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Category: Foreign Policy region

  • US Military in South Korea

    US Military in South Korea

    The presence of the American military in South Korea began at the end of WWII, when American and Soviet forces entered the peninsula to facilitate the removal of Japanese forces. The American military was positioned south of the 38th parallel whereas Soviet forces moved north. When North Korean forces invaded South Korea in 1950, triggering the Korean War (1950-1953), the US supported South Korea to oppose the communist regime. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 1.8 million Americans served in the war. The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, which ended hostilities and established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The Korean Peninsula remained divided at the 38th parallel in a perpetual state of war as the armistice agreement was not a permanent peace treaty. The Truman administration prioritized stability over reunification, and America and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. The American military has remained in South Korea ever since. 

    Financing the US Military Presence

    The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) establishes the obligations of the US and South Korea in maintaining American forces. The US is responsible for the maintenance of US troops in South Korea, and South Korea fund the facilities. The financial contribution of South Korea comes in the form of Special Measure Agreements (SMA’s). Eleven SMAs have been signed since 1991, with the 11th signed in 2021. 

    The Trump administration raised concerns over South Korean contributions. In the SMA signed in 2014, which was supposed to last until 2018, South Korea paid 920 billion won, or approximately $866.86 million USD. This was a 5.8 percent increase from the previous agreement. The increase was theorized to be from the decision to send more tanks and soldiers. In the 2019 SMA, South Korea paid 1.04 trillion won, or $921.5 million USD, which was an 8.2 percent increase from the previous agreement. The 2019 agreement was only for one year, while the agreements usually last for 3-5 years. In the negotiations for a 2020 SMA, President Trump rejected the South Korean offer of a 13 percent increase and requested a 5 billion dollar contribution. The delays that resulted from the disagreements resulted in furloughs for the first time since the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and increased tensions with South Korea. 

    The Biden administration signed the 11th SMA in 2021, and it will last until 2025. South Korea paid 1.1833 trillion Korean Won in 2021, and the amount will rise according to the contribution of the previous year by the ROK defense budget increase rate. The 2021 defense budget increase rate will be used for the 2022 contribution, the 2022 rate for 2023, and so on. The renewal rate was partially driven by the rift that had been created by the Trump administration, and Biden’s attempts to repair this. 

    Operation Control (OPCON)

    Operational control can be defined as “authority to perform functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission” and does not involve “authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.” In 1994, peacetime opcon was transferred to Korea, but wartime opcon is still maintained by the United States Forces Korea (USFK), under combined command of both the US and SK. The peacetime transfer means that the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff controls the operations during peacetime, and Combined Forces Command will control operations during wartime. 

    The controversy mainly lies in the transfer of wartime OPCON. Wartime OPCON was initially supposed to transfer to South Korea in 1996, but the discussion was postponed when North Korea threatened a nuclear attack. President Roh Moo hyun agreed with President Bush, in 2007, that wartime OPCON would be transferred over to South Korea by 2012. President Roh politicized the issue, and framed it as South Korea needing to retake sovereignty. The following president, Lee Myung bak postponed the discussion to 2015 because of the “evolving security environment”, most likely referencing the North Korean Cheonan incident in 2010. In the following presidential administration, Park Geun hye rejected the 2015 deadline, citing that it was too soon considering the increased nuclear threats and testing from North Korea, and President Obama agreed that it could be reconsidered. In the 46th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Joint Communique, article 11 details an implementation of a conditions-based approach in the transfer of wartime OPCON to Korea:

    • ROK will assume wartime OPCON when ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured (meaning the ROK military capabilities will need to be able to counter North Korean missiles, and confidently lead the combined defense posture) 
    • The security environment on the Korean peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable transition 

    This would delay the transfer to sometime in the 2020’s, but it was not clear precisely when. The following president, Moon Jae In, conversed with the Trump administration in order to speed up the process of transfer, and the Alliance Guiding Principles were drafted at the 50th SCM. Post-transition, the CFC would be a “separate standing entity” (therefore, not dissolved), and the ROK would appoint a General or Admiral to serve as Commander of the CFC, with a US General or Admiral as deputy commander. The current CFC command has a four star US general as Commander, and a four star ROK general as deputy commander. The Moon administration wished to undertake a Full Operational Capability (FOC) exam in 2021, but the Trump administration said neither side was ready. 

    The current president, Yoon Suk yeol, believest South Korea lacked sufficient readiness to operate intelligence assets, which suggests that the OPCON transfer may not happen in the immediate future. President Yoon maintains that he wishes for a speedy transfer, but only if it does not undermine the combined defense posture of SK and US. At the 53rd SCM, the joint communique lists the reaffirmation “that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before the wartime OPCON is transitioned to the F-CFC [Future-Combined Forces Command]”. They also pledged to do a FOC exam in 2022. There are speculations that the war in Ukraine and tension between the US and China may lead the Biden administration to hesitate to transfer wartime OPCON, but the 2023 54th SCM may yield more clear answers.

  • What the Colombian Presidential Election Means for US Relations

    What the Colombian Presidential Election Means for US Relations

    Introduction

    On June 19, 2022, Colombia elected Gustavo Petro, the 62-year old, left-wing senator, former mayor of Bogotá, and former member of the M-19 guerilla, as president with 50.8% of the vote, defeating Rodolfo Hernandez, a 77-year-old real estate tycoon and former mayor of Bucaramanga. 

    Petro’s win is historic, as he becomes the country’s first-ever leftist president. His running mate, Francia Márquez, is also breaking new ground by becoming the first Afro-Colombian and first woman to be elected vice president. Petro received almost 11.3 million votes, the most any presidential candidate has ever received. Many of those votes were the result of a surge in participation from poor and coastal communities.

    Many of these voters were not energized to the polls by concerns over security and counter-narcotics, which have dominated past election cycles. Instead, the COVID-19 pandemic, mass protests, and a deteriorating economic climate, along with issues such as inequality, poverty, social problems, police brutality, corruption, and climate change have become the main drivers for a new wave of poor, young, and urban Colombians. Many viewed Petro as a figure to challenge the establishment and help “the nobodies”.

    Petro’s Colombia

    When Petro was inaugurated n August 2022, he took over a nation reeling from rising inflation, poverty, and unemployment. According to Americas Quarterly, 4 million Colombians went into poverty during the pandemic. A 2022 poll found 85% of Colombians think the situation in the country is worsening, with 34% believing the economy is the main problem. Only 26% of Colombians are satisfied with its democracy. 

    Petro is taking over an unsatisfied and disillusioned Colombia. But it’s up to Petro to find allies for his Pacto Historico coalition—a coalition of left-leaning and center political parties and social groups—to begin to enact some of his campaign promises and goals from the economy to climate change.

    Economic Reform

    During his campaign, Petro emphasized the need for structural economic reform, stating in an interview with El Pais, “the establishment does not want change. It has become wealthy with an economic model that prioritizes the financial sector and is based on the extraction of oil and coal….a model like this increases social inequality, which is the mother of violence.” 

