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Category: Foreign Policy region

  • Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya and Somalia

    Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya and Somalia

    Introduction

    The United States has been diplomatically engaged with Kenya since 1964, and with Somalia since 1960. Substantial amounts of aid have accompanied diplomatic relations, including development, monetary and military aid. In later decades, particularly since the 1998 bombings of the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, these aid types have made up a significant part of the US response to terrorism in the region. Two semi-distinct approaches to terrorism have emerged: countering violent extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism (CT). The two are used to address terrorism in different ways, including through actions taken against terrorism’s immediate and proximate causes. US attention to these issues became more comprehensive during the Global War on Terror in response the attacks on September 11th, 2001.

    Counterterrorism 

    The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “[t]he unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.” Counterterrorism, in turn, is the neutralization of the ability of terrorists and their organizations to perpetrate this kind of violence. This neutralization is primarily accomplished through military operations, law enforcement activity, and the prevention of terrorism through the strengthening of these capabilities.   

    The United States has had and currently has numerous counterterrorist programs in both Kenya and Somalia, spanning a wide breadth of approaches. Numerous government agencies are responsible for these programs, including the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of State. These programs address the threat of terrorism through kinetic action, law enforcement and investigation, and conventional security programs. 

    Kinetic action involves active forms of warfare, which the US has used in Somalia since 1992. Between 2001 and 2011 the US, through the Department of Defense, used ground raids and traditional airstrikes to find and neutralize elements of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. Starting on June 23, 2011, counterterrorism efforts in Somalia included the extensive use of drone strikes. These strikes have resulted in an estimated 1,729 deaths as of June 3, 2022. Of these deaths, 1,589 are estimated to be militants with either Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, or ISIS. The strikes occur in areas of high Al-Shabaab activity, such as in the southern part of the country. Training camps for terrorist organizations are preferred targets for strikes, as they represent large gatherings of individual terrorists often located some distance from major civilian population centers. These strikes deny terror organizations manpower and cripple their leadership, resulting in hampered capability to carry out violence. 

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation handles investigations into terrorist activity against US assests in the region, most notably in the aftermath of the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Its investigation was, at the time, the largest conduct in the history of the bureau, drawing on over 900 agents and many more supporting staff. The investigations in Kenya and Tanzania set a precedent for a greater overseas presence for the FBI, bettering the organization’s ability to counter the threat posed by terror groups. Additionally, the cooperation between US law enforcement and law enforcement in Kenya was demonstrated to be strong and yielded arrests, extraditions and prosecutions. 

    The Department of State aids in augmenting the ability of local forces to respond to terror attacks. An internal component called the Diplomatic Security Service trains and helps equip local teams of police officers, from both regular forces and from the Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR). Both of these units were tested during the attack on the DusitD2 hotel in Nairobi on January 15, 2019. Members of the SPEAR team engaged and dispatched at least two of the attackers. The following explosive sweeps of the compound were then accomplished by bomb squads equiped by the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (ATA). The SPEAR program and ATA program have been implemented in countries across Africa, aiding response to terror activity and increasing international cooperation through joint training excersises. 

    Countering Violent Extremism 

    Countering violent extremism (CVE) policy approaches the problem of terrorism by addressing its driving factors. The United States Agency for International Development is the primary US agency responsible for this kind of program, and has active programs in Kenya. Its stated goals for CVE policies are to reduce the risk of recruitment into and support for terrorist organizations, as well as building local capacity to do the same. 

    USAID’s program Kenya NiWajibu Wetu (NIWETU), translated from Kiswahili to Kenya is Our Responsibility, was an effort to engage local officials and individuals to build capacity to prevent violent extremism. One of the program’s key actions was its support and funding of an expansion of the Kenya School of Government to build curriculum teaching CVE policy to civil servants in Kenya’s administrative bureaucracy. The cooperation and willingness of the Kenyan Government to engage with and support this policy has been key to its success, and will result in civil servants taking their knowledge to postings in departments across the country. In addition to education initiatives, NIWETU has worked with Kenya’s National Counter Terrorism Center and county level authorities to create county-level CVE action plans for creating solutions at a more local level. These plans were developed with the assistance of various groups of local stakeholders, including religious and youth leaders, government and security officials, private sector representatives and women’s groups.  

    Other USAID programs aim to address driving factors of violent extremism directly, through creating programming that offers alternatives to recruitment by violent extremist organizations. The Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions program provided assistance to county governments in bettering access to social services for youth and vulnerable groups. Another program, the Kenya Youth Employment and Skills program, aimed to address lack of access to economic opportunities and help youth register for ID cards that prove Kenyan citizenship. 

    Benefits and Drawbacks 

    The strengths of counterterrorism activities lie in their ability to address the immediate effects of terrorist violence, as well as acting against terrorist organizations. CT programming improves the ability of host nations to respond to terror attacks as they occur, and improves their ability to proscute liable individuals in the aftermath. They allow for the destruction of assets utilized by terrorist organizations, and allow military assests to hunt and destroy individual terrorists. These policies are not without their drawbacks,  Counterterrorism programming can result in locals becoming discontented with the United States. In Kenya, some locals blame the United States for discouraging tourism, and even for causing an uptick in terrorist violence by the American presence. Counterterrorism programming does not address the roots of terrorism itself, and so remain necessary so long as the ideology remains rooted among at-risk communities. 

    Countering violent extremism targets the roots of terrorism by attempting to build stability among communities and create lasting solutions from within countries. As Kenya works to build its own robust CVE capabilities, US support to their efforts has helped to advance and improve the quality of their CVE policies as well as the implementation of CVE at the local level. US-Kenya cooperation has been dependent upon political, security, and diplomatic good will on both sides; effective cooperation will require continued good will. For both the United States and Kenya, CT has been the main budgetary focus of both governments; CVE receives substantially fewer resources. USAID handles US CVE efforts, and has a budget for 2023 of $60.4 billion, of which CVE makes up a very small percentage. CT efforts, on the other hand, received $96 billion across various agencies in 2017.    

  • Failures and Successes of the EU

    Failures and Successes of the EU

    Introduction

    The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union founded in the aftermath of World War II. The mass violence of the war left many Europeans feeling unsure of the future of the continent. With calls for cooperation increasing, new organizations sprung up across Europe in an effort to foster trust between nations and prevent war from breaking out again. These organizations formed the basis of what eventually became known as the EU in 1993. The union’s principal goals are the promotion of peace, freedom, security and justice for its citizens, as well as greater economic stability and growth within its market.

    The EU is divided into four main institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Council. The European Commission is the executive body of the EU—they propose new laws and ensure these laws are properly implemented if they are approved. The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament discuss, and adopt or reject, new laws. The key difference between the two organizations is that the European Parliament represents citizens of the EU, and is made up of democratically elected representatives, while the Council of the European Union represents the governments of EU members, and is made up of national ministers appointed by their country. The European Council is made up of political leaders of EU member countries and is responsible for defining the goals and overall priorities of the EU.

    The EU, as of 2022, has twenty-seven member countries. Several other countries are part of trade deals or other alliances with the EU and several other countries are considered candidates for membership.

