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Category: Foreign Policy region

  • American Attitudes on Korean Reunification

    American Attitudes on Korean Reunification

    History of the 38th parallel split

    Prior to World War II, the Korean peninsula was a Japanese colony. When Japan surrendered following WWII, the US and USSR agreed to split the peninsula at the 38th parallel to oversee the removal of Japanese forces. The USSR occupied the northern region, while the US occupied the south. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People’s Army invaded South Korea at the 38th parallel to install a communist regime. The US, abiding by the containment policy and influenced by Cold War tensions, deployed the American military with United Nations forces to aid defend South Korea. The war ended in 1953 in a stalemate at the 38th parallel. China supported North Korea by supplying troops, aiding in war strategy, and handled the repatriation of ethnic Koreans back to Korea. The Truman Administration gave up on reuniting North and South Korea and instead made stability the priority in East Asia to avoid further conflict. South Korea and the US signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, leading to a more official military partnership, and a number of American forces remained in South Korea. In 1961, North Korea and China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (not to be confused with the Warsaw Pact of the same name).   

    When the DPRK and the First Republic of Korea were created in 1948, both governments wished for reunification, but only on their own terms. In this context, reunification is defined as the DPRK and ROK joining as one to be a single, sovereign state. Whether it happens through engaged diplomacy or the sudden collapse of North Korea, the US and China are expected to play a role in the reunification process.

    American response to Korean reunification efforts by presidential administrations

    At a press conference for US-ROK relations in 2015, Obama stated “President Park has articulated a better vision—a unified Korea free from the fear of war and nuclear weapons—and that’s a vision that we very much support,” which has been the most explicit show of support for reunification thus far. The main US priority is a denuclearized North Korea. Further, America desires a peaceful transition towards a democratic nation with a market-oriented society that avoids state collapse, civil war, or general unrest. The ROK’s membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty limits their own involvement in the denuclearization process, so this role will most likely be upheld by the US, foreign institutions, and other NPT states.

    In 2018, President Trump and North Korean Dictator Kim Jong-Un met for the first time at the Singapore Summit to discuss peace on the Korean peninsula, US-NK relations, denuclearization, and recovery of US soldier remains. This summit was only partially successful with 55 bodies repatriated, and 5,300 still remaining. The main failure of the Singapore summit was the lack of agreement over the denuclearization timelines and expectations, where the US and NK both failed to operationalize the agreed upon terms of the joint statement and disagreed on what denuclearization would look like. In 2019, Trump and Kim Jong-Un met at their second summit in Hanoi, which was cut short after the first day without signing a joint statement, as Kim believed sanctions would be lifted in exchange for a halt on nuclear and missile testing and Trump believed that North Korea could be convinced to cut their nuclear programs immediately. The two could not progress past that impasse. This reduced the chances of future repatriation of remaining bodies, but showed North Korea’s desire for a decrease in sanctions while America continues to push for the dismantling of NK’s missile and nuclear development. While reunification was not explicitly discussed at these submits, the reasons why these summits failed could be a signifier of the difficulty of future American efforts of demilitarization and denuclearization during the reunification process.

    Under the Biden administration, President Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae In reaffirmed their nations’ strong relations in a 2021 joint statement. Both nations share a commitment to denuclearization efforts, and plan to explore diplomatic efforts with the DPRK to promote peace. When Moon Jae In was elected in 2017, he states that Korea must be the one to lead peace efforts in the peninsula and foster connections with regional neighbors. This shows a commitment to diplomatic efforts, like the inter-Korean summits in 2018, and with South Korea leading the process.

    The role of America and foreign nations in the reunification process

    The other nations involved will affect how peacefully and easily Korea reunifies, and the main nations the US will take into account are Russia, China, and Japan. Regardless of these nations’ support or enthusiasm of reunification prospects and the future, it is generally agreed that the process cannot happen peacefully without their support and cooperation. The US may be the only state in a position to balance the influence of the other, powerful nations. In the Park Geun Hye administration, South Korea hoped for a three-way dialogue between Korea, US, and Japan/China to enable stronger regional cooperation in the denuclearization process. China may prefer the status quo to the military power a unified Korea may bring, especially with the current South Korea-US military alliance. The US must accept the possibility that a unified Korea may choose neutrality and/or opt out of the current relationship.

  • What Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership?

    What Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership?

    The Trans-Pacific Partnership(TPP) is a free-trade agreement created as an extension of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership which contained Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. More well-known free-trade agreement examples are NAFTA and USMCA. In a free trade agreement, parties are usually not able to tariff, tax, or discriminate against the other agreeing parties. Parties are usually required to follow specific rules, regulations, and laws involving their economic trade and internal legal system in regard to matters such as copyright and labor protections. Proponents of free trade agreements often argue they cause economic growth and expand a country’s environmental and labor protections to other countries which may have worse or no protections. Opponents often argue that jobs are lost and companies will exploit cheaper labor supply to benefit from the new low trade taxes, contributing to wealth inequality.

    Benefits and Goals of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership

    The Trans-Pacific Partnership was a major part of Barack Obama’s foreign and economic policy. Two main benefits include: 

    1. Growth in middle-class jobs and therefore the United States economy: Most US economic growth has come from international trade in the past decade and Asia’s importance and share of the world economy is predicted to continue growing. In addition, the deal included stronger environmental regulations, protection of American companies from discrimination, and stronger union and labor protections. Obama saw these benefits and protections as a major boost to the United States economy by making trade an equal playing field. This equal playing field was supposed to emerge due to the combination of smaller goals helping to prohibit companies from stealing American intellectual property and out-competing America with cheaper labor.
    2. Competition with China: The Obama administration was concerned that if the United States did not create a deal with these countries they would turn to China. An overarching goal of the Obama administration was to use economic connections and influence from the TPP to contain China. If China created its own free trade agreement, Chinese-style laws and economic regulations would proliferate in the region rather than American-style policies.

    The Drawbacks and Collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership

    Opponents argued that the TPP would lead to greater income inequality and an overall loss of jobs. These opponents often argued that the TPP would not help GDP growth, destroy close to half a million jobs, and mainly help large companies. Americans were reminded of current trade deals such as WTO-China and NAFTA where opponents also disputed the economic benefits and claimed they would destroy jobs and raise income inequality. President Trump was a vocal opponent of the agreement, and the US withdrew from the TPP in 2017 when Trump took office. Trump favored a targeted approach with each individual country. The other countries moved forward without the United States, and new members join the agreement each year. However, the US has struggled to negotiate individual agreements with a diverse set of countries.