    Petro’s goals include tax reform to finance new social programs and public projects to combat rising inequality and poverty in the country. 42.5% of the Columbia population—21 million people—live below the poverty line of 331,000 pesos (~$77) per month. Much of his plan is focused on increasing taxes and royalties on extractive industries and their products, such as mining endeavors and fossil fuels, which could raise around $5.2 billion in added revenue. Petro wants to implement a new progressive income tax where Colombians earning more than 10 million pesos per month—1% of the population—will pay progressively higher taxes. 

    Petro also plans to focus on corporate tax evasion. According to Reuters, tax evasion costs the Colombian government $17.6 billion annually. These funds could be used to reduce the country’s deficit, which sits at 7.1% of its GDP.

    Climate Change

    Petro has been adamant that his priority as president is dealing with the environment and moving the country away from extractive industries, towards a productive economy. His vision of a “productive” economy would be becoming independent of oil and mining industries, which account for 50% of Colombia’s exports and 14% of government revenue, and replace them with renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and tourism. He also committed to end new oil exploration licenses which will be a complicated task because the government currently holds an 88% stake in EcoPetrol. However, Petro has made it a key goal of his presidency to make Colombia a global example in shifting away from extractive industries toward an environmentally oriented future.

    Social Reform

    Petro’s running mate, Francia Marques, represents a crucial advancement for many marginalized groups in Colombia. Petro’s has proposed creating a Ministry of Equality and ensuring 50% of all government positions are held by women. His campaign has put forward reforms to the public pension, healthcare programs, and public education in an effort to expand coverage and accessibility.

    The issue of hunger has also intensified recently, with the Colombian Association of Food Banks reporting that around 16 million Colombians have access to 2 meals or less a day. To combat this issue, Petro plans to declare a state of emergency against hunger in the country.

    Security & Counter-Narcotics

    In regards to security, Petro has stated that he wants to properly implement the 2016 peace agreement with the guerilla group FARC, and begin peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN). He has also set his goals to promote reforms for the military and police including hold military officials accountable for human right violations, dismantle the police riot squad (ESMAD), professionalize the military, and reform its merit-based promotion system.

    US-Colombia Relations Under Petro

    Colombia has been the US’s strongest Latin American partner for over two decades, with the US providing over $13 billion in aid. However, with the election of Gustavo Petro, the US finds itself with a new Colombian government different from the conversative governments of the past. While the Biden administration seems to be taking an open and cautious approach with Colombia, Petro seeks a ‘more equitable’ relationship” with Washington. At this time, it is not yet clear what that equitable relationship will entail.

  • Combating the Islamic State in Syria

    Combating the Islamic State in Syria

    Introduction 

    The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a Sunni jihadi group that seeks to establish a global caliphate and claim religious authority over all Muslims. The Islamic State has taken advantage of the instability and violence under the Assad regime in Syria and continues to mount attacks in the region despite the defeat of the caliphate in 2018. Apart from carrying out attacks in the region, the militant group exploits refugee conditions in Syria to radicalize and recruit individuals for its resurgence. Counter-terrorism and deradicalization efforts essential steps to combat the resurgence of the Islamic State in Syria. 

    Rise of the Islamic State 

    The Islamic State, also known as the Daesh, emerged from the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a local affiliate of Al Qaeda under the leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. With the start of the Arab Spring and the growing instability and violence in Syria, AQI grew to carry out attacks and bolster its strength and expand its caliphate to Syria to establish a fundamentalist Sunni Muslim state in Greater Syria. In June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi changed the group’s name to ISIS and formally declared the ISIS caliphate.

    The militant group’s ideology stems from Salafism and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia (Islamic Law). The group developed a global jihad network by expanding to different geographic areas and establishing affiliates in Libya, the Sinai Province, Afghanistan, West Africa, and the Greater Sahara. They have further expanded affiliates into Congo, Mozambique, Philippines and Bangladesh. The primary targets of the Islamic State include the West and regimes in the Arab world which it does not view as upholding Islamic values. The Islamic State’s primary strategy includes territorial control and expanding its position in the world. 

    The Islamic State’s preferred attack types are a reflection of the tactics evolved from the civil wars in Syria and Iraq. In the height of their strength, the militant group deployed artillery, massed forces, and tanks to expand territorial holdings. In the territories that they do hold, they have carried out public executions, rape, and symbolic crucifixions to terrorize the populations into submission. 

    Islamic State’s Current Presence in Syria 

    Presently, the Islamic State continues to be active in the regime-controlled territory in the Syrian desert and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF)-controlled northeast. Attacks include small-arm assaults, ambushes, roadside bombings, kidnappings, and acts of sabotage. According to the United Nations, there are presently approximately 10,000 Islamic State fighters across Iraq and Syria. The militant group faces a more challenging operating environment than before in light of Assad’s resurgence as well as the presence of international forces. 

    One of the most significant concerns is the radicalization occurring within the al Hol detention facilities in SDF-controlled territory. The camp holds approximately 60,000 men, women, and children that have links with the Islamic State, and remains a site of recruitment and radicalization. Recently, the Islamic State mounted an attack on a prison in Northeastern Syria that held Islamic State fighters. U.S.-backed SDF forces fought the Islamic State fighters for 10 days, eventually retaking the prison—but not before the escape of approximately 100 Islamic State prisoners. 

    In February 2022, the U.S. carried out a covert operation in February that resulted in the death of the former leader of the Islamic State, al Qurayshi. This special operation demonstrated a high degree of sophistication in U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism operations. While it was a significant blow to the terrorist organization, it is unlikely to change the Islamic State’s current trajectory. 

    Past U.S. Policies to Combat the Islamic State in Syria

    In 2014, the U.S. The Department of Defense (DoD) established the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF – OIR) to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The aim of this operation was to advise, assist, and enable partnered forces in the defeat of the Islamic State. 

    Under CJTF-OIR the U.S. adopted a limited liability and limited risk strategy to defeat the Islamic State. This included air power, which played a crucial role in the defeat of the global caliphate in 2018. The U.S. and partner nations used precision strikes which eventually affected the militant group’s ability to control resources through its oil business in Syria. Airpower also played a critical role in gathering intelligence on the group’s whereabouts and resources. Overall, airpower played an essential role in blunting the Islamic State’s momentum in Syria, targeting its cash resources, and countering vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks in Mosul. Combined, these operations eliminated the militant group’s hold on large swaths of territory in Syria which was crucial to the caliphate’s survival. 

    Under CJTF-OIR, the DoD also focused on training, equipping, and advising local forces in Syria—namely, the U.S. backed Syrian Democratic Forces which played a significant role in the defeat of the Islamic State in Kobani and Raqqa. In 2019, the U.S.-backed SDF forces besieged the Islamic State in Baghouz which was the Islamic state’s last territorial enclave, ending the Islamic State’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria. 

