their role in a massive bribery and money laundering case. The Biden administration has since unveiled the first national security strategy memorandum focused on corruption. The National Assembly rejected Cortizo’s proposed constitutional reform package which would have allowed the Attorney General to investigate judicial and legislative leaders.

    Migration: Panama and the US recently signed a bilateral migration protection agreement with a focus on Panama’s southern border with Colombia. This border is a major pathway for irregular migration, with asylum seekers and migrants from South America crossing the border in an effort to reach Mexico or the United States. Cooperation on this front is twofold: the US aims to provide protection and resources for vulnerable migrants as well as support Panama’s border security efforts.

    US-China Tensions: China began investments in Panama in 2013 as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has raised concerns that Chinese companies may try to gain influence over the Panama Canal’s operations. The Panama Canal is considered highly important to the US economy. Panama’s key geographic position created a stronger trade relationship with China than many other Latin American nations share. However, President Cortizo suspended or canceled multiple Chinese investment projects, generating uncertainty about the future of relations with China and causing some setbacks for Chinese projects.

  • The Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Latin America

    The Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Latin America

    What Are Human Rights Defenders?

    According to the United Nations, human rights defenders “individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights in a peaceful manner.” This often takes the form of monitoring governments and businesses to bring attention to human rights violations and crimes, defending vulnerable populations, and advocating for environmental protection. Human rights defenders often come into conflict with authoritarian governments who see them as threats, as human rights defenders can directly criticize government action or fill a gap when a government fails to act. In Venezuela, domestic laws are used against human rights defenders that limit their operations and restrict their access to funding. 

    Violence in the Region

    Central and Latin America is a global hotspot for the persecution of human rights defenders. The region accounts for three quarters of all murders of defenders globally. In January 2022, thirteen defenders were killed in Colombia, three in Honduras, three in Brazil, and one defender and four journalists in Mexico. Eighteen of those killed were involved in defending rights in relation to access to land and the protection of land and the environment. In recent years, human rights defenders have experienced greater persecution due to the effects of the pandemic, increasing environmental hazards, and the lack of legal protections in place for HRDs. The pandemic allowed oppressive governments to implement draconian policies, take new steps to restrict movement and privacy, and crack down on opposition under the guise of public health measures. 

    Many human rights defenders migrate elsewhere within the region to avoid retaliation from the perpetrators of human rights violations, and there is no significant evidence that authoritarian regimes carry out transnational repression. Many defenders and activists attempt to flee to countries that are safer, but there are still many risks in states throughout the region. 

    Environmental activists are especially vulnerable in Mexico and Colombia. 212 environmental and land/water activists were murdered globally in 2020—a record high. 165 of these deaths took place in Latin America, with 65 in Colombia and 30 in Mexico. Colombia had led in the number of murders for two consecutive years (2019 and 2020) and almost half of these offences were against people engaged in protecting small-scale agriculture/land rights. 40% of human rights defenders killed in 2019 were involved in land protection, worked with indigenous groups, or advocated for environmental changes. 

    Honduras: The Honduran government has been accused of using the criminal justice system to persecute activists, especially the Garifuna indigenous group which is currently disputing ownership of certain properties. In 2021, 200 were harassed, threatened, or attacked, and 80% of the violence targeted activists defending land and environmental rights. Roughly 90% of violent incidents reported against human rights defenders went unpunished.

    Nicaragua: Human rights abuses have been prevalent in Nicaragua and, as a result, 100,000 have fled the country. Costa Rica, Panama, and Mexico are major destinations for Nicaraguan migrants. Many opposition leaders and activists were arrested prior to the contentious 2021 election, causing supporters to leave out of concern for political persecution.

    Policy Options Looking Forward:

    The goal for HRDs today and in the future is to be allowed to work freely in their environments to promote respect, protection, and equality for all along with environmental protection(including land access and control). The US, EU, all Latin American countries, businesses, and investors are being called on to “protect HRDs from the attacks they face and to tackle the drivers of abuse.” However, it is not clear what that protection should look like, and, apart from asylum processes for at-risk individuals. The mechanism for changing another state’s domestic practices is nonexistent, beyond vague statements about soft power and diplomacy.

    The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders: In 1998, the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders was adopted by the General Assembly and commits the UN to promoting and protecting those who advocate for human rights across the world. This resolution was adopted twenty-five years ago, and could be updated to address the current state of human rights. The current resolution recommends utilizing diplomacy to protect defenders, but lacks details for how that should take place. The Declaration does not have a mechanism for enforcement  and relies on powerful countries to create consequences for human rights violations, which may not align with other strategic interests. For example, the US works closely with Mexico to manage migration and security along the shared border, so pressuring Mexico to change its behavior towards journalists could come at a high cost in terms of reduced cooperation on migration.