    Future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership

    With another recent change in administration, the Trans-Pacific Partnership has resurfaced as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF). This partnership has risen at a time when Americans have a record low opinion of the Chinese government on a host of issues. Americans have developed negative opinions toward China due to Covid-19, the Hong Kong crackdowns, and the Uyghur genocide. Americans previously held a neutral perspective on China, and this fall in opinion has transformed tariffs and other economic restrictions placed on China by President Trump from a controversial and partisan issue into a commonly supported idea by members of both parties. 

    Data from a 2019 survey and a separate 2022 survey 

    At the same time, American opinions toward foreign trade and trade agreements have grown greatly and reached all-time highs.

    Data from https://www.pollingreport.com/trade.htm

  • The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

    The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

    This brief was originally written by Mariah Smith on March 2, 2022. It was updated and republished by Freya Pereira.

    Ethiopia began building the Grand Ethiopian Resistance Dam (GERD) in 2011 and it has caused conflict and strained relations in the region ever since. The dam is located on Ethiopia’s stretch of the Nile River, and will impact water flow to the downriver nations including South Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt. Since building the dam commenced, negotiations have focused on assuaging Sudan and Egypt’s concerns over the impact of the decreased water supply but with little progress made. Ethiopia has not ceased construction based on the concerns posed by Sudan and Egypt and therefore GERD construction has remained a critical issue within East African geopolitics. 

    Ethiopia’s Position on GERD

    While the GERD poses a geopolitical threat to the region, it also has tremendous potential to bolster Ethiopia’s economy.  

    • Energy: The GERD is estimated to quadruple Ethiopia’s energy output once completed, which would provide energy access to over 75 million Ethiopians. Currently, less than half of Ethiopia’s population of 110 million receive power from the national energy grid.
    • Agriculture: The water harnessed by the dam will irrigate over one million acres of arable land, propelling Ethiopia’s agriculture-based economy.
    • Jobs: the dam will require a large workforce for its maintenance. Ethiopia is expected to hire over 12,000 workers, creating both high and low skill jobs. 

    Originally, funding for the dam was restricted by the US government due to its potential for political destabilization. Yet, the arrival of Chinese bankers and engineers has revitalized the efforts and led to plans for more than 25 large hydroelectric dams. Ethiopia feels justified in utilizing the Nile because 85% of the water which flows through the Nile is runoff from the Ethiopian highlands. In addition, Ethiopia argues that the dam will not meaningfully restrict water supply although Egypt and Sudan disagree on this point.

    Egypt’s Concerns about GERD

    Egypt’s main argument relies on the 1929 Agreement that allocated all the Nile River’s waters to Egypt and the supplemental 1959 Agreement which included Sudan in water shares of the Nile. The 1929 Agreement was made between Egypt and Great Britain which represented Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), and Sudan at the time and granted Egypt veto power over Nile River projects. The 1959 Agreement supplemented the previous agreement by including Sudan as an official shareholder. Both of these agreements did not give rights to Ethiopia and other upstream states. Ethiopia does not recognize these agreements as legally binding because it was not an independent nation at the time, and the agreements were made by Great Britain representing it as a colonial power. 

    Egypt is entirely reliant on the Nile River for its water supply, and sees the dam as an existential threat. The main issue at hand is what Ethiopia will do if there is a drought. Egypt wants a binding commitment that if there is a drought, Ethiopia will continue releasing water from the dam to maintain the flow downriver. 

    Sudan’s Dilemma about GERD 

    Sudan is caught in the middle between Egypt and Ethiopia. On the one hand, Sudan is also almost entirely dependent on the Nile River for water, and is not comfortable with relying on Ethiopia to moderate the water supply especially if water becomes scarce. On the other hand, the dam is projected to become a cheap energy source in the region, and facilitate other development projects which Sudan could benefit from.

    The US Position on GERD Thus Far

    Former President Trump’s Administration is most notable for taking a “hardball” approach to Ethiopia. The approach entailed temporarily pausing aid to Ethiopia due to “[the Administration’s] concern about Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to begin to fill the dam before an agreement and all necessary dam safety measures were in place.”. Egypt is a close ally of the United States, and one of the biggest receivers of US aid (1.43 billion annually). Egypt also has long standing diplomatic relations with key ally Israel, and has used its regional influence to promote ties between Israel and the rest of the Arab world. For this reason, many felt the US came down firmly on the side of Egypt and Sudan when attempting to mediate the conflict.

    The current Biden Administration has decided to take a more neutral stance. In a recent move, the Biden Administration has delinked the pause in Ethiopian aid from the GERD policies which sends a less severe message to Ethiopia, a US ally, and represents a significant shift in the overall US approach moving forward.

    Suter, Margaret.

  • Introduction to U.S.-Jordan Relations

    Introduction to U.S.-Jordan Relations

    This brief was originally written by Rylan Forester. It was updated and published by Sahara Snizek.

    Jordan plays a central role in the Middle East, as an oasis of stability in a region full of conflict, making it a key ally of the U.S., U.K., and the EU. Militarily, Jordan has been a U.S. partner since it was designated as a Major Non-NATO ally in 1996. Most recently, Jordanian military forces have worked in frequent collaboration with regional and international allies, like the U.S., to combat ISIS in Syria, specifically in the south along the Jordanian-Syrian border.

    Fact sheet

    Source: The World Fact Book CIA

    History of Jordan’s Relations with the U.S.

    The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan became an independent state in 1946, when the nation ousted British control. Abdullah I was the first king of Jordan and his family, the House of Hashim, is believed to be ancestors of the Prophet Muhammad. Jordan’s interactions with the U.S. have historically been tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When Palestine was officially partitioned by the 1947 UN Resolution and war broke out a year later, Jordan annexed the West Bank, yet 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled their homes and headed between the West Bank and Transjordan because of the violence. Today, there are more than two million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, not to mention the millions of Palestinians who are now Jordanian citizens. Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel in the 1967 Six Day War and as a result, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), then led by Yasser Arafat, fled to Jordanl.

    More than twenty years later in 1994, President Clinton orchestrated the signing of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, making the Hashemite Kingdom the second Arab country, after Egypt, to normalize ties with Israel. After almost fifty years in power, King Hussein of Jordan passed away in 1999 and his son Abdullah II ascended to the throne. Under King Abdullah II’s reign, Jordan increased ties with the West which has boosted its economy. The 2008 financial crisis worsened the Jordanian economy as well as exacerbated civil unrest which came with Arab Spring protests in the country in 2011. Abdullah II ushered in a series of economic and political reforms which satisfied protesters, but an influx of Syrian refugees has overwhelmed Jordan’s public services. 

