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Category: Foreign Policy region

  • Senegal-U.S. Relations: An Overview

    Senegal-U.S. Relations: An Overview

    Introduction

    As one of the few African countries that has never experienced a coup d’etat, Senegal is a notable center of peaceful power transfers, democratic values, and religious coexistence. Senegal is also unique in terms of its longstanding, favorable view of close partnership with the West, especially the United States. Since Senegalese independence in 1960, the U.S. has sought to maintain strong relations with Senegal, largely due to its geopolitical reputation as “the gateway to Africa”. As a convenient transit point for commerce and troop deployment, Senegal has historically been one of the foremost political, military, and economic allies of the U.S. within Africa. This strategic interest, combined with a long chain of pro-U.S. Senegalese presidential administrations, has led to a continuing politico-economic-military partnership between the two countries. 

    A brief history

    The U.S. formally recognized the Republic of Senegal on September 24th, 1960—a month after Senegal’s break from the previously-recognized independent Mali Federation and three months after the region gained independence from French colonizers. After his election in 1960, Senegal’s first president Léopold Sédar Senghor believed that cultivating close ties with the West would be functionally necessary for Senegal’s financial and technical survival in the early post-independence period. He saw Senegalese relations with the United States as a “natural consequence” of relations with Europe, and admired the US for its youthful dynamism and strides towards racial integration. In a meeting with U.S. President Richard Nixon, Senghor predicated Senegalese relations with the U.S. on the fair treatment of Black Americans. If discrimination rose in the U.S., he assured Nixon that Senegal would look elsewhere—ostensibly to China and the Soviet bloc—for partnership. Senghor’s immediate successor, Abdou Diouf, and the rest of Senegalese presidents have continued Senegal’s close political, economic, and military relations with the United States.

    Bilateral Economic relations

    Trade

    Senegal’s main exports to the U.S. are agricultural products, minerals, and textile fibers, while the main U.S. exports to Senegal are energy-related products, transportation equipment, and chemicals. Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Senegal is granted trade preferences that include the duty and quota-free export of many products to the United States. While this has given Senegal easier access to the American market, the trade balance remains skewed towards American exports to Senegal (Fig. 1). The U.S. trade surplus with Senegal has fluctuated over the past decade, but totaled 180 million in 2020.

    Senegal has also maintained a bilateral investment treaty with the US since 1990. U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Senegal was approximately 21 million in 2018, compared to Senegal’s 1 million FDI in the U.S. during the same year. U.S. investment in Senegal has expanded in recent years, with over 50 US private companies doing business with Senegal in various sectors. Senegal is also a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has its own investment agreement with the United States.

    Bilateral aid

    U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently announced the U.S’s conviction that “it is time to stop treating Africa as a subject of geopolitics and start treating it as the major geopolitical player it has become” during his visit to Dakar this past November. However, most U.S. involvement in Senegal revolves around some type of development aid. Contemporary U.S. aid to Senegal mostly focuses on agricultural production, infrastructure, healthcare, education, energy production. 

    For example, in 2018, Senegal signed on to their second Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) contract aimed at improving Senegal’s electricity sector. The contract consists of $550 million from the U.S. government and will be supplemented by $50 million from the Senegalese national government. The U.S. (in partnership with the UN) provided 903,990 Covid-19 vaccine doses to Senegal, though logistical oversights—including the short shelf life of the donated vaccines – have rendered large amounts unusable. The U.S. also committed 3.3 million to Senegal’s Institut Pasteur de Dakar with the aim of improving vaccine production capabilities in Senegal.

    The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has robust operations within Senegal. Currently, the USAID x Yaajeende project partners with rural Senegalese community-based solution providers to increase the production of high-quality agricultural products in rural areas. Moreover, Senegal hosts one of the largest Peace Corps programs in Africa, with over 4,000 volunteers having participated since its founding in 1963. As an agricultural powerhouse, Senegal is also a strong partner in USAID’s Feed the Future program. Many scholars assert that US development aid has not significantly progressed the Senegalese economy.

    Military cooperation

    Senegal’s strategic location and willingness to partner with US international missions renders it a cornerstone in US-Africa military operations. Senegal has one of the largest and most technically-advanced militaries in Sub-Saharan Africa and has been indispensable in U.S.-backed peacekeeping missions like those in Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 2016, Senegal signed a defense cooperation deal with the U.S. that solidified the country as a key military ally and troop transport point for America. The deal proactively deregulates the deployment of American troops to Senegal and is intended to speed up deployment in the wake of mass disaster or terrorist threat. Senegal is also a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), established in 2021 in response to the growing presence of Al Qaeda and Boko Haram in West Africa. Through the TSCTP, it receives military training and resources from the U.S.

    Perceptions of the U.S.

    While the Senegalese public has generally viewed the U.S. in a positive light, this perception has decreased in recent years, with a notable dip at the beginning of the Trump administration in 2016. However, Senegalese approval ratings of U.S. leadership seemed to stabilize at around 48% in 2018—a relatively high rating globally at the time.

    The lack of diplomatic engagement in Africa during the Trump administration was likely perceived as a foil to France’s significant intervention in and influence over Senegalese markets and politics. This relationship is sometimes viewed as a remnant of colonialism and often protested by the Front Pour Une Révolution Anti-impérialiste et Panafricaine (FRAPP) in Senegal.

    The Senegalese approval rating of U.S. leadership dropped to 32% in 2020, a major decline from 2018. This plummet could be the result of the Biden administration’s more active diplomatic engagement with a Senegalese public that supports less foreign interference, or negative perceptions of U.S.-backed COVID response programs. It is unclear whether this number has increased over the first two years of the Biden administration.

  • Introduction to Kazakhstan

    Introduction to Kazakhstan

    A Brief History

    Pre-Soviet Union

    The Kazakh steppe has been a traditional homeland of nomadic tribes that stand as the early ancestors of the modern Kazakh people. Though Kazakhs are Turkic people, their culture and way of life are greatly influenced by the surrounding civilizations that they have come into contact with. Modern-day Kazakhstan’s path became more apparent as the Russian Empire conquered the steppe as the country expanded eastward in the 18th and 19th centuries.

    Kazakh SSR

    Following the dissolution of Imperial Russia, Kazakhstan became a Soviet republic in 1925. The Kazakh SSR had an initially tumultuous past as forced agricultural collectivization under Joseph Stalin led to more than a million deaths in the 1930s. Moreover, the republic was the destination for many political and social opponents to Stalin’s regime exiled to Central Asia. However, due to positive agricultural programs in the 1950s and 60s, Kazakhstan was an attractive destination for agricultural workers from around the Soviet Union. Like much of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, Kazakhstan experienced significant upheaval. In late 1986, many young ethnic Kazakhs protested for the replacement of First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR Dinmukhamed Konayev. Government soldiers were deployed to suppress the unrest leading to several deaths and many arrests. These events subsequently became known as the Jeltoqsan protest. In October of 1990, Kazakhstan declared sovereignty over its territory as a republic within the USSR, and in December of 1991, it officially declared independence as the last Soviet republic to do so.

