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Category: Foreign Policy region

  • Ukraine and the Changing Transatlantic Security Order

    Ukraine and the Changing Transatlantic Security Order

    The Shadow of War Returns to Europe

    The post-Cold War security environment in Europe was characterized by the diminishing influence of Russia, which saw its former Warsaw Pact allies gradually integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Russia under President Vladimir Putin considered this expansion detrimental to its security interests. Russia attempted to stop Georgia and the Baltic Republics from establishing closer security ties with NATO, even going to war with Georgia briefly in 2008. Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution (2014) overthrew a pro-Russia regime and the country aspired to democratize and draw closer to the European Union. In response, Russia forcibly annexed Crimea in 2014 and aided separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region—which borders Russia—in seceding. 

    The United States and its allies considered this a threat to democracy and pluralism in Europe. The allies implemented sanctions against Russia in 2014 with the intention of forcing Russia to negotiate a withdrawal. However, Russia’s economic and military capabilities were not significantly affected by the sanctions. Critical sectors like energy were not sanctioned because European countries like Germany depended on Russian oil and natural gas. Putin demanded a guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO or the EU and, when an agreement was not reached, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The full-scale Russian invasion threatens to reverse post-Cold War borders in Europe, destabilize the trans-Atlantic security order, and affect countries far removed from the theater of war.

    Western Allies Respond

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine was met with strong reactions from the United States and its allies. In his statement on February 26, President Joe Biden declared, “Putin chose this war. And now he and his country will bear the consequences.” The United States coordinated with the G7, the world’s leading industrial nations, to launch a new round of sanctions on Russia to curtail its ability to finance the war, and held an emergency NATO summit to map out the next steps.

    The United States has also been urging allies to increase their defense spending, a long-standing US policy objective. In response to the invasion, Germany announced a shift in its defense policy, including re-armament. During his February 27, 2022 speech to parliament, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged an additional €100 billion for the armed forces and committed Germany to spending 2% of its GDP on defense, in line with NATO expectations. Other European countries have taken similar steps to strengthen their military capabilities. Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced that Poland will allocate 3% of its GDP to defense from 2023. The Netherlands has committed an additional €5 billion to defense over the next few years. This is a 40% increase from its 2022 defense budget and meets NATO’s 2% GDP target in 2024 and 2025.

    The invasion has reignited talks of an EU common defense policy. On February 28, 2022 the Council of Europe, the highest decision-making body for EU member states, approved a historic €500 million package for Ukraine. This includes €450 million in military supplies and an additional €50 million for fuel and protective equipment. This is the first time the EU has pledged lethal equipment to a non-EU member through the European Peace Facility (EPF). The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) Josep Borrell explained that the EU “wants peace in Europe, but we have to be prepared to defend this peace.” 

    EU heads of state and government pledged on March 10, 2022 to take more defense responsibility which several US Presidents had urged. EU leaders also endorsed the Strategic Compass soon after, a plan of action to increase the EU’s ability to respond to crises with rapid deployment capacity, increased defense investment, and better preparedness for hybrid threats. The European Council subsequently met in May and June to reiterate its commitment to increase military and financial support for Ukraine and to advance Ukraine’s EU membership request. EU members also approved the latest round of EU sanctions on Russia which included crude oil and refined petroleum products as well as Russian-origin gold.

    Despite the EU’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, fulfilling some promises may be challenging. For example, the EU pledged to provide fighter jets, but the Ukrainian air force is trained to fly Russian-made  MiG-29s and Su-24s. Only Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia have that type of jet, and those states have been hesitant to send their aircraft to Ukraine due to supply shortages and fear of escalation However, when Poland finally proposed to do so, provided the US accelerates its delivery of F-16s to Warsaw, the United States decided against this move by concluding that the proposal was not tenable. On March 8, in a statement by the Pentagon, Press Secretary John F. Kirby expressed concerns over dispatching American aircrafts into contested airspaces.

    Deepening Transatlantic Ties

    The United States provided leadership to create a coordinated response to the invasion. This included imposing stricter and broader sanctions on Russia than in 2014, providing military aid to Ukraine, and increasing defense coordination. US Foreign Secretary Anthoney Blinken stated, “The strategy that we’ve put in place, massive support for Ukraine, massive pressure against Russia, solidarity with more than 30 countries engaged in these efforts, is having real results.”

    The sanctions imposed on Russia are changing Europe’s economic dependencies, particularly in the energy sector. To restructure these dependencies, Europe is establishing new partners and alternative technologies. The United States is trying to fill in the gap and has seen demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) rise by over 50% in Europe compared to the same period the year before. A protracted war in Ukraine could bolster the significance of the new US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) formed in June 2021 and eventually lead to closer transatlantic cooperation on energy, trade, technology and innovation. This emerging collaborative spirit helps in overcoming the tensions generated by Eurosceptic security and trade positions held by the Trump administration. This shift makes it easier to take coordinated steps for addressing the long-term economic impact of the war.

    Reviving NATO

    Finland and Sweden are traditionally non-aligned countries, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced the two Nordic nations to reassess their security interests and apply for NATO membership on May 18, 2022. Although experts believe an attack on Finland and Sweden is unlikely while Russia is focused on Ukraine, Finland and Sweden remain vulnerable until they are included in NATO’s mutual defense guarantees. Ahead of their formal application, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Finland and Sweden to sign security guarantees. President Biden expressed support for the two countries’ NATO bids and welcomed Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson at the White House.

    Swedish and Finnish NATO membership has a number of advantages. Sweden has naval bases on the Baltic Sea and a navy with experience operating in confined waters, which adds key capabilities in the Baltic region. Gotland is a strategically important Swedish island which can act as a staging ground for naval operations in the region. Finland shares a long border with the Kola peninsula, which is Russia’s Arctic navy and nuclear submarine base. This puts NATO in a position to isolate the peninsula from mainland Russia.