    Continued U.S. Policies to Counter the Islamic State in Syria 

    The U.S. is likely to continue its multilateral counter-terrorism efforts to diminish any resurgence of the Islamic State. Developing a comprehensive security plan to reassess ISIS’s threat capabilities in the Northeast of Syria is vital to counteract any resurgence. This includes gathering cross border intelligence-sharing between the colaution, SDF and Iraqi authorities. In addition, the U.S. can provide more security personnel and technical equipment to secure prison systems that house former jihadi fighters. These measures can cause significant  blows to the resurgence of the Islamic State and prevent former jihadi fighters from re-joining the Islamic State. 

    In addition, the U.S. may address the sources of Islamic State resilience. This includes countering the radicalization occurring within the refugee camps in al-Hol. This would include a combined effort from the U.S. and allied nations to develop rehabilitation centers to de-radicalize individuals. This measure will address the grievances that factor into radicalization and address the pathways to de-radicalization. However, there are significant challenges to the implementation of this policy. It requires cooperation by the Assad regime to house individuals within rehabilitation centers in Syria, which would mean normalizing relations with a regime responsible for war atrocities. 

  • Understanding US-EU Agricultural Trade Policy

    Understanding US-EU Agricultural Trade Policy

    With both, the U.S. and the EU embrace similar ideologies such as their prioritization of democracy and the maintenance of a liberal economy, and often agree on how to respond to various international conflicts, one being the recent invasion of Ukraine. However, when discussing agricultural trade policy, reaching a consensus that meets both economies’ respective needs has proven difficult.

    Background Information

    Since its conception, the European Union has made it a priority to support farmers, with early EU budgets giving agriculture over 70% of allocated funding. In more recent budgetary breakdowns, the EU has lowered this number to 31% but the priority to protect small farmers is still present in its agricultural systems and policy. For example, in 2016 the EU had around 10.8 million farms with an average size of 47 acres, and the US had 2.1 million farms at an average size of 441 acres. This illustrates differing ideological approaches to agriculture, as the European Union prioritized small farmers while the United States focuses on factory farm agriculture.

    The two economies also differ in attitudes towards food quality and production. Set to expire in 2023, the U.S. Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018—also referred to as The Farm Bill of 2018—increased oversight in agricultural production and addressed food security and climate issues related to the factory farm model. The 2018 Farm Bill provided $428 billion in funding for U.S. farmers over its five-year duration to incentivize responsible agricultural practices.

    In 2020, the European Union announced their Farm to Fork Strategy which prioritizes freshness, fairness, and accessibility of food systems. The Farm to Fork Strategy aims to: 

    • Make food systems more sustainable.
    • Combat the loss of biodiversity throughout the region.
    • Help mitigate the effects of climate change.
    • Protect the accessibility of healthy foods by combating price increases.

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    The EU also announced its willingness to support a global transition to similar models, which directly threatens the models in place in the United States. The Farm to Fork Strategy led to more restrictions on geographical indication labels. These labels provide an official indication of where certain products are produced in order to protect the tradition and history of certain regions’ cuisines and cultures. Much like the general aims of the Farm to Fork Strategy, there is no equivalent to the EU’s geographical indications labels in the United States, creating another point of conflict. 

    Recent Conflicts 

    In recent years, tensions rose when the U.S. enacted tariffs on steel and aluminum in 2018. Intended to protect US-based steel and aluminum producers, these tariffs taxed 25% on imports of steel and 10% on imports of aluminum. This import tariff, paired with a threat to tax foreign imports on cheese and champagne, led the French government to announce their intentions to limit trade with countries that did not meet EU agriculture standards, including the United States. 

    The relationship between the United States and the European Union faced another point of conflict with the Appellate Body crisis in 2019. The United States blocked the appointment of new judges to the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Appellate Body. After two of the three remaining Appellate Body members’ terms expired, the Appellate Body lacked the quorum necessary to hear appeals, which in effect blocked the dispute settlement system, leading many to doubt the WTO’s role in enforcing multilateral trade rules. The U.S. objected to new appointments over concerns the WTO judges acted in a way that infringed on U.S. sovereignty.

    Current Strategies

    President Biden has begun to roll back many restrictions put in place by the previous administration. President Biden lifted the tariffs on steel and aluminum and established the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The TTC aims to demonstrate how a democratic and market-oriented approach to trade and technology can improve the prosperity and quality of life of both EU and U.S. citizens. Stated goals for the TTC include:

    • To cooperate in development and production of new technologies to reflect shared democratic values, including the prioritization of human rights.
    • To ensure that trade policies and the deployment of new technologies reflect and are informed by national security and scientific priorities as well as commercial and economic priorities.
    • To encourage competitiveness within the transatlantic economy and ensure joint leadership in setting global norms for new technologies that are based on U.S.-EU shared democratic values.
    • To retain leadership in STEM for the US and allies whilst fighting authoritarian influence in emerging and digital technology spaces.

    Future Developments

    The European Union and the United States have announced priorities for improving agro-food trade policy moving forward. These priorities include: 

    • Protecting geographical indications (GIs) for exported EU products.
    • Ensuring that the EU standards for agriculture are adhered to and respected.
    • Securing enhanced access to the U.S. market for products such as chocolate, diary, and processed meat products.
    • Addressing barriers that limit U.S. firms’ access to the EU market by further liberalizing bilateral trade agreements and investment ties.

    In an attempt to meet these goals, the EU and the U.S. have proposed a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The T-TIP is a comprehensive trade and investment agreement meant to provide more transparency for both entities while maintaining high standards in health and safety. Through the T-TIP, both countries would experience a decrease in restrictive tariffs which would theoretically increase access to foreign goods as well as increase employment in both respective regions. However, many economists are concerned over the lack of transparency surrounding the agreement’s negotiations and fear that the minimal agricultural standards in the United States could negatively impact the economic prosperity of small EU farmers. 

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  • Introduction to Cuban Migration

    Introduction to Cuban Migration

    US Policy Throughout History

    The United States’ policy overseeing Cuban migration has evolved over the past 70 years. 

    • Between the early 1930s and 2019, there were an estimated 1.4 million Cuban migrants in the US. 
    • Following strained US-Cuban relations, the US enacted the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966, which allowed Cubans who had resided in the US for at least a year to apply to become lawful and permanent residents. It was a fast track to permanent residency for many Cuban immigrants. The Cuban Adjustment Act came into effect after the 1959 Cuban Revolution which resulted in 1.4 million Cubans fleeing to the United States. 
    • In 1994 the US agreed to admit 20,000 Cubans annually. Prior to receiving permanent status in the US, Cuban immigrants were considered refugees and were counted as such within the overarching immigration system. However, this number did not include the family members of the admittees. Family members (spouses of a Cuban native or unmarried child under the age of 21) were allowed to apply for a green card under the CAA. Therefore, a total of 20,000 households are admitted into the US each year. 
    • In 2007, the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program (CFRP) began allowing family members of US citizens to travel to the US without having to wait for immigration visas. Once these migrants were physically present in the US, they were able to apply for work permits. This step allowed for the reunification of families and allowed for a more streamlined process of migration.