    Post-USSR

    When Kazakhstan gained its independence in 1991, ethnic Kazakhs found themselves as a minority group in their own state. However, many non-Muslim ethnic groups moved to their respective states, while many Kazakhs living in other former Soviet states were repatriated. Between 1990 and 2019, Nursultan Nasarbayev, a holdover from the Soviet era, served as Kazakhstan’s president. In 2019, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev succeeded Nasarbayev.

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    Image Courtesy of Britannica

    Modern Kazakhstan

    The modern-day Republic of Kazakhstan is a linguistically, ethnically, and religiously diverse state. Although Kazakhstan is predominantly populated by ethnic Kazakhs, there are many ethnic Russians living within its borders. Moreover, along with Kazakh, Russian is an official language and the language of interethnic communication.

    Kazakhstan is a presidential republic led by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and acting Prime Minister Alihan Smaiylov. Although Almaty, a city of nearly two million people located in southeast Kazakhstan, is the country’s largest city, Nur-Sultan, a city of just over a million residents, is the capital. Kazakhstan has a bicameral parliament with an upper house, the Senate, and a lower house, the Majilis. Despite its outwardly democratic system, Kazakhstan is considered a consolidated authoritarian regime where free and fair elections are not provided. 

    Kazakhstan’s economy is primarily driven by the exportation of natural resources to partners in China, Italy, and Russia. Alternatively, Kazakhstan relies heavily on Russia and China for manufactured imports such as packaged medicine and cars. The average Kazakh citizen earns roughly 268,000 Tenge per month. Although an initially staggering number, this only amounts to about 620 USD, as $1 is worth approximately 432 Tenge.

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    Nazarbayev (left) and Tokayev (right) Image Courtesy of The Astana Times

    January 2022

    What happened?

    For about a week and a half in early January, thousands of Kazakhs participated in violent protests. The situation was very volatile, and in many cities in the country, such as Almaty, a state of emergency was declared. On January 7th, President Tokayev ordered security forces to “shoot to kill without warning.” This undoubtedly escalated the situation and caused more violence.

    What caused the events?

    The primary catalyst for the mass protests was the government lifting price caps on liquefied petroleum gas. This gasoline is a low price, low-carbon fuel used by many Kazakhs to power their cars. By lifting the price cap, the cost of liquefied petroleum gas doubled. However, this was not the only cause of the demonstrations. Significant social and economic inequalities, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the autocratic nature of the Tokayev regime motivated many Kazakhs to demonstrate.

    What was the result?

    Although the accurate number is somewhat unclear, officially, 225 people were killed during the demonstrations, and many more were injured. Kazakh authorities said that roughly 10,000 people were detained. Of the many thousands of people detained, approximately 700 criminal cases are open against protesters whose charges range from terrorism, murder, and seeking to overthrow the government.

    President Tokayev appealed to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization for assistance in ending the demonstrations. This is notable as it was the first time CSTO soldiers had been deployed. These soldiers were effective in securing airports and government buildings, although their deployment was very short.

    In response to the economic concerns voiced by the demonstrators, the Kazakh government imposed a 180-day state regulation on fuel and food prices. The demonstrations also led to some political shifts as Tokayev’s cabinet, led by the former Prime Minister Askar Mamin, resigned.

    American Response

    The United States’ response to the upheaval in Kazakhstan was expected. Given the geographic distance between the two states, the U.S. could do little more than condemn the violence and ask all sides to work towards a peaceful resolution. However, the United States and Kazakhstan have a close political relationship as the U.S. was the first state to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence. Moreover, the two states have a close economic relationship. The United States has invested heavily in Kazakhstan’s energy potential, and nearly $54 billion has been invested into the Kazakh economy over the last thirty years. 

    Russian Response

    Compared to the United States, Russia had a greater stake in calming the situation. Were the Kazakh protests successful, they may have provided a blueprint for anti-Putin actors in Russia. In many ways, Russia had a responsibility to assist the Tokayev government. Both states are CSTO members, and Russia had to assist when called upon. The unrest in Kazakhstan posed a tangible security concern for Russia as the two states share a massive border. Long-lasting unrest in Kazakhstan could have provided another problem for Russia along its borders, in addition to the concerns in the South Caucasus and Ukraine.

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    Kazakh protestors Image Courtesy of Financial Times

  • The Euro and its impact on the European Union

    The Euro and its impact on the European Union

    This brief was originally published by Francesca Reynolds on July 15, 2021. It was updated and republished by Larissa Cursaro on June 22, 2022.

    History

    Although it took until 2002 for the Euro to become a physical currency, the idea of a common currency alongside a united monetary and fiscal policy was an ambition of the European Union since the 1960s. Then on January 17 1989, two decades later, the European Parliament declared the free circulation of goods, capital, services, and people to be the “four fundamental freedoms” of the European Union, thus officially encouraging the adoption of a single-currency. The purpose of the common currency was to support economic activity between states, stabilize economies, and enhance options for consumers.  

    The Euro is now the currency of 19 nations, leaving only 8 EU countries that use an alternative currency (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden). 

    The European Central Bank (ECB) was established simultaneously in order to coordinate monetary policy (policies relating to interest rates and money supply, used by central banks to influence the level of demand in an economy e.g. management of interest rates) between countries. This necessary measure also further integrated the economies of many EU countries, leaving national governments with only fiscal policy (policies relating to the amount spent by a government e.g. levels of taxation) to manage their country’s economy. 

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    Benefits

    • The Euro enables trade to operate far quicker by removing the need and risk of currency exchanges when operating across eurozone countries. Currency exchanges cost money to complete and are a risk to businesses as fluctuations in rates lead to uncertainty about the cost of the exchange. Therefore, by removing this barrier, trade has flowed easier between countries. 
    • Having a single-currency economy also incentivizes trade between the EU and other countries. The stability of a single-currency economy is attractive to potential trade partners as it ensures a relatively consistent exchange rate. This stability, paired with prudent economic management makes the Euro an attractive reserve currency for non-Euro countries, thus giving it a more powerful voice in the global economy. Fun Fact: The Euro is the world’s second most popular reserve currency. 
    • In theory, a combined currency should also incentivise countries to support each other and thus promote greater stability. There are a few reasons for this. First, countries with larger economies tend to be more stable as they are able to spread risk. For example, a natural disaster in a small country can ruin their economy and currency. On the other hand, a natural disaster in one US state will likely have an insignificant impact on the currency. Second, more successful countries have an incentive to help out less successful countries, otherwise known as “cohesion policy”. This is because the value of the currency impacts all countries using it, so if countries want to prevent harmful impacts to their own country, they need to support others. This benefit was realized during the 2020 Coronavirus Crisis. Although there was initially insufficient support for a collective measure, the ECB consistently bought debt in severely impacted countries to keep interest rates low. Eventually, the Next Generation EU recovery plan was put in place. It is the largest stimulus package ever from the EU and is worth around €750 billion. 

