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Category: Foreign Policy region

  • The Vienna Talks: Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal

    The Vienna Talks: Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal

    Background

    As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden pledged to reenter the Iran nuclear deal that the Obama administration brokered in 2015. The deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), offered international sanctions relief in exchange for limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, which the Iranian government insists is for peaceful purposes. In 2018, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and implemented  a “maximum pressure” campaign consisting of harsher sanctions, new designations of terrorist organizations, and travel restrictions, among other measures. In response, Iran committed significant breaches of the JCPOA including enriching uranium to higher concentrations, exceeding uranium stockpile limits, developing advanced centrifuges, and restricting international monitoring. 

    In an op-ed written in September 2020, President Biden expressed his desire to “strengthen and expand” the deal to include provisions addressing Iran’s regional activities and ballistic missile program, among other concerns expressed by critics of the original deal. A month into his presidency, Biden made three preliminary moves to jump-start negotiations with Iran. First, the U.S. accepted an invitation from the EU to attend a meeting with the other JCPOA signatories, the P5+1–Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany–and Iran to discuss a path forward. The Biden administration also reversed former President Trump’s decision to reinvoke all United Nations sanctions when Iran initially violated the terms of the agreement (known as “snapback sanction”). Finally, Biden removed travel restrictions on Iranian diplomats based at the United Nations in New York. Despite such overtures, Tehran rejected the invitation to meet and diplomacy initially stalled over disagreements about which country should make the next move. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif refused to engage directly with the U.S. until Biden agreed to lift all sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. However, after weeks of discreet negotiations, Tehran committed to indirect talks with the P5+1. 

    “On the Right Track” 

    The first round of negotiations began in Vienna on April 6, 2021. European envoys acted as intermediaries, shuttling between the Iranian and U.S. delegations. In initial meetings, the Joint Commission formed two expert working groups: one charting Washington’s timetable for lifting sanctions, the other discussing Iran’s plan for reversing nuclear breaches inconsistent with JCPOA guidelines. At the third round of talks, another working group formed to address the sequencing of measures necessary to bring the U.S. and Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA. Enrique Mora, the EU coordinator for the talks, reported  “good progress,” a phrase echoed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov. However, after the sixth round of talks concluded on June 20, 2021, negotiations reached an impasse. 

    Challenges 

    Two events aroused suspicion during the talks, although it is unclear to what extent these events impacted negotiations. After the first round of talks in Vienna, an explosion hit Natanz, Iran’s key uranium enrichment facility. Iran blamed the act of “nuclear terrorism” on Israel, and in retaliation, increased its uranium encirchment level from 20 to 60%, a step closer to weapons-grade (90%). Although some JCPOA signatories expressed “grave concern” about Iran’s enrichment activities, Foreign Minister Zarif emphasized that Iran “will not allow this act of sabotage to affect the nuclear talks.” Shortly after the explosion at Natanz, a taped interview with Zarif was leaked to the press. In the recording, Zarif, who helped negotiate the original deal in 2015, alleged that Russian officials conspired with Iranian General Suleimani to sabotage the JCPOA before it was brokered in 2015, suggesting that Moscow sought to prevent Tehran from normalizing relations with the West. Iran’s Foreign Ministry characterized the leak as “illegal” and the Russian Foreign Ministry refused requests for comments. Despite skepticism from outside observers and JCPOA signatories, negotiations continued seemingly unaffected by the revelations, although the explosion in Natanz pressured the delegations to expedite the negotiation process.  

    Aside from external controversies, Iran’s domestic politics played a substantial role in delaying negotiations. Throughout the talks, Iran’s outgoing president Hassan Rouhani faced pressure from a hardline parliament hostile to the JCPOA.  Rouhani blamed a law passed by the Iranian parliament and Guardian Council in December 2020 for hindering diplomatic success. The law, which required the Atomic Energy Association of Iran to accelerate its nuclear development if certain sanctions were not lifted, raised concern from other JCPOA participants and cast doubt regarding Iran’s commitment to the deal. Additionally, some observers including Ali Raibee, a spokesperson for the Rouhani government, contended that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sought to postpone a final agreement until Iranian elections in June, which promised a hardline victory. After a controversial vote on June 18, the new hardline president Ebrahim Raisi requested time to consolidate a new government before continuing negotiations in Vienna. Raisi’s decision was no shock, as Zarif and other JCPOA signatories previously expressed a desire to reach an agreement before Raisi’s election. Since Raisi’s election, no date has been set to resume talks in Vienna.