    Why Cubans are Migrating

    Historically, mass migration from Cuba to the United States has been in response to economic and political struggles that are present within Cuba. There has been a steady flow of migration since the 1959 Cuban Revolution. The largest migration waves coincide with economic crises, and many fled in the 1960’s when the Cuban government closed nearly 55,000 small businesses as part of the socialist economic transformation. Cuba’s economy is currently struggling due to combined issues from the Covid-19 pandemic, the US trade embargo, and domestic issues such as inflation, corruption, and shortfalls in domestic food production. In 2014, the Obama Administration lifted sanctions on Cuba allowing for more economic freedom.

    Trump and Biden Administrations: What has Changed?

    The Trump Administration reversed many of Obama’s efforts to improve bilateral relations with Cuba, and enacted new sanctions in 2017 which prohibited commerce with businesses controlled by or operating on behalf of the Cuban military, intelligence agencies, and security services, as well as limited travel and trade between the two countries. These policies took aim at revenue from travel, tourism, and remittances. In 2017 the US suspended visa processing and Cuba halted consular services in response.

    The Biden Administration sought to improve relations with Cuba. In 2022, the two countries held migration talks for the first time in four years, and visa processing has resumed as of May of 2022. The Biden Administration is seeking to stop the surge of Cuban migrants at the US-Mexico. In May of 2022, the Biden Administration announced the resumption of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program (CFRP). This will allow Cuban residents in the US to apply for parole for their family members. 47% of Americans support restaffing the US embassy and issuing visas while 22-24% of Americans oppose these steps; 24-31% of Americans have no opinions on these issues. 

    The State of Migration Today

    Migration from Cuba to the US consists mostly of people between the ages of 20 and 40 and a majority are women. Many Cubans attempt to enter the US through the US-Mexico border, and Cubans are among the top nationalities waiting at the US-Mexico border for entry into the US. Cubans travel from Cuba to Nicaragua and from there, make their journey to the US-Mexico border in hopes to cross into the US. Nicaragua is a popular starting point for migrants as Nicargua has eliminated visa requirements for Cubans. The US government is already struggling to process many migrants from Latin America. Many Cubans apply for political asylum, and there is currently a 54 month backlog for asylum hearings. The Biden Administration hopes to eventually lift remittance restrictions which would benefit Cuba’s economy and the families of migrants.

  • Who Are Yemen’s Houthis, and What Do They Want?

    Who Are Yemen’s Houthis, and What Do They Want?

    Among the myriad groups battling for control of Yemen, the Houthi movement is of particular interest to international policymakers due to its ties to Iran and its destabilizing effect on Yemen since civil war broke out in 2014 resulting in a  humanitarian crisis.

    Who are the Houthis?

    The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), is a group of Zaydi Shi’as, a minority community in Yemen historically concentrated in the northern region. Shi’a Muslims are a minority in the global Islamic community, and Zaydis are a Shi’a group with beliefs distinct from Shi’as in Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere. The Houthi movement, named after a religious leader of the Houthi clan, emerged in the 1990s as an effort to revive the Zaydi tradition. Some Zaydis, including families that were influential in northern Yemen before unification, felt that their religious and cultural traditions were  threatened by state-funded efforts to establish Salafi leaders in Zaydi areas in the 1980s. Political and religious marginalization led the Houthis to question the Yemeni government’s authority.

    The Houthis’ relationship with the Yemeni government

    The Houthis became politically active in 2003 when the group’s leader, Hussein Badr al Din al Huthi, opposed then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and openly criticized government corruption. The Houthis gained support from anti-Saleh Yemenis around the country. In response, Saleh initiated a military campaign against the Houthis, and, in 2004, Saleh’s forces killed Hussein al Houthi. Subsequently, the Houthis waged six uprisings against Saleh’s government between 2004 and 2010. Saudi Arabia, which shares a long border with Yemen, aided Saleh’s troops in attempting to suppress the Houthi uprisings. 

    During the 2011 Arab uprisings, the Houthis participated in the national protests against President Saleh, who eventually ceded power to his deputy, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi. During the transition, the Houthis criticized Hadi and the UN-sponsored National Dialogue Conference created to address the political future of Yemen. During this period of weak leadership, government transition, and intense political competition, the Houthis seized territory and gained support in the north. In a dramatic reversal, Saleh allied with the Houthis against his former political ally, Hadi, and in 2015, the Houthis and Saleh loyalists ousted Hadi, who subsequently fled to Saudi Arabia. However, in 2017, Saleh withdrew his support for the Houthi coalition, which killed him a few days later. 

    The Houthis role in Yemen’s civil war 

    Since capturing Yemen’s capital Sanaa in 2014, the Houthis have built an alliance with a network of northern political, military, and tribal groups. The coalition, referred to as the Sanaa-based authorities, have cemented control over state institutions, sidelined political rivals, and steadily gained territory in the north. The alliance, led by the Houthis, currently control almost all of northern Yemen and remain the dominant force in Yemen’s most populated areas. However, the Houthis also face pressure from a web of armed groups within Yemen, including the Islamist party Islah, a southern separatist movement, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Many Yemenis oppose the Houthis’ de facto governance and criticize the group’s practices of shelling cities, firing missiles into populated areas, and allegedly recruiting child soldiers. 

    The Houthi-Saudi Conflict 

    In 2015, Saudi Arabia feared a rise in Houthi support from Shia-majority Iran. In response, the Saudis assembled a coalition of states—Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco (until 2019), Qatar (until 2017), Senegal, Sudan, and the UAE—with the goal of stopping Houthi advances and returning Hadi to power. The coalition, backed by the United States, enforced a naval blockade and targeted the Houthis with air strikes, which pushed the Houthis and their allies out of southern Yemen and the city of Aden. This made way for Hadi to establish a temporary government in Aden. However, the government was unable to provide basic services and security to the city and surrounding areas, and Hadi himself primarily lived in Saudi Arabia.

    In response to the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive, the Houthis have launched unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missile attacks into Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including air strikes on Saudi oil fields and storage facilities. The Houthis target critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent, the UAE, to force an end to the coalition’s military operations. In 2021, the Houthis launched an offensive to capture Marib, the last northern stronghold of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. The Saudi-led coalition has responded to Houthi attacks with increased airstrikes, and data from the Yemen Data Project tallies 25,054 airstrikes conducted by the Saudi-led coalition since 2015, resulting in over 8,983 civilian deaths. 

    Internal conflict, divided political loyalty in southern Yemen, and divided military loyalty throughout the country all contribute to religious, political, and geographic tensions in Yemen. AQAP and a local branch of the Islamic State have capitalized on the instability and attempted to gain ground in the south. 

    International influence and rivalries deepen the complexity of the internal conflict. With continued Sunni-Shia tensions within and between countries, Shia-majority Iran backs the Houthis while the U.S., Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states back Yemen’s internationally recognized government. This Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen is but one dynamic driving conflict in the country.

    What do the Houthis want?