    Issues

    The most significant issue facing the adopters of the Euro is the coordinated monetary policy that often fails to fit local economic conditions. The economies of the countries currently using the currency vary significantly. Germany is the world’s third largest exporter but has to use the same monetary policy as Lithuania whose export value is 67th globally. Without tailored monetary policy for each economy, countries can struggle to solve issues impacting their populations, as was the case during the eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis.

    There is also concern regarding the economies of some member states that have already adopted the Euro. In order to become a member of the eurozone, countries must meet certain economic standards called “convergence requirements”, one of which requires the country’s debt ratio to be under 60% debt to GDP.  Considering that this is a non-negotiable prerequisite to join the eurozone, many economists wonder if the European Commission should start holding current eurozone members to the same standard. Some of the largest countries in the European Union—such as Italy, France, and Spain—fail this requirement with the average percent debt to GDP in the Euro area being 100 percent. If left unchecked, they may cause the Euro to lose value, which could be devastating for the Euro area’s economy.

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    Future

    • There are frequent reports of the potential collapse of the Euro, however, at least in the near future, this seems unlikely. The Euro was able to survive in Greece despite both economic and political crisis after the 2008 financial crisis, so it seems likely to continue through comparatively steadier times. 
    • The number of countries using the Euro could be set to increase. Since 1991 any country joining the EU has had to adopt the Euro and meet the “convergence requirements” (excluding Denmark). With a number of countries in the pipeline to joining the EU, it is no surprise that the eurozone is set to expand. On June 1st, 2022, the European Commission determined in its convergence report that Croatia has fulfilled the convergence requirements for the adoption of the euro on the first of January, 2023. However, many countries have been on the path to EU accession for many years without having been deemed to fulfill the convergence criteria.
  • US, China and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Part 2: Cooperation

    US, China and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Part 2: Cooperation

    This brief was originally published by Aerin Lee on September 21, 2021. It was updated and republished by Ethan McQueen on June 24, 2022.

    The Quad can cooperate in two ways to achieve their goals in the Indo-Pacific region: either with a narrow functional approach or a broader regional approach. A narrow functional approach would involve the Quad countries working together under a combined disaster relief policy to handle region-wide disasters. A broader regional approach would involve neighboring Indo-Pacific nations, not just the immediate members of the Quad, to handle such regional disasters and establish the Indo-Pacific as a coherent regional order. This Indo-Pacific regional order would serve as an organized body of nations aiming to contain Chinese influence. The potential consequences of attempting to contain China has made neighboring countries wary of taking an active role in the regional order.

    Quad-plus

    In 2020, the Quad countries held a teleconference with Vietnam, South Korea, and New Zealand to discuss how to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. These three nations have come to be known as participants in a Quad-plus dialogue because of their recent cooperation. Each of these three Quad-plus parties are Indo-Pacific powers with important relations with the Quad countries. For example, in 2018, Australia and Vietnam established a strategic partnership, pledging to increase political engagement with each other, deepen bilateral trade, and welcome intelligence and security cooperation. South Korea has been allied with the US under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, and the two nations have worked together to support inter-Korean cooperation and strengthen their respective economies. New Zealand formally adopted Indo-Pacific foreign policy in 2019, signaling its intent to deepen cooperation with the Quad countries due to increasing security concerns regarding China, as China has pushed its Maritime Silk Road into the Indian Ocean, militarized the South China Sea, and pushed into the Pacific islands.

    Complications to Cooperation

    India and the United States have a complicated trade relationship, leading to India drawing closer to Russia. In 1998 the United States sanctioned India over its nuclear tests, canceling all current orders for American military equipment and cutting off any future orders. India depends on imports for its military needs and is one of the largest arms importers in the world accounting for 10% of all worldwide arms imports. While these sanctions were appealed in just a few years, this isolation of India from western military companies helped lead to India becoming the biggest military importer of Russian military equipment in the world. This relationship led to a rift in the response of India and other Quad members towards the Russian-Ukraine war. The United States, Japan, and Australia placed aggressive sanctions but India increased oil imports from Russia to record levels and plans to enter into new contracts with Russian oil companies. In response, the United States sent convoys and threatened to sanction India. However, the United States has also been in discussion to provide military aid to India to help decrease their reliance on Russian arms. 

    Many US allies in the Indo-Pacific have been hesitant to join the effort, mainly due to the Quad’s clear intentions to oppose China. In particular, South Korea is reluctant to engage with the Quad because its foreign policy priority lies in improving relations with North Korea and sustaining peace on the Korean peninsula. Since China is North Korea’s primary benefactor, this also means that South Korea must maintain good relations with China. 

    A Binding Adversary

    Even with the complicated relationships between the Quad countries, India has remained mostly committed to the Quad. and the prospect of Korea joining a Quad-plus expansion has become a real possibility. With China’s behavior becoming more aggressive with its territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the Belt and Road Initiative, many nations’ attitudes toward the Quad and toward Chinese pressure have changed. These negative changes toward China have been further compounded by the Russian-Ukrainian war and China’s response.  Thus, the Quad and Quad-plus expansion are logical because these countries all share concerns regarding China’s aggressive behavior and have faced pressure from China in recent years.

  • Turkey’s Strategy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    Turkey’s Strategy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    Turkey shares complicated relationships and maritime borders with both Russia and Ukraine, and it has taken a dual approach to maintain distance from either neighbor. Turkey’s status as a NATO member and an economic partner with both Russia and Ukraine puts it in a unique position to serve as a place of negotiation and a communicator to the West. As Turkey balances its NATO responsibilities and strategic considerations, Ankara has worked to avoid alienating either side as it attempts to secure its own international and domestic position as a regional decision-maker.

    Early Stages of the Conflict

    In late March of 2022, Turkey served as the host of the first of three-way talks between Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba of Ukraine and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov of Russia, along with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu. During these talks in the town of Antalya in southern Turkey, Cavusoglu described Turkey’s role as more of a “facilitator” than a “host”. As part of the talks, Turkey brought up critical issues to the conflict, including free access to humanitarian corridors and the violence occurring in the city of Mariupol. Although no agreement was reached, Turkey has strengthened its position as a diplomatic actor in dealing with a developing conflict with two of its major economic partners. On a more personal level, President Vladimir Putin himself was reported to have called Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to outline his demands throughout the negotiations process. Finding himself in a difficult position, Erdogan has sought to optimize Turkey’s ability to pivot strategically while maintaining a distance from the current conflict. 

    Initially, Turkey’s position on the current conflict favored the Ukrainian cause. Erdogan criticized the West’s response as weak and joined NATO in condemning Russia by voting for the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine. This isn’t the first time that Turkey has publicly denounced Russia’s actions in the region—Ankara criticized Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and has been outspoken in support of Ukraine’s claim over Crimea and for Crimean Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group that has been persecuted under Russian control. Additionally, Turkey has joined Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives such as the August 2021 Crimea Platform summit.