    History of the EU

    • 1951: West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This organization requires all member countries to place their coal and steel industries under a single management, easing distrust after WWII.
    • 1957: The Treaties of Rome are signed by the same six members of the ECSC, creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).
    • 1958: The European Parliament is created to facilitate discussion between the three European communities.
    • 1960: The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is created to encourage and facilitate trade between European countries not in the EEC.
    • 1965: The Merger Treaty is signed, merging the executives of the three major European communities into a single administration called “The European Communities”.
    • 1992-1993: The Maastricht Treaty is signed in 1992, officially creating the European Union when it came into effect in 1993. This treaty established a common currency — the Euro — and introduced the concept of European citizenship. The EU’s single market also launched in 1993.
    • 2007: The Treaty of Lisbon is signed, giving greater power to the European Parliament. They now elect the head of the EU’s Commission and are responsible for establishing the EU’s budget.
    • 2016: The UK votes to leave the EU and they officially leave the alliance in 2020.

    Successes

    1. Post-WWII: After WWII, Europe was fractured. Western European countries sought to establish and strengthen relationships with each other. The EU, in its earliest forms, accomplished its difficult goal of reconciliation and unity between member nations through various trade deals and intergovernmental organizations. To this day, no two EU member nations have ever been engaged in an armed conflict against one another.
    2. Economic Cooperation: The EU is the world’s largest single market. The vast majority of trade barriers between EU member states have been removed, allowing for the free movement of goods, services, capital and people across the organization’s borders. This allows for greater economic competition and promotes economic growth. However, it can be challenging to balance competing economic interests among member states, especially when it comes to monetary policy. Disputes occur when some nations are experiencing inflation and others are experiencing sluggish economic growth, which traditionally require different monetary responses.
    3. Unified European Identity: The EU not only creates a forum discussion, it unifies the continent politically and economically. All citizens of member nations of the EU are considered EU citizens, uniting people from across the continent under a set of rights, which guarantee them equal treatment no matter which EU state they are in. EU citizens’ rights are guaranteed in their Charter of Fundamental Rights and include a wide range of privacy, employment, consumer and human rights, as well as the right to vote in European Parliament elections.
    4. Activism: The EU has taken a staunch stance against injustice and inequality, both within their borders and beyond. The EU provides aid for millions across the globe, and collectively, the union and its member countries are the largest donor of humanitarian aid in the world. The EU has several programs providing food, shelter, water, healthcare and other forms of stability for more than eighty countries. The EU won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.

    Failures

    1. Democratic Legitimacy: While EU citizens vote in EU Parliament elections, most EU representatives are not democratically elected. In addition, voter turnout for EU Parliament elections has been decreasing since the Parliament was created and in 2019, only 50.66% of eligible EU voters participated. Many still believe that it fails to represent the average EU citizen and that it is not being held accountable for its decisions.
    2. Yugoslav Wars: With the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the EU was faced with its first major crisis since the end of the Cold War. The early peace negotiations organized by the EU were mismanaged and unorganized, and the EU failed to end the fighting or find a solution to the conflict. This was largely due to continual disagreement among member states, which also led to delays in military and humanitarian aid. The lack of a unified policy ultimately exacerbated the wars, leading to longer conflict, a larger death toll, and greater economic and material damages.
    3. Right-wing Nationalism: In recent years right-wing parties have gained influence across Europe. A central focus of many of these parties is the maintenance of their state identity and interests, or nationalism. International organizations, like the EU, often do not align with countries’ national interests. Euroscepticism, or political opposition to the EU, has increased in recent years in countries such as France, Poland and Hungary. Nationalism was also a central reason for the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU. These sentiments threaten the credibility and stability of the union, and by failing to address them, the EU, and its place in Europe is weakened.
    4. Covid-19: The health policy of the EU in response to the global Covid-19 pandemic was somewhat successful in its economic response, but largely a failure in terms of healthcare — specifically their vaccine rollout. Vaccine distribution across the EU was slow and poorly coordinated. This led to an increased death toll and greater economic loss.

    The EU and the United States

    The European Union and the United States have a close relationship defined by peace and cooperation. Relations between the two are further strengthened by the existence of NATO, which includes many of the same members of the EU, and the United States. The U.S. and the EU are the largest economic and military powers in the world, dominating trade and leading many global diplomatic and political discussions. What the EU does therefore greatly impacts the United States—and vice versa. In order to facilitate this relationship, members of the EU Parliament and the U.S. House of Representatives meet biannually to discuss a wide range of topics from foreign affairs to cyber security. This is known as the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, and it allows both delegations to establish a united statement and policy on certain issues.

    The Future of the EU

    As the Ukraine War continues, the EU enters a new challenge. The war has become something for the EU to rally against, and has patched up some of the divides created by growing Euroscepticism across the continent. However, the EU’s response has still been lacking. Because all EU decisions must be agreed upon by all members, and some nations—notably Hungary—remain staunchly against stricter sanctions for Russia, the EU’s overall economic response has been weak.

    Beyond the war in Ukraine, the EU will have to face many additional challenges in the coming years. With threats to leave by member nations like Hungary, the EU may see more countries depart like the UK. The EU will also be tasked with addressing issues of immigration, inflation, climate change and healthcare. The EU’s response to these concerns as well as the Ukraine War will define their future status.

  • Introduction to US-Azerbaijan Relations

    Introduction to US-Azerbaijan Relations

    Fact sheet

    History of relations

    The United States recognized Azerbaijan as an independent state in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union and established diplomatic relations the following year. Shortly after independence, fighting escalated between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. USAID provided humanitarian assistance to those fleeing the conflict. In 1997, the first official visit to the United States by the President of Azerbaijan took place. 

     Strategic Interests

    Role of the Armenian-American lobby

    The United States has a large and politically active Armenian-American population that has influenced US policy towards Azerbaijan. The Armenian National Committee of America, which is the largest and most influential Armenian-American political organization, has advocated prohibiting the sending of U.S. military equipment or technology to Azerbaijan and opposition to any preferential trade or tax treatment to Azerbaijan. They have also achieved political successes such as legislative limits on U.S. defense sales or transfers to Azerbaijan and stopping a nomination for the position of U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Some US politicians such as Congressman Adam Schiff are critical of Azerbaijan. Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act limited U.S. assistance for Azerbaijan. The large Armenian population in the United States has led Azerbaijan to view the United States as a biased negotiator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    State of relations today

    Despite the common interests, relations between Azerbaijan and the United States along with other Western countries have become more strained recently. One reason is criticism of Azerbaijan’s human rights record. Azerbaijan has been criticized by the U.S. State Department for various violations such as its attacks on media freedom and suppression of political opposition. Azerbaijan is also in dispute with the OSCE Minsk Group, which helps to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For example, Azerbaijan has been frustrated that the OSCE Minsk Group hadn’t demanded the full withdrawal of Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States has recently become more disengaged from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The U.S. co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group was not afforded the rank of Ambassador during the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration’s actions regarding the recent fighting was criticized by then-candidate Biden during the presidential campaign in 2020. Azerbaijan’s swift retaking of Karabakh and the shelling of civilians during the recent fighting in the region has caused unease particularly in the U.S. Congress. Although the U.S. was predicted to curtail security assistance to Azerbaijan, the Biden Administration recently waived Section 907 and allowed for security assistance. The fact that the U.S. has not played an active role in the conflict is claimed to have benefitted Russia and damaged its relationship with Azerbaijan, as shown by the fact that Russia brokered a ceasefire agreement that halted the recent fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and allowed for the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the region.  