    Future Prospects 

    Despite speculation, the Biden administration stated that the new Iranian government would not significantly alter Tehran’s negotiating position. However, President Raisi has held firm that regional and missile issues are “non-negotiable,” complicating Biden’s plan to open discussions related to these matters. Although the Biden administration and the other JCPOA signatories have confirmed their willingness to resume negotiations after Raisi forms a new government, White House officials have warned that the option will not remain open “indefinitely.” Aside from disagreements over the lifting of U.S. sanctions, members of the JCPOA are concerned that Tehran’s nuclear escalation resulting from the 2020 law has shortened Iran’s breakout window—the time it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb. If Iran’s recent nuclear developments are irreversible, the one-year breakout period envisioned in the 2015 accord may be null and JCPOA signatories may be less willing to restore the 2015 deal as it stands if the intended nonproliferation benefits are weakened. 

    Although the U.S. and its JCPOA partners have expressed a desire to resume talks in Vienna immediately, Iranian officials have requested bilateral meetings with EU officials in Brussels to find “practical solutions to the current deadlock in Vienna.” The Biden administration views this step as unnecessary and recently announced its willingness to explore a “Plan B” with Israel. The current path forward remains unclear, as questions regarding U.S. sanctions relief and Iran’s breakout time complicate the prospect of future diplomatic negotiations. Presently, Tehran is not ready to resume a seventh round of talks in Vienna, and the Biden administration’s current rhetoric indicates increasing impatience over the deadlock.

  • Intro to the Houthi Movement in Yemen

    Intro to the Houthi Movement in Yemen

    History of Conflict in Yemen

    Modern Yemen formed in 1990 through the unification of two regions: The Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. Soon after the union, a military officer, Ali Abdullah Saleh, became the country’s leader. Though Yemen is a majority-Sunni country, the north region is Shia-dominant, which poses religious tensions.

    The U.S. supported Saleh in the early 2000s in the fight against growing terrorist organizations in the country and region. The U.S. also lent support to the country during the chaos of the Arab Spring, when Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also became more active. The U.S. continued its involvement in Yemen when further political tensions emerged.

    In 2011, Saleh was ousted due to accusations of corruption, and former Vice President Abdrahbbuh Mansour Hadi took over. Hadi’s interim government is backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S., and the UN sees Hadi as Yemen’s rightful leader. However, Hadi’s leadership has been challenged by jihadists, a separatist movement in south Yemen, former government loyalists, and factors such as corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity.

    The Houthis saw an opportunity during the period of weak leadership, government transition, and many actors vying for power to attempt to gain military power in the north. The Houthis didn’t have faith in Hadi’s interim government and wanted to ensure their own security and take control of their homeland in northern Yemen. The Houthis also oppose Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for backing Hadi’s government. At the same time, Saleh allied with the Houthis against his former political ally, Hadi, and sought to regain the presidency. In 2015, the Houthis and Saleh loyalists ousted Hadi, and he fled to Saudi Arabia.

    The Houthis had initially opposed Saleh because he supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Despite this disagreement, the Houthis later allied with Saleh against Hadi’s UN-backed government. However, in 2017, Saleh withdrew his support from the Houthi coalition and was killed by Houthis. 

    Who are the Houthis?

    The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), is a group of Zaidi Muslim who were a sect of Shia Islam, and believed to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad’s family. Hussein al-Houthi formed Ansar Allah to revive the Zaidi Shia tradition and gain more power for the group in Yemen. Because Zaidi ancestors were seen as a threat by leaders of modern-day Yemen, they suffered discrimination. This caused the Houthis to question Yemeni government authority and demand more respect and control of their homeland.

    The Houthis challenged Saleh’s legitimacy by claiming he was a weak leader and was a puppet of the U.S. Because of their stance, the Houthis gained support from anti-Saleh Yemenis around the country. The Houthis wish to install an interim government friendlier to their goals of:

    • Maintaining regional autonomy
    • Respecting diversity
    • Strengthening a democratic state
    • Lowering fuel prices
    • Securing military control in the north
    • Controlling much of the country, specifically the oil-rich eastern region
    • Gaining political power and international recognition

    Gulf states and the U.S. view Hadi as Yemen’s rightful leader and view the Houthis as an insurgent group.