    Naval Response

    Ankara changed its rhetoric after the beginning of the conflict. Erdogan and other Turkish figures in the government and media have called the invasion “unacceptable,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “courageous,” and the Ukrainians “helpless civilians.” However, when Ankara began describing the conflict as a “war” rather than repeating the Russian term “special operation,” it was able to invoke the articles of the 1936 Montreux Convention, at Zelenskyy’s request. Invoking the Articles of the Montreux Convention allowed Turkey to close the Bosphorus Strait to warships and thus block warring states from accessing the Black Sea (Figure 1). This has effectively limited Russia’s ability to move ships from other fleets into the region. Before the invasion of Ukraine, 16 Russian warships sailed through the strait to conduct military exercises in the Black Sea and now are engaged in the conflict. Due to the closing of the Bosphorus Strait, two of Russia’s Slava-class cruisers, the RTS Marshal Ustinov and the RFS Varyag were unable to move into the Black Sea from other operating areas. This move has earned Ankara praise from NATO and EU allies.

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    Military and Economic Response

    Turkey has also sent aid to Ukraine in the form of weapons. Turkey sent a number of Bayraktar TB2 armed drones to Ukraine. These weapons have been deployed in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh and have been extremely effective in other conflicts. Although Ukrainian officials have repeatedly underlined this contribution and its success, possibly to publicly pressure Turkey to take a more active pro-Ukrainian stance, Ankara has stopped short of claiming the transaction as a form of military aid. Rather, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Sedat Onal has publicly emphasized that the transfer of Bayraktar TB2 drones was instead an agreement made between the Ukrainian government and a private Turkish company. This attempt to distance the Turkish government from any overt lethal aid to the Ukrainian cause underlines the strategic considerations leading Turkey to avoid alienating Russia. 

    Turkey’s commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity has avoided outright alienating Russia. Erdogan’s response to the current invasion has stopped short of other measures pursued by other NATO members. Ankara has continuously declined to join sanctions on Russia, calling them “useless,” and it has refused to close its airspace to Russian aircraft. Through this, Turkey has become a “haven,” becoming the base of Russia’s connection to the rest of Eurasia. Some oligarchs and citizens have fled there as the effects of Western economic sanctions take hold of the Russian economy, leading to fears that it will undermine the effectiveness of the measures. However, this strategy is risky for Turkey. If the United States and the West decide to ramp up secondary sanctions, Turkish banks and businesses could be greatly affected. 

    Russian-Turkish Security Relationship

    Turkey’s strategic hedging of its actions during the current crisis has much to do with its complex security and economic relationships with Russia. Russia and Turkey are historical competitors in multiple security areas and have fought on opposite sides of multiple regional conflicts, such as Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Geography and politics play a major part in Turkey’s decisions. As both a NATO member and a close neighbor to Russia and Ukraine, with economic ties to both countries, Turkey risks becoming deeply involved in a conflict with both security and economic partners.

    There has been an increasing security relationship between Ankara and Moscow in the past few years. Despite their opposing stances in regional conflicts, Turkey has increasingly viewed Russia as a “counterweight” to the West’s powers and pressures in the international sphere and seeks a deepened relationship with Russia to diversify its security strategy. In regional conflicts such as Syria, the countries cooperate. For example, they arranged a 2020 ceasefire agreement, and mutually brokered a security corridor and joint patrols. Criticism over the human rights abuses and the rule of law in Turkey has increased from the West, leading Erdogan to turn to alternative allies. Putin hasn’t questioned any of Erdogan’s domestic human rights crackdowns, and he extended his support during the 2016 failed coup in Turkey. A shared goal of legitimating their role in the regional order outside of Western-led institutions has provided a platform on which the two nations have begun to cooperate.

    Turkey’s pivot towards Russian partnership is exemplified in the highly controversial 2019 purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which led to a downturn in relations with the United States. The U.S.’s response included a sanctions package against Turkey’s defense industry, Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and the resulting cancellation of a large transaction of U.S. F-35 fighter jets. This is indicative of a larger Turkish policy trend of reducing dependence on NATO and the West, looking to alternative allies. Turkey’s pivot to ​​Russian weapons platforms has led to concerns about its future unity with NATO.

    Domestic Considerations

    Aside from its international strategic considerations, Ankara’s domestic economic considerations are a central determinant in the ongoing conflict. Both Russia and Ukraine are key economic partners to Turkey. Turkey, whose energy needs are import-dependent, especially depends on Russia: Russian natural gas made up 45% of Turkey’s gas purchases last year. Rosatom, a Russian conglomerate, began building a nuclear plant at Akkuyu in southern Turkey. Ankara has a very profitable free trade agreement with Ukraine, which it does not want to lose. As the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, Turkey’s security and defense sectors are tied up with Ukraine’s as well. For example, a new drone manufacturing factory has been planned to co-produce the long-range tactical Bayraktar TB2 system with Ukraine, further promoting the Turkish drone brand and expanding it to other markets. Turkey is also a major importer of sunflower oil and wheat, and in 2021 it imported 64.6 percent of its wheat from Russia and 13.4 percent from Ukraine—78% of a critical import overall. Turkey’s exports to Russia have been measured at 4.5 billion dollars in 2020, and to Ukraine at 2.24 billion dollars, figures that are expected to be disrupted as the crisis continues. Additionally, Ukrainians and Russians make up 23% of Turkey’s tourism sector revenue, a large share of an industry that represents about  4% of Turkey’s overall GDP. 

    Hit hard already by the ripple effects of Western sanctions, Turkey also knows well what a cooling economic relationship with Moscow would look like. In 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet on the Turkish-Syrian border area, the subsequent sanctions and downturn in relations proved devastating to the Turkish economy. The impacts of tensions with Russia caused double-digit inflation, high unemployment, and a rising current account deficit. Russia cracked down on tourism to Turkey, imposed import restrictions on Turkish goods, and even suspended the building of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. The ten-month sanctions eventually ended when Erdogan personally apologized for the downing of the Russian bomber. This example of Russia’s status as a close economic partner to Turkey may explain Ankara’s hesitation to join harsher sanction measures.

    The conflict, as well as Western-imposed sanctions, has already compounded Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis. Since sanctions were introduced, Turkey’s economy has taken a turn for the worse, including surging inflation at a 20-year high of 54%. The tourism industry has taken a hard hit from the loss of Ukrainian and Russian visitors, losing Turkey billions in revenue. As supply chain disruptions affect imports and exports, grains, oil, and gas prices have skyrocketed. With national elections coming in 2023, worries about civic dissatisfaction due to economic losses have been at the forefront of Erdogan’s mind.

    Ankara’s position as a mediator in the talks has so far seemed to work more than any other measure. The only signs of diplomatic progress have emerged from the three-way discussions, as Russia said it would significantly scale back its military activity around Kyiv and northern Ukraine, a confidence-building “de-escalation” step. Whether this step will be carried out, however, is unclear. In this way, Ankara has worked to solidify itself as a key independent international intermediary to both the West and Russia while avoiding endangering either of its critical partnerships.