    NATO has functioned as an instrument for United States security interests and conflict leadership, but lost credibility by mishandling conflicts in Libya (2011) and Afghanistan (2015-2021) under US leadership. NATO’s reemergence provides the US a chance to strengthen its relationship with its longest allies and exert US influence on the European continent.

    Ending Aggression Through a United Front

    Some speculate that Trans-Atlantic solidarity will not hold if the war turns into a protracted, localized conflict, with Russia forcibly occupying parts of Eastern Ukraine. There are concerns that the economic toll of the conflict on sanctioning nations, declining public interest, and other international priorities will lead to disunity in the alliance. However, a destabilized Ukraine will remain a source of insecurity for the entire continent.

  • Introduction to U.S.─France Relations

    Introduction to U.S.─France Relations

    Introduction

    France is a founding member of NATO, the European Union, and holds permanent membership and veto power on the UN Security Council. France has influence in all three of these organizations, as well as an extensive military, with the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. It maintains a strong diplomatic presence across the globe and was ranked first in soft power—a country’s ability to persuade others without force or coercion, often through collaboration and the shaping of positive attitudes towards said country—in 2017 and 2019. For these reasons, the United States’ relationship with France is one of the country’s most important diplomatic relationships, as French actions impact American interests.

    Quick Facts

    History of U.S.─France Relations

    France is the United States’ oldest ally. The relationship between the United States and France began during the Revolutionary War, when France allied with the American colonists against Great Britain in 1778 through both a military and economic Treaty of Alliance. This alliance with the United States was essential to the American victory.

    During World War 1, the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies and sent millions of American troops to France to fight on the Western Front, where U.S. troops were essential in turning the tide of the war against Germany. The U.S. and France were also allied in World War 2, and the U.S. was essential in liberating France from German occupation.

    In 1949 France and the United States entered a military alliance once again through the founding of NATO. France supported the United States during the Cold War but had its own interests to look after as well. Due to disagreements over the French nuclear program, France withdrew from NATO’s military command structure in 1966. Prior to the United States joining the Vietnam War in 1964, the U.S. supported French opposition to the Viet Minh through military assistance. When France lost control of Vietnam the United States became the dominant western power in the region, to the dissatisfaction of France.

    The two countries cooperated against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War but France later opposed the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. Relations once again became friendlier in 2007 with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French Presidency. Sarkozy was pro-American, and he returned France to full NATO membership. In the years following, the two countries cooperated in several counter-terrorism operations and were strong allies. 

    The election of President Donald Trump weakened French opinion of the United States. In particular, President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accords (2017) and the Iran Nuclear Deal (2018) were heavily opposed by France. In 2020 the United States established tariffs on French imports over France’s digital services tax, which impacted American tech companies. In 2021 France recalled their ambassador to the United States for the first time ever over the AUKUS crisis. AUKUS is a security pact between the U.S., Australia and the U.K. and France viewed its exclusion as a betrayal. This pact also led to Australia canceling a major, lucrative submarine deal with France without warning. Despite conflicts between the U.S. and France, relations have recently strengthened due to collaboration against Russia after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

    Strategic Interests

    • Security: France is an invaluable ally to the United States in global security efforts. It is a principal member of NATO, and took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union in January, 2022. Cooperation with France is necessary to create a unified front against global threats, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. France has dedicated $2 billion in financial aid to Ukraine and, through the European Union, has imposed several rounds of sanctions on Russia. The United States relies on French support and action to jointly combat security challenges across the globe.
    • Trade: France is a valuable trading partner for the United States, and in 2019, the two countries traded more than $138 billion in goods and services. France is the United States’ third largest trading partner in Europe, and in 2020 they made up roughly 1.9% of U.S. trade. The main U.S. exports to France include industrial chemicals, aircraft and engines, electronics, scientific and medical instruments and supplies, and broadcasting equipment. The U.S. is the top destination for French investment, and the U.S. is also the largest foreign investor in France. The two nations have a bilateral convention on investment, and create a tax treaty bilaterally to address the issues of double taxation and tax evasion that can often occur through international trade and investment. Trade and investment with France is a major source of job creation in the United States, further emphasizing the importance of the economic relationship.
    • Counter-Terrorism: France is one of the central allies in the United States’ ‘War on Terror.’ It runs several counter-terrorism initiatives, and provides aid for U.S. operations across the globe.
      • West Africa: This is one of the principal regions where France has been involved in combating terrorism. Operation Serval is a military operation in Mali that began in 2013 which aimed to stop Islamic militants’ push from northern Mali into the country’s center, and towards the capital. The operation received financial and military support from the United States and was a relative success, as it pushed the militants back, but left the country unstable. Mali has undergone two coup d’états since, one in 2020 and one in 2021. To this day, France maintains a smaller presence in the country fighting militants and receives support from the United States.

    This is just one example of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two nations. France has also allied with the United States in other operations, such as through membership in the Combined Task Force 150 which aims to fight maritime terrorism and criminal activity in the Arabian Gulf. 

    Right-Wing Nationalism: The right-wing nationalist movement has gained popularity across Europe in recent years, and Marine Le Pen, the leader of the French National Rally party is a prime example of this ideology. Despite losing the 2022 French presidential election to Emmanuel Macron, the far-right performed historically well, gaining more than 40% of the vote. Marine Le Pen represents a growing trend of extreme nationalism in France, and has publicly spoken out against the EU and NATO. She believes that French laws should take precedence over laws of international organizations, denounces U.S. influence in France, and is viewed to be sympathetic to Russia. Losing French support in areas such as NATO would be a critical blow to the United States and its allies.