    Differing perspectives

    Azerbaijan’s relations with the United States have received criticism. One criticism is that Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev is a dangerous figure due to his cooperation with and tolerance towards Jihadis in Syria as well as his hostile views towards Armenia, which could serve as a destabilizing factor in the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The country is also criticized for its close foreign policy ties with Turkey’s president Recyp Tayyip Erdogan, which could undermine the ability of the U.S. to use Azerbaijan for its strategic interests. Turkey and Azerbaijan share a close relationship with each other that has been referred to as “two states, one nation”. The United States along with other Western countries have been criticized for ignoring the corruption and political repression of Azerbaijan’s government in favor of close cooperation, which is referred to as “caviar diplomacy”.

    On the other hand, supporters claim that Azerbaijan has contributed positively to the national security of the U.S. and is a pro-Western country that serves as an ideal partner for security issues in the region due to the aforementioned cooperation on security and counter-terrorism. Azerbaijan has also been praised by supporters for its friendly relations with Israel and for being a secular Muslim country in contrast to neighboring Iran. This is in contrast to Armenia, which is aligned with Russia as an economic and military partner and Iran, which shares a common distrust towards Azerbaijan’s friendly relations with Israel and the West. 

  • Introduction to U.S.-Colombia Relations

    Introduction to U.S.-Colombia Relations

    Fact Sheet

    Population: 51,500,708 

    Capital: Bogota

    System of Governance:  Presidential Representative Republic

    President: Gustavo Petro

    Majority Language: Spanish

    Majority Religion: Catholicism

    GDP Per Capita: $5,334.6 (2020)

    Global Freedom Score: 64 (partly free)

    GINI Index: 54.2 

    History of Colombia’s Relationship with the U.S.

    Relations between Colombia and the U.S. officially began in 1821, when the South American country was known as Gran Colombia and included the modern states of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Of specific interest to the U.S. was the Panama isthmus, the natural geographic location for a canal through Central America. The construction of a canal was critical to U.S. maritime trade, and when Gran Colombia refused an offer for the U.S. to build the canal, the U.S. supported Panama in successfully revolting against the Colombian government. After independence, the new Panamanian government convened a treaty with the U.S., allowing for the construction of the Panama Canal. This event impacted U.S.-Colombia relations for decades.

    While bilateral relations cooled, U.S. corporate activity in Colombia grew as large companies invested in the South American nation, many of whom employed exploitative labor practices. In 1928, over 2,000 Colombian workers on strike at the U.S. corporation United Fruit Company were killed by the Colombian military. The strikers were portrayed by U.S. officials and United Fruit Company representatives as reflecting a “subversive tendency,” and this stoked American fears of a broader communist movement in the region. The massacre occured after the U.S. government threatened to send in the Marine Corps if the strike continued, and the event sparked outrage at U.S. commercial interests in Colombia. 

    By the mid-20th century, the U.S. and Colombia were aligned militarily. Colombia fought alongside the Allies in WWII, and the country contributed many aspiring officers to the School of the Americas (SOA), which opened in the Panama Canal Zone in 1946. The SOA trained Latin Americans in American counterinsurgency tactics, and, despite evidence of inhumane acts attributed to graduates of the SOA, the school still operates today under a different name.

    In 1948, a period of instability dubbed “La Violencia” began in Colombia. This was a time of political violence that spiraled into mass indiscriminate warfare, leaving more than 200,000 Colombians dead before 1964. The two major resistance organizations during the latter stages of La Violencia were leftist groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). To diminish some of this violence and in line with the U.S.’s Cold War anti-communist strategy, American military advisors developed “Plan Lazo”, a counterinsurgency blueprint for the Colombian security forces. Foretelling future interventions, Plan Lazo focused overwhelmingly on military intervention, with scant resources for social reforms or administrative structures. It was deemed mostly unsuccessful in controlling the violence Colombia faced.

    President Richard Nixon’s declaration of a global War on Drugs in 1971 forever altered U.S.-Colombia relations. For this reason, this chapter of history is given its own section below. Since major strife in Colombia broke out in the mid-20th century, the U.S. has been invested in Colombian affairs. Today, Colombia is the U.S.’ most closely aligned regional partner, and the countries have enjoyed relatively friendly relations.

    Key US Foreign Policy Considerations

    Colombia is continuing to dig itself out of the multi-sided conflict that mired the country in violence for much of the past half-century. The violent actors included the previously mentioned leftist guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN), right-wing paramilitary groups – namely the United Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC) – and powerful drug cartels. Colombia has made great progress in decreasing the levels of violence, seeing a steady decline in both the crime and homicide rates since 1990. In 2002, Álvaro Uribe Vélez was elected president on a promise to end the endemic violence, and his mix of aggressive enforcement and negotiation with the violent groups proved effective. The government and the AUC agreed to a ceasefire in 2003, and members of both FARC and the ELN agreed to put down their weapons soon after, though many continued their violent struggle.

    A recent victory was won in 2016, when after decades of negotiation, Colombia and the FARC militia announced a successful peace accord. In return for demobilizing, the deal protected FARC fighters who confessed to war crimes from criminal sentencing and also guaranteed former rebels seats in Colombia’s Congress. The accord was an indication that Colombia was on the road to stability, a major priority for multiple U.S. administrations. Colombia is a major regional partner for the U.S., due in large part to a long economic and security-based relationship. Since 2016, the U.S. has sent over $1 billion in direct and indirect support to ensure these internal security gains are preserved.

    Colombia is also an important regional partner due to the instability of its neighbor Venezuela. Colombia supports the declared presidency of Juan Guaidó, and there has been animosity towards Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, following the lead of U.S. policy. As a consequence of economic misery, over 2 million Venezuelans have crossed the border into Colombia, which is offering protected status and work permits to the refugees. In June 2022, President Biden announced $314 million in humanitarian, health, economic, and development assistance for Venezuelan refugees, much of which is directed towards Colombian efforts.

    Economically, Colombia is emerging as an important trade partner for U.S. companies facing decreasing margins in the historically lucrative Asia market. The U.S. is Colombia’s most important trade partner, and bilateral trade totaled $29.9 billion in 2020. In March 2022, President Biden designated Colombia as a major non-NATO ally, which gives Colombia access to new economic and security programs, including counterterrorism initiatives, a larger selection of American weapons, and cooperative research and development projects. 

    Spotlight: Drug Policy

    Colombia’s role as a drug supplier developed in the late 1970s. Marijuana production diversified into cocaine trafficking, with boats and airplanes taking most of the product to the United States. Two major cartels developed: the Medellín cartel led by the infamous Pablo Escobar and a rival group based in Cali. These cartels became massive political and criminal forces, contributing to the endemic violence that characterized Colombia for most of its recent history.

    Colombia became the focus of the U.S.’s War on Drugs, and the U.S. exported both military supplies and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents in an attempt to stem the flow of drugs. During the 1990s for example, the U.S. provided $1.6 billion in security assistance to the country.  