    Regional and International Impact

    In 2015, Saudi Arabia, other majority-Sunni Arab states, the United States, United Kingdom, and France feared a rise in Houthi support from Shia-majority Iran. In response, the Saudi-led coalition targeted Houthis in air strikes with the goal of stopping Houthi advances and returning Hadi to power. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the UAE pushed the Houthis and their allies out of southern Yemen and out of the city of Aden. This made way for Hadi to establish a temporary government in Aden. The government was unable to provide basic services and security to the city and surrounding areas, and Hadi himself was still primarily living in Saudi Arabia.

    In response, the Houthis have committed drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in recent years, including air strikes on Saudi Arabian oil fields that affected oil production in the country in September of 2019.

    In August 2019, the Saudi-backed Hadi forces and UAE-backed southern separatists clashed. The southern separatists took over Aden and demanded a power sharing deal with the Saudi-led coalition. The UN hoped this would lead to peace, but in January 2020, more conflict erupted between Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. In April of 2020, southern separatists broke a peace deal with the Saudi-led coalition and wanted to govern Aden and southern Yemen themselves.

    Internal conflict, divided political loyalty in southern Yemen, and divided military loyalty throughout the country all contribute to tensions in the region on religious, political, and geographical grounds. These tensions make countries vulnerable to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In Yemen, AQAP and a local branch of the Islamic State have capitalized on the instability and attempted to gain ground in the south. 

    Image 1

    The complexity of the internal conflict is deepened by international influence. With continued Sunni-Shia tensions in and between countries, we see Shia-majority Iran backing the Houthis (though Iran denies this) while Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States backing Hadi’s government. This proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia exacerbates the region’s worst issues of ineffective leadership, internal violence, and religious extremism.


    Image 2

    Yemen is strategically located on a strait that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, through which many of the world’s oil shipments pass. In addition the U.S. is interested in securing Saudi Arabia’s borders, having access to free travel for oil through the strait connecting the Arabian and Red Seas, and a Yemeni government that will effectively work with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

    U.S. President Biden’s Response

    U.S. President Biden seems to be a less staunch supporter of the Saudi-led coalition. Biden claims he wishes to end support for the coalition’s military involvement, including selling weapons to Hadi loyalists. Instead of the military approach, Biden plans to appoint a special envoy to Yemen to encourage cooperation through diplomacy. In addition, Biden reversed former President Trump’s categorization of the Houthi Movement as a terrorist organization as this designation threatens the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemenis.

    Future of Conflict in YemenPeace deals between warring groups with international allies on both sides have failed, meaning a stalemate for the conflict. A conflict which Saudi Arabian leadership thought would last a few weeks became years of suffering, tension, and conflict.

  • Introduction to United States and Dominican Republic Relations

    Introduction to United States and Dominican Republic Relations

    Fact Sheet

    History of US-DR Relations

    Christopher Columbus first set foot on the island of Hispaniola, which is now the D.R. and Haiti, in 1492. The island was colonized and split into two nations, Haiti in the west and the D.R. in the east, in 1697 by France and Spain, respectively. Haiti gained its independence from France in 1804, and conquered the Dominican Republic in 1822, ruling it for 22 years. In 1844, the Dominican Republic gained its independence from Haiti. In 1858, President Pedro Santana believed that re-annexing the D.R. to Spain would allow the country to thrive. This was a highly unpopular decision and the Dominicans revolted against Spain. From 1863 to 1865, the Dominican Restoration War took place against Spain, and the Dominicans retook the country.

    The United States and the Dominican Republic (D.R.) began an official diplomatic relationship in 1884. At this time, the United States was primarily interested in the Dominican Republic as a stable, democratic trading partner. 

    At this time the D.R.’s economy began to improve, but mainly through European loans, and the country accumulated a heavy debt burden which it was not able to pay back. The United States intervened on behalf of the D.R. because President Franklin D. Roosevelt was focused on maintaining influence in Latin America through the Roosevelt Corollary. He wanted to prevent European influence or occupation in Latin America due to the region’s proximity to the United States. He used what is now known as Big Stick Diplomacy – the idea that negotiating with countries and having a powerful, unspoken threat of military backing would keep European forces out of the region. Under this proposition, Roosevelt sent U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic and other Latin American and Caribbean countries, occupying the D.R. in 1916. This occupation was met with heavy criticism by the citizens of the Dominican Republic, leading the U.S. to leave in 1924.