  • Introduction to the OSCE

    Introduction to the OSCE

    Introduction

    The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is an intergovernmental group made up of 57 European, North American, and Asian nations and 11 “partners for cooperation” in Africa and Oceania. Founded during the Cold War as a neutral forum for discussion between the Western and Eastern blocs, the mandate of the OSCE has evolved from one of discussion between great powers into an organization that defends human rights, oversees elections, and monitors active combat zones.

    Even as the OSCE’s mandate has evolved, the core mission of “promoting stability, peace, and democracy” has remained constant. The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to all conflict in the broader Eurasian area, and the OSCE has been involved in mediating conflicts in recent decades. More recently, the OSCE has been involved in everything from a mission to monitor ceasefire violations in Ukraine to collaborating with its member countries to “strengthen cooperation on environmental issues.”

    History of OSCE

    The OSCE was created in 1975, at the signing of the Helsinki Accords. At the time, the United States and the Soviet Union were in a “détente,” a period of warmer relations between the two historic rivals. The Nixon presidency and the Brezhnev premiership was an era of decreased tension, eventually leading to both powers attending the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the early 1970s. After years of deliberations, the nations represented at the conference agreed to sign a document entitled the Helsinki Final Act, commonly referred to as the Helsinki Accords. This document outlined a set of politico-military, economic, environmental, and human rights commitments. This was the first time the USSR made explicit human rights commitments.

    After the signing of the Accords, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe continued to serve as a forum for meetings and began certifying whether states were meeting the commitments they made in Helsinki. After the end of the Cold War, the group’s name was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its role began to expand beyond its original purpose. The organization has come to play a large part in mediating inter-state disputes, overseeing elections, and even maintain missions in certain regions to prevent conflicts.

    How Does the OSCE Work?

    The OSCE maintains a policy of neutrality, so serves a different purpose and operates differently from organizations like NATO and CSTO. Harkening back to its past as a forum for discussion and mediation, much more emphasis is placed on summits: meetings where heads of state and ambassadors from member countries make long-term decisions and set goals for the entire organization. Other representative bodies include the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, made up of representatives from every member state. The Parliamentary Assembly passes resolutions about issues like human rights, democracy, and environmental issues in order to ensure member states are meeting the commitments they made in Helsinki.

    The Permanent Council is the primary OSCE decision-making body. This Council contains delegates from every member state and representatives from each of the OSCE’s Partners for Cooperation. All decisions at the Permanent Council are made by consensus. The OSCE also has multiple executive structures, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and Representative on Freedom of the Media. These institutions are another method the OSCE uses to ensure member states are fulfilling their commitments.

    What Does the OSCE Do?

    The OSCE has an active presence in a dozen countries, mostly former Soviet and Yugoslav states. These field offices “assist host countries in putting their OSCE commitments into practice” and “enable the OSCE to tackle crises as they arise.” The key goals of these missions are to restore trust between former rivals and build lasting peace in regions that have faced conflict and war. Field operations also focus on helping states control crime and terrorism, transition to democracy, clear minefields from past wars, and negotiate settlements of conflicts as they develop on the ground.

    The OSCE maintains a large presence in Ukraine, deploying both a monitoring mission focused on the Donbas region and a coordinator that is helping Ukraine with issues from the transition to democracy to cybercrime and human trafficking. The OSCE’s monitoring mission is an “unarmed, civilian mission” whose task is to “observe and report in an impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine.” This work is integral as tensions escalate in the region and all parties attempt to reach a peaceful settlement.

    OSCE field offices are also active in former Yugoslav republics such as Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo, helping them build resilient institutions and repair the damage of conflicts in the 1990s. The OSCE helps these nations clear land mines, run counter-terrorist operations, and defend their democratic institutions. In states and regions with ongoing conflicts like Moldova and the South Caucasus, the OSCE facilitates discussions between all parties and is working to resolve their respective territorial disputes.

    The OSCE’s primary function is to serve as a forum for discussion. In this capacity, the organization operates forums like the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been the main diplomatic process attempting to bring an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus. The group has published assessments of the situation and hosts infrequent meetings between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to discuss the conflict. The OSCE is also involved in the “5+2” format that is currently mediating the Transnistrian territorial conflict and the Geneva International Discussions, a forum for mediating the crisis in Georgia. OSCE successfully mediated discussions between multiple states in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Peace Accords, resulting in more transparency and arms control between the former rivals.

    The OSCE Minsk group is one of the most visible and prominent examples of OSCE mediation today. The group has been focused on reaching a peaceful settlement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended in 1994. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a region of Azerbaijan populated by Armenians declared independence and sought to join Armenia. Following a bloody war, the Armenians were able to secure de-facto autonomy and an uneasy status quo began. Despite winning the war, the newly established Republic of Artsakh was not recognized by any U.N. member states, including Armenia. For the next few decades, OSCE sponsored a forum for the two sides to come to a permanent solution that would respect the rights of refugees from both sides and the self-determination rights of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh. The group continuously worked to facilitate a settlement, hosting multiple conferences between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders and monitoring the situation on the ground from their offices in Yerevan and Baku.

    Criticisms

    Although the Minsk group was one of the best avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, it also demonstrated some of the structural issues with OSCE and was the subject of criticism. The group moved very slowly—little came of the talks held between the two rivals and frequent border clashes killed dozens of Armenian and Azerbaijani servicemembers. In 2020, a war broke out between the two sides, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of thousands of Armenians and allegations of war crimes by both sides. The Minsk group was unable to facilitate a peaceful settlement and now risks being cast aside by both nations in favor of a more violent solution to the crisis.

    The reasons for the Minsk Group’s apparent failure in Nagorno-Karabakh reflect criticisms of the organization. The ery structure of the organization is focused on neutrality—by definition, OSCE is a pan-European security organization. Multiple post-Soviet nations, including Azerbaijan, have attempted to cripple OSCE’s ability to monitor their compliance with the Helsinki Accords, attacking the organization in the press and even closing down OSCE offices. Much like many other international organizations, OSCE has no way of enforcing resolutions and only operates with the consent of its member states. The Permanent Council is made up of nations with conflicting national interests, making it difficult for the organization to agree on and implement policy. OSCE’s consensus approach to making larger political decisions makes this task even more difficult, as all members must agree on a path forward to resolve disputes between nations that are often at odds with each other and both sit on the council. 

    OSCE also faces financial challenges. The organization’s annual budget is only €138 million, less than 3% of the UN’s. This has left OSCE overstretched and unable to carry out its mandate. As of 2017, OSCE was only able to deploy 6 monitors to the 200-kilometer line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops in Nagorno-Karabakh. For comparison, the United Nations maintains a peacekeeping force of 15,000 in South Sudan, with a budget of $1 billion.

    These challenges come at a time when Europe is becoming increasingly politically divided, and old divisions between east and west are on the rise. The new situation in Europe requires an organization like OSCE to mediate future disputes, coordinate international responses, and monitor conflicts to ensure peace and stability.       

  • The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant Part 2

    The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant Part 2

    Though climate change and its effects do not recognize state borders, they affect states in the Levant in different ways due to variations in states’ geography, environment, economy, and government response. In Syria, the adverse effects of climate change have caused new and exacerbated existing socioeconomic problems, worsening living conditions for the Syrian people. In the past two decades, environmental conditions in Syria have deteriorated further because of unsustainable, unhelpful government policies. 