  • Introduction to US-Serbian Relations

    Introduction to US-Serbian Relations

    Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

    Serbia, a country of over ten million people with a unique cultural background and ties to two different global powers, is a key player in US foreign policy. Serbia is a country that has existed as the battleground between Europe and Asia. Serbia was part of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia and the following Yugoslav wars saw the US intervene through NATO and the United Nations. Relations following the war were strained due to the US-led support for the independence of Kosovo, a region full of Albanians who declared independence in 2008. Relations are also strained with the west due to Serbian ties to Moscow and the drawn-out process of joining the EU.  

    Fact Sheet

    • Population: 10,533,871
    • Capital: Belgrade
    • System of Government: Parliamentary republic
    • Chief of state: President Aleksandar Vucic
    • Head of government: Prime Minister Ana Brnabic
    • Primary Language: Serbian (official) 88.1%, Hungarian 3.4%, Bosnian 1.9%, Romani 1.4%, other 3.4%
    • Ethnic demographics: Serb 83.3%, Hungarian 3.5%, Romani 2.1%, Bosniak 2%, other 5.7%,
    • Religious populations: Orthodox 84.6%, Catholic 5%, Muslim 3.1%, Protestant 1%, atheist 1.1%, other 0.8%
    • Real GDP: $125.8 billion (2021 est.)/ GDP per Capita: $18,200 (2020 est.)
    • Gini index: 34.5
    • Freedom score: 62-Partly Free

    Brief History with the U.S.

    Following World War I, the United States under President Woodrow Wilson helped to establish the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, known as Yugoslavia. The United States was the first major power to establish relations with Yugoslavia on February 6, 1919, which lasted until the country was invaded in 1941. The United States along with the United Kingdom unsuccessfully pressured Yugoslavia to side with Allied forces, despite Germany being Yugoslavia’s main trading partner. Yugoslavia eventually joined the Axis. The rise of Communist leader Joseph Tito, caused the US to distance itself from Yugoslavia. Tito eventually distanced Yugoslavia from the USSR, and the US provided some military and economic aid.

    Following Tito’s death, the different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia struggled to find a balance of power, eventually leading to the Yugoslav wars and the dissolution of the country. The United States intervened through NATO and the United Nations initiatives. Clinton oversaw the first use of NATO force which was a controversial decision, as NATO up until that point had behaved as a defensive, not offensive military alliance. President Clinton oversaw the Dayton agreement which ended the conflict and led to the creation of independent nations out of former Yugoslavia around ethnic and linguistic identities.

    Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević lost power (he was later convicted of war crimes), and the United States began providing development aid amounting to 1.1 billion dollars to stimulate economic development and support democratic institutions. Relations began to improve until 2008 when Kosovo, with backing from the US and EU, declared independence under a new constitution. Modern-day US-Serbian relations focus mainly on the issue of Kosovo, and its close ties to Moscow 

    U.S. Strategic Interests:

    • Trade: The United States has a total trade and investment relationship with Serbia amounting to $1.6 trillion every year. Major US businesses invested in Serbia include Coca-Cola, Microsoft, and Panasonic. Much of this investment and growth is thanks to US and EU efforts following devastating periods including the end of the Yugoslav wars, the great recession of 2008, and a crippling storm season in 2014 that ended in negative GDP growth. The United States can leverage this economic reliance on foreign investment to help ensure Serbian cooperation with US interests, such as providing economic benefits in exchange for recognizing Kosovo or implementing sanctions against Russia. 
    • Military: The US has recognized Kosovo as an independent nation since 2008 and relations between Kosovo and Serbia have been slowly improving. However, recent Kosovan policies have exacerbated tensions. A new set of laws requires those traveling from Serbia to Kosovo and Serbs living in Kosovo to carry identification documents to separate themselves from Serbia. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) made an official statement that it would intervene if the stability of the region is threatened. The US is in a difficult position as it wants to keep strong relations with Serbia due to its strategic position in the Balkans.

    Diplomatic: Serbia criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but has not implemented sanctions against Russia. Serbia has also been on a slow EU accession process, and may be less enthusiastic about siding with the US and EU allies because the prospect of joining now feels remote and onerous.

  • The War in Yemen Part 2: US Response

    The War in Yemen Part 2: US Response

    U.S. Response

    U.S. involvement in Yemen is multifaceted. Primarily, Washington has been engaged in counterterrorism efforts in Yemen since the early 2000s, fighting AQAP, the Islamic State, and affiliate groups. Since 2002, the U.S. has launched nearly 400 air strikes associated with counterterrorism efforts in Yemen. Policymakers fear that the instability in Yemen will embolden transnational terrorist groups and thus are interested in supporting a government that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 

    Regarding the conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, Washington’s support for the coalition is tied to the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership and concerns that the war threatens Saudi Arabia’s position vis-a-vis Iran. Additionally, the U.S. is interested in maintaining access to the Bab al Mandeb strait through which many of the world’s oil shipments pass. 

    Both the Obama and Trump administrations provided logistical and intelligence support–weapons, military advice, and a coordinated planning cell–to the Saudi-led coalition. Both presidents scaled down support for the coalition as the humanitarian situation in Yemen worsened and human rights groups alleged the Saudi-led coalition of indiscriminately bombing civilians and critical infrastructure. 

    In February 2021, President Joe Biden introduced a new initiative to end the conflict in Yemen, signaling a renewed focus on advancing diplomatic efforts and resolving the humanitarian crisis. The plan included ending U.S support for Saudi-led offensive operations in Yemen and appointing a special envoy for Yemen, career diplomat Timothy Lenderking. A week later, the State Department revoked the Trump administration’s designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). However, the Biden administration has sanctioned some Houthi leaders under Yemen-specific authorities. Despite his decision to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition, President Biden reiterated the United States’ commitment to helping Saudi Arabia defend itself from Houthi attacks. 