    From 1930 to 1960, Rafael Trujillo ruled as the Domincan Republic’s dictator and military strongman. His 1961 assassination led to a tumultuous period of military coups and civil unrest. The U.S. became concerned that a communist regime would emerge on the island. In April 1965, the U.S. sent 22,000 troops to the Dominican Republic, leading to the 1965 Dominican Republic civil war.

    Since the end of the civil war, the Dominican Republic has been a relatively stable democracy and developed a stronger relationship with the United States. Although the nation still struggles with poverty and human rights violations, it has made steady progress and proved to be a strong ally of the U.S. in the region.

    U.S. Strategic Interests in the D.R.

    • Trade: The D.R. and U.S. recently signed the Dominican Republic Central America United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2007. This trade agreement encompasses many countries in the region, including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The goal under this agreement is to eradicate tariffs, allow trade to become more free and open, and give the countries more access to industrial and cultural products. When the agreement was signed in 2007, the D.R. exported 57.4% of its goods to the U.S. and imported 44.9% of its goods from theU.S.. Today, 53.8% of the Dominican Republic’s exports go to the U.S., while the 49.6% of D.R. imports come from the U.S.. The two countries’ proximity allows for cheap, efficient trade. 
    • Security and the War on Drugs: Under the Obama Administration in 2010, the U.S. and the D.R. signed the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The CBSI’s primary goal is to provide funding to Caribbean countries to curb illegal drug trafficking, facilitate citizen safety, and encourage local governments and law enforcement agencies to prevent crime. In June 2021, Congress passed the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act which approved $74.8 million USD to CBSI for each fiscal year between 2022 and 2026. The Dominican Republic is expected to get approximately 23% of that funding, which is the highest amount any country receives under this initiative. In past years, a significant portion of this funding has gone to officer training, public outreach, maritime responses, and other preventative measures within the Dominican Republic. 
  • The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant

    The Effects of Climate Change on Living Conditions in the Levant

    With each passing year, the detrimental effects of climate change are becoming ever more apparent, especially in regions like the Levant. As conditions worsen, they lead to social and economic crises in countries throughout the Levant which have struggled to adapt. Ultimately, climate change threatens U.S. interests in the Levant because it exacerbates instability, heightens social and economic problems, and weakens states’ ability to implement an effective response. 

    Background 

    The Climate of the Levant Region 

    The Levant is a geographic region along the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean and includes Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, and Palestine. Located in a transitional climate zone between North-Atlantic-influenced climate systems and monsoonal-influenced climate systems, the region has an arid to semi-arid climate, meaning it receives relatively little precipitation. Despite this dry climate, the Levant has historically been known as the Fertile Crescent for its rich soil and relatively high access to water, which comes from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. 

    These factors have allowed for high agricultural output in the Levant, which has helped many civilizations flourish over thousands of years. Climate change threatens this agricultural productivity and the humans who depend on it. 

    Climate Change 

    Climate change refers to long-term shifts in regional or global climate and weather patterns. Though these changes can result from natural processes, today, climate change is primarily driven by human activity. The IPCC notes that there is strong evidence for anthropogenic drivers of climate change, meaning man-made drivers. These include the burning of fossil fuels and other human actions—such as deforestation, increased livestock farming, and the use of fluorinated gasses—that have caused the Earth to warm. Global warming refers to the overall heating of the Earth due to the greenhouse effect, which occurs when greenhouse gasses, such as carbon dioxide, trap heat from the Sun in the Earth’s atmosphere. 

    Since the Industrial Revolution, humans have exponentially increased the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to the extent that the Earth is warming at an unprecedented and accelerated rate. As the Earth’s temperature increases on a global level, regional climate systems are affected differently, meaning the climate is changing rather than simply warming.