    Environmental Effects of Climate Change in Syria 

    • Drought and Desertification: In the years leading up to the Syrian civil war, the country experienced its worst drought on record. The drought began in the winter of 2006-2007 following a reduction in regional rainfall, which is the primary water source for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and their tributaries. Lasting from 2007 to 2010, the drought followed a number of multi-year droughts in the 1980s and 1990s. 
    • Water Scarcity: According to data collected by climatologists, water became much more scarce during the recent Syrian drought with decreased surface moisture and groundwater supplies. Rising temperatures contributed to drier soil and increased evaporation. In the years since the onset of the Syrian conflict, the country has faced rainfall deficits and other worsening environmental conditions. 
    • Crop Failure: This water scarcity has substantially reduced vegetation and agricultural output. The drought caused widespread crop failure throughout the Syrian countryside and left farmers and nomadic herders without needed water sources for irrigation and livestock. According to former Vice President Al Gore, between 2006-2010, the severe drought destroyed 60% of Syrian farms and caused 80% of livestock to perish.
    • Dust Storms: Another interrelated consequence of the Syrian drought has been increased sandstorms throughout the country and region. The sharp decline in Syrian farming caused an increase in the amount of untended soil, which can easily be swept up in a dust storm. 

    Economic and Societal Effects 

    • Food Insecurity: Syria’s reduced agricultural production has caused significant price hikes in imported food products like wheat and rice and greater food insecurity overall. Syria’s reduced irrigation capacity and pasture availability have diminished its cereal production and livestock while wheat production has reached record lows. In 2020, 50.25% of Syrians, were food insecure. 
    • Urbanization and Population Displacement: As drought undermined hundreds of thousands of farmers’ livelihoods, many were forcibly displaced from rural areas to urban centers. While estimates vary, some reports suggest that as many as 1.5 million Syrians were internally displaced because of climate-related factors, meaning they became climate migrants or refugees. Additionally, the influx of more than one million Iraqi refugees by 2010 exacerbated the economic pressures and resource demand caused by internal population displacement in Syria. 
    • Social Upheaval: Syria’s rapid urbanization prior to the civil war increased social unrest in the country’s cities, with greater competition for employment and increasingly scarce resources. As food and economic insecurity and climate migration rose in, the Assad regime violently suppressed protesters and worsened living conditions for the Syrian people.

    Syrian Government Mismanagement 

    • Unsustainable Environmental Policies: While climate change has worsened living conditions in Syria, the country’s government has also contributed to this issue. Even before the 2011 uprising, unsustainable agricultural policies like the overuse of water for water-intensive crops degraded agricultural land in Syria. This policy intensified the climate change effects and related issues on Syrians. Additionally, Syria lacked and still lacks the necessary drought monitoring and management capabilities to respond effectively to droughts and their negative byproducts.
    • Poor Governance: The Assad regime failed to provide subsidies for powering irrigation pumps and transporting produce, exacerbating Syria’s water scarcity and crop failure. While the government had developed a national drought strategy by 2006, it did not implement the plan in time to alleviate the drought’s effects. The regime worsened the drought’s economic fallout by shutting down a micro-finance network of village funds a few years before the uprising. By taking away this network, which functioned as an income security net, the government denied rural Syrian farmers economic relief.
  • Russian Foreign Agent Laws: Protecting Civil Society, or Preventing It?

    Russian Foreign Agent Laws: Protecting Civil Society, or Preventing It?

    Amidst the variety of international criticism expressed about Vladimir Putin’s administration, we frequently hear about the Russian state’s suppression of political dissent, most often through the shutting down of oppositional media organizations or cracking down on protests. Most recently, the issue of Russia’s “foreign agent” law has come to the forefront of this criticism, with a plethora of international groups deriding its use as retaliatory, oppressive, and a means of censorship. The Russian government and adjacent media, on the other hand, view the law as necessary for the protection of the political process, and compare it to other countries’ restrictions on individuals acting in the interest of foreign governments. While there are instances where the law has legitimate standing, it is often utilized as a tool to suppress political goals that are against the administration’s wishes. 

    What is the Russian law on foreign agents?

    Under the law, nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive any funding from foreign sources must report said foreign funding, and also be included on a registry of agents acting in the interests of foreign entities. These organizations can still publish materials if they report their funding properly, but must do so under the stipulation that they explicitly indicate “[the materials] are published … by a foreign agent.” In late 2017, a law was passed that allowed foreign agent laws to extend beyond NGOs, by also including media organizations on their own foreign agent register. 

    Failing to report funding from foreign sources can result in heavy fines for an organization. Creating or working for an organization which receives international funding can have consequences too, especially if the organization is perceived to be encouraging citizens to “refuse to perform civil duties or commit other illegal acts.” An individual who fails to report their foreign agent status, or proliferates propaganda in service of a foreign agent, may: be fined up to one year of salary or wage,  do “corrective labor” for up to two years, or serve jail time for up to two years. Article 3 offers more details on punishment.

    Examples of foreign agents on the registry, and the debate around them

    The law has been applied to several obvious “foreign agent” mass media, such as Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. These two organizations aim to promote Western and American ideals abroad and receive most, if not all, of their funding from non-Russian sources. 

    More contentious examples have involved Russian NGOs focusing on election processes, such as Golos, which has twice been branded a foreign agent, and the Levada Center, a sociological research center that surveys public opinion. Golos was designated as a foreign agent leading up to the 2021 State Duma election, because the local vote-monitoring organization received a donation of 200 roubles from an Armenian citizen. The Levada Center was designated a foreign agent in 2016 after the Ministry of Justice claimed to have found hidden sources of foreign funding, a claim which the director disputed. 

    Supporters of the foreign agent law cite the need to prevent foreign influence and protect Russian sovereignty. When the law was passed in 2012, Pravda described it as “… not prohibitive—as some critics would like to interpret it,” claiming that “thousands” of foreign agents operate in Russia through uncontrollable cash payments. In 2013, President Putin outlined his beliefs to officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service, alluding to some NGOs as “structures financed from abroad and serving foreign interests.” This law, then, is framed as an attempt to regulate these foreign agents, as well as uncontrollable money, in an effort to prevent interference in Russian affairs. 

    Opponents of the law have decried the discriminatory effects a foreign agent designation holds. The director of the Levada Center emphasized that the term itself, inostrannie agent, has a historical connotation “synonymous with ‘spy’ or ‘saboteur.’” Therefore, citizens are less likely to trust organizations labeled as foreign agents. While Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has stated that “the department must follow the spirit and letter of the law” in response to criticism about Golos’ registration, opposition figures argue that the stigma of being a foreign agent is a disproportionate response to, in this case, a $3 donation. 

    IMAGE BELOW: Press secretary Dmitry Peskov with President Putin. Only one day before classifying Golos as a foreign agent, Putin said he would review the “fuzzy criteria” surrounding the law. 