    The Biden Administration: In October 2021, President Biden announced that the US would serve on the UN Human Rights Council for three years in order to work to protect human rights defenders globally. Biden aims to promote accountability of governments that have persecuted, threatened, and killed defenders. The Biden and Harris Administration claim to put democratic values and human rights at the center of US Foreign Policy, yet there is no formal policy for protecting those who are defending human rights abroad. The US State Department has published a list of ways in which the US attempts to protect activists abroad that include assisting defenders obtain international protection, attending judicial hearings of defenders, attempting to keep close contact with activists abroad, encouraging host governments to work with the defenders, working with the UN to address specific threats, etc.

    La Esperanza Protocol: This protocol aims to improve the investigation of and response to serious threats against human rights defenders. This protocol, implemented in 2019, is the first international tool to establish best practices and guidelines to investigate threats of this kind. This project does important work in gathering knowledge and making it publicly available, but does not have a mechanism to ensure its implementation.

  • What the Colombian Presidential Election Means for US Relations

    What the Colombian Presidential Election Means for US Relations

    Introduction

    On June 19, 2022, Colombia elected Gustavo Petro, the 62-year old, left-wing senator, former mayor of Bogotá, and former member of the M-19 guerilla, as president with 50.8% of the vote, defeating Rodolfo Hernandez, a 77-year-old real estate tycoon and former mayor of Bucaramanga. 

    Petro’s win is historic, as he becomes the country’s first-ever leftist president. His running mate, Francia Márquez, is also breaking new ground by becoming the first Afro-Colombian and first woman to be elected vice president. Petro received almost 11.3 million votes, the most any presidential candidate has ever received. Many of those votes were the result of a surge in participation from poor and coastal communities.

    Many of these voters were not energized to the polls by concerns over security and counter-narcotics, which have dominated past election cycles. Instead, the COVID-19 pandemic, mass protests, and a deteriorating economic climate, along with issues such as inequality, poverty, social problems, police brutality, corruption, and climate change have become the main drivers for a new wave of poor, young, and urban Colombians. Many viewed Petro as a figure to challenge the establishment and help “the nobodies”.

    Petro’s Colombia

    When Petro was inaugurated n August 2022, he took over a nation reeling from rising inflation, poverty, and unemployment. According to Americas Quarterly, 4 million Colombians went into poverty during the pandemic. A 2022 poll found 85% of Colombians think the situation in the country is worsening, with 34% believing the economy is the main problem. Only 26% of Colombians are satisfied with its democracy. 

    Petro is taking over an unsatisfied and disillusioned Colombia. But it’s up to Petro to find allies for his Pacto Historico coalition—a coalition of left-leaning and center political parties and social groups—to begin to enact some of his campaign promises and goals from the economy to climate change.

    Economic Reform

    During his campaign, Petro emphasized the need for structural economic reform, stating in an interview with El Pais, “the establishment does not want change. It has become wealthy with an economic model that prioritizes the financial sector and is based on the extraction of oil and coal….a model like this increases social inequality, which is the mother of violence.” 

    Petro’s goals include tax reform to finance new social programs and public projects to combat rising inequality and poverty in the country. 42.5% of the Columbia population—21 million people—live below the poverty line of 331,000 pesos (~$77) per month. Much of his plan is focused on increasing taxes and royalties on extractive industries and their products, such as mining endeavors and fossil fuels, which could raise around $5.2 billion in added revenue. Petro wants to implement a new progressive income tax where Colombians earning more than 10 million pesos per month—1% of the population—will pay progressively higher taxes. 

    Petro also plans to focus on corporate tax evasion. According to Reuters, tax evasion costs the Colombian government $17.6 billion annually. These funds could be used to reduce the country’s deficit, which sits at 7.1% of its GDP.

    Climate Change

    Petro has been adamant that his priority as president is dealing with the environment and moving the country away from extractive industries, towards a productive economy. His vision of a “productive” economy would be becoming independent of oil and mining industries, which account for 50% of Colombia’s exports and 14% of government revenue, and replace them with renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and tourism. He also committed to end new oil exploration licenses which will be a complicated task because the government currently holds an 88% stake in EcoPetrol. However, Petro has made it a key goal of his presidency to make Colombia a global example in shifting away from extractive industries toward an environmentally oriented future.

    Social Reform

    Petro’s running mate, Francia Marques, represents a crucial advancement for many marginalized groups in Colombia. Petro’s has proposed creating a Ministry of Equality and ensuring 50% of all government positions are held by women. His campaign has put forward reforms to the public pension, healthcare programs, and public education in an effort to expand coverage and accessibility.