    This foreign involvement did not sit well with some in the Colombian government, and in response to the policies of Colombian leader Ernesto Samper, President Bill Clinton decertified Colombia as a partner in the drug war in the late 1990s. In 2000, however, the new administration of Andres Pastrana provided a reset in U.S.-Colombia drug policy, which led to the announcement of  “Plan Colombia”, a bilateral security strategy that aimed to end drug production and promote economic development. Eventually, Mexican cartels grew in power and took away much of the Colombian cartels’ influence and importance, leading to less violence and trafficking in Colombia. U.S. support for counternarcotics efforts continues today, however, with Colombia eradicating more than 130,000 hectares of coca and seizing nearly 580 tons of cocaine in 2020. 

    The election of left-wing President Gustavo Petro in June 2022 opens the possibility of a new approach to Colombia’s drug policy. Petro has been roundly critical of the U.S.-led war on drugs. During his campaign, Petro voiced his disagreements with current extradition policies and the large sums of investment into security spending. He has stated that his priority with the U.S. is addressing climate change, and that his administration will center their drug policy around environmental factors. Petro is Colombia’s first left-wing head of state, and his election could usher in a new stage in the long history of drug policy collaboration between the U.S. and Colombia.

  • Failures and Successes of NATO

    Failures and Successes of NATO

    Introduction

    NATO, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is a military and political alliance founded in 1949 and dedicated to ensuring the security and freedom of its members. As the Cold War took shape and the Soviet Union threatened European governments, the founding countries of NATO determined that a transatlantic alliance was necessary to both deter Soviet aggression and promote political integration rather than militarism. In the decades since, NATO has grown in structure and members into the organization it is today. The primary political council of NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and it is chaired by NATO’s Secretary General. Each member has a seat on this council and all decisions are made by consensus, so that any decision made by NATO reflects the will of all members. If a decision reached under the NAC or a political subcommittee has military implications, the Military Committee is responsible for giving expert advice to the NAC and for organizing and carrying out NATO’s military operations. 

    The United States is the largest financial contributor to NATO and a key member of the alliance. The alliance promotes democratic ideas and peaceful conflict resolution around the world. Countries looking to join must have a functioning democratic government and a commitment to peacefully resolve conflict. With a large network of members and resources, NATO aims to hold its members to a standard of democracy and intervenes to defuse conflicts before they happen. However, there is continuous debate over how to handle NATO member states experiencing democratic backsliding. In addition, conflict is deterred by the collective defense aspect of NATO, where an attack on one member is an attack on all members. Despite its shortcomings and the challenges it faces, it is often considered to be one of the most successful international alliances in history.

    There are currently thirty members of NATO and several countries are aspiring to join. Other countries are engaged in working partnerships with the alliance, while not being members.

    Source: Statista

    A Brief History

    • 1949: As communism spread across Europe, and the Soviet’s influence increased, the United States’ desire for a security treaty with Western Europe outside of the UN’s Security Council (where the USSR held veto power) led to the creation of NATO.
    • 1955: In response to West Germany joining NATO, the Soviet Union and seven other Eastern European countries formed the Warsaw Pact.
    • 1991: The Soviet Union collapsed, leading to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was created as a platform for cooperation between old Warsaw Pact members and NATO.
    • 1995: NATO became involved in its first ever crisis response operation, leading the Implementation Force, a peace enforcement force during the Bosnian War.
    • 2001: 9/11 resulted in NATO invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first, and only, time. Article 5 states that “an attack against one… shall be considered an attack against them all.” NATO launched several counter-terrorism initiatives and deployed military forces to Afghanistan.
    • 2003: NATO takes control of the International Security Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a UN-mandated security force responsible for ensuring the Afghan government’s authority.
    • 2014: NATO suspends most relations with Russia over their illegal annexation of Crimea.

    Successes

    1. The Cold War: During the Cold War, NATO’s efforts were centered around three goals: controlling the Soviet Union, dissuading militant nationalism and communism across Europe, and establishing greater European political unity. The alliance played a major role in maintaining the tense peace of the Cold War and ensuring the war remained ‘cold’. With the end of the war, NATO worked to further maintain peace. They established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and, in 1997, NATO encouraged bilateral discussion between the United States and Russia through the Founding Act.
    2. Modern Day Protection: Today, NATO continues to provide a level of protection for its members. Since its founding, a NATO member has only been attacked and evoked Article 5 once (the United States after 9/11). Member countries are afforded collective security, just as NATO originally sought to do. Additionally, NATO has created a global network of more than 40 countries and other partners around the globe—ranging from the African Union to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This network provides NATO support in its crisis management operations, ranging from aid operations such as its delivery of relief supplies after the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake to counter-terrorism operations in the Mediterranean and the coast of Somalia.
    3. The Ukraine War: NATO has publicly denounced the Russian invasion of Ukraine and NATO member countries and allies have provided substantial aid to Ukraine. The United States has contributed roughly $54 billion to Ukraine. Other countries have provided humanitarian aid and support for the more than 5 million refugees of the war. The Ukraine war has reaffirmed the importance of NATO, and even spurred Finland and Sweden to increase their efforts to join the alliance. These countries’ membership would strengthen the alliance militarily through increased air and submarine capabilities, allowing for NATO to further dissuade Russian aggression.

    Failures

    1. Funding Issues: In 2006, NATO Defense Ministers agreed to a commitment that 2% of their countries’ GDP would be allocated towards defense spending. However, the majority of NATO members do not meet this goal. Currently, the United States accounts for over two-thirds of the alliance’s defense spending.
    2. Afghanistan: After 9/11, NATO was a considerable presence in Afghanistan, and their forces were crucial in their support of the Afghan government. When President Donald Trump signed an agreement with the Taliban in 2020, both NATO and American troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan. What followed was an immediate fall in the Afghan government at the hands of the Taliban. Despite the two decades NATO spent in Afghanistan, no long term solution was reached, and without their presence, the nation’s former government could not survive.
    3. Right-Wing Nationalism: With the spread of right-wing nationalism across Europe, discontent with international institutions like NATO and the EU grows. If right-wing nationalist movements continue to increase in popularity across Europe, there could be increased calls for countries to leave institutions like NATO. The challenge NATO faces now is how to combat and address their criticism, and how to unify a divided Europe.
    4. Russian Aggression: Despite supposed verbal promises to Russia that it would not expand to the east, NATO has admitted several former Warsaw Pact members since the fall of the Soviet Union. Now, with NATO members bordering Russia and the promise of further expansion, Russia feels increasingly threatened. The possibility of Ukraine joining NATO has been cited as a significant reason for Vladmir Putin’s invasion of the country.

    The Future of NATO

    As the war in Ukraine continues, NATO is more relevant now than it has been in decades. NATO plays a role in distributing military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and the alliance will be influential in the outcome of the war. NATO serves as a means of collective defense and security against Russia and the increasing threat to international order that they represent. With debates over how NATO can best assist Ukraine, and how to best avoid conflicts such as this in the future, NATO will have to revisit its current deterrence strategy in the upcoming years. Also at play is the growing role of China on the world stage. NATO must consider that the world does not revolve solely around the Euro-Atlantic region, and address questions about its role outside this region and across the globe. NATO continues to be essential towards not only the security of its members including the United States, but to the world.