    After its addition to the registry, the Levada Center conducted a poll on the term “foreign agent.” Among the 1,800 Russian adults surveyed, notable results were as follows:

    • Out of the 25% of surveyed adults who had heard of the law, 56% view the law as an attempt to limit Western influence, while 26% see it as an attempt to “clamp down on independent social organizations”.
    • 45% associate the term with espionage, “infiltrators”, and double agents; an additional 7% associate the term with an “enemy of Russia”.
    • 66% believe an organization who receives foreign money will work in the interests of their foreign sponsor.

    By including certain political opposition and media dissidents on the Foreign Agent Registry, the government has found a way to mitigate the proliferation of these organizations’ ideas by legally invalidating their conclusions as the products of foreign sponsorship. By labeling an organization like Golos as a foreign agent, the Russian government delegitimizes their vote-monitoring capabilities to a large chunk of Russians citizens. If, for example, Golos claimed to have evidence of election tampering done by the ruling party, their conclusion would be met with skepticism. The government sees this law as a buttress for Russian unity and stability, while dissidents see it as yet another tool in preventing a civil society outside of the government’s parameters. 

  • Growth for the Few: The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa

    Growth for the Few: The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa

    In the aftermath of World War II, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall issued a proposal that would mark the birth of a now-ubiquitous buzzword: international development. The Marshall Plan called for intensive U.S. investment in the reconstruction of Europe, provided that European countries agreed to reduce trade barriers and stabilize currency. After this plan proved effective in bolstering European Gross National Products, the U.S. shifted its focus to globally “underdeveloped areas”, including the African continent. However, like the Marshall Plan for Europe, this international aid to Africa did not come without conditions. African nations fundamentally restructured their economies in order to receive aid; thus, structural adjustment was born.

    Definitions and Context

    Generally, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are macroeconomic policy reforms that nations must implement as a precondition for loans from International Monetary Institutions (IMIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These loan conditionalities are based in neoliberal economic objectives, such as the privatization, stabilization, liberalization, and deregulation of national economies. While these key tenets exist within all SAPs, specific policy conditions vary from nation to nation. SAPs became popular in a wide variety of historically exploited regions—from Latin America to Africa—in the 1980s. This popularity was due in large part to OPEC’s 1970 oil price hikes which decreased sale prices for commodity exports and raised interest rates, making loan repayment more expensive for those nations. 

    While common discourse (both in academic circles and from IMIs themselves) frames SAPs as things of the past that tapered off in the late 1990s, the latest available data shows that 2014 IMF loan conditionalities are very similar to those from the 1980s. SAPs might not pervade modern discourse, but they still exist in practice. 

    History of SAPs in Sub-Saharan Africa

    SAPs are particularly relevant to discourse on Sub-Saharan Africa because the region accounts for the largest proportion of SAPs in the world. 37 out of the 46 Sub-Saharan nations have undergone structural adjustment due to the region’s tumultuous economic history.

    After the Era of Independence in the 1960s, many newly-empowered leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa set their sights on long-term economic plans with strong investment in state-run industry. The wave of independence also placed emphasis on Pan-Africanism and intercontinentally-driven development. This led to the creation of continental institutions such as the African Development Bank, which invested African funds in African-led development projects. However, a mixture of external market factors and internal governance problems in the 1970s caused many Sub-Saharan Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) to dip below pre-independence levels. This economic downturn left many African nations with few choices except turning to IMIs—rather than intracontinental organizations—for funds. Eventually, even the African Development Bank, founded on aspirations of intra-continental economic problem solving, came to mirror the strict structural adjustment lending system of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

    Impact on human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa

    While SAPs included a vast array of macroeconomic policies, they did not originally integrate social policy development or poverty reduction strategies, which were seen as the responsibility of national governments. This lack of consideration for the socioeconomic consequences of adjustment on common people and the imposition of homogenous policy conditionalities on a heterogeneous group of Sub-Saharan countries led to widespread neglect of human rights and social services in African debtor countries. SAPs reduced the power of national governments to fund social welfare programs and to act autonomously in general. In turn, this both delegitimized those governments in the eyes of their people and left poor and marginalized communities without safety nets as governments were cut back on public spending. While some SAPs have successfully achieved a narrow set of neoliberal macroeconomic objectives, there is a general consensus that their negative socioeconomic impacts on social services and human rights far outweigh their benefits in Sub-Saharan Africa.

    While SAPs impacted all genres and levels of human rights across Africa, the following analysis examines their impact on so-called first and second-generation human rights. First-generation rights include physical integrity rights and equity, while second-generation rights include the right to healthcare and education. 

    Physical Integrity Rights

    As SAPs force national governments to privatize institutions, the power and size of governments decrease. Additionally, since governments must adhere strictly to policy guidelines set by IMIs as conditions of the aid, they become less accountable to their people and thus suffer from perceptions of delegitimization. As the size, power, and perceived legitimacy of African governments decrease, national police and military forces obtain more discretion in using force against citizens. SAPs have also been shown to increase protest and ethnic conflict as African populations condemn their decreasing economic prosperity. When combined, increases in protest and military autonomy lead to physical integrity rights violations such as the extrajudicial imprisonment, forced disappearance, and torture of protestors. 

    Gender and Wealth Inequality

    As Sub-Saharan governments introduced austerity measures and privatized industry, national unemployment rates rose disproportionately for poor populations. Moreover, as countries attempt to achieve economic “stabilization,” central banks increased interest rates to combat inflation. This exacerbated preexisting wealth inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa by blocking poor populations out of markets and decreasing small businesses’ access to affordable loans. Even after the IMF employed its PRGF targeting income inequality, the resounding impacts of SAPs in Sub-Saharan wealth gaps remain. Ultimately, women and girls are the “shock absorbers” of adjustment. Since they are typically barred from participation in the formal sector, women make up 70% of informal entrepreneurs—the population least acknowledged or protected in SAP policies. Overall, policies that increase income inequality affect women disproportionately, perpetuating already dire situations of gender inequality in the region. 

    Access to Education and Healthcare

    When governments adopt austerity measures, they limit funding for non-privatized public institutions like schools and health clinics. As governments defund schools, the socioeconomic benefit of completing primary and secondary education decreases; enrollment then dwindles as poor children choose to work instead. Moreover, the declining quality of public education creates an opportunity gap between those children whose parents can afford private school tuition and those whose parents cannot. The push to defund and privatize healthcare has had a similarly detrimental effect. Many healthcare professionals see their salaries drop and choose to migrate rather than be laid off or accept low wages. Poor families are unable to afford quality medical supplies. As access to medical supplies and qualified professionals decreases, public health crises are exacerbated. Neonatal mortality rates have increased and responses to HIV/AIDS have been significantly impaired in Sub-Saharan Africa over the duration of SAPs.