    Challenges for Jordan

    • Lack of Water Resources: Jordan is the 15th most water-stressed country in the world, according to the World Resources Institute. The factors increasing water scarcity in the country are population growth, reduction of flow in the Yarmouk River due to the creation of dams in Syria, lack of rainfall due to climate change, and overuse of groundwater. Private wells that have been illegally constructed by residents have also contributed to unsuitable groundwater extraction. In the north part of the region, a substantial influx of Syrian refugees have heightened the demand for water as well. According to a study by Stanford University, a combination of dwindling water resources and a continually growing population are predicted to halve per capita water use in Jordan by the end of the century. 
    • Devoid of hydrocarbon resources: Unlike its oil rich neighbors, the Hashemite Kingdom is devoid of hydrocarbon resources. Jordan’s stability has made the country a refuge for displaced neighbors when wars force residents to abandon their homes. Jordan is hosts more than two million Palestinian refugees and the majority of Jordanian citizens are Palestinian (including the current Queen Rania Al-Abdullah), so Israeli-Palestinian issues are Jordanian issues and politics. The Hashemite Kingdom remains one of the most ardent defenders of Palestinian rights and adocates for Palestinian demands such as the right to return or its claim to East Jerusalem. Nevertheless, since 1994, when Jordan normalized ties with Israel, Amman has expanded trade and engagement with the Jewish state to the dismay of some Palestinians in Jordan.
    • Islamic State (ISIS): The instability in Syria, caused by the civil war, brought 700,000 Syrian refugees to Jordan and fueled ISIS’ rise. To date, 3,000 Jordanians have joined the terrorist group, the third most from any country in the world. King Abdullah is no friend to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad but the war has disrupted Syria’s trade with Jordan and brought terrorism to Jordan’s border. The Hashemite Kingdom has cooperated with regional allies like the UAE along with international partners like the United States to combat ISIS. 
    • Iran: Iran’s rising influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen poses a potential threat to Jordan and has pushed the Kingdom into further cooperation with like-minded Sunni Arab states throughout the region. The Hashemite monarchy is wary of the Iranian regime which has been out-spoken in its support for the overthrow of Sunni monarchs. As Iran expands its presence in the region, Jordan may seek closer ties with its Sunni-Arab partners as a counterbalance. 
    • Building Relations with China: Although U.S.-Jordanian relations remain strong, Amman has increasingly engaged with China through Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since the project launched in 2013, Jordan has become a key member of the BRI. PRC officials hope to build on progress in Jordan to connect the rest of the Levant with projects in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the Mediterranean, and Eurasia. 

    U.S. Strategic Interests

    • Promote Peace between Israel and Palestinians: Behind Israel, Jordan is one of the U.S.’ key regional allies. The U.S. and Jordan share the goal of creating peace between Israel and Palestine. In recent talks between President Biden and King Abdullah II, Biden asserted his support for a two-state solution. Jordan can be a key mediator in resolving the conflict due to its geographic position, cooperation with Israel’s military, shared intelligence with the U.S., the U.K, and Israel, and global collaboration to end the war on terror. Jordan also belongs to several multilateral organizations such as the Arab Quartet, Munich Group, and the Jerusalem Committee at the Organization for the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which can assist in facilitating a two-state solution.
    • The War on Terror: Amman shares the U.S.’ goal to combat terrorism, and actively participates with the U.S. and other Sunni Arab states in missions to combat ISIS in Syria. Jordan is a regional leader in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Intelligence collaboration between the U.S. and Jordan continues to contribute to the U.S.’ counterterrorism and countering violent extremism efforts in the Middle East.
    • Counter Iran’s Influence in the Region: Jordan, like many of its neighbors, has grown increasingly concerned about Iran’s involvement in the region. Iran has pursued the production of nuclear weapons without full adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards, and supports militant splinter groups across the region which have an overall destabilizing influence. Jordan collaborates with the U.S. and Sunni neighbors to limit Iran’s influence and promote stability. 

    House Refugees: Jordan’s role as a safe haven for Middle East refugees contributes to regional stability and more broadly, global stability. More than 700,000 Palestinians fled to Jordan in 1948. Instability in Iraq, triggered by the 2003 U.S. invasion of the country has displaced more than 750,000 Iraqi refugees currently residing in Jordan. The Syrian civil war has caused 700,000 Syrians to seek refuge in Jordan as well.

  • Introduction to U.S.-Egypt Relations

    Introduction to U.S.-Egypt Relations

    Egypt is a key strategic partner of the United States in the Middle East and North Africa. The country is historically influential across the Arab world, and is one of the few in the region to have established  long-lasting peace with Israel. The Egyptian government is also staunchly anti-Islamist extremeism and is part of key counter-terrorism partnerships with the U.S. along with the Arab/U.S. alignment against Iran. As a result of their support of major U.S. regional interests, Egypt has become the second largest recipient of U.S. military and financial aid. However, the Arab Spring in 2011 led to volatility in the country, and the first democratically elected President was assassinated. The subsequent rise to power of President Kalil el-Sisi has paralleled a rise in human rights violations and the suppression of free speech and journalism. These issues have called into question the decision of the United States to continue sending a large volume of military aid to the country.

    Fact Sheet

    Population: 102,334,403 (2020 est.)

    Capital: Cairo

    System of Governance: Republic

    President: Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi (since: 2014)

    Majority Language: Arabic 

    Majority Religion: Sunni Islam

    GDP Per Capita: 12,607.0 (2020 est)

    Freedom House Rating: Not Free

    History of U.S.-Egypt Strategic Relations

    Modern relations with Egypt began in 1922, after Egypt gained independence from the British Empire. In the post-World War II era Egypt grew to be a key strategic partner for the United States. At the time, Egypt was influential in the Arab League through cultural, media and social diffusion across the region. Egypt’s influence was especially important to the U.S.’ efforts towards achieving a Arab-Israeli peace. Egypt and Israel signed a landmark peace agreement in 1979, facilitated by the United States during the Camp David Accords. This established a long-lasting peace between the two nations and solidified Egypt as a vital U.S. ally in the Middle East. Since then, the U.S. has provided over $50 billion dollars in military aid and $30 billion dollars in economic aid to Egypt. Egypt has also become one of the U.S.’ largest export markets. With the assistance of American aid, the Egyptian military has grown to be one of the most powerful institutions in the country and heavily influences the government.

    Though Egypt has remained a partner for U.S. strategic interests, the political conditions of the country have been volatile in the 21st century, including a revolutionary period between 2011 and 2013 during the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring led to political unrest in Egypt with revolutionary forces ousting the former President, Hosni Mubarak. The first democratically-elected President, Mohammed Morsi, represented the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamist organization with peaceful and violent factions. He was soon deposed by the defense minister, Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi. President Sisi, a counterrevolutionary, has since come down hard on civil liberties in Egypt and perpetrated severe human rights violations. The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs estimates that between 70,000-100,000 political prisoners are imprisoned as of March 2021. In addition, Egypt’s rate of executions tripled from 32 to 107 executions between 2019 and 2020 under President Sisi.  