    The Houthis’ goals have shifted throughout eight years of conflict, but the movement’s primary aim is to gain international recognition of a Houthi-led government in Yemen. Additionally, Ansar Allah seeks to secure military control in the north and the oil rich-eastern region and establish a government that is more favorable to its political and ideological views and goals. In 2021, the Houthis presented a plan to end the war to Saudi officials. The proposal includes a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Yemen, and a transitional period followed by a peace agreement. 

    The Houthis’ relationship with Iran

    Iran is often accused of providing the Houthis with weapons, training, and funding. Saudi Arabia’s perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy capable of launching cross-border attacks near its southern border has driven the Saudi kingdom’s offensive. The degree of Iranian support to the Houthis is contested although the U.S., United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have provided evidence of Iranian military involvement in Yemen and support from Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed group based in Lebanon. The Saudi naval blockade has intercepted various Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis since 2015, and Iran has trained Houthi fighters within its borders. In January 2021, the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen released a report citing a growing body of evidence confirming that individuals or entities in Iran provide weapons or weapons components to the Houthis; however, it is unclear whether there are direct command-and-control links between Tehran and the Houthis.

    Tehran denies providing arms and military training to the Houthis, asserting that Iranian assistance is confined to “advisory and spiritual support”. Iran and Hezbollah openly support the Houthis politically and the Houthis’ television channel, Al Masirah, is broadcast from Beirut with the assistance of Hezbollah. Some analysts characterize Iranian influence on the Houthis as limited and emphasize the Houthis adhere to a different Shi’a tradition than Tehran. Others counter that the Houthis’ formation, ideology and political aspirations are largely influenced by the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic. 

    The Houthis’ relationship with the U.S.

    After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Houthi movement assumed an anti-American stance, and the group often characterizes its mission as a resistance to Saudi, Israeli, and American influence in the region. 

    The U.S. opposes the Houthis’ military campaign, and supports the internationally recognized government, formerly led by President Hadi and now led by a presidential council as of April 2022. The Obama and Trump administrations backed the Saudi-led coalition and provided weapons, military advice, and logistical support to offensive operations in Yemen. However, after criticism from Congress and humanitarian groups over indiscriminate bombing of civilians, both Presidents scaled down support to the coalition. 

    In 2021, U.S. President Biden ceased providing support for the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive operations, including relevant arms sales. The Biden administration also appointed U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking to encourage cooperation through diplomacy. In addition, Biden reversed former President Trump’s categorization of the Houthi movement as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) as this designation disrupted humanitarian aid to Yemen.

    Recent Developments

    On April 1, 2022, the Houthis and the internationally recognized government in Yemen agreed to a two month UN-mediated truce. Shortly after committing to the ceasefire, the Houthis signed an action plan with the UN pledging to end using children as soldiers, attacks on schools and hospitals, and killing children. In June 2022, the parties agreed to renew the truce for another two months, although significant barriers to lasting peace remain.

  • The Future of Nord Stream 2

    The Future of Nord Stream 2

    Background

    Despite a large-scale effort to transition Europe’s energy output to more environmentally friendly sources, the ties between capitalist economies and natural gas have proved too strong to cut entirely at this time. The ongoing necessity of natural gas has tied Europe and Russia together. Russia, the world’s largest exporter of petroleum, has long benefited from being the EU (the third largest economy in the world)’s greatest supplier of crude oil due to its geographic proximity and political ties. This was made more efficient through the construction of Nord Stream, an underwater pipeline completed in 2012 to carry oil from western Russia to northeastern Germany under the Baltic Sea. A second pipeline under construction, which was expected to double Russia’s supply of oil to the EU, has been suspended due to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The Biden administration was staunchly opposed to the second pipeline due to concerns over the EU’s reliance on Russian energy, and this position has strengthened due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

    Importance of Oil to Russia 

    Prior to Nord Stream, Russian oil companies paid billions of dollars in transit taxis annually to transport petroleum through neighboring Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream allowed Russian companies to eliminate the middleman, so to speak, and transport petroleum without paying transit taxes. This reduced the importance of friendly relations between Russia and its former Soviet satellites in the eyes of the Russian government, and impacted Ukraine’s economy. The first pipeline was key in strengthening Russia’s economy while allowing the state to avoid international cooperation.

    The original Nord Stream pipeline also created an important bond between Europe and Russia, especially between Russia and Germany, where the European side of the pipeline ended. In 2020, Europe was Russia’s top trading partner, importing over €150 billion worth of goods (mainly oil) from Russia.

    Relation to Ukraine Crisis 

    This relationship became strained in 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine, marking the beginning of its Westward expansion into neighboring countries. This aggression made EU member states question Russia’s intentions in eastern Europe, and created conflict between two powers aiming to maintain influence in the region. Since the annexation, Russia has continued to encroach on its neighbors’ autonomy, culminating in the invasion of Ukraine. The EU paused construction of Nord Stream 2 and enacted damaging sanctions in an effort to curb Russian aggression. 

    US Position 

    Russia is not the main supplier of oil for the US. For that reason, among others, the US does not have a similar relationship of economic interdependence with its former Cold War rival. However, the US has a strong and lasting partnership with the EU spanning a host of economic, social, and international interests. For this reason, the EU’s reliance on Russia and EU energy security have an impact on US interest. The EU’s economy depends on energy generated through oil and gas, so Russia has the ability to destabilize the European economy. For the US, Nord Stream 1 and 2 represent a threat because they give Russia, an adversary in many areas of the foreign policy, influence over the US’s strongest diplomatic and economic partners. 

    US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken represented the Biden administration’s stance on the project, stating, “this pipeline is a Russian geopolitical project intended to divide Europe and weaken European energy security.” He concluded, “Nord Stream 2 is a bad deal—for Germany, for Ukraine, and for our Central and Eastern European allies and partners.” 

    Suspending Nord Stream 2 and Impact on the US

    The suspension of Nord Stream 2 is a victory for the US in some ways, as it reduces further cooperation between the EU and Russia. The EU is in the process of rethinking its energy economy, which involves reducing reliance on oil and natural gas in favor of greener energy sources like wind and solar power. However, this transition is expensive and will happen over the course of decades. In the meantime, moving away from Russian energy puts increased importance on oil and gas producing states like Saudi Arabia. The US and the EU have taken a stronger stance against human rights violations by the Saudi government in recent years, and may now be forced to backtrack. 

    The US has felt the effects of suspending progress on the pipeline through soaring gas prices and inflation. While Russia is not the US’ main supplier of oil, the suspension of Nord Stream 2, along with other moves to punish and deter Russian aggression, has thrown off the balance of supply and demand in the domestic and global energy market, forcing the US to cooperate with other oil producing states, like Saudi Arabia, while also ramping up domestic energy production. Many domestic energy sources, like fracking and offshore drilling, have a significant environmental cost.  