  • The Global War on Terror: Successes and Failures – A Case of Al-Qaeda

    The Global War on Terror: Successes and Failures – A Case of Al-Qaeda

    Introduction

    The United States’ longest war came to an end with the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Taliban’s swift and hostile takeover of Afghanistan’s government following the U.S. withdrawal left the country once again in the hands of the Taliban. The Taliban takeover is a significant development in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and raises questions about the unforseen consequences of the war against terrorism. 

    The GWOT is an international, American-led coalition campaign launched in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. Following the attacks, then-President George W. Bush launched a comprehensive plan to eliminate and disrupt all terrorist organizations around the globe. He stated, “Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” 

    The U.S. employed every instrument of national power including diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial and military tools to disrupt and defeat not just Al-Qaeda but to extend the fight to other militant groups around the world. Nations around the globe joined the U.S. in the battle against global terror. The GWOT led to the disruption of violent extremist organizations, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, the disruption of terrorist financing, the advancement and transformation of global security, and the elimination of the immediate terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. Simultaneously, the GWOT also fueled radicalization and laid the foundation for the rise of extremist groups with similar ideological sympathies that can spread violence.

    Successes of the GWOT

    Military and intelligence operations including offensive strategies and covert operations proved successful in the fight against terrorism. These operations have been shown to deter transnational terrorist groups from conducting logistically complex attacks in the face of limited resources as a consequence of U.S. and international led-military forces. U.S. military action succeeded in ousting the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in December 2001. While Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies once controlled 95% of Afghanistan, U.S. military campaigns succeeded in seizing large swaths of Al-Qaeda-held territory including its center of gravity near the Afghan-Pakistan border in Afghanistan and reduced its ability to carry out large-scale terrorist attacks. This impacted Osama Bin Laden’s immediate communications with the organization. This disconnect eventually reduced Al-Qaeda’s ability to plan until 2004 when Osama Bin Laden reconnected with Al-Qaeda after years of hiding. 

    Targeted killings proved effective in dismantling terrorist groups that followed a hierarchical bureaucratic structure. However, Al-Qaeda was still able to conduct attacks despite leadership decapitation. Thus, while leadership decapitation was a major blow to the terrorist organization, the bureaucratization of Al-Qaeda allowed the group to formulate contingencies for a leadership turnover. However, the GWOT succeeded in eliminating key terrorist leaders of Al-Qaeda, including Osama Bin Laden. 

    Additionally, the U.S. made domestic advancements by developing more efficient technology and law enforcement processes and establishing the Transportation Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security to prevent further attacks on the U.S. homeland.

    Failures of the GWOT

    According to the Costs of War project at Brown University, nearly 20 years after the 9/11 attacks, the financial costs of the GWOT stand at $8 trillion and the death toll stands at 900,000 people. Casualties include U.S. military members, allied fighters, opposition fighters, journalists, humanitarian aid workers, and civilians. Of the total number killed, 287,000 are categorized as civilians, 207,000 as members of the national military and police forces, and another 301,000 as opposition fighters. 

    In the aftermath of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Iraq was destabilized without an effective bureaucratic system to provide basic goods and services to its citizens. The absence of adequate law enforcement and military forces to secure Iraqi borders, and the absence of extensive monitoring led to the country being infiltrated by former jihadist foreign fighters. 

    Following the Iraqi invasion, the provisional government led a de-Baathification process to rid the government and military of Ba’ath influence. The Ba’ath political party had previously led the country and top officials perpetrated human rights violations, but many had joined the party because it was the only way to gain many roles in the government sector. The de-Baathification gave rise to grievances that extremist groups started to exploit. Former Iraqi soldiers with no jobs were susceptible to radicalization. Grievances in the Sunni regions remained strong as there was little progress made with regards to reconstruction while security forces targeted former Ba’ath party members through unjust anti-terrorism laws. The use of unjust anti-terrorism laws, lack of security and services, and the length of displacement of these communities all led to an environment that extremist groups such as the Islamic State could exploit. All these conditions fueled radicalization and laid the foundations for the rise of other extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq. 

    GWOT moving forward

    Moving forward, the U.S. will likely continue to carry out special operations in regions that witness the rise of jihadi groups, to disrupt and eliminate terrorist organizations, disrupt terrorist financing, and prevent radicalization. U.S. military doctrine retains the essential elements to plan and execute successful operations against conventional and irregular opponents. Recently, the U.S. successfully executed a covert operation that killed the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader Abu Ibrahim al–Hashimi al-Qurayshi. This operation demonstrates a high degree of sophistication in U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism efforts. 

    Most importantly, the U.S. is incorporating countering violent extremism into the U.S. National Security Strategy to prevent the radicalization of individuals as radicalization and recruitment remain threat multipliers. Thus, preventing radicalization remains essential to countering extremism, especially in internally displaced camps where extremist propaganda is widely being spread. 

  • Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    Introduction to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership

    AUKUS Partnership Outline

    The AUKUS Partnership was one of the first major foreign policy actions of President Biden’s Administration. On September 15, 2021, AUKUS partners released a joint statement announcing the agreement. The goal of the partnership is to promote information and technology sharing, and integrate security and defense measures by increasing cooperation on a variety of capabilities, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific Region.  

    The AUKUS Partnership has three pillars 

    1. Provide Australia with “conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capabilities (SSN)”. Prior to this agreement, this technology was limited to six nuclear capable states (U.S.,UK, France, Russia, China, and India). The U.S. previously shared SSN technology with the UK, and AUKUS now extends this to Australia, a non-nuclear state. As such, this partnership is set to revolutionize Australian naval capabilities, which have struggled to travel longer distances due to limitations of electrically powered submarine fleets. 
    2. Advance military capabilities “to promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region”. The AUKUS partnership outlines objectives to expand and develop technologies, such as: AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS, the development of robotic undersea technologies), AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA, development of quantum technologies), cooperation on Artificial Intelligence (AI), collaboration on hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and the development of cyber capabilities and security measures. 
    3. Commit to information exchange. As of February 8, 2022, The Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA) came into effect, resulting in AUKUS partners sharing nuclear propulsion intel trilaterally, the first agreement to do so with a non-nuclear capable state.

    U.S. Favorability of UK Partnership 

    Prior to the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the UK had limited influence or presence within the Indo-Pacific Region, with the only formal international agreement being their membership in the Five Eyes security alliance. However, this new partnership indicates a significant shift in UK foreign policy , confirming the UK’s intention to align with U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

    Figure showing the Overlap of Defense, Intelligence, and Security Groups in the Indo-Pacific Region.

    The AUKUS Partnership presented significant political fallout in U.S.–Europe relations, because it prioritized the UK security partnership over a broader European security pact.

    France was the most affected by the establishment of the AUKUS partnership as Australia withdrew from a previously agreed Franco-Australian Submarine deal to join AUKUS. This led to an increased strain on the U.S.–France Relations, due to both the loss of a multi-billion Euro agreement and the creation of a new security alliance formed without major European allies. Following the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, the new alliance took significant attention away from the European Union’s (EU) own policy plans for the Indo-Pacific Region. Given the contentious relations between the UK and the EU in a post-Brexit Europe, this partnership highlighted a perceived favoritism of U.S.–UK relations as loyal security partners, over a united Europe. In addition, with the introduction of the AUKUS Partnership, the agreement has strengthened an EU-independent UK as the only European state with significant security partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region.