    The issue of hunger has also intensified recently, with the Colombian Association of Food Banks reporting that around 16 million Colombians have access to 2 meals or less a day. To combat this issue, Petro plans to declare a state of emergency against hunger in the country.

    Security & Counter-Narcotics

    In regards to security, Petro has stated that he wants to properly implement the 2016 peace agreement with the guerilla group FARC, and begin peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN). He has also set his goals to promote reforms for the military and police including hold military officials accountable for human right violations, dismantle the police riot squad (ESMAD), professionalize the military, and reform its merit-based promotion system.

    US-Colombia Relations Under Petro

    Colombia has been the US’s strongest Latin American partner for over two decades, with the US providing over $13 billion in aid. However, with the election of Gustavo Petro, the US finds itself with a new Colombian government different from the conversative governments of the past. While the Biden administration seems to be taking an open and cautious approach with Colombia, Petro seeks a ‘more equitable’ relationship” with Washington. At this time, it is not yet clear what that equitable relationship will entail.

  • Introduction to Cuban Migration

    Introduction to Cuban Migration

    US Policy Throughout History

    The United States’ policy overseeing Cuban migration has evolved over the past 70 years. 

    • Between the early 1930s and 2019, there were an estimated 1.4 million Cuban migrants in the US. 
    • Following strained US-Cuban relations, the US enacted the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966, which allowed Cubans who had resided in the US for at least a year to apply to become lawful and permanent residents. It was a fast track to permanent residency for many Cuban immigrants. The Cuban Adjustment Act came into effect after the 1959 Cuban Revolution which resulted in 1.4 million Cubans fleeing to the United States. 
    • In 1994 the US agreed to admit 20,000 Cubans annually. Prior to receiving permanent status in the US, Cuban immigrants were considered refugees and were counted as such within the overarching immigration system. However, this number did not include the family members of the admittees. Family members (spouses of a Cuban native or unmarried child under the age of 21) were allowed to apply for a green card under the CAA. Therefore, a total of 20,000 households are admitted into the US each year. 
    • In 2007, the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program (CFRP) began allowing family members of US citizens to travel to the US without having to wait for immigration visas. Once these migrants were physically present in the US, they were able to apply for work permits. This step allowed for the reunification of families and allowed for a more streamlined process of migration.

    Why Cubans are Migrating

    Historically, mass migration from Cuba to the United States has been in response to economic and political struggles that are present within Cuba. There has been a steady flow of migration since the 1959 Cuban Revolution. The largest migration waves coincide with economic crises, and many fled in the 1960’s when the Cuban government closed nearly 55,000 small businesses as part of the socialist economic transformation. Cuba’s economy is currently struggling due to combined issues from the Covid-19 pandemic, the US trade embargo, and domestic issues such as inflation, corruption, and shortfalls in domestic food production. In 2014, the Obama Administration lifted sanctions on Cuba allowing for more economic freedom.

    Trump and Biden Administrations: What has Changed?

    The Trump Administration reversed many of Obama’s efforts to improve bilateral relations with Cuba, and enacted new sanctions in 2017 which prohibited commerce with businesses controlled by or operating on behalf of the Cuban military, intelligence agencies, and security services, as well as limited travel and trade between the two countries. These policies took aim at revenue from travel, tourism, and remittances. In 2017 the US suspended visa processing and Cuba halted consular services in response.

    The Biden Administration sought to improve relations with Cuba. In 2022, the two countries held migration talks for the first time in four years, and visa processing has resumed as of May of 2022. The Biden Administration is seeking to stop the surge of Cuban migrants at the US-Mexico. In May of 2022, the Biden Administration announced the resumption of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program (CFRP). This will allow Cuban residents in the US to apply for parole for their family members. 47% of Americans support restaffing the US embassy and issuing visas while 22-24% of Americans oppose these steps; 24-31% of Americans have no opinions on these issues. 

    The State of Migration Today

    Migration from Cuba to the US consists mostly of people between the ages of 20 and 40 and a majority are women. Many Cubans attempt to enter the US through the US-Mexico border, and Cubans are among the top nationalities waiting at the US-Mexico border for entry into the US. Cubans travel from Cuba to Nicaragua and from there, make their journey to the US-Mexico border in hopes to cross into the US. Nicaragua is a popular starting point for migrants as Nicargua has eliminated visa requirements for Cubans. The US government is already struggling to process many migrants from Latin America. Many Cubans apply for political asylum, and there is currently a 54 month backlog for asylum hearings. The Biden Administration hopes to eventually lift remittance restrictions which would benefit Cuba’s economy and the families of migrants.