    A small number of U.S. military personnel are stationed in Yemen to conduct operations against AQAP and the Islamic State. Amidst Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Biden administration authorized additional deployments of U.S. military personnel and equipment to the UAE in February 2022.

    Perspectives on Washington’s Yemen Policy 

    Although Congress has been divided on Washington’s Yemen policy since 2015, many lawmakers supported Biden’s Yemen plan due to increasing concerns that U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition has enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law and contributed to Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. However, some lawmakers and human rights organizations find Biden’s distinction between weapons systems used for offensive operations in Yemen and arms supplied for Saudi Arabia’s territorial defense vague. Some assert that the U.S. still enables coalition air strikes by providing spare parts and maintenance for the Saudi air force. This concern was echoed by 50 members of Congress who proposed a bipartisan War Powers Resolution in June 2022 to end U.S. involvement in the war entirely. The House has adopted the provision for three consecutive years, but the legislation has not been enacted.

    Additionally, lawmakers and aid organizations supported the Biden administration’s reversal of the FTO designation. Many claimed that the FTO designation of the Houthis prevented the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid. However, critics of revoking the FTO designation claim that the decision fails to incentivize the Houthis to end attacks on coalition targets, halt advances, or participate in peace talks.

    Recent Developments 

    On April 1, 2022, the Houthis and the internationally recognized government in Yemen agreed to a two-month UN-mediated truce, which the parties renewed in June for an additional two months. The parties agreed to halt all military operations, open ports to fuel ships, and allow flights to and from the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport. Shortly after the parties reached an agreement, interim President Hadi stepped down and ceded his powers to an eight-member presidential council. According to some reports, Saudi officials arranged Hadi’s resignation. In August 2022, the parties agreed to renew the truce for another two months, although significant barriers to lasting peace remain. 

    . 

    Additional Policy Considerations  

    Washington’s current priority in Yemen is to use the leverage from the current truce to advance a more permanent political settlement and improve the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Several experts and members of Congress have suggested that the Biden administration propose a plan to Saudi Arabia to further ease port restrictions at Hodeida or lift the air and naval blockade altogether. The current blockade prevents some delivery of fuel and supplies to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port, which threatens the delivery of aid, food, and water to Yemenis in areas under the Sanaa-based authorities’ control. Although the current truce has allowed more fuel ships to enter the port and opened flights from the Sanaa airport, President Biden’s Yemen team could push the Saudis to expand upon the current agreement. 

    Some analysts are skeptical of lifting the blockade, which the Houthis have historically identified as a prerequisite for peace talks. Some believe such action will allow Iranian weapons to reach the Houthis and provide them with more funds and aid, which the Houthis have withheld or diverted in the past. If the truce breaks down and hostilities continue, some fear that Ansar Allah could use newly acquired resources from port revenues to fund their offensive further. However, a United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects imports for illicit weapons, is already in place; the Saudi and Yemeni government-enforced vessel clearance process is a secondary measure. A possible solution to the anti-Houthi camps’ fears about port revenues is to allow the UNVIM to manage and direct port revenues while the parties negotiate a broader political settlement. 

  • The War in Yemen Part 1: Background and Main Actors

    The War in Yemen Part 1: Background and Main Actors

    The Republic of Yemen, a small country of 29 million on the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, has been torn apart by war since 2014. Separate but overlapping violent conflicts, exacerbated by a Saudi-led military intervention, have generated political fragmentation and the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Of the estimated quarter of a million people that have died in Yemen since 2014, over half of those deaths are the result of indirect causes such as hunger and inadequate access to medical services. As of 2022, 16.2 million people, over half the population, face acute hunger, and 4.3 million Yemenis are internally displaced. All parties to the conflict are accused of violating international humanitarian law. As the war in Yemen approaches its eighth year, many are hopeful that the recent UN-mediated truce will finally end Yemen’s crisis. 

    Background 

    Yemeni politics are complicated by historic divisions across cultural, religious, and geographic lines. The modern state of Yemen was established in 1990 through the unification of two regimes: the Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. Soon after, a military officer named Ali Abdullah Saleh became the country’s leader. Saleh remained president until the 2011 Arab Spring protests, when thousands of Yemenis took to the streets to demand his resignation following accusations of corruption. After his ousting, Saleh’s vice president, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, took over in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

    Backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. and recognized as legitimate by the UN, Hadi’s interim government faced challenges from various groups, including a secessionist movement in south Yemen, former government loyalists, and Houthi rebels. Meanwhile, Yemen continued to be plagued by government corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity.

    Yemen’s civil war began in September 2014 when the Houthis and Saleh loyalists took control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, demanding a new government and fuel subsidy reforms. Following failed negotiations with Hadi’s government, the Houthis and Saleh’s forces captured the city of Aden and seized the presidential palace, which led Hadi’s government to resign in January 2015. Subsequently, Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia and requested international intervention. In 2015, the Saudis formed a coalition backed by the United States and launched an offensive consisting of air raids and an economic blockade aimed at halting the Houthi advance and returning Hadi to power.

    Who is Involved?  

    The Houthis: The Houthi movement, named after its founder Hussein al Houthi, emerged in the 1990s as a Zaydi revivalist movement in Yemen’s northern region. Zaydis practice a form of Shi’a Islam and are a minority in Yemen and the global Islamic community. In the early 2000s, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), grew into a political and military movement opposed to then-president Saleh’s government. From 2004 to 2010, Saleh attempted to suppress the group using military force, but the Houthis maintained a presence in the north. 