    President Trump worked closely with President Sisi, even calling him his “favorite dictator,” and made policy changes that advantaged Egypt. For instance, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has been a critical geopolitical issue in the region amidst Egypt’s fears that the Ethiopian dam project will negatively impact the flow of water downstream and allow Ethiopia to effectively control Egypt’s water flow. The Trump administration withheld. aid to Ethiopia in an attempt to persuade them to meet Egypt’s demands. Trump also used inflammatory rhetoric when discussing the issue, claiming that Egypt will “end up blowing up the dam.” These actions cumulatively led to damaged relations between Ethiopia and the U.S.

    President Biden did not call President Sisi when he entered office in 2020, despite Egypt being one of America’s closest allies in the region. However, renewed conflict between Israel and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in 2021 brought U.S. attention back to Egypt. President Biden made two calls to President Sisi, and credited Egypt for helping to end the violence. He also stated the U.S. would review the GERD issue with renewed effort but underscored the importance of improving the human rights in Egypt. In February of 2021 the U.S State Department confirmed a $200 million dollar arms sale to Egypt.

    U.S Strategic Interests

    • Arab and Israel conflict: Egypt was influential in the Arab League, which made them an important ally in the U.S.’ goal to broker peace between the Arab world and Israel. As mentioned above, Egypt mediated a cease fire between Israel and Palestine during the 2021 conflict on the Gaza strip. In the call with President Sisi, President Biden committed to working with Egypt to create lasting peace in the Gaza Strip with Egypt’s help.
    • Counterterrorism: Egypt and the U.S. share an interest in combating Islamic extremism. The Sinai Penninula is home to an active ISIS sect, and all major Egyptian terrorist attacks in 2020 occurred in the region. Egypt joined the U.S. backed coalition against ISIS; however, Egypt only committed to combating ISIS within its own borders. American aid to Egypt is contingent on counterterrorism cooperation. Egypt also coordinates with Somalia and Sudan on counterrorism issues. However, Egypt’s approach to counterterrorism is violent, and the government engages in human rights abuses in the name of stopping Islamic extremism.

    Ongoing policy debates

    Arguments against continuing the U.S.-Egypt partnership:

    1. Egypt is no longer as influential in the Arab league and the current relationship is based on the impression that it maintains that same influence;
    2. The relationship is one-sided: The United States has provided a significant amount of aid with limited return from Egypt. Egypt continues to trade with North Korea, Russia, China and Iran while Egypt’s counterterrorism operations have had limited success in tackling radicalism in the country due to the violence the government uses to try to suppress it;
    3. Human rights: The protection of human rights in the country has rapidly disintegrated since the rise of President Sisi. Numerous reports from human rights groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International  record extreme conditions of torture and violence in Egyptian prisons against political prisoners. Religious freedoms and free press have also been undermined during President Sisi’s time in office.

    Arguments for continuing the U.S.-Egypt partnership/alliance:

    1. The concern that Egypt will turn to Russia for support
    2. Despite the arguments criticizing the U.S. partnership with Egypt, policy advisors are not suggesting pulling out of Egypt. Instead, these policymakers recommend that the U.S. aid package to Egypt should focus on the people rather than strengthening the military and government. 
      1. For instance, Egypt faces a growing water crisis and needs increased investment in its water treatment processes to protect its access to basic necessities. 
    3. Investing in the Egyptian people would promote a message that American attention is focused on human rights concerns in the country and not on bolstering the perpetrators.

    Within academic and policy circles, the below arguments are further discussed as strong motives to continue investing in the U.S.-Egypt relationship:

    1. Egypt still plays a leading role in regional diplomacy despite concerns their influence has weakened as evidenced by their impact during the 2021 Gaza strip conflict.
    2. It is essential to keeping order in the Sinai, Gaza and Egyptian-Israeli border.
    3. If U.S. military action in the region is necessary, Egypt is a possible partner. As they were in the 1990 Gulf War during the UN coalition against Iraq.
    4. Egypt is part of a broad regional alignment countering Iran.

    Promoting human rights and democracy was also a major election promise made by current President Joe Biden; he stated that his intention was to “revitalize our national commitment to advancing human rights and democracy around the world.” However the extent of this promise is yet to be seen. Observers note that there has been a general shift in U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East which deprioritized Egypt in U.S. strategic interests, as is evidenced by Biden’s delayed call to President Sisi, supporting the President’s election promise. However the $200 million arms sale and his praise for Egypt during the Gaza strip conflict indicates that the relationship may also remain largely unchanged. 

    There is vocal opposition against the U.S.-Egypt partnership amongst the Egyptian population. This is likely due to the American support of the Egyptian military, which has been an oppressive force in Egypt. Should the United States decouple from the Egyptian government, it may result in the creation of a power vacuum, enabling the rise of opposition in an attempt to revive the aims of the 2011 Arab Spring.

  • China’s Role in the Ukrainian Crisis and Sino-Russian Relations Viewed from Washington D.C.

    China’s Role in the Ukrainian Crisis and Sino-Russian Relations Viewed from Washington D.C.

    Following the 2014 Donbas War and the military intervention in Syria, Russia has been facing isolation in the international community. However, amid the enmity of the international community, China has grown closer both economically and politically with Russia in the second decade of the 21st century, particularly through the trading of natural resources and cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. As Dan Coats, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, noted in the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, “China and Russia are more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s”. During the 2022 Ukrainian crisis, China has been considered by U.S. officials as the largest potential aid towards Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. Directly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry described China as one of Russia’s key remaining friends, and Moscow hoped that Beijing would continue to provide rhetorical and substantive assistance. As Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister announced, China and Russia “will always maintain strategic focus and steadily advance our comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”

    China-Russia Defense and Economic Cooperation

    China and Russia appear to be moving toward a higher level of defense cooperation in recent decades. Since the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the two countries have engaged in close military interactions from cooperation in training and arms trade. Suffering from the western arms embargo after 1989, China saw Russia as a crucial source of advanced military equipment and technologies. In 1996, Beijing and Moscow began a “strategic partnership of coordination” that established high-level dialogues on a range of issues, including security and military affairs. The military ties between the two countries reached a higher level in the past decade. Since 2012, the PLA and Russian Armed Forces have conducted 14 joint military exercises. The Russian government also approved the selling of some of its most advanced military equipment to China, including the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense system and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet.