  • U.S.-Mexico Drug Policy Collaboration

    U.S.-Mexico Drug Policy Collaboration

    Introduction

    The U.S. is the leading consumer of illegal drugs in the world. The rate of drug overdose deaths in the U.S. was close to 320 per million residents in 2021, while the average for G20 nations was 23.8 per million residents. The border shared between the U.S. and its southern neighbor Mexico is the entryway for many of these illicit drugs. In 2020, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents seized over 266 tons of illicit drugs (cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, fentanyl, etc.) at points of entry along the border.

    Stopping this flow of drugs is a policy priority for both the U.S. and Mexico. In 1914, the U.S. passed the Harrison Narcotics Act, the first major legislation to regulate the distribution and sale of narcotic drugs. This marked the beginning of drug enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico. By the end of the 20th century, supplying the increasing demand for illicit drugs in the U.S. became the business of powerful Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), popularly known as cartels. These organizations and their violent tactics have become a threat to both countries. Mexican-based DTOs have formally and informally expanded across the border, creating a web of supply chains and control that poses domestic challenges for the U.S. and Mexico alike. This issue has become one of the most important aspects of the U.S. relationship with Mexico and a national security issue. 

    Early 20th Century Prohibition

    Prior to the 1900s, drugs like opium and marijuana traveled freely from areas of cultivation (especially China) to the U.S. due to their unregulated nature. However, the U.S. began to curtail the use of these substances through the Harrison Narcotics Act, and later by the formation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) in 1930. The FBN, led by Harry Anslinger, initiated a campaign to regulate and outlaw these recreational drugs. These efforts culminated in the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act, a bill that de facto criminalized the recreational or medical use of marijuana. 

    Many of these drugs were imported from Europe, yet with World War II disrupting intercontinental trade, Mexico became a major producer and supplier for the U.S. drug market. The economic incentive to produce illicit drugs grew under prohibition. Opium was particularly profitable for the Mexican economy, and since the demand was almost entirely abroad, trafficking of the drug was mostly tolerated by Mexican authorities. Additionally, opium harvesting was concentrated in the remote Sinaloan highlands, which is prime for cultivation of the poppy plant (the natural base for opium and heroin) and far from the reaches of federal oversight. 

    The War on Drugs and Operation Intercept

    One of the many cultural changes that rocked the 1960s was the increase in recreational drug use, especially amongst American youth. The conservative response to this counterculture movement was embodied politically by Richard Nixon, and especially by his declaration of the “War on Drugs” in 1971. The roots of this anti-drug focus can be traced two years prior to Operation Intercept, the 1969 drug enforcement policy that jolted the Mexican government into developing a capacity for domestic drug enforcement. 

    Thousands of U.S. agents spread across the entire U.S.-Mexico border and inspected all passing vehicles for evidence of illicit drugs. This led to catastrophic backups in cross-border traffic, negatively impacting the Mexican public and government officials alike. Intercept was planned unilaterally, with the intent of forcing Mexico to take action within its borders and on its own accord. The policy did not curtail the amount of drugs trafficked from Mexico to the U.S., but it did force Mexico into action. Traffic disrupted licit trade and caused headaches for residents of both nations, and Intercept was halted after only 17 days. Since then, the Mexican government has been a willing partner with the U.S. in drug enforcement operations. 

    Operation Condor

    By 1975, enforcement measures were not going as planned. Mexico was supplying up to 87% of the heroin entering the U.S., and the two countries needed a reset in drug enforcement collaboration. A series of joint operations, culminating in Operation Condor, was the answer. 

    Mexico, supplied with U.S. military-grade helicopters and aircraft, began a campaign of crop eradication, targeting fields in the states of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, known together as the “Golden Triangle”. This region of Mexico is the cradle of opium poppy and marijuana plantations. The mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure make the land isolated and difficult to patrol. However, federal soldiers infiltrated drug-cultivating communities, ultimately arresting and killing many supposed traffickers while receiving accusations of human rights abuse. In total from 1977-87, Condor missions destroyed over 220,000 fields and indicted more than 2,000 criminals, yet the northern stream of drugs did not subside.

    This crackdown pushed many of the Sinaloans out of the area, most of whom reconvened in Guadalajara. It also motivated the criminals to organize formally, sowing the foundations for the first Mexican DTOs. Condor’s crackdown finally allowed Colombian cartels to blossom and prosper, initiating the rise of Colombia’s export of cocaine to the U.S.