    Ramifications of the AUKUS Partnership

    The response to the AUKUS partnership has been mixed. As discussed, the pact strained U.S.-French relations, and distanced the U.S. from Europe in terms of Indo-Pacific cooperation. Some believe this may lead to the EU pursuing its own independent security strategy when dealing with contentious U.S. and China relations, a position that has been publicly supported by French President Emmanuel Macron.

    The AUKUS partnership, however, will have the most on-the-ground impact within the Indo-Pacific region. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reactions have been divided on the new security partnership present in the region. Recent analysis shows that 36.4% of ASEAN respondents say AUKUS would help “balance China’s growing military power”, yet 22.5% say the deal could spark “a regional arms race”. Overall there is a worry of what the broader consequences of agreements such as AUKUS may be, and their effects on the stability of the region.   

    A major concern of the AUKUS Partnership is the potentially dangerous precedent an agreement of this nature could set for nuclear proliferation. While all three partners emphasized their commitment against nuclear proliferation, this agreement is the first to allow a non-nuclear capable state to access nuclear technology. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear states to declare all nuclear material, with the IAEA verifying the material is not being used for weaponry development, thus acting as a deterrence for nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT relies on states to self-monitor naval nuclear reactors because of practical issues with access. Australia is setting a precedent as the first non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear materials the IAEA is not monitoring. It could be dangerous if other countries follow this path, and derail the current global nuclear nonproliferation system. While Australia may not prove to be an exploitive threat to nuclear weapons development through the AUKUS partnership, a future agreement of this nature could serve as the perfect cover for potential would-be-proliferators to advance nuclear development programs under the guise of access to nuclear material through naval reactors, no longer checked by the IAEA. 

    US–UK Relations and Nuclear Proliferation

    A 2020 report by Pew Research demonstrates that nuclear nonproliferation is a major foreign policy issue in the United States; 73% of Americans perceive the “spread of nuclear weapons” as a major threat to the U.S. This position attracts bipartisan support, with both Democrats and Republicans responding in equal measure to the perceived international threat. Moreover, 80% of respondents favor state cooperation with other countries as “very important” when navigating the spread of nuclear weapons.

    The United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK) have a long history of alignment on foreign policy objectives towards nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear war. Much of the existing U.S.–UK agreements on nuclear cooperation between both states derive and build upon the original 1958 “Atomic Energy. Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes” agreement, which bound both countries in a united front against other state development of atomic weapons. As such, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Partnership is yet another foreign policy step the U.S. and the UK have taken to further their allied cooperation to address the international security threats of today.

  • The US Role in Countering Terrorism in Kenya and Somalia

    The US Role in Countering Terrorism in Kenya and Somalia

    Introduction

    On October 11, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the beginning of the Global War on Terror. New US policies were implemented domestically and internationally to combat the threat of terrorism. Both military operations and civilian aid programs have been used for this purpose, and Kenya and Somalia have experienced a combination of both policy types. Both countries have been of interest to US security efforts for the past three decades, with US military operations in Somalia predating the war on terror, and diplomatic relationships with both established shortly after their respective indepences. 

    Diplomatic Overview 

    The US established diplomatic relations with Somalia shortly after its independence from Great Britain and Italy in 1960. Since independence, the country has experienced coups and civil wars which made consistent diplomatic relations difficult. For example the US embassy in Mogadishu was closed from 1991 to 2018. During this period, the US undertook military operations in 1992-1994 and 2002, at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa. At the same time, the Somalian government received $3 billion in humanitarian, governance and security aid since 2006. Additionally, the United States works with local and global organizations to create and support effective systems to locally address humanitarian issues. 

    US relations with Kenya are stronger than those with Somalia. Relations were established in 1964, and the scope of bilateral engagement between the two countries began to expand in 1992 when Kenya became a multiparty democracy. The relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership in 2018, and the first Bilateral Strategic Dialogue with Kenyan representatives took place  in 2019. This dialogue affirmed US commitment to work with Kenya on addressing a variety of issues, including defense and civilian security in both the country and region. Kenya receives a large amount of aid from the United States, which totalled $560 million for fiscal year 2020. The United States and Kenya cooperate closely on security programs, with US agencies including the State Department and Department of Defense contributing millions to improving both civilian law enforcement and defense institutions. Programs focus on different approaches to security, including counterterrorism and countering violent extremism, as well as bolstering criminal investigation capacity, border security, and crisis response. 

    Historic and Present Threats 

    US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were bombed in 1998 by Al-Qaeda, killing a total of 224 people and injuring over 4,500. During the War on Terror, Kenya and Somalia were one region of concern due to Al-Qaeda and its regional affiliate, Al-Shabaab. In January of 2020, Al-Shabab militants attacked a Joint US-Kenyan military installation, CSL Manda Bay, on the Northern, killing three Americans.

    Al-Shabaab, a regional cell of Al-Qaeda established 1993 is the primary terror group operating in Kenya and Somalia. The group has varying ideologies, but most members are unified by a commitment to Sharia Law and opposition to the Western-backed Federal Government of Somalia. The group has been responsible for many terrorist attacks in Kenya and Somalia, targeting embassies, shopping malls and hotels. They are composed of an estimated 8,000 active members.  

    Policy 

    United States activities confronting terrorist threats in Kenya and Somalia can be grouped into two categories, counterterrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE). Counterterrorism encompasses a variety of actionable policy, including border security, military operations, law enforcement and legislation. US agencies and military bodies will cooperate with host nations in solving issues in these categories through equipping local armed forces, intelligence support, and advisory support. Countering violent extremism takes a different approach, focusing on prevention through increasing peaceful options for political, economic and social engagement for communities. To accomplish this, programs engage with communities at local levels, focusing on regional governments with specific focuses to prevent the spread of violent extremism. 

    Involved Agencies and Their Roles 

    The State Department increased its focus on regional security following the embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Soon after, Kenya was added to the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which acted as a signal of increased US interest. The program didn’t receive funding until a few years later, and involved training Kenya Defense Force personnel through the Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR). SPEAR is a program through which the Diplomatic Security Service trains forces from ATA member countries in tactical responses to instances of terrorist violence, protecting the interests of both the member state and US personnel and facilities. 

    The Department of Defense cooperates with and trains soldiers and personnel from the Kenya Defense Force (KDF), as well as providing intelligence and technical support during counterterrorist operations. Soldiers from Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) train alongside KDF units, such as SPEAR teams, in situations including crisis response, humanitarian assistance, and evacuation of non-combatant personnel. US military assets are also deployed in tandem with Kenyan military personnel during counterterrorism operations such as Operation Linda Nchi, whose goal was combating the threat Al-Shabaab to the Kenyan homeland. US air assets provided intelligence and survey information, while the KDF shouldered the bulk of the fighting and ground operations.  

    The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) works to counter violent extremism (CVE) in at-risk countries, including Kenya and Somalia. As early as 2011, USAID began conducting CVE activities in the ethnic Somali majority community of Eastleigh in Nairobi. Subsequently, larger scale work began in cooperation with the Kenyan National Counterterrorism Center to support local capability to counter violent extremism. Leveraging the 2010 Kenyan constitution, USAID and the Kenyan NCTC worked with all 47 Kenyan counties to develop local level CVE action plans. USAID focuses primarily on the civilian cooperation between the United States and Kenya, and has provided substantial support for local authorities to counter violent extremist networks through civilian-made solutions.  