    The two countries’ converging economic interests also incentivized them to engage in further cooperation in trade and financial strategies. Since the 2014 Dunbas war, state firms and banks in Russia have faced sanctions from the Western powers, hindering the ability of Russia to raise financing in Western markets. After the trade war with the U.S. in 2018, China also began seeking greater independence from the global financial market. Consequently, in order to reduce their reliance on the U.S. dollar and Western capitals, both China and Russia began to embrace the possibility of dedollarization. In 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang signed 38 agreements on a visit to Moscow deepening cooperation on energy and establishing a three-year currency swap deal worth 150 billion yuan (about $24.5 billion). This deal was renewed for another three years in 2017, marking the joint effort for the two countries to pursue financial autonomy. The trading relationships between the two countries received more attention from the public. China and Russia both recognized each other as one of the most important trading partners in the world. China considered oil and natural gas imported from Russia as major substitutes for imports from the OPEC countries and was thus crucial to the energy safety of China. 

    Impact of the Ukraine Invasion on Sino-Russian Relations

    Despite the shared economic and security interests between China and Russia, China remained ambiguous about providing support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Following the invasion, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi restated China’s understanding of “Russia’s legitimate security concerns” and criticized NATO’s five consecutive rounds of eastward expansion for threatening the national security of Russia. However, China gradually abandoned its anti-west narrative and its emphasis on national security. Although the Chinese leaders continued to reaffirm the close ties between the two countries, China intended to establish itself as a mediator of the Ukrainian crisis and thought to mitigate the conflicts by facilitating peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. 

    While China hoped to expand its influence in Europe by mitigating the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. On the other hand, the military cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies also reached higher levels. The possibility of a Russian invasion contributed to more defense spending across the NATO countries. While the Russian military is proved to be depleted from the war in Ukraine and European countries are willing to increase investments in their defense, the United States can now relocate limited resources to Asia.

    However, a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis is still necessary for securing U.S. strategic interests in national security and ideology. Firstly, Ukraine has proven to be an important ally of the United States in nuclear proliferation in the past decades. The partnership between Kyiv and Washington D.C. in nuclear proliferation eliminated the large Soviet nuclear arsenal. Second, the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 established Ukraine as a buffer state between the United States and Russia. Therefore, an escalation of the Ukrainian crisis into total war between Russia and the West is a further violation of the Budapest Memorandum and damages the public images of both sides. Third, as two major autocracies in the world, an ideological tie is forming between China and Russia in their collective interests against the United States and the democratic values it represents. Therefore, any direct confrontation between the United States and Russia in Ukraine may turn the Ukrainian crisis into a proxy war like North Korea and Vietnam and eventually lead to a new cold war between the East and the West. In order to protect Ukraine, prevent potential nuclear threats against the U.S. and its European allies, and prevent the conflict between the East and the West from escalating into a new cold war, the United States is likely to seek a peaceful resolution of the on-going war rather than escalation of the conflicts in Ukraine.

    Conclusion

    For Russia, the cost of losing the war in Ukraine may be too high for the Putin regime. The possibility of further Western sanctions and losing public support encouraged Putin to rely on China for further support. Although China is taking cautious steps to position itself in the Ukrainian crisis, a potential Sino-Russian alliance is the last thing the United States wants to see. On the other hand, as a rising power, China is seeking to increase its political and economic influence across Eurasia through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As a result, China is hoping to initiate peace talks, and establish itself as a mediator of the conflict.

  • Introduction to U.S.-West Africa Relations

    Introduction to U.S.-West Africa Relations

    West Africa is the most populated region in Africa, home to over 420 million people and natural resources such as petroleum, diamond, gold, timber, and cacao. West Africa and the United States cooperate on issues including trade, development aid, climate-related issues, intra-African conflicts, and immigration. 

    Trade and Development

    West Africa has experienced GDP (Growth Domestic Product) growth of 3.5% in 2019 and 3.6% in 2020. The U.S. has significantly increased trade with several West African countries including Nigeria ($3.2 billion), Ghana ($1.8 billion), and Cote d’Ivoire ($1.2 billion) in total goods traded (two-way) during 2019. The primary platform created in an attempt to stimulate U.S.-Africa trade is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), established under the Clinton administration in 2000. This preferential trade agreement facilitated stronger commercial ties between the U.S. and selected beneficiary countries in Sub-Saharan Africa by allowing eligible countries to gain duty-free access to the U.S. market for thousands of products. Fifteen countries in West Africa were eligible for AGOA benefits in 2020, although many argue the eligibility requirements for countries can be too stringent, and the trade growth since AGOA was established has been inconsistent. Most countries registered gains in exports, although many exports, especially those derived from fuel, have been largely unsteady and have limited market diversification and expansion. 

    The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID)’s West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (WATIH) exemplifies a more recent venture to further integrate West African businesses into U.S.-African trade through a five-year $140 million trade and investment activity. This program seeks to catalyze sustainable economic growth and increase competitiveness through market-based strategic partnerships with the private sector. The primary objectives are to improve food security in West Africa, create job opportunities for women, and increase investment and exports in key growth sectors.

    Other initiatives enacted by Congress such as the U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF) aim to provide grants to small enterprises in underserved communities in Sub-Saharan Africa to strengthen operational assistance, business expansion, and market integration. USADF has made strides in generating partnerships with Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger with over $20 million in investments in more than 50 local businesses impacting millions of lives. 

    Dissension over the history of United States development programs in Africa is pervasive. Many experts argue the system is plagued with profligate investment and is unsustainable or inefficient, frequently only benefitting a small fraction of individuals. Despite these concerns, trade between the United States and West Africa is on the rise.

    Intra-African conflicts

    Since 2020, West Africa has experienced 5 coups d’état in Chad, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso due to security challenges aggravated by ongoing conflicts with jihadist insurgents in the greater Sahel region. The region is no stranger to internal conflict, with the recent turmoil aggravating the situation of food insecurity, political corruption, violence, inflation, and refugees or displaced peoples. 

    Washington attempts to mitigate conflict through the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), established in 2007 as a combatant command responsible for U.S. Department of Defense operations and security cooperation on the African continent. American troops have been deployed to Niger to provide training, logistics, and intelligence to assist the Nigerien and Malian military’s fight against jihadists affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and to assist in the Boko Haram-induced conflict in northern Nigeria. In 2020, the U.S. halted military cooperation with Mali following the coup and has limited most of its military presence in West Africa to Niger. 