    Man-made global climate change is having and will continue to have many harmful effects. These include sea level rise; more frequent and extreme natural disasters; biodiversity loss; longer, hotter heatwaves and droughts; and changes in precipitation patterns, among others. As the Earth warms, these effects will exacerbate existing economic, social, and political problems. For this reason, climate change is widely considered a threat multiplier—it increases political instability and social upheaval and therefore poses a security risk to humans and governments around the world. 

    The Physical Effects of Climate Change in the Levant 

    In the Levant, the worst effects of climate change include longer and more severe droughts, desertification, hotter temperatures, decreased rainfall, and more frequent dust storms. These effects are occurring simultaneously today and will only get worse in the future. 

    • Drought: According to a NASA study 1998-2012, the Levant region experienced its most severe drought of the past 900 years. During this recent drought, the Levant was 50% drier than at any other point in the past 500 years and 10-20% drier than the driest period during the last nine centuries. Because of climate change, droughts in the Levant and elsewhere globally are expected to be more intense, last longer, and set in quicker. 
    • Desertification: The Levant’s dryland ecosystem is extremely susceptible to overexploitation and improper land use. These practices contribute to the region’s desertification—land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas caused by human activities and climatic variations. This process causes reduced crop and livestock productivity, changes in the composition of plant species, and reduced biological diversity. Thus, in the Levant, it will cause a reduction in the amount of land suitable for agriculture. 
    • Hotter Temperatures and Worse Heatwaves: Because of climate change, the Levant is expected to experience both increased average temperatures and more intense and longer heatwaves. Climate models predict that temperatures in the Levant will continue to rise, and the region will become increasingly hotter and drier. These climate change effects are already visible throughout the region as countries experience record-breaking heat. When combined with high humidity, extreme heat poses health risks, especially to the elderly and children. 
    • Decreased Rainfall and Changing Patterns: Climate change is projected to decrease the average amount of rainfall in the Levant, a region that already does not receive much precipitation. This effect not only poses a problem for regional agriculture, which often relies on rainfall but is also connected to the other environmental problems the region faces. In the past, the Levant’s climate has been characterized by dry summers and more temperate, rainy winters. However, as the climate changes, rainfall patterns are shifting, which has meant drier winters. This shift in rainfall patterns, likely due to an atmospheric shift bringing drier air to the region, is important because rain-fed farming systems like many in the region are especially vulnerable to changes in rainfall patterns. 
    • Sand and Dust Storms: Another major climate-related concern for the Levant is the increase and worsening of dust storms. These storms are remarkable for their intensity and the large size of their dust particles. The particles from the massive sandstorm that occurred in the region in September 2015 were bigger than any that had been recorded since 1995. The sandstorm created a thick layer of dust spanning Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Cyprus. Dust storms cause significant air pollution, which is a hazard for people’s health in itself, and these storms also increase aircraft and traffic accidents. 

    Government Mismanagement in the Levant 

    While climate change has caused or exacerbated these physical effects, related issues have contributed to the problems the region faces today. Namely, pollution and other consequences of government mismanagement have further worsened environmental and living conditions in the region. Poor governance and corruption make people in the Levant less able to feel relief from extreme heat and other climate change effects, as citizens face water and electricity shortages when they need these resources the most. In other words, there is less water now, and of what water there is, the public cannot access it. 

    The Effects of Climate Change on Humanity in the Levant 

    Between the intensifying impacts of climate change and inadequate government responses to these effects, the people living in the Levant face worsening living conditions due to a number of climate-related problems. These include water scarcity, food insecurity, climate migration, more disease, worsening economic conditions, and social strife. 

    • Water Scarcity: Due to climate change and its drying effects on the Levant region, freshwater resources have become more scarce, in both quantity and quality. Additionally, pollution and the salinization—increased salt concentration in water—of rivers and other water sources worsen water quality. An increasing number of people in the region are facing a lack of access to clean water, which is a public health concern as well. The effects of climate change, such as increased rainfall, flooding, and droughts, can often degrade water quality even as population growth increases its demand. As clean water becomes increasingly inaccessible, the risk of water-borne illnesses like cholera goes up as people are forced to consume contaminated water. For instance, contaminated water in Gaza leaves people more vulnerable to illnesses and infections, including cholera, Salmonella, diarrhea, polio, and viral meningitis. 
    • Food Insecurity: As temperatures continue to rise, water supplies continue to fall, and environment degradation worsens, food insecurity is