    Since capturing Sanaa in 2014, Ansar Allah has created a coalition–often referred to as the Sanaa-based authorities–with northern political, military, and tribal groups. The alliance, led by the Houthis, has cemented control of Yemen’s north-western highlands and Red Sea coast, where about 70% of Yemen’s population lives. Many Yemenis oppose the Houthis’ de facto governance and criticize the group’s repressive security system and its’ practices of firing missiles into populated areas and shelling cities. The Houthis’ primary goal is to gain international recognition of a Houthi-led government in Yemen. The group has increasingly attacked coalition targets, mainly critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the Houthis also face a web of adversaries inside Yemen, including the Southern Transition Council (STC), al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the Islamist party Islah. In February 2021, the Houthis launched an offensive to capture Marib, the last stronghold of the internationally recognized government. The group faced setbacks due to coalition airstrikes but made territorial gains in the Marib governorate in the final months of 2021. 

    Iran: Shi’a-majority Iran has increasingly conducted irregular warfare against its adversaries, primarily through proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Iran is often accused of providing the Houthis arms, technology, training, and other forms of support. Tehran openly supports the Houthis politically but denies providing the Houthis arms or material aid. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the Houthis receive weapons or weapons components from Iran. Local media outlets assert that officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of Iran’s Armed Forces, are stationed in Yemen. However, the extent of coordination between Tehran and the Houthis is debated; some analysts maintain that Tehran’s decision-making power in Yemen is likely limited. 

    The Saudi-led coalition: In 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition to reinstate Hadi’s government and reverse the Houthis’ territorial gains. The coalition includes Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco (until 2019), Qatar (until 2017), Senegal, Sudan, and the UAE; Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti have also lent logistical and military support to the coalition. Saudi officials’ perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy capable of launching cross-border attacks has fueled the coalition’s offensive. According to the Yemen Data Project, the coalition has conducted about 25,054 air raids, resulting in almost 9,000 civilian casualties. Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government also enforce a vessel clearance process on commercial shipments directed to the Houthi-controlled Hodeida port. This blockade, intended to prevent the flow of illicit weapons, has impeded or delayed the delivery of fuel and other essential supplies to parts of Yemen and has contributed to Yemen’s economic crisis. 

    United Arab Emirates: After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most prominent military role within the coalition. While Saudi Arabia has focused much of its operations in the north, the UAE has deployed ground troops and formed and backed local militias, including the STC, the Support and Backup Brigades, and the Hadrami Elite Forces, in Yemen’s south around key ports and shipping lanes. Some of these forces, notably the STC and affiliates, have come into conflict with the Yemeni government forces, which has weakened the anti-Houthi camp and created a rift within the Saudi-led coalition. Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical ambitions and desire to undermine Islah, a Yemeni Islamist party loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, are two objectives driving the Emirates’ intervention. The UAE scaled down its military involvement in 2019 but still maintains influence in southern Yemen.

  • Russia-Ukraine invasion and Southeast Asian Responses

    Russia-Ukraine invasion and Southeast Asian Responses

    Russia-Ukraine invasion explained

    The Russia-Ukraine conflict began in early 2014, and tensions have slowly escalated ever since. Last year, the Russian government started sending troops and placing resources in proximity to Ukraine’s border. In December 2021, Russia issued a set of demands calling on NATO to cease expansion to Eastern and Central Europe and reject Ukraine’s application to join the treaty organization. NATO did not accept these demands and implemented sanctions on Russia in response. The United States and other NATO member states also supplied Ukraine with weapons. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has displaced eight millions of people internally and caused thousands of deaths.

    In response, President Biden declared Putin’s actions “unprovoked and unjustified.” The United States and NATO nations implemented further sanctions, and the U.S and other G7 countries committed to continue military support. In an United Nations emergency session, 141 out of 193 states voted to condemn Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine and called for immediate ceasefire. Caught between Russia, China, and the United States, many Southeast Asian nations remained in the minority that stayed neutral and/or supported Russia.

    ASEAN’s relationship with China and the United States

    Southeast Asian countries have historically had to balance interests with China and the United States. The ASEAN block is the fifth biggest economic region in the world. Since 2010, trade between China and ASEAN has doubled from $235.5 billion to more than $507.9 billion. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China has projected influence while investing in the infrastructure and digital economy of ASEAN nations. 

    The United States considers ASEAN a crucial partner for trade and strategic cooperations in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden Administration has brought relations with ASEAN to the forefront, hosting the first U.S-ASEAN summit and prioritizing ASEAN states as the first destination for high profile members of the administration like Vice President Kamala Harris.

    In the past decades, most ASEAN nations sought to remain neutral between the United States and China, maintaining good relations with both great powers. However, this is not always possible and conflicts like the Russian invasion of Ukraine have forced ASEAN to publicly take a side as China has maintained support for Russia while the United States has led the efforts to support Ukraine and punish Russia.

    ASEAN’s relationship with Russia and its variety of responses to the Russian-Ukraine conflict

    Economic ties between Russia and the ASEAN pact are modest, and Russia is ASEAN’s 9th largest trade partner. The Russian-Ukraine conflict is predicted to have a low impact on ASEAN’s economic prospects. However, shortages from Russian sanctions and rising gas prices are likely to impact many ASEAN’s economies. Russia is a leading supply for arms sales in the region since Putin rose to power. In general, ties between Russia and Southeast Asian nations are weak and vary from nation to nation. However, since Russia and China are important strategic partners, negative sentiments towards Russia might affect relations with China. This places ASEAN nations in a difficult position in deciding whether to condemn Russia’s violation of international law or to appease an important partner. 

    At the United Nations session discussing the Russian attack, eight out of ten ASEAN nations voted to condemn Russia, while Vietnam and Laos abstained. Singapore has voiced the strongest opposition to the Russian invasion, and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked that if politics were based on “might is right”, such as the recent attack, the “world would be a dangerous place for small countries like Singapore”. This aligns with Singapore’s past reactions to international violations. In the 1980s, Singapore condemned China’s attack at Gac Ma in Vietnam as well as the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. 