    The Rise of DTOs and the Camarena Incident

    As U.S. efforts to intercept contraband from Colombia became successful, the transport routes shifted to Mexico, thereby increasing the power of the Mexican cartels. In 1985, the muder of U.S. DEA agent Enrique Camarena on Mexican soil began a much more violent chapter in U.S.-Mexico drug policy cooperation.

    Camarena was tortured and killed because he got too close to the cartels. As is dramatized in the popular television show Narcos: Mexico, the DEA agent was investigating the head of the Sinaloa Cartel, Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo, also known as the “boss of bosses”. Camarena’s torture and murder was a turning point in U.S.-Mexico drug enforcement collaboration. The ensuing crackdown led to a dissolution of Mexico’s federal police force, and major kingpins like Gallardo were arrested or killed.

    A year later, in 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive, which allowed the Department of Defense to engage in anti-smuggling activities on the U.S.-Mexico border while classifying drug trafficking as a national security threat. Cooperation on military training began about a decade after, when U.S. and Mexican defense officials agreed to open the bilateral relationship to military support. 

    By the late 1990s, DTOs controlled nearly the entirety of the supply chain. Cartels were willing to resort to brutal violence for the control of profitable territory, demonstrated by the Camarena incident and subsequent uptick in drug-related homicides. This era would be a preview of the first two decades of the new millenia, when cartel violence exploded to even higher levels.

    President Calderón and the Mérida Initiative

    Rampant globalization during the late 20th century ushered in new challenges for bilateral drug cooperation. Drugs began to enter the U.S. through more routes and the violence between DTOs only grew. President Felipe Calderón was elected during this period of strife and insecurity, and declared war on the drug cartels eight days into his term.

    Perhaps politically motivated after a contested election, Calderón’s “war” was no bluff. His initiative against the cartels raised the level of violence in the country. By 2011, up to 96,000 soldiers were combating cartels. Decapitation tactics—eliminating the kingpins at the top of the cartels—were the primary strategy during Calderón’s initiative. U.S. support from DEA agents were essential, providing crucial support in many high-profile arrests like that of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.

    Beyond the services of federal agents, the U.S. was a major actor during this period of drug enforcement. The U.S. and Mexico signed the Mérida Initiative in 2007 to solve the evolving challenges facing drug enforcement. Between 2007 and 2010, the U.S. provided Mexico about $2 billion in equipment, aircraft, technology, and training through Mérida, funding supply-side counternarcotic efforts such as interdiction and eradication of crops. These tactics proved ineffective at slowing drug usage in the U.S., and incited higher levels of violence in Mexico. Calderón’s offensive against the cartels initiated an increase in fighting between rival gangs and security forces, leading to an estimated 47,000 to 70,000 deaths. Under former President Obama, Mérida took on a modified approach, focusing more on training judges and prosecutors.

    Looking Forward

    In October 2021, the U.S. and Mexico announced the end of the Mérida Initiative, and the beginning of the “Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities.” This new collaboration focuses on promoting human rights and providing economic alternatives to organized crime. The agreement is a welcomed return to policy collaboration between the two countries, which was soured in 2020 by the arrest of a former Mexican defense secretary in Los Angeles on drug charges. The focus of the Bicentennial Framework is ostensibly aligned with current Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s “hugs not bullets” approach to drug enforcement. However, many commentators have noted the expansion of Mexico’s military deployment within the country, rising from 69,000 to 125,000 troops since he took office in 2018. 

    The Bicentennial Framework is the most recent iteration of a decades-long policy focus between the U.S. and Mexico, which despite intense effort from both nations, has not led to long-term success. In fact, the statistics on drug use in the U.S. and violence in Mexico reveal a dispiriting report card. Homicides in Mexico during 2021 were over 43,000, four times higher than the rate when President Calderón’s war on cartels began in 2008 (14,000). In late 2021, the U.S. reached the grim milestone of 100,000 overdose deaths annually, nearly three times more than the rate of overdose death in 2008 (36,000). These two statistics indicate the most important drug policy issues in both countries: for the U.S. it is curtailing the evolving opioid epidemic, and for Mexico it is slowing the violence ravaging parts of the country.

  • Introduction to U.S.-Colombia Relations

    Introduction to U.S.-Colombia Relations

    Fact Sheet

    Population: 51,500,708 

    Capital: Bogota

    System of Governance:  Presidential Representative Republic

    President: Gustavo Petro

    Majority Language: Spanish

    Majority Religion: Catholicism

    GDP Per Capita: $5,334.6 (2020)

    Global Freedom Score: 64 (partly free)

    GINI Index: 54.2 

    History of Colombia’s Relationship with the U.S.