  • Introduction to Post-Brexit Britain

    Introduction to Post-Brexit Britain

    Overview of UK–European Union Relations

    The United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) have a long and turbulent history of engagement. The origins of the EU date back to 1945 as a means to bring European nations together to avoid the destruction of World War II from happening again. UK Prime Minister (PM) Winston Churchill endorsed this ideal, calling it “a kind of United States of Europe”. However, the UK declined the invitation to join the European Economic Community (EEC; former name for the EU) in 1957. In 1961, the UK applied to join, and was vetoed twice by French President Charles de Gaulle, who felt the UK was a selfish actor who had prioritized relations with the U.S. over supporting the new union with European relations. In 1973, under PM Edward Heath, the UK successfully entered into the EEC, supported by a 1975 EEC Membership referendum vote with 67% in favor. 

    A major point of contention between the UK and the EU during its membership was a perceived infringement on UK sovereignty. In the 1980s, the EU was moving towards a more “federal” Europe, with a single currency (the Euro) and universal social policies. This was rejected by PM Margaret Thatcher, who saw these actions as “a European super-state exercising a new dominance”. PM John Major, Thatcher’s successor, opted into the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which gave increased power to the EU. However, he opted out of both the single currency and many social policies. Under PM Tony Blair, the UK sought to repair some of the strained UK-EU relations by signing the Social Chapter in 1997, which involved progressive social changes long supported by the Labor Party he led. This aligned the UK with EU social policies of the time which prioritized improving equal opportunity in the workplace, social security, workers rights, and improving working conditions by revolutionizing health and safety standards. 

    Following the 2008 financial crisis 2008 and 2011 Euro crisis, the EU sought to create new budgetary policies through treaties. The crisis of the Euro, also known as the European Debt Crisis, began in 2009 when EU member Greece was grappling with high debt levels and a struggling economy, and other EU members provided loans as a bailout. The Greek economy continued to struggle, and the stability of European financial institutions was threatened. PM David Cameron vetoed UK involvement in the pact that sought to address the financial issues, which deviated the UK from EU policies and emboldened euro-skeptics in the UK. Growing discontent in the UK and an uncompromising EU catalyzed the 2016 UK Referendum on EU membership. With a 51.9% majority, the UK voted to leave the EU, beginning what is known as “Brexit.” This vote was divisive, with England and Wales voting to “Leave”, and Scotland and Northern Ireland voting to “Remain”. The UK decision to leave the EU, officially completed in January 2020, put immense strain on UK–EU relations, and UK relations with other allies. 

    Ramifications of Brexit

    1. Trade: the UK no longer has barrier-free access to the EU’s single-market, and the two parties are negotiating a trade agreement. The UK had a vision of a more “Global Britain” free from the constraints of EU membership. However, few trade deals have been signed by a post-Brexit UK. The U.S. is hesitant to engage in trade talks until the final terms of UK–EU relations have been determined, and requires that peace will be maintained between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland before an agreement is finalized. 
    2. Relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Brexit strained the long standing peace on the isle of Ireland, established by the Good Friday Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement ended decades of conflict over governance in Northern Ireland, between two populations making up Northern Ireland, ‘Unionists’ (also known as Loyalists, predominantly Protestants, who were in favor of Northern Ireland being part of the UK) and ‘Nationalists’ (also known as Republicans, predominantly Catholic, who wanted Northern Ireland to be independent from the UK instead joining the Republic of Ireland). The U.S. played a large role in brokering the agreement, which established shared governance between parties in Northern Ireland and recognition of its status as part of the UK. 

    As a result of Brexit, tensions over trade across the land border between the Republic of Ireland (an EU member) and Northern Ireland (no longer an EU member) has sparked uncertainty in particular with Unionists, who feared it could cause separation between Northern Ireland and the UK. The 2021 Northern Ireland Protocol mitigated some tensions, but the UK intends to eventually adjust the protocol to facilitate trade. This resurgence of this issue is causing tension in the U.S.-UK relationship.

    Brexit and U.S.–UK Relations

    President Obama stated the UK would be at the “back of the queue” when it comes to trade should they opt to leave the EU, and he was in favor of the UK maintaining its EU membership. President Trump was in favor of Brexit, and advocated for a tougher stance on the UK’s exit agreement—known as “Hard-Brexit”—which PM Theresa May wanted to avoid. The Biden Administration is navigating a post-Brexit Britain, and he has stressed that relations between the U.S. and the UK are contingent on maintaining peace in Ireland. When the UK announced its intention to change the Northern Ireland Protocol, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi stated that Congress “cannot and will not support a bilateral free trade agreement” should the UK violate the agreement.

    The Brookings Institute found U.S. bilateral relations with European partners are highest with the UK, awarding a score of 6.5/10, in contrast with a 5.7 for U.S.-EU relations. In the absence of EU membership, the UK has reoriented its foreign policy to align closer with the U.S. This can be seen through the 2021 Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) Partnership, the New Atlantic Charter, and the UK’s support for Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. 

    However, the instability of Brexit has reduced the UK’s appeal as a competitive global partner for the U.S., and forced the U.S. to walk the line between supporting a longstanding ally and maintaining relations with a powerful bloc of countries. The UK has more autonomy when making international agreements, in comparison to the EU, but it wields less diplomatic and economic influence. EU agreements require all member states to sign off, but represent a significant, united diplomatic and economic force.

  • Introduction to U.S.-Saudi Relations

    Introduction to U.S.-Saudi Relations

    The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, home of the two holiest sites in Islam and the world’s second-largest oil reserves, is an important regional power and a long-standing partner of the United States. Abdul Aziz ibn Saud founded the kingdom in 1932 and established an absolute monarchy. King Ibn Saud’s rule drew its legitimacy from an 18th-century pact between the Al Saud family and the founder of Wahhabism, a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam that has dominated the kingdom’s religious establishment. The discovery of vast oil fields in the country in the 1930s and the formation of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) transformed Saudi Arabia’s economy as the kingdom became a major oil exporter. Saudi Arabia is a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and a member of several regional organizations, including the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

    The kingdom’s financial power, religious significance, and geostrategic position lend Saudi Arabia global influence. However, the Saudi government faces regular criticism for violating human rights and enforcing discriminatory practices toward women and religious minorities. To quell these criticisms, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, has implemented new social reforms. Despite the crown prince’s modernizing ambitions, his increasingly aggressive domestic and foreign policies have undermined these reforms. The kingdom’s leadership transition, MBS’ role in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and a changing regional landscape have prompted the Biden administration to reassess the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship long defined by energy and security interests. 

    Factsheet:

    • Population: 35,354,380
    • Capital: Riyadh
    • System of governance: Absolute Monarchy
    • Head of state: King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman   
    • Majority language: Arabic
    • Majority religion: Sunni Islam
    • GDP per capita: $44,300 
    • Global Freedom Score: 7/100
    • GINI Index: 45.9 (2013)

    Brief History with the U.S.