    Meanwhile, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei condemned Russia’s attack but were less outspoken. These countries voted against Russia at the United Nations session. However, they did not name Russia as the “aggressor” and focused on advocating for respect for international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. 

    The countries with the most muted responses were Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. With their proximity to both China and Russia, it is more difficult for these countries to use strong language to condemn Russia’s actions. Here, both Malaysia and Thailand used neutral language such as “concerned” or “deeply concerned” to refer to the conflict, rather than specifying that Russia was at fault. Vietnam refused to use any language to condemn Russia, likely because Russia is its most important defense partner. In the past several decades, Vietnam has relied heavily on Russian imported weapons for national defense, especially in the South China Sea conflict.

  • U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan and its effects on ASEAN relations

    U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan and its effects on ASEAN relations

    U.S’s withdrawal in Afghanistan in 2021

    In 2021, after twenty years of military occupation, the United States and international forces departed Afghanistan. President Biden remarked: “It’s time to end America’s longest war”. After the withdrawal event, the local Afghan government disbanded, and the Taliban, an Islamic extremist group that formerly took control of the nation, retook power. 

    Many experts supported the decision, calling it “a wise strategic choice that took significant political courage”. Despite continuous investments in Afghanistan, many believed the United States could not change the course of political dynamics in this country. For that reason, this withdrawal would result in the most efficient outcome for the U.S and its allies. 

    Other experts regard the U.S’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan as a sign of weakened American strength in the international arena. Experts speculate that a withdrawal from Afghanistan might potentially signal other withdrawals in other arenas of conflict in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Under the context of the South China Sea conflict, ASEAN countries might face a decline in U.S support, thus they have to find new ways to circumvent Chinese aggression. As a result, such withdrawals can have serious impacts on aspects of United States-ASEAN relations.  

    U.S support for ASEAN nations in the South China Sea conflict

    The end of America’s longest war had major implications for allies around the world, including in relation to U.S. foreign policy in the South China Sea conflict. Since the early 2010s, China has made authoritative claims in the South China Sea to strengthen its authority in the region. China claimed possession of the estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas under the sea. These claims and other militaristic actions antagonized relations with neighboring states including Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. According to the ASEAN countries and the United States, within the framework of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), many of China’s claims were invalid. 

    To ensure regional political security as well as to secure its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, the United States has supported its Southeast Asian partners to combat China’s aggression. U.S allies like Japan also sold equipment and combat ships to the Philippines and Vietnam. In a 2020 press release, Secretary of State Pompeo declared “the world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire. America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law”. The U.S’s proactive approach and continuous support within the span of this conflict signaled the United States’ strong advocacy for ASEAN allies in military conflicts with China.

    Future of U.S- ASEAN relations post-Afghanistan withdrawal

    In reality, most countries in Southeast Asia did not see this withdrawal as a major shift in U.S foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region. While it does signal a temporarily weakened America, it did not alter the U.S’s long term goals in the Indo-Pacific region. Some Southeast Asian policy experts believe the withdrawal might give Southeast Asia the full attention they believe it deserves given U.S-China’s competing interest in the region. 

    While the Afghanistan withdrawal seemed abrupt, most Southeast Asian nations did not see it as a surprise. In 2011, the Obama administration indicated the U.S. would withdraw from the Middle East to focus on the Asia-Pacific. This move was part of the United States’ foreign policy strategy to withdraw from “forever wars”. Overall, the withdrawal was the final result of a decade-long foreign policy. 

    The United States will likely continue and even strengthen its multi-lateral support for ASEAN, especially in disputes such as the South China Sea conflict. The United States will continue to be a strong advocate for other ASEAN claimants in the face of China’s assertive actions. Following Biden’s inauguration and Afghanistan’s withdrawal in 2021, Vice President Kamala Harris visited Singapore and Vietnam, two key ASEAN partners. The trip’s goal was to cement U.S relationships with ASEAN nations after the complications of the Afghanistan withdrawal. According to NPR, one senior administration official in the Biden administration remarked: “Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific are really important and that’s why she’s going”. In addition, during her visit, Harris confirmed that the United States will continue to “bolster economic and security ties with its Southeast Asian countries”. 

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  • Introduction to Russia-West Africa Relations

    Introduction to Russia-West Africa Relations

    The “New Scramble for Africa” is a phrase newly adopted by many in the field of foreign policy, defining the latest form of colonialism where global powers seek control of strategic resources on the African continent. The phrase derived from the 1884-5 Berlin Conference, in which thirteen European countries and the United States met in Berlin to divide African territory and take power and control from existing African states and peoples. Russia was excluded from the process, but now, in a time of tension with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia is a top contender in the “New Scramble for Africa” and its strategy for influence in West Africa is comprehensive and carefully calculated. 

    Trade/Economy

    The 2019 Russia-Africa Sochi Summit, co-hosted by President Vladamir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was a major economic forum “for peace, security, and development.” The summit was attended by 43 African heads of state and developed plans for future cooperation between Russia and Africa. Russia-Africa trade has generally shown a steady upward trend, especially in West Africa. 

    Ghana and Nigeria were the main African destinations of Russian non-commodity exports in 2020, with export industries like agriculture, mechanical engineering, timber, and chemicals leading the charge. The Russian Export Center (the Russian government’s central trade department) has recorded an increase in interest in Russian exports in many West African countries. The total 2020 trade revenue (USD million) was upwards of 2.04 billion dollars between West African countries and Russia. The primary contributors were Senegal (480 USD million), Nigeria (461 USD million), Ivory Coast (291 USD million), and Togo (283 USD million). 