    Governance and control of Somalia is fractured, with regional governing bodies maintaining control over certain areas of the country. US organizations primarily work with the recognized Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to support local efforts to combat violent extremism and terrorism. The FGS has implemented a number of its own programs, such as regulations on financial transactions requiring any suspicious movement of funds to be reported to the country’s Financial Reporting Center. The US military also has presence in the country with its stated mission being one of advise-and-assist, enabling local forces to orchestrate more effective campaigns against terrorism. This includes training, advising and equipping the forces of the FGS. 

    Conclusions 

    The United States has major security interests in Kenya and Somalia, stemming from its fight against Al-Qaeda. Policy in the region has been and is varied, using both CT and CVE methods to work towards broad and specific objectives. Cooperation with local authorities is a cornerstone of both types of policy, and will continue to be in the future. Currently active programs from USAID, DOD, and the State Department all cooperate with military and civilian sectors of the Kenyan and Somali governments.

  • Latin American Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy

    Latin American Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy

    A Time of Change

    In 2021 and at the start of 2022, Latin American politics were dominated by numerous, significant elections. Newly elected leaders marked the beginning of a new wave of youth attempting to change the region’s status quo. Many of these leaders will come into power facing countless issues that have been plaguing Latin America for years: the rising prices of commodities, economic recovery from COVID-19, corruption, democratic backsliding, debates over extractivism, and growing tensions between the U.S. and China in the region.

    At the same time, the U.S. finds itself at a crossroads in its relationship with the region. While President Biden has made it a priority to work with Latin American governments to tackle issues such as migration crises and economic recovery, the administration will still have to work on amending its partnerships with the region following years of deteriorating relations. A fresh wave of leadership across the region may present an opportunity for the U.S. to realign its foreign policy with Latin America.

    Focusing on the elections in Ecuador, Chile, and Honduras, what do these new governments mean for the future of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America?

    Ecuador

    On May 24th, 2021, Ecuador’s newly elected president, Guillermo Lasso took office. Lasso is a conservative, right-leaning, former banker who had a surprising victory over Andrés Arauz. Arauz was the hand-selected successor of former President Rafael Correa, the long-time serving leftist president who has since been convicted of corruption. Lasso’s victory represents a shift away from the authoritarian leftist politics of Correa, which has ignited both hopes for change and uncertainty about the future of the country.

    Since taking office, Lasso has attempted to enact his pro-business and pro-investment policies but has been faced with limited support in Congress. Further issues have plagued his first six months in power, including the growing security crisis and intensifying drug trade, as well as the massive influx of Venezuelan migrants into the country. Moreover, the need for economic stability in the wake of rising inflation has consumed much of Lasso’s time in office. This has led Lasso to prioritize juridical reforms across the Ecuadorian government to create a safe environment for foreign investments and attempt to renegotiate trade and debt agreements with the U.S., China, and IMF to help revitalize the economy.

    Lasso has proven that he can be a strong ally for the U.S. in South America. Both his participation in the Summit of the Americas and the recent visit by First Lady Jill Biden exhibit the continued strength of the U.S.-Ecuadorian relationship. Moreover, despite the growing presence of China in Ecuador’s economy, the U.S remains the country’s number one trading partner. With this strong ally in South America, the U.S. has the option to work with Lasso and the Ecuadorian government to tackle many of the important issues that President Biden has been focusing on in Latin America, including dealing with migration, drug trafficking, corruption, and climate change. Lasso and Ecuador have the potential to be key allies as the U.S. attempts to reestablish itself as a primary player in Latin America.

    Chile

    The election of Gabriel Boric for president in December of 2021 marked a monumental shift in Chilean politics. Boric represents the epitome of the new wave of leadership sweeping across Latin America, as a young, leftist leader with a focus on the issues of climate change, social reform, and inequality. Boric came into power riding a massive wave of social unrest beginning in 2019. This wave of support is what pushed Boric to victory over José Antonio Kast, a right-wing lawyer, whom many Chileans viewed as a dangerous regression towards the conservative right-wing dictatorship of Pinochet.

    Since Boric’s inauguration in March of 2022, he has focused on tackling many of the same issues that plague governments across the region, including migration and economic instability. However, following the 2019 protests in the country, Chile has been attempting to rewrite its constitution, which has remained unchanged since Chile transitioned to democracy in 1990. The Constitutional Referendum has consumed much of Chilean politics in Boric’s first months in charge and has hindered many of his efforts to pass taxes on mining companies and social justice reform. Further issues such as rising inflation and the soaring cost of commodities have left Chile, a country that imports much of its food and crude oil, in a difficult economic situation that Boric will have to face in the coming months.

    While domestic issues remain central during the early days of Boric’s presidency, his election victory provides a new opportunity for U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, Boric represents the new “millennial” left wave that is passing through Latin America: a “new left” with an ideological shift away from the authoritarian leftist governments of the early 2000s who vilified the United States, to one that seeks to work and collaborate with the U.S. to preserve democracy and tackle other international affairs. Boric has already shown his desire to work with the U.S. by attending the recent Summit of the Americas. Fostering a positive U.S.-Chile relationship can be an example for other newly elected leaders across the region.

    Moreover, much of the Biden administration’s goals and priorities align well with Boric’s agenda, especially the focus on strengthening democracy, social reforms, inequality, and climate change. The issue of climate change could be a key point of collaboration between both countries as Boric seeks to make the country’s mining companies more community-oriented and environmentally friendly, which are efforts that can be aided by U.S. support. 

    Chile can also be an opportunity for the U.S. to reinvigorate itself as an important economic partner in the region. Chile has the second-largest lithium deposits in the world and is the number one exporter of copper, so the country has a vital role in the global economy, as the demand for batteries and electric cars continues to grow. The natural resources have attracted Chinese manufacturers, culminating in China being Chile’s number one trading partner. The U.S. could pursue new economic strategies such as increasing investments, building on current trade deals, and strengthening the region’s supply chain, to lessen the trade gap with China in Latin America. 

    Honduras

    The election of Xiomara Castro in November of 2021 was a turning point for Honduran politics; it marked the end of a 12-year single-party rule, and Castro became the country’s first female president. A 62-year-old center-leftist, Castro is the wife of former President Manuel Zelaya, who was ousted in a 2009 military-backed coup, which both the U.S. and OAS condemned. 

    Castro has taken over the country at one of its lowest points. Her predecessor, former President Juan Orlando Hernádez was indicted by the U.S. for drug trafficking. Moreover, the country has begun to recover from the devastating shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as two Category 4 hurricanes in 2020, which resulted in a 9% decline in GDP. While the past two years have been a slow growth towards recovery, Honduras remains one of the poorest countries in Central America. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, 73% of the population lives below the national poverty line, with almost 54% living in extreme poverty. With a reeling economy and intensifying violence, thousands of families have made the treacherous journey northwards to the U.S. causing a mass migration crisis.