    Relations between Colombia and the U.S. officially began in 1821, when the South American country was known as Gran Colombia and included the modern states of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Of specific interest to the U.S. was the Panama isthmus, the natural geographic location for a canal through Central America. The construction of a canal was critical to U.S. maritime trade, and when Gran Colombia refused an offer for the U.S. to build the canal, the U.S. supported Panama in successfully revolting against the Colombian government. After independence, the new Panamanian government convened a treaty with the U.S., allowing for the construction of the Panama Canal. This event impacted U.S.-Colombia relations for decades.

    While bilateral relations cooled, U.S. corporate activity in Colombia grew as large companies invested in the South American nation, many of whom employed exploitative labor practices. In 1928, over 2,000 Colombian workers on strike at the U.S. corporation United Fruit Company were killed by the Colombian military. The strikers were portrayed by U.S. officials and United Fruit Company representatives as reflecting a “subversive tendency,” and this stoked American fears of a broader communist movement in the region. The massacre occured after the U.S. government threatened to send in the Marine Corps if the strike continued, and the event sparked outrage at U.S. commercial interests in Colombia. 

    By the mid-20th century, the U.S. and Colombia were aligned militarily. Colombia fought alongside the Allies in WWII, and the country contributed many aspiring officers to the School of the Americas (SOA), which opened in the Panama Canal Zone in 1946. The SOA trained Latin Americans in American counterinsurgency tactics, and, despite evidence of inhumane acts attributed to graduates of the SOA, the school still operates today under a different name.

    In 1948, a period of instability dubbed “La Violencia” began in Colombia. This was a time of political violence that spiraled into mass indiscriminate warfare, leaving more than 200,000 Colombians dead before 1964. The two major resistance organizations during the latter stages of La Violencia were leftist groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). To diminish some of this violence and in line with the U.S.’s Cold War anti-communist strategy, American military advisors developed “Plan Lazo”, a counterinsurgency blueprint for the Colombian security forces. Foretelling future interventions, Plan Lazo focused overwhelmingly on military intervention, with scant resources for social reforms or administrative structures. It was deemed mostly unsuccessful in controlling the violence Colombia faced.

    President Richard Nixon’s declaration of a global War on Drugs in 1971 forever altered U.S.-Colombia relations. For this reason, this chapter of history is given its own section below. Since major strife in Colombia broke out in the mid-20th century, the U.S. has been invested in Colombian affairs. Today, Colombia is the U.S.’ most closely aligned regional partner, and the countries have enjoyed relatively friendly relations.

    Key US Foreign Policy Considerations

    Colombia is continuing to dig itself out of the multi-sided conflict that mired the country in violence for much of the past half-century. The violent actors included the previously mentioned leftist guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN), right-wing paramilitary groups – namely the United Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC) – and powerful drug cartels. Colombia has made great progress in decreasing the levels of violence, seeing a steady decline in both the crime and homicide rates since 1990. In 2002, Álvaro Uribe Vélez was elected president on a promise to end the endemic violence, and his mix of aggressive enforcement and negotiation with the violent groups proved effective. The government and the AUC agreed to a ceasefire in 2003, and members of both FARC and the ELN agreed to put down their weapons soon after, though many continued their violent struggle.

    A recent victory was won in 2016, when after decades of negotiation, Colombia and the FARC militia announced a successful peace accord. In return for demobilizing, the deal protected FARC fighters who confessed to war crimes from criminal sentencing and also guaranteed former rebels seats in Colombia’s Congress. The accord was an indication that Colombia was on the road to stability, a major priority for multiple U.S. administrations. Colombia is a major regional partner for the U.S., due in large part to a long economic and security-based relationship. Since 2016, the U.S. has sent over $1 billion in direct and indirect support to ensure these internal security gains are preserved.

    Colombia is also an important regional partner due to the instability of its neighbor Venezuela. Colombia supports the declared presidency of Juan Guaidó, and there has been animosity towards Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, following the lead of U.S. policy. As a consequence of economic misery, over 2 million Venezuelans have crossed the border into Colombia, which is offering protected status and work permits to the refugees. In June 2022, President Biden announced $314 million in humanitarian, health, economic, and development assistance for Venezuelan refugees, much of which is directed towards Colombian efforts.

    Economically, Colombia is emerging as an important trade partner for U.S. companies facing decreasing margins in the historically lucrative Asia market. The U.S. is Colombia’s most important trade partner, and bilateral trade totaled $29.9 billion in 2020. In March 2022, President Biden designated Colombia as a major non-NATO ally, which gives Colombia access to new economic and security programs, including counterterrorism initiatives, a larger selection of American weapons, and cooperative research and development projects. 