    The Russian Export Center is also involved in infrastructure development projects in the region, including a major railway in the region and supplying energy resources and equipment to West African companies and governments. Russia is also a top arms seller to countries including Mali and Nigeria. Many experts believe Russia is pursuing economic relations to expand military influence in West Africa. 

    Intra-African Conflict

    Russia’s outsider apparatus and its evolution as a partner to West African government and military organizations allow the country to step in when power vacuums occur in the African region. West African citizens in countries such as Mali or Burkina Faso are increasingly opposed to intervention from western states, including former colonial powers like France and the UK. This strengthens the possibility of Russian involvement in those countries. 

    In Mali, a vacuum opened for Russia following the gradual withdrawal of French troops after years of conflict with Islamist militant groups in the Sahel. Operation Barkhane was a French military operation in northern Mali to oust Islamist groups. Russian mercenaries are slowly beginning to substitute French troops, specifically with increased involvement from the Wagner Group—a Russian mercenary organization. The Wagner Group has been identified as a part of several operations in the counter-insurgency mission in Northern Mali. These missions frequently produce human rights abuses and atrocities, such as the alleged Wagner Group-backed massacre of more than 300 civilians in the town of Moura in April 2022. Several experts claim The Wagner Group is closely tied to Russia’s military intelligence agency, GRU although political intentions remain unclear. The Wagner Group has been linked to unpopular military coups and regimes deemed ‘undemocratic,’ such as those in Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic. 

    Some West African countries feel neglected by the West, and jihadist militants in the Sahel are increasingly threatening state security. This has produced an environment ripe for Russian influence. Burkina Faso and Guinea recently underwent coups as a result of growing instability and insecurity in the Sahel, and the potential for further Russian-based expansion in West African military conflicts is looming. 

    Russian military presence in Africa

    Climate/Energy

    The 2019 Sochi Summit did not go into depth about the implications of climate change in West Africa and the rest of the continent. However, there are prospects of addressing the issue in future summits including the impending 2023 Russia-Africa Forum.

    The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine faced global backlash and has caused international food shortages, and caused knock-on effects in Africa Disrupted gas exports from Russia have limited economic activity and the ability of people to heat homes, cook food, and use transport. Countries like Senegal currently rely on oil for half of their electricity generation. In the entirety of West Africa, diesel generators account for more than 40% of total energy consumption. The cost of diesel in Nigeria has increased by 200% and increased prices of electricity generation in Ghana and Ivory Coast.

    Immigration/Education

    Russia is home to a population of 70,000 people of African descent. There is a high population of Nigerians and Cameroonians living in Russia, and many have allegedly been deceptively lured to Russia for false jobs. The language barrier, prejudice, and discrimination have steered many Africans away from living in Russia. The Russian government has shown, however, efforts to integrate African immigrants into their communities, labor market, media, and politics, and recently established Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. The university was named after Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, and aims to provide an opportunity for young people from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to acquire an education. 

    Conclusion

    Nearly 150 years since the Berlin Conference, Russia is now one of the top influencers in African trade, conflict, climate, energy, and society as a whole. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has drastically shifted relations within the new global order. For West Africa, citizens will be heavily relying on democratic institutions to initiate change in the quest for a secure future in the region and a benign relationship with Russia. 

  • The Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Latin America

    The Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Latin America

    What Are Human Rights Defenders?

    According to the United Nations, human rights defenders “individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights in a peaceful manner.” This often takes the form of monitoring governments and businesses to bring attention to human rights violations and crimes, defending vulnerable populations, and advocating for environmental protection. Human rights defenders often come into conflict with authoritarian governments who see them as threats, as human rights defenders can directly criticize government action or fill a gap when a government fails to act. In Venezuela, domestic laws are used against human rights defenders that limit their operations and restrict their access to funding. 

    Violence in the Region

    Central and Latin America is a global hotspot for the persecution of human rights defenders. The region accounts for three quarters of all murders of defenders globally. In January 2022, thirteen defenders were killed in Colombia, three in Honduras, three in Brazil, and one defender and four journalists in Mexico. Eighteen of those killed were involved in defending rights in relation to access to land and the protection of land and the environment. In recent years, human rights defenders have experienced greater persecution due to the effects of the pandemic, increasing environmental hazards, and the lack of legal protections in place for HRDs. The pandemic allowed oppressive governments to implement draconian policies, take new steps to restrict movement and privacy, and crack down on opposition under the guise of public health measures. 

    Many human rights defenders migrate elsewhere within the region to avoid retaliation from the perpetrators of human rights violations, and there is no significant evidence that authoritarian regimes carry out transnational repression. Many defenders and activists attempt to flee to countries that are safer, but there are still many risks in states throughout the region. 

    Environmental activists are especially vulnerable in Mexico and Colombia. 212 environmental and land/water activists were murdered globally in 2020—a record high. 165 of these deaths took place in Latin America, with 65 in Colombia and 30 in Mexico. Colombia had led in the number of murders for two consecutive years (2019 and 2020) and almost half of these offences were against people engaged in protecting small-scale agriculture/land rights. 40% of human rights defenders killed in 2019 were involved in land protection, worked with indigenous groups, or advocated for environmental changes. 

    Honduras: The Honduran government has been accused of using the criminal justice system to persecute activists, especially the Garifuna indigenous group which is currently disputing ownership of certain properties. In 2021, 200 were harassed, threatened, or attacked, and 80% of the violence targeted activists defending land and environmental rights. Roughly 90% of violent incidents reported against human rights defenders went unpunished.

    Nicaragua: Human rights abuses have been prevalent in Nicaragua and, as a result, 100,000 have fled the country. Costa Rica, Panama, and Mexico are major destinations for Nicaraguan migrants. Many opposition leaders and activists were arrested prior to the contentious 2021 election, causing supporters to leave out of concern for political persecution.