    The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strategic partnership for almost 80 years despite tensions over Saudi Arabia’s Islamic conservatism and human rights record. The U.S. oil industry has had close ties with Saudi Arabia since the discovery of oil in the kingdom in 1938, and a 1945 meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud solidified government ties. Since then, cooperation in the energy and defense sectors has been the cornerstone of the bilateral partnership. Nevertheless, the oil-for-security pact has been challenged periodically, most notably in 1973 when Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members embargoed oil exports to the United States and Europe in retaliation for their support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The subsequent rise in global oil prices caused fuel shortages and high gas prices in the U.S., and U.S.-Saudi relations deteriorated for a brief period.

    Several events in 1979 triggered a drastic shift in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 

    1. The Shah of Iran, one of two Twin Pillars that formed the backbone of Washington’s Middle East policy at the time, was ousted. The subsequent creation of an Islamic Republic in Iran sparked a regional competition with Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Islamic community and was a strategic loss to the U.S.
    2. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Washington responded by committing to defend the Persian Gulf and its oil fields as a vital U.S. security interest. The war also marked the beginning of Washington and Riyadh’s joint policy of arming and training anti-Soviet forces known as the mujahideen. Many Saudi men traveled to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviets, including Osama bin Laden. 

    Defense cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia continued throughout the 1980s and increased in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and 550,000 U.S. troops and coalition forces flooded the region to protect the Kuwait-Saudi border. About 5,000 U.S. troops remained in Saudi Arabia after the war, which prompted criticism from Bin Laden and less extreme Saudi conservatives who opposed Western influence in the region. 

    In 2001, after the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks on the U.S., relations between Washington and Riyadh frayed. The attacks sparked anti-Saudi sentiment among Americans because 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi-born and allegedly supported by Saudi officials. Saudi opinions of the U.S. also soured due to the Bush administration’s criticism of Saudi Arabia’s monarchical rule and conservative Wahhabi establishment as well as Washington’s broader regional policy of promoting democratic reforms antithetical to the kingdom’s system of governance. 

    The relationship continued to sour during the Obama administration given its resolve to decrease U.S. involvement in the region, which led Riyadh to question Washington’s reliability as a partner. Several instances, including President Obama’s call for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down during the Arab uprisings, Washington’s unwillingness to intervene in Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s exclusion from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) deepened the kingdom’s suspicions.

    Riyadh’s concerns about Iran’s regional activities increased in 2014 as civil war broke out in Yemen and the Iranian-backed Houthi forces made territorial gains in the country. Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition to launch offensive operations. The U.S. initially provided logistical and intelligence support for operations in Yemen, but eventually suspended some weapons transfers to the kingdom amidst high civilian casualties from Saudi airstrikes and a growing humanitarian crisis.  

    Current Status of Relations 

    U.S.-Saudi ties warmed under President Trump, who reinstated the arms sales and withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Issues that previously caused tensions in the partnership, including U.S. support for Israel,  elicited a less forceful response from the kingdom during the Trump presidency. Saudi Arabia tacitly accepted Bahrain and the UAE’s recognition of Israel under the Abraham Accords, despite the kingdom’s commitment to conditioning normalization with Israel on the establishment of a Palestinain state. Saudi Arabia’s military operations in Yemen and MBS’ role in the murder of Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi evoked concerns from Congress and brought the kingdom’s domestic policies to the fore of disucssions about the future of U.S.-Saudi relations. 

    On the campaign trail, President Biden pledged to treat the Saudis as the “pariah that they are,”  and since assuming office he has sought to reassess the underpinnings of the U.S.-Saudi partnership in line with his commitment to pursue a human rights-centered foreign policy. In 2021, President Biden ceased U.S. support for offensive operations in Yemen and restarted nuclear negotiations with Iran. The White House also released the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment that MBS approved the operation to kill Jamal Khashoggi, and Biden has refused to deal with the crown prince directly. In return, Saudi Arabia has rejected U.S. requests to increase oil production in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent surging oil prices. In an effort to ease rising oil prices and manage current tensions, Biden broke from his previous policy and met with MBS during a trip to the kingdom in July 2022.

    U.S. Strategic Interests:

    • Energy: Providing close to half a million barrels of oil per day to the U.S., Saudi Arabia is the third largest source of imported oil to the U.S. Although the United States is the world’s largest producer of oil due to the “shale boom,” Washington and Riyadh continue to cooperate in the energy sector due to Saudi Arabia’s ability to quickly adjust production levels and therefore price and stabilize the energy market. Washington and Riyadh have also explored civil nuclear cooperation for electricity production, but action stalled in 2020 because the kingdom has wavered on its commitment to forego nuclear weapons development. 
    • Defense: Saudi Arabia is the largest recipient of U.S. arms, with sales totaling $100 billion. The kingdom’s armed forces have relied on U.S. military training and education assistance for decades. As of May 2022, there are about 700 U.S. military and civilian personnel in Saudi Arabia. Congress has typically supported U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia for the purposes of reducing U.S. troop presence in the region, supporting the U.S. arms industry, and containing Iran. Although Washington and Riyadh maintain long standing defense ties, Saudi Arabia has recently sought to diversify its defense supply lines, and in 2021 signed a defense cooperation agreement with Russia and received ballistic missile production technology from China. Washington has refused to sell Riyadh ballistic missiles due to proliferation concerns.
    • Counterterrorism: Since al Qaeda launched a series of attacks inside the kingdom in 2003, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have cooperated closely on counterterrorism efforts. Saudi Arabia faces terrorist threats from the Islamic State (IS), al Qaeda and affiliates, and the Yemen-based Houthi movement. To improve information sharing and reduce cross-border attacks, the kingdom cooperates with regional and international partners like the U.S. Through the Office of the Program Manager-Ministry of Interior Program and the Interior Military Assistance Group, U.S. military advisors assist the Ministry of Interior develop critical security capabilities and train the Saudi Ministry of Interior security forces. Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism strategy focuses on combatting radicalization, recruitment, and terrorist financing within the kingdom through monitoring religious activites, rehabilitating prisoners, and regulating travel to conflict zones.
    • Trade and Investment: The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a Trade and Investment Framework in 2003, and the countries enjoy strong financial ties. The kingdom is one of the United States’ top trading partners in the MENA region and a top destination for U.S. exports. Although oil, arms, and machinery have historically defined the U.S.-Saudi trade relationship, the kingdom is working to diversify its economy through its Vision 2030 program, launched in 2016. Under Vision 2030, the kingdom has sought to attract foreign direct investment, mainly through selling shares of Saudi Aramco, but concerns over Saudi Arabia’s political risk and questions about the valuation of Saudi Aramco jeopardize the kingdom’s ability to meet its 2030 goals. Nevertheless, Saudi investment in U.S. companies remains robust. Saudi’s sovereign wealth fund has stakes in U.S. tech companies, including Uber and Tesla, and many American businesses have operations in the kingdom.
    • Regional and Geopolitical Competition: The U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the common goal of countering Iran’s regional influence. Washington and Riyadh seek to increase regional stability, curb Iran’s support for aggressive non-state actors, and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. As Washington attempts to wind down commitments in the region, Saudi Arabia remains a strategic partner committed to balancing and countering Iran. In April 2022, Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in the fifth round of talks (which began in 2021) intended to manage tensions and restore diplomatic relations, although the two parties have not reached a formal agreement. To Washington’s consternation, Saudi Arabia has established stronger relations with Russia and China since MBS was appointed crown prince in 2017. The kingdom maintains an OPEC+ agreement with Russia to manage global oil production and has deepened trade and investment ties with China.
  • Introduction to China-West Africa Relations

    Introduction to China-West Africa Relations

    The hegemonic rivalry between the U.S. and China has continued to escalate over the past several decades, with battles for global development, military presence, and other modes of action taking the forefront. The resource-rich region of West Africa is one of the latest theaters of operation in this scramble for influence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has propelled them to become West Africa’s top foreign investor, with military associations and education programs furthering their presence in the region. However, BRI’s lack of transparency, untenable debt, and suspect intentions has left many West Africans skeptical.