    Climate Change

    Conflict in the Sahel has complicated access to food and water in the region and is a major contributor to the high number of nearly 40 million food-insecure people in West Africa. This situation has been exacerbated by climate-related issues, with climate change likely to lower crop yields and production, resulting in a rise in the price of food for communities, especially in rural areas. Following the minimal success of the West Africa Biodiversity and Climate Change (WA BiCC), a five-year climate support juncture that ended in 2021, USAID created the West Africa Biodiversity and Low Emissions Development (WABILED) program. WABILED aims to enhance the capacity of national and regional networks and institutions to enforce wildlife trafficking laws in West Africa, lower deforestation and forest degradation, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions through technology and knowledge management support and funding. 

    Immigration

    Rural to urban movement has dominated internal migration patterns as well as the crucial seasonal migration from inland to coastal areas due to droughts, reduced crop yield, or heat waves. By 2050 it is predicted that nearly 32 million people will be displaced within their own countries in West Africa due to climate factors. Those already attempting to leave the region have been characterized as climate migrants or climate refugees.

    In 2019, approximately 2.1 million sub-Saharan African immigrants lived in the United States. While the region accounts for roughly one-third of the population of sub-Saharan Africa, the chart below demonstrates that West Africans make up nearly half of the total population of sub-Saharan African migrants to the United States. The Trump administration was criticized for its 2020 travel ban, which restrained entry and visa issuance that could lead to permanent residency for several Muslim-majority countries, including Nigeria. The Biden administration lifted the ban, although the impact it had on West African immigration today is still unclear. 

  • The KORUS Free Trade Agreement

    The KORUS Free Trade Agreement

    Historically, the United States and South Korea have had a strong military alliance, and moved to expand economic relations through the KOR-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which entered into force in 2012. An FTA is an economic agreement between two nations setting expectations and obligations in terms of the exchange of goods and services, protection of investors, etc. For the US, the aim is to protect US economic interests abroad and to aid US exports. Key provisions in the FTA include:

    • Consumer and industrial products became duty free and 95% would be expected to be duty free within three years.
    • Textiles and apparel—“yarn forward” treatment allowing for apparel that uses materials from US/SK qualifies for preferential treatment.
    • Trade remedies (actions taken in response to import surges, fair value sales, etc.) which allowed for US to exempt SK imports if it did not endanger the US domestic industry, and established a third-party committee— Medicines and Medical Devices Committee— to review government reimbursements and pricing on pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 
    • Some provisions for digital trade, but they are less extensive than other agreements, and some have called for updates to this specific provision. 

    The KORUS Free Trade Agreement is the United States’ second-largest FTA by trade-flows, only surpassed by NAFTA, now called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). US-SK exports were $80.5 billion, imports were $88.1 billion, totalling an estimated $168.6 billion (2019) in trade flows. 

    Challenges to the Free Trade Agreement

    When negotiating the final agreement, the beef and auto sectors were two major sticking points. South Korea had banned American beef after the outbreak of mad-cow disease in 2003, and there was significant debate about lifting that restriction. The issue of beef was perceived as a public health issue and became highly politicized. In the initial 2007 agreement, beef was avoided entirely because of its sensitive nature in South Korea, but eventually restrictions were lifted on boneless beef under 30 months old. On the US side, the auto industry had concerns over the rising imports and a weakening domestic market—General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler sales in 2007 fell 7.3% while U.S. sales of foreign brands (U.S.-based production plus imports) rose about 3%. Because of these conflicts, President Bush did not submit legislation to ratify the agreement 

    The Obama Administration took office focused on improving terms for the US auto industry in the FTA, leading to a supplemental trade agreement. The new terms expanded on Korean safety standards and allowed for 25,000 cars per US automaker to be imported into Korea as long as they meet US federal safety standards, and more leniency for small-volume importers (up to 4500 vehicles) in terms of environmental standards. The letter also specifies under Section A that there would be a reduction in duties (taxes), and in Section B desires more transparency from South Korea in preventing delays and barriers to trade while establishing an early-warning system. The beef issue was resolved when South Korea eliminated its 40 percent tariff, which was projected to save $1,300 per ton of beef imported to Korea and would approximately total $90 million annually for US beef producers at 2010 sales levels.

    Recent Developments and Critiques

    According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, as of 2019, South Korea is the US’ 6th largest goods trading partner with $134.0 billion in total (two way) goods trade during 2019, and the US is South Korea’s 2nd largest trading partner. However, under the Trump Administration, the US threatened to leave the agreement, leading to increased economic tension between the two countries. Trump blamed Korea for an increase in trade deficit, and wanted Korea to reduce policies which disadvantage American firms so that trade would be more balanced, with the current trade deficit at 29 billion (2021). He also raised concerns over non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the steel and auto industry that disadvantaged American markets by protecting Korean manufacturers. Non-tariff barriers are restrictions in trade that arise due to sanctions, domestic laws, quotas, etc. and are outside the agreed upon terms of an FTA. Minor revisions were made to the FTA in 2019 to address these concerns. 

    • The previous limit of 25,000 cars per US automaker imported by Korea was raised to 50,000 cars.
    • The 25% tariff on Korean trucks that was supposed to expire in January 2021 was extended to 2041.
    • The US restricted imports on steel and washing machines (Section 201 and 232). 
    • Minor changes were made to pharmaceuticals, customs, and investor-state dispute settlement.

    When Trump threatened to leave the agreement in 2017 due to the deficit, 2017 (Jan-May) data showed that US merchandise exports to Korea were up 23% year over year and and US imports from Korea were down 2%. It was suggested that trade diversion (where imports shift from lower cost nations to higher cost nations, something that can follow free trade agreements) may have contributed to the trade deficit, but ended up leaving the global trade balance largely unchanged in the long term. From 2012, the date of implementation, the US trade deficit in goods with Korea increased by 75% from $13.2 billion to $23.1 billion in 2017. 

    The rising trade deficit has led to concerns over the FTA, but many economists argue that the balance of trade is not an accurate way to measure the benefits of a trade agreement. For example, high US imports indicate consumers have access to products at lower prices, or better-quality goods at similar prices. Currency value also plays a major role in trade deficits; when the dollar is strong American consumers can afford to buy more imported goods, but American goods on foreign markets are comparatively more expensive. 

    Future Developments

    During a May 2021 summit, President Biden and President Moon Jae-in announced plans for greater cooperation to address trade and industry developments, but the Trump-era restrictions remained in place. The Korean government urged the Biden administration to ease the steel restrictions, but they remain in place as of July, 2022. South Korea recently elected a new president, so the future of the FTA could change. In their joint statement, both leaders reaffirmed their support for the FTA and discussed close cooperation on foreign exchange market developments. It is important to keep an eye on the renewable energy, semiconductor, and auto industries for the future, especially considering Biden’s $5 billion investment in an electric vehicle plant. 