    Policy Options Looking Forward:

    The goal for HRDs today and in the future is to be allowed to work freely in their environments to promote respect, protection, and equality for all along with environmental protection(including land access and control). The US, EU, all Latin American countries, businesses, and investors are being called on to “protect HRDs from the attacks they face and to tackle the drivers of abuse.” However, it is not clear what that protection should look like, and, apart from asylum processes for at-risk individuals. The mechanism for changing another state’s domestic practices is nonexistent, beyond vague statements about soft power and diplomacy.

    The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders: In 1998, the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders was adopted by the General Assembly and commits the UN to promoting and protecting those who advocate for human rights across the world. This resolution was adopted twenty-five years ago, and could be updated to address the current state of human rights. The current resolution recommends utilizing diplomacy to protect defenders, but lacks details for how that should take place. The Declaration does not have a mechanism for enforcement  and relies on powerful countries to create consequences for human rights violations, which may not align with other strategic interests. For example, the US works closely with Mexico to manage migration and security along the shared border, so pressuring Mexico to change its behavior towards journalists could come at a high cost in terms of reduced cooperation on migration.

    The Biden Administration: In October 2021, President Biden announced that the US would serve on the UN Human Rights Council for three years in order to work to protect human rights defenders globally. Biden aims to promote accountability of governments that have persecuted, threatened, and killed defenders. The Biden and Harris Administration claim to put democratic values and human rights at the center of US Foreign Policy, yet there is no formal policy for protecting those who are defending human rights abroad. The US State Department has published a list of ways in which the US attempts to protect activists abroad that include assisting defenders obtain international protection, attending judicial hearings of defenders, attempting to keep close contact with activists abroad, encouraging host governments to work with the defenders, working with the UN to address specific threats, etc.

    La Esperanza Protocol: This protocol aims to improve the investigation of and response to serious threats against human rights defenders. This protocol, implemented in 2019, is the first international tool to establish best practices and guidelines to investigate threats of this kind. This project does important work in gathering knowledge and making it publicly available, but does not have a mechanism to ensure its implementation.

  • US Response to the EU Energy Crisis

    US Response to the EU Energy Crisis

    Over the course of the past six months, the United States committed to several EU-U.S. trade agreements to support the European economy in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The US aims to reduce the European Union economy’s dependence on Russian gas and oil. The EU and the US have restricted energy imports from Russia, and Russia has responded with energy-related sanctions.

    Background Information

    According to the European Commission, the EU imported 155 billion cubic meters

    of natural gas from Russia, as well as €48 billion worth of Russian crude oil and €23 billion worth of Russian refined oil in 2021. During this same year, crude oil was one of the largest energy imports into the EU, amounting to 62%, followed by natural gas at 25%, the majority of both coming from Russia.

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    Within the EU, Germany is Europe’s largest importer of Russian gas, importing 42.6 billion cubic meters of gas in 2020, followed by Italy who imported 29.2 billion cubic meters of gas in the same year.

    Russian sanctions on EU fuel imports were devastating given the EU’s dependency on natural gas and crude oil. Russia imposed sanctions in May 2022 on European subsidiaries of the state-owned energy giant Gazprom who categorized these sanctions as “a ban on the use of a gas pipeline owned by EuRoPol GAZ to transport gas through Poland [and to the rest of the EU].” Since Russia’s sanctions were implemented, the EU has attempted to find new alternatives to Russian oil and gas, and some—including Germany—are rationing oil consumption to mitigate the sudden loss of fuels. 

    Current Discussion 

    Due to its dependency on Russian fuels, Germany initially opposed EU plans to target the Russian energy sector.

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    However, three months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany announced support for an embargo on Russian fuel imports, allowing the EU to pass a more aggressive package of restrictive measures against Russia.

    Adopted in June, the new package has five main elements: 

    • Restricts oil imports including an immediate embargo on all crude oil and refined oil products and a gradual embargo on petroleum products and seaborn crude oil for countries lacking the infrastructure to fully transition to non-Russian energy. 
    • Gradually restrict Russian oil transportation to “third world” countries.
    • Prohibits financial relations with the Russian government and state-owned entities, as well as with three major Russian banks and one Belarusian bank.
    • Suspends three Russian State outlets from broadcasting as well as advertising for Russian products and services.
    • Expands the list of banned items to include any additional chemicals and technologies that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons as well as halts exports to entities in many sectors, including weapons and scientific research.

    As a result of the increased severity of EU restrictions on Russian gas and fuel, the EU turned to the U.S and began importing liquified natural gasses (LNGs) and other fuel sources. The EU imported 60 billion cubic meters of LNGs from the United States since April 2016, and experienced a surge in U.S. LNG imports since 2019. 

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    The United States announced it will supply 15 billion cubic meters of LNGs to the EU to mitigate the developing energy crisis abroad. In March 2022, President Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a joint task force to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. 

    The Task Force has two primary objectives: 

    • Diversifying LNG Supplies in Alignment with Climate Objectives: the United States will work to ensure at least 15 billion cubic meters of LNG exports to the EU in 2022 with the intention of increases in the future and both entities will work to ensure that any and all expansions of LNG import/export infrastructure will prioritize sustainability and efficiency.
    • Reducing Demand for Natural Gas: both the EU and the US commit to decrease dependency on natural gas by accelerating market deployment of clean energy measures through funding advancement of renewable energy technologies.

    Concerns

    This Task Force will cost about $60 billion dollars. Currently, the EU does not have LNG import infrastructure to sustain this ambitious plan. Most of the regasification facilities in the EU are in coastal countries, so central European countries will have difficulty accessing the LNGs after they have been processed. The United States will also need to build more LNG export facilities as current liquefaction plants have reached maximum capacity. The construction of these facilities would cost upwards of $10 billion in investments.