    Trade and Development

    In 2020, Chinese exports to West African countries peaked at over $40 billion U.S. dollars, making the western region China’s principal trading partner in Africa. Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia received the most trade exports, with the main products being machinery and electronics, textile and apparel, hi-tech products, and finished goods. West African imports to China accounted for $10.8 billion dollars in trade mostly consisting of minerals, metals, agricultural products, and crude oil. 

    The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) encapsulates China-West Africa trade relations through the most recent 2035 China-Africa Vision document. This agreement entails a 60$ billion USD Chinese investment promise in Africa by 2035 directed at agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, environmental protection, and digital economy. The Dakar Action Plan is an analogous proposal that originated during the most recent FOCAC in November 2021. The plan suggests a reorientation of China’s economic engagement with Africa and reciprocates the thorough, exhaustive list submitted for the China-Africa 2035 Vision. These plans favor the developmental facet of Chinese-West Africa relations and insinuate further endeavors through China’s global Belt and Road Initiative, which has been met with fierce criticism by the international community because of the high risk of debt traps through unsustainable loans and erratic negotiations. 

    Certain West African countries epitomize BRI’s high-risk investment, particularly Guinea and Nigeria. In Guinea, Chinese diplomatic, regulatory, financial, and commercial actors operate in different capacities to secure vital materials such as bauxite and iron ore. The mining partnerships are rooted in state-owned enterprises’ connections with private Chinese companies, demonstrating the importance of China’s costly infrastructure investment to gain access to the valuable mining sector. 

    Nigeria has received the most investment from China, with over $20 billion from Chinese firms. In March 2020, Nigeria confirmed it borrowed over $3 billion from the Chinese government for infrastructure projects. The latest data from the Debt Management Office in Nigeria revealed that the debt is continuing to grow, causing experts to warn the federal government of debt traps and potential reclamation of Chinese-funded projects in Nigeria. As infrastructure projects and trade with China continue to materialize, China’s intentions provoke suspicion amongst the international community, and the lack of transparency validates this distrust. 

    Intra-African Conflicts

    Chinese intervention in West African conflicts tends to be muted. However, as BRI’s influence advances amongst states, certain arms sales and partnerships confirm that China is not shying away from strategic military intrusion in the region. From 2016 to 2020, China ranked as the world’s fifth-largest arms exporter, selling nearly 100 million TIVs (trend-indicator value of major conventional weapons) to Nigeria. Many linked this mass transfer of arms to China’s “domestic demand for oil” whereas other experts claim that China is simply involved for the profit. 

    In Benin, the private Chinese company Poly Technologies Inc. built the country’s largest military barrack in the town of Allada, in addition to providing training and donating trucks, logistics materials, and arms to the Beninese military. Whether China is using Benin for geopolitical strategic purposes or interested in economic engagement, the Sino-Beninese alliance proves to be one of the most dynamic in West Africa. 

    Although the Spanish-speaking nation of Equatorial Guinea is not in West Africa, West African governments and global powers should pay close attention to China’s prospects in the insular country. A recent U.S. Department of Defense report stated that China is actively seeking a naval base in the Port of Bata, Equatorial Guinea. This budding Chinese port could grant access to the Gulf of Guinea and be the closest Chinese military base in distance to the United States. Akin to China’s economic and developmental engagement in the region, their military aspirations remain unclear or undisclosed. 

    Climate Change

    In 2021, China’s CO2 (carbon dioxide) emissions reached almost 12 billion metric tons, accounting for nearly 33% of the global total. In an attempt to counteract this drastic contribution to climate change and its effect on regions like West Africa, the Chinese government claims to have launched over 100 clean energy and green development projects under the framework of the FOCAC. The 2021 Dakar Ministerial meeting issued a Declaration on China-Africa Cooperation on Combating Climate Change which intends to improve energy development, upgrade industrial structure, and achieve low-carbon, green, high-quality development in African countries including Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and other West African countries. Minimal evidence has appeared since FOCAC that a shift toward greener Chinese development is taking place, and some stakeholders demand the expansion of the FOCAC process.

    One Chinese-backed project exemplifying environmental adaptation is the Great Green Wall (GGW) initiative which aims to create an 8,000 km wall of fertile land and trees across the Sahel. GGW’s ambition is to restore 100 million hectares of currently degraded land, sequester 250 million tons of carbon, and add local job opportunities. Rural Sahelian communities in Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Niger would all have access to this climate-resilient wall in a region-wide effort to combat temperatures which are rising more rapidly than anywhere else in the world. Although there has been minimal progress on the construction of the GGW, the symbol of hope for a new climate-friendly era of Chinese-West African relations is blossoming in the barren dunes of the Sahara. 

    Immigration/Education

    There are an estimated 500,000 African migrants currently living in China and between 1 million and 2 million people from China living on the African continent. Many African migrants to China are merchants or traders who are granted M visas, which permit a 30-day stay. Some migrants have applied for study or tourist visas to circumvent the requirements for other visas. China’s 2013 Exit and Entry Administration law was met with bitter criticism for excluding many African immigrants due to illegal entry, residence, and employment. The COVID-19 pandemic also inflamed anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa due to conspiracies about virus’ origin in Wuhan, China. 

    Scholarships and university programs have played a part in bringing a considerable influx of African students to China, especially those from anglophone West African countries such as Nigeria or Ghana. One element propagating Chinese ideology is the Confucius Institutes (CI) which are a vital component of China’s soft power efforts to promote the Chinese language and the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative of history and culture. The first CI’s were inaugurated in 2009 in Lomé (Togo), Lagos (Nigeria), and Porto-Novo (Benin). There are now more than 15 CIs around major West African cities. 

    Conclusion

    Is China a sustainable and valuable partner for West African economies and communities? Or is their presence a Trojan horse hoping to exploit resources and people in a race for global hegemony? The United States, which has a complex relationship with the region, must carefully examine China’s every move to fully understand and compare the repercussions and advantages of foreign policy in West Africa. Ranging from a prospective Chinese port in Equatorial Guinea to Confucius Institutes in Nigeria, China’s scope continues to expand in every direction and it is in the hands of the international community to inspect and analyze Chinese intentions and keep West Africa on the route to prosperity.