    Spotlight: Drug Policy

    Colombia’s role as a drug supplier developed in the late 1970s. Marijuana production diversified into cocaine trafficking, with boats and airplanes taking most of the product to the United States. Two major cartels developed: the Medellín cartel led by the infamous Pablo Escobar and a rival group based in Cali. These cartels became massive political and criminal forces, contributing to the endemic violence that characterized Colombia for most of its recent history.

    Colombia became the focus of the U.S.’s War on Drugs, and the U.S. exported both military supplies and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents in an attempt to stem the flow of drugs. During the 1990s for example, the U.S. provided $1.6 billion in security assistance to the country.  

    This foreign involvement did not sit well with some in the Colombian government, and in response to the policies of Colombian leader Ernesto Samper, President Bill Clinton decertified Colombia as a partner in the drug war in the late 1990s. In 2000, however, the new administration of Andres Pastrana provided a reset in U.S.-Colombia drug policy, which led to the announcement of  “Plan Colombia”, a bilateral security strategy that aimed to end drug production and promote economic development. Eventually, Mexican cartels grew in power and took away much of the Colombian cartels’ influence and importance, leading to less violence and trafficking in Colombia. U.S. support for counternarcotics efforts continues today, however, with Colombia eradicating more than 130,000 hectares of coca and seizing nearly 580 tons of cocaine in 2020. 

    The election of left-wing President Gustavo Petro in June 2022 opens the possibility of a new approach to Colombia’s drug policy. Petro has been roundly critical of the U.S.-led war on drugs. During his campaign, Petro voiced his disagreements with current extradition policies and the large sums of investment into security spending. He has stated that his priority with the U.S. is addressing climate change, and that his administration will center their drug policy around environmental factors. Petro is Colombia’s first left-wing head of state, and his election could usher in a new stage in the long history of drug policy collaboration between the U.S. and Colombia.

  • Latin American Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy

    Latin American Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy

    A Time of Change

    In 2021 and at the start of 2022, Latin American politics were dominated by numerous, significant elections. Newly elected leaders marked the beginning of a new wave of youth attempting to change the region’s status quo. Many of these leaders will come into power facing countless issues that have been plaguing Latin America for years: the rising prices of commodities, economic recovery from COVID-19, corruption, democratic backsliding, debates over extractivism, and growing tensions between the U.S. and China in the region.

    At the same time, the U.S. finds itself at a crossroads in its relationship with the region. While President Biden has made it a priority to work with Latin American governments to tackle issues such as migration crises and economic recovery, the administration will still have to work on amending its partnerships with the region following years of deteriorating relations. A fresh wave of leadership across the region may present an opportunity for the U.S. to realign its foreign policy with Latin America.

    Focusing on the elections in Ecuador, Chile, and Honduras, what do these new governments mean for the future of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America?

    Ecuador

    On May 24th, 2021, Ecuador’s newly elected president, Guillermo Lasso took office. Lasso is a conservative, right-leaning, former banker who had a surprising victory over Andrés Arauz. Arauz was the hand-selected successor of former President Rafael Correa, the long-time serving leftist president who has since been convicted of corruption. Lasso’s victory represents a shift away from the authoritarian leftist politics of Correa, which has ignited both hopes for change and uncertainty about the future of the country.

    Since taking office, Lasso has attempted to enact his pro-business and pro-investment policies but has been faced with limited support in Congress. Further issues have plagued his first six months in power, including the growing security crisis and intensifying drug trade, as well as the massive influx of Venezuelan migrants into the country. Moreover, the need for economic stability in the wake of rising inflation has consumed much of Lasso’s time in office. This has led Lasso to prioritize juridical reforms across the Ecuadorian government to create a safe environment for foreign investments and attempt to renegotiate trade and debt agreements with the U.S., China, and IMF to help revitalize the economy.

    Lasso has proven that he can be a strong ally for the U.S. in South America. Both his participation in the Summit of the Americas and the recent visit by First Lady Jill Biden exhibit the continued strength of the U.S.-Ecuadorian relationship. Moreover, despite the growing presence of China in Ecuador’s economy, the U.S remains the country’s number one trading partner. With this strong ally in South America, the U.S. has the option to work with Lasso and the Ecuadorian government to tackle many of the important issues that President Biden has been focusing on in Latin America, including dealing with migration, drug trafficking, corruption, and climate change. Lasso and Ecuador have the potential to be key allies as the U.S. attempts to reestablish itself as a primary player in Latin America.

    Chile

    The election of Gabriel Boric for president in December of 2021 marked a monumental shift in Chilean politics. Boric represents the epitome of the new wave of leadership sweeping across Latin America, as a young, leftist leader with a focus on the issues of climate change, social reform, and inequality. Boric came into power riding a massive wave of social unrest beginning in 2019. This wave of support is what pushed Boric to victory over José Antonio Kast, a right-wing lawyer, whom many Chileans viewed as a dangerous regression towards the conservative right-wing dictatorship of Pinochet.