    Case study: Mozambique

    While Mozambique is generally hailed as a structural adjustment success, human rights tell a different story than economic growth. Left in socioeconomic disarray from a civil war that began in 1979, Mozambique began requesting aid in the 1980s. Because it refused to sign with the World Bank or IMF, aid was withheld from the country—even during a national famine—until it conceded to what it saw as exploitative and capitalist conditions in 1987. From then on, SAPs shifted Mozambique to a market economy and privatized over 900 public enterprises. In the first year of SAPs, the Mozambican government cut health and education subsidies from MT 21 billion to MT 15 billion. 

    Even after “pro-poor” PRGF programs from the IMF were implemented in 2001, government spending on health and education remained constrained. Mozambican education reached dismal levels of quality and enrollment, and the Mozambican life expectancy remains one of the lowest in the world. Mozambique’s GDP has grown 6-8% per year for the past decade, but that growth remains unevenly distributed. Over the same period, Mozambican wealth inequality and degrees of poverty have increased. Nearly 60% of Mozambicans lived on under $1.25 per day in 2016 compared with 54.1% in 2002, one year after PRGFs were implemented. After over 30 years of SAPs in Mozambique, the country still has one of the worst education systems, shortest life expectancies, and lowest HDIs in the world.

    Conclusions

    Looking to the future, the UN Economic Commission for Africa suggests three conditions to make SAPs more viable for the region: 1) country-specificity, 2) loaner accountability to common people, and 3) increased African participation in identifying problems, ideating solutions, and implementing programs for development.

  • Ukraine Crisis and U.S. Sanctions Part 2

    Ukraine Crisis and U.S. Sanctions Part 2

    Russian Central Bank

    In coordination with European allies, the United States has also targeted investment in Russian funds. It has prohibited any U.S. individual or entity from engaging with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and frozen any assets of the Bank held in the United States or by Americans elsewhere. On a larger scale, the G-7 countries announced that Russia will be restricted from accessing its reserve holdings in G-7 jurisdictions, freezing about half of Russia’s foreign reserves. 

    The measures the United States has taken against the Central Bank are most significant in the imposition of limits on employing international reserves, which otherwise would be used to bolster the Russian economy in the face of U.S. sanctions. Moscow’s financial defense system against international economic sanctions has been referred to as a “fortress Russia” economy. Moscow’s efforts to sanction-proof the Russian economy have included amassing $630 billion dollars in foreign currency reserves. The foreign currency reserves were built up by over 75% since 2015, intended to enable Russians to exchange rubles for foreign currencies in the case of foreign sanctions. Despite a concerted attempt to shift towards the Chinese yuan, 45% of those assets were held in Western currencies. Preventing Moscow from selling foreign currency reserves to stabilize the ruble curtails its ability to protect its domestic economy from international economic sanctions.

    Nord Stream 2

    A significant development in the sanctions against Russia is within the energy and gas sector: Germany’s agreement to halt certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, worth $11 billion. After Russia recognized two breakaway regions in Ukraine, the United States terminated a previous waiver that exempted Nord Stream 2 AG, the parent company of the natural gas pipeline project, and its CEO from sanctions under U.S. law. Nord Stream 2 AG is a company under Gazprom, a Russian state-owned gas company. Despite pressure from the United States to reduce energy reliance on Russian suppliers, Berlin has resisted discontinuing the Nord Stream 2 project. Russia produces about 10% of the world’s oil, and concerns have arisen over the dependence of Europe on Russian gas. Europe’s significant economic interdependence on Russia’s gas companies has made this sector difficult to sanction as concerns emerge about rising gas prices. However, sanctions stopped short of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which is operational and has transferred gas to Germany since 2011. 

    SWIFT Sanctions

    The most recent sanctions blocking Russian banks from the global financial network SWIFT have the potential to cripple the Russian economy. Just days before Russia invaded Ukraine, disconnection from the SWIFT financial system was not included as a potential sanction, and the move seemed unlikely. A measure restricting banks from SWIFT has only been used once before against the Iranian government in 2012. SWIFT, or “Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication” is the world’s primary international payment network and is central to participation in the global financial system. Restricting banks from using SWIFT blocks international trade flow and undermines transfers and messaging across borders. Cutting Russia off from SWIFT was floated as a potential economic sanction in the aftermath of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, but it was ultimately not implemented because these sanctions could hurt the economies of the U.S. and its allies by stymying Russian participation in the global financial system. However, a day after the invasion, a joint statement by the U.S., European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, U.K., and Canada announced that certain Russian banks would be subject to a disconnection from SWIFT, marking an approach that would allow further expansion of SWIFT sanctions and protect against outsized economic harm in the rest of Europe. This measure marks a distinct escalation in sanctions against Russia.

    Consequences

    Isolating Russia economically in this way may put pressure on Moscow to temper or halt its actions in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. As the situation in Russia and Ukraine continues to develop, additional sanction measures may be introduced by the United States and the EU as a deterrent and political punishment for Russia’s violations of the Minsk Protocol and international law regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty, especially the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by the U.S., U.K., and Russia. Under that agreement, the United States provided assurances that it would not only respect Ukraine’s conditions to denuclearize but respond if Russia were to violate its security. By providing military assistance and imposing sanctions on Russia, it fulfills those assurances. 

    The economic consequences of the sanctions have already begun to take effect on Russia’s domestic economy. The Kremlin’s “fortress economy” has been put to the test: after sanctions were introduced there was a run on central banks as Russians attempted to withdraw foreign currencies. The Russian rouble collapsed against the dollar, depreciating to record lows—losing more than 40% of its value, settling at less than a U.S. penny. This depreciation has accelerated inflation in Russia; the central bank has more than doubled interest rates (to 20%), introduced capital controls, and blocked interest payments to foreign investors. 

    Image 1 

    While sanctions on Russian financial institutions and industries imposed by governments have damaged the Russian economy in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, economic consequences are emerging from the private sector as well. Disruptions in the supply chain and the volatility and depreciation of the ruble have created an unattractive and risky business environment. As the Russian economy begins to face the repercussions of a swift Western response, it has become increasingly difficult for private companies to operate there. Those who stay risk violating sanctions, reputational damage, and logistical complications. American credit rating agency Fitch downgraded its evaluation of the Russian economy from ‘B’ to ‘C’, indicating that a sovereign debt default is “imminent.” Many Western investors and companies have pulled out of Russia or announced their intentions to do so, severing sometimes decades-long business ties. This includes multinational corporations such as Paypal, ExxonMobil, BP, Visa, Mastercard, IBM, Amazon Web Services, Goldman Sachs, Apple, and Disney. In addition to the loss of consumer goods trade, many of these entities have significant financial and industrial clout. The loss of international business has more long-term implications than sanctions imposed by Western governments; private trepidation to operate in Russia could last far longer after sanctions have been lifted.

    However, it is unclear whether sanctions and their economic ramifications will be effective in swaying Moscow’s decision-making regarding Ukraine. Just as the economic impact of sanctions in the past has been debatable in altering Russia’s behavior, it is difficult to evaluate how much of an effect the 2022 sanctions will have. As of this moment, the fighting continues to escalate, as does the intensity and urgency of the international response to the conflict. Whether the economic damage will influence the Kremlin to back away from military action is yet to be seen.