    However, Castro’s victory could prove to be a reset in U.S.-Honduran relations. During her campaign, Castro ran on a platform heavily aligned with the Biden administration’s goals for Central America. This led Vice President Kamala Harris to attend Castro’s inauguration, showing positive signs for the relationship. Efforts by the Biden administration such as the “Root Causes of Migration” policy seek to tackle the issues such as economic insecurity, corruption, human rights violations, and violence that push families to migrate northwards. However, such policies will require support from government officials in Central America to be effective. As Castro shows signs of being a strong ally in the region, Honduras may become essential for the U.S. plan to deal with the current migration crisis.

    U.S. support could also be crucial in aiding Honduras with its economic recovery. Over 30% of the country’s budget is consumed by debt to international financial institutions, many of whom the U.S. is a primary financier. By renegotiating this debt, much of the country’s budget could be redistributed towards health, education, and national development. Furthermore, dealing with Honduras’ rampant corruption problem is also a major target for Castro, who has already pledged to create an anti-corruption commission. Congruently, President Biden has made solving corruption an important part of his “Root Causes of Migration” plan. He has also promised $4 billion in aid which Honduras will only have access to once government corruption is dealt with. 

    The Future Remains Uncertain

    For Ecuador, Chile, and Honduras change brings hope and uncertainty. While new leadership could prove to be a turning point for many of these countries, many developments still remain to be seen. For the U.S., this could be the opportunity to push for a new foreign policy to re-establish itself in Latin America. However, these leaders need time and patience, which might be the hardest thing to find.

  • The Southern Gas Corridor and European Energy

    The Southern Gas Corridor and European Energy

    This brief was originally written by Nick Griffin. Before its publication, it was updated by Arielle Romm.

    As Europe transitions away from fossil fuels and towards green energy, natural gas has filled the gap between what existing fossil fuel generators are permitted to produce and clean energy sources are capable of providing. Natural gas generates about 22% of Europe’s energy supply, of which Russia supplies 33%. Russia’s influence over Europe’s energy supply poses a security threat for the continent. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the West’s ensuing sanctions have disrupted the supply of essential fuel. Many target Russia’s lucrative energy industry, which U.S. President Joe Biden has called “the main artery of Russia’s economy” and the U.S. banned imports of Russian oil, gas, and coal entirely. As Russia becomes more aggressive, European leaders have begun to recognize the necessity of diversifying energy imports and look elsewhere for natural gas supplies. In light of this, Central Asia and the Southern Gas Corridor have become key players as a counterbalance to both Russian energy power and strategic considerations regarding China’s influence in the region. 

    The Invasion of Ukraine and Impact on Energy Supply

    After Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, the United States, Europe, and other allies imposed sanctions to punish the nation for invading and deter further escalation. Though these sanctions aim to target the Russian economy, Europe and the West face steep energy prices as a result and may have to pay exorbitant gas prices if the conflict does not end quickly. Immediately following the invasion, gas prices rose 36% due to fear of sanctions impacting the European markets’ natural gas supply. The ongoing conflict has resulted in the destruction of pipelines and threatens to disrupt the flow of energy to European homes. In March of 2022, Putin set an ultimatum to Western nations that had previously been recipients of Russian gas and resources, requiring payment for gas in Russian rubles, rather than US dollars or euros. In the aftermath of this announcement, gas prices in the West jumped even further, and governments scrambled to find alternatives. Already, Russian energy giant Gazprom has halted the flow of gas to Bulgaria, Poland, and Finland, who refused to capitulate to the demands. Damaged Russia-West relations could impact the energy supply well into the future. Germany has canceled the certification of an important pipeline, Nord Stream 2, and sanctions could persist for years. 

    Building and Expanding the Southern Gas Corridor

    The ongoing war in Ukraine has highlighted the necessity of diversifying, but plans to connect Central Asian energy with Europe have been in the works for more than a decade. In 2012, an agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey resulted in a new, Trans-Anatolian pipeline to transport Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian Sea gas fields to European markets. Construction began in 2015 and was completed in 2018. The existing Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) was expanded to connect with Greece, Italy, and Southeastern Europe. Known as the Southern Gas Corridor, this energy source has become essential in recent weeks and could be the future of European energy. Further expansions are underway; the Gas Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria will connect to the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline in Stara Zagora. When the expansion is complete, Bulgaria is projected to import ⅓ of its natural gas from Azerbaijan.

    Understanding Europe’s Dilemma

    Although plans are currently in the works to fully transition to green energy (eliminating the need for gas pipelines altogether), Germany’s carbon emission reduction goals are currently set to a 65% reduction by 2030 and an 88% reduction in carbon emissions by 2040. The EU, recognizing the urgency of this energy shift, has pledged to spend €210 billion ($222 billion) to wean itself off Russian oil and gas through the REPowerEU plan. works to reduce its consumption of Russia’s gas by 66% before the end of this year, but may only be able to break its dependence completely before 2027 even at the best-case scenario. However, the most ambitious plans still require Europe to import natural gas at least a few more years, if not decades. Continued reliance on Russia is a security risk while changing suppliers to Turkey and Azerbaijan would shift the risk and support two regimes that have been accused of human rights violations. 

    • Azerbaijan, the source of the gas, has been called an authoritarian state by organizations like Freedom House. The leader of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has ruled since a 2003 election that featured accusations of repression and intimidation of opposition candidates and rallies. Azerbaijan has been accused of violating its citizens’ human rights, including those of opposition leaders and journalists by Human Rights Watch. The country is also purported to have committed war crimes during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, including decapitations and mutilations of Armenian soldiers as well as the use of cluster bombs against civilian targets. 
    • Similarly, Turkey has been accused of clamping down on civil rights, limiting the free speech rights of dissidents and journalists, and criminalizing criticism of Turkish President Erdogan. Erdogan’s government has been charged with torturing political dissidents in prison.

    China’s economic presence in Central Asia has grown in recent years. Already, China poses a counterbalance to the West’s efforts to use energy as leverage against Russia. In February of 2022, Russia and China signed a 30-year contract to supply gas to China via a new pipeline, agreeing to do so in euros, and increase their relationship since the 2019 signing of the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline between the two. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, imports of Russian oil have risen by 55% from a year prior, taking Saudi Arabia’s place as China’s biggest oil supplier. This energy alliance is a distinct concern in the face of growing Western sanctions on Russian energy, leading to fears of a so-called “gas pivot” to China. China has also developed energy relationships with both Turkey and Azerbaijan, leading to increased fears of its growing influence in the region. The region is undergoing a geopolitical shift that continues to diminish ties to the Euro-Atlantic states and elevates China’s influence in Central Asia. Beijing and Moscow are the region’s principal economic, political, and security partners, a marker of declining U.S. influence.

    United States Role and Consideration

    The United States has long been concerned about Russia using energy supplies as a political tool to influence other nations. A recent report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations states that U.S. interests lay in “alleviating Russian gas-fueled pressure against NATO allies” and “bolstering bilateral relations in the Caspian Sea region.” U.S. diplomacy was critical in developing this project, and has opened doors for U.S. engagement in Central Asia, strengthening ties with Azerbaijan as an alternative to its relationship with Russia, and opened doors to advancing rule-of-law and climate investment issues. Even in the United States, domestic considerations have come into play as gas prices reach record highs. Although the U.S. does not import large amounts of Russian oil (and has now banned it), the lower supply caused by the conflict has prices rising as Europe seeks to find other sources, raising demand and cost globally.