    Reopening the FTA discussion would affect current steel restrictions and open conversations about the auto industry again, but also provide an opportunity to fill in the gaps of the digital industry which currently exist in the FTA, and add updated provisions about climate change. President Biden also recently launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), which includes South Korea, that aims to address supply-chain issues, climate change, business ethics, and more. As the IPEF develops and more details are finalized, it may create more opportunities for cooperation between the US and South Korea. 

  • Introduction to The New Atlantic Charter

    Introduction to The New Atlantic Charter

    History

    The first Atlantic Charter between the United States and the United Kingdom was signed August 14, 1941 by then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The Charter marked one of the founding agreements of what was to become the United Nations, and connected two countries around shared principles and policies. Since the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. and the UK have maintained strong diplomatic relations—often referred to as the “Special Relationship”. This Special Relationship commenced in 1946 giving rise to one of the most significant international partnerships of the modern day. 

    The U.S. and the UK’s military and security relations have strengthened through cooperation in conflicts such as the Korean War, the Persian Gulf War, the Iraq War, and military operations in Afghanistan, alongside founding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The U.S. and the UK have often supported similar economic policies, including the shift towards privatization and promotion of capitalism during the Reagan Administration and a UK government led by PM Margaret Thatcher. Ultimately, the two countries remain committed to the protection of democratic values and cooperation against adversaries who fail to recognize or adhere to alliances or institutions. Thus, on June 10, 2021, President Biden and Prime Minister Johnson signed The New Atlantic Charter, reaffirming the historic alliance. 

    Outline of The New Atlantic Charter

    The New Atlantic Charter has eight sections:

    1. Defending democracy be it democratic values, ideals, and institutions that contribute and protect to this form of governance. This paragraph also expands into supporting transparency, the protection of civil society and human rights, and the commitment to protecting an independent media. 
    2. Sustaining international co-operation through developing laws, norms, and strengthening existing institutions to face the challenges of today. This component advocates for a “rules-based” approach to facing the good and bad impacts of emerging technologies, economic development while protecting the workers that enable it, and supporting free trade between countries.
    3. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful resolution to disputes, with both the U.S. and UK uniting and standing against interference with these principles. Much of this alludes to opposing the growing issue of disinformation, election interference, and reaffirming the need for debt transparency and debt relief. Moreover, this paragraph concludes with the commitment to defend lawful international “freedom of navigation” be it by air or seas.
    4. Innovation in Science and Technology, seeking to continue to promote development of these areas to support shared security, create employment domestically, foster global development, and create technologies to be deployed for the support of democratic values. 
    5. Collective security and international stability through reaffirming the shared responsibility to protect these principles in the modern world. This component re-emphasizes both the U.S. and the UK commitment to NATO and its allies, particularly with modern day security threats, be it cyberspace, arms control, and the disarmament or proliferation of nuclear weapons. The notable tone of this paragraph is that these threats are a collective issue for both countries and therefore should be tackled through international cooperation.
    6. Building a sustainable global economy that is free, fair, sustainable, climate-friendly and rules-based. Both countries are committed to fighting corruption, encouraging financial stability and transparency, while working towards fair and environmentally mindful global innovation and competition.
    7. Tackling the climate crisis by recognizing the immediate threat this poses and as such, both the U.S. and the UK seek to prioritize this issue in all their respective international actions.
    8. Addressing health crises through collaboration to advance health systems and protections, to strengthen collective defenses against health threats and assist in others striving to do the same.

    One of the overarching takeaways from the signing of The New Atlantic Charter is the return of diplomacy as the key American tool in international relations, a mechanism long used and endorsed in UK foreign policy actions. Much of the agreement reaffirms prior understandings, but it also attempts to reference the challenges of the twenty-first century, some of which are cited throughout the document.

    The Future

    The New Atlantic Charter signals a new dawn of the U.S.–UK relations at a time when many feel the rules-based world order is at its most vulnerable since World War II. While the charter steers away from naming specific adversaries, each component alludes to the perceived threat China and Russia, and a world that has been permanently changed by COVID-19. Over the past few years, the U.S. and the UK have embodied that vision by expanding their collective presence in the Indo-Pacific Region with the introduction of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) Partnership to counterbalance China, and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty following Russia’s invasion.

    However, recent data indicates many Americans are concerned about how much focus the U.S. places on global affairs, potentially to the detriment of domestic issues. This suggests a growing U.S. skepticism towards the importance or necessity of agreements with international allies, with a majority favoring a focus towards domestic policy rather than global affairs. At the same time, the UK’s influence on the global stage has been declining since the start of the “Special Relationship”. Many who support an outward-facing U.S. presence feel the U.S. needs to expand relations with other countries who can bring more to the table.

  • U.S.-Mexico Drug Policy Collaboration

    U.S.-Mexico Drug Policy Collaboration

    Introduction

    The U.S. is the leading consumer of illegal drugs in the world. The rate of drug overdose deaths in the U.S. was close to 320 per million residents in 2021, while the average for G20 nations was 23.8 per million residents. The border shared between the U.S. and its southern neighbor Mexico is the entryway for many of these illicit drugs. In 2020, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents seized over 266 tons of illicit drugs (cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, fentanyl, etc.) at points of entry along the border.

    Stopping this flow of drugs is a policy priority for both the U.S. and Mexico. In 1914, the U.S. passed the Harrison Narcotics Act, the first major legislation to regulate the distribution and sale of narcotic drugs. This marked the beginning of drug enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico. By the end of the 20th century, supplying the increasing demand for illicit drugs in the U.S. became the business of powerful Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), popularly known as cartels. These organizations and their violent tactics have become a threat to both countries. Mexican-based DTOs have formally and informally expanded across the border, creating a web of supply chains and control that poses domestic challenges for the U.S. and Mexico alike. This issue has become one of the most important aspects of the U.S. relationship with Mexico and a national security issue. 

    Early 20th Century Prohibition

    Prior to the 1900s, drugs like opium and marijuana traveled freely from areas of cultivation (especially China) to the U.S. due to their unregulated nature. However, the U.S. began to curtail the use of these substances through the Harrison Narcotics Act, and later by the formation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) in 1930. The FBN, led by Harry Anslinger, initiated a campaign to regulate and outlaw these recreational drugs. These efforts culminated in the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act, a bill that de facto criminalized the recreational or medical use of marijuana. 