    Since Boric’s inauguration in March of 2022, he has focused on tackling many of the same issues that plague governments across the region, including migration and economic instability. However, following the 2019 protests in the country, Chile has been attempting to rewrite its constitution, which has remained unchanged since Chile transitioned to democracy in 1990. The Constitutional Referendum has consumed much of Chilean politics in Boric’s first months in charge and has hindered many of his efforts to pass taxes on mining companies and social justice reform. Further issues such as rising inflation and the soaring cost of commodities have left Chile, a country that imports much of its food and crude oil, in a difficult economic situation that Boric will have to face in the coming months.

    While domestic issues remain central during the early days of Boric’s presidency, his election victory provides a new opportunity for U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, Boric represents the new “millennial” left wave that is passing through Latin America: a “new left” with an ideological shift away from the authoritarian leftist governments of the early 2000s who vilified the United States, to one that seeks to work and collaborate with the U.S. to preserve democracy and tackle other international affairs. Boric has already shown his desire to work with the U.S. by attending the recent Summit of the Americas. Fostering a positive U.S.-Chile relationship can be an example for other newly elected leaders across the region.

    Moreover, much of the Biden administration’s goals and priorities align well with Boric’s agenda, especially the focus on strengthening democracy, social reforms, inequality, and climate change. The issue of climate change could be a key point of collaboration between both countries as Boric seeks to make the country’s mining companies more community-oriented and environmentally friendly, which are efforts that can be aided by U.S. support. 

    Chile can also be an opportunity for the U.S. to reinvigorate itself as an important economic partner in the region. Chile has the second-largest lithium deposits in the world and is the number one exporter of copper, so the country has a vital role in the global economy, as the demand for batteries and electric cars continues to grow. The natural resources have attracted Chinese manufacturers, culminating in China being Chile’s number one trading partner. The U.S. could pursue new economic strategies such as increasing investments, building on current trade deals, and strengthening the region’s supply chain, to lessen the trade gap with China in Latin America. 

    Honduras

    The election of Xiomara Castro in November of 2021 was a turning point for Honduran politics; it marked the end of a 12-year single-party rule, and Castro became the country’s first female president. A 62-year-old center-leftist, Castro is the wife of former President Manuel Zelaya, who was ousted in a 2009 military-backed coup, which both the U.S. and OAS condemned. 

    Castro has taken over the country at one of its lowest points. Her predecessor, former President Juan Orlando Hernádez was indicted by the U.S. for drug trafficking. Moreover, the country has begun to recover from the devastating shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as two Category 4 hurricanes in 2020, which resulted in a 9% decline in GDP. While the past two years have been a slow growth towards recovery, Honduras remains one of the poorest countries in Central America. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, 73% of the population lives below the national poverty line, with almost 54% living in extreme poverty. With a reeling economy and intensifying violence, thousands of families have made the treacherous journey northwards to the U.S. causing a mass migration crisis.

    However, Castro’s victory could prove to be a reset in U.S.-Honduran relations. During her campaign, Castro ran on a platform heavily aligned with the Biden administration’s goals for Central America. This led Vice President Kamala Harris to attend Castro’s inauguration, showing positive signs for the relationship. Efforts by the Biden administration such as the “Root Causes of Migration” policy seek to tackle the issues such as economic insecurity, corruption, human rights violations, and violence that push families to migrate northwards. However, such policies will require support from government officials in Central America to be effective. As Castro shows signs of being a strong ally in the region, Honduras may become essential for the U.S. plan to deal with the current migration crisis.

    U.S. support could also be crucial in aiding Honduras with its economic recovery. Over 30% of the country’s budget is consumed by debt to international financial institutions, many of whom the U.S. is a primary financier. By renegotiating this debt, much of the country’s budget could be redistributed towards health, education, and national development. Furthermore, dealing with Honduras’ rampant corruption problem is also a major target for Castro, who has already pledged to create an anti-corruption commission. Congruently, President Biden has made solving corruption an important part of his “Root Causes of Migration” plan. He has also promised $4 billion in aid which Honduras will only have access to once government corruption is dealt with. 

    The Future Remains Uncertain

    For Ecuador, Chile, and Honduras change brings hope and uncertainty. While new leadership could prove to be a turning point for many of these countries, many developments still remain to be seen. For the U.S., this could be the opportunity to push for a new foreign policy to re-establish itself in Latin America. However, these leaders need time and patience, which might be the hardest thing to find.