    Many of these drugs were imported from Europe, yet with World War II disrupting intercontinental trade, Mexico became a major producer and supplier for the U.S. drug market. The economic incentive to produce illicit drugs grew under prohibition. Opium was particularly profitable for the Mexican economy, and since the demand was almost entirely abroad, trafficking of the drug was mostly tolerated by Mexican authorities. Additionally, opium harvesting was concentrated in the remote Sinaloan highlands, which is prime for cultivation of the poppy plant (the natural base for opium and heroin) and far from the reaches of federal oversight. 

    The War on Drugs and Operation Intercept

    One of the many cultural changes that rocked the 1960s was the increase in recreational drug use, especially amongst American youth. The conservative response to this counterculture movement was embodied politically by Richard Nixon, and especially by his declaration of the “War on Drugs” in 1971. The roots of this anti-drug focus can be traced two years prior to Operation Intercept, the 1969 drug enforcement policy that jolted the Mexican government into developing a capacity for domestic drug enforcement. 

    Thousands of U.S. agents spread across the entire U.S.-Mexico border and inspected all passing vehicles for evidence of illicit drugs. This led to catastrophic backups in cross-border traffic, negatively impacting the Mexican public and government officials alike. Intercept was planned unilaterally, with the intent of forcing Mexico to take action within its borders and on its own accord. The policy did not curtail the amount of drugs trafficked from Mexico to the U.S., but it did force Mexico into action. Traffic disrupted licit trade and caused headaches for residents of both nations, and Intercept was halted after only 17 days. Since then, the Mexican government has been a willing partner with the U.S. in drug enforcement operations. 

    Operation Condor

    By 1975, enforcement measures were not going as planned. Mexico was supplying up to 87% of the heroin entering the U.S., and the two countries needed a reset in drug enforcement collaboration. A series of joint operations, culminating in Operation Condor, was the answer. 

    Mexico, supplied with U.S. military-grade helicopters and aircraft, began a campaign of crop eradication, targeting fields in the states of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, known together as the “Golden Triangle”. This region of Mexico is the cradle of opium poppy and marijuana plantations. The mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure make the land isolated and difficult to patrol. However, federal soldiers infiltrated drug-cultivating communities, ultimately arresting and killing many supposed traffickers while receiving accusations of human rights abuse. In total from 1977-87, Condor missions destroyed over 220,000 fields and indicted more than 2,000 criminals, yet the northern stream of drugs did not subside.

    This crackdown pushed many of the Sinaloans out of the area, most of whom reconvened in Guadalajara. It also motivated the criminals to organize formally, sowing the foundations for the first Mexican DTOs. Condor’s crackdown finally allowed Colombian cartels to blossom and prosper, initiating the rise of Colombia’s export of cocaine to the U.S.

    The Rise of DTOs and the Camarena Incident

    As U.S. efforts to intercept contraband from Colombia became successful, the transport routes shifted to Mexico, thereby increasing the power of the Mexican cartels. In 1985, the muder of U.S. DEA agent Enrique Camarena on Mexican soil began a much more violent chapter in U.S.-Mexico drug policy cooperation.

    Camarena was tortured and killed because he got too close to the cartels. As is dramatized in the popular television show Narcos: Mexico, the DEA agent was investigating the head of the Sinaloa Cartel, Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo, also known as the “boss of bosses”. Camarena’s torture and murder was a turning point in U.S.-Mexico drug enforcement collaboration. The ensuing crackdown led to a dissolution of Mexico’s federal police force, and major kingpins like Gallardo were arrested or killed.

    A year later, in 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive, which allowed the Department of Defense to engage in anti-smuggling activities on the U.S.-Mexico border while classifying drug trafficking as a national security threat. Cooperation on military training began about a decade after, when U.S. and Mexican defense officials agreed to open the bilateral relationship to military support. 

    By the late 1990s, DTOs controlled nearly the entirety of the supply chain. Cartels were willing to resort to brutal violence for the control of profitable territory, demonstrated by the Camarena incident and subsequent uptick in drug-related homicides. This era would be a preview of the first two decades of the new millenia, when cartel violence exploded to even higher levels.

    President Calderón and the Mérida Initiative

    Rampant globalization during the late 20th century ushered in new challenges for bilateral drug cooperation. Drugs began to enter the U.S. through more routes and the violence between DTOs only grew. President Felipe Calderón was elected during this period of strife and insecurity, and declared war on the drug cartels eight days into his term.

    Perhaps politically motivated after a contested election, Calderón’s “war” was no bluff. His initiative against the cartels raised the level of violence in the country. By 2011, up to 96,000 soldiers were combating cartels. Decapitation tactics—eliminating the kingpins at the top of the cartels—were the primary strategy during Calderón’s initiative. U.S. support from DEA agents were essential, providing crucial support in many high-profile arrests like that of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.

    Beyond the services of federal agents, the U.S. was a major actor during this period of drug enforcement. The U.S. and Mexico signed the Mérida Initiative in 2007 to solve the evolving challenges facing drug enforcement. Between 2007 and 2010, the U.S. provided Mexico about $2 billion in equipment, aircraft, technology, and training through Mérida, funding supply-side counternarcotic efforts such as interdiction and eradication of crops. These tactics proved ineffective at slowing drug usage in the U.S., and incited higher levels of violence in Mexico. Calderón’s offensive against the cartels initiated an increase in fighting between rival gangs and security forces, leading to an estimated 47,000 to 70,000 deaths. Under former President Obama, Mérida took on a modified approach, focusing more on training judges and prosecutors.

    Looking Forward

    In October 2021, the U.S. and Mexico announced the end of the Mérida Initiative, and the beginning of the “Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities.” This new collaboration focuses on promoting human rights and providing economic alternatives to organized crime. The agreement is a welcomed return to policy collaboration between the two countries, which was soured in 2020 by the arrest of a former Mexican defense secretary in Los Angeles on drug charges. The focus of the Bicentennial Framework is ostensibly aligned with current Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s “hugs not bullets” approach to drug enforcement. However, many commentators have noted the expansion of Mexico’s military deployment within the country, rising from 69,000 to 125,000 troops since he took office in 2018. 

    The Bicentennial Framework is the most recent iteration of a decades-long policy focus between the U.S. and Mexico, which despite intense effort from both nations, has not led to long-term success. In fact, the statistics on drug use in the U.S. and violence in Mexico reveal a dispiriting report card. Homicides in Mexico during 2021 were over 43,000, four times higher than the rate when President Calderón’s war on cartels began in 2008 (14,000). In late 2021, the U.S. reached the grim milestone of 100,000 overdose deaths annually, nearly three times more than the rate of overdose death in 2008 (36,000). These two statistics indicate the most important drug policy issues in both countries: for the U.S. it is curtailing the evolving opioid epidemic, and for Mexico it is slowing the violence ravaging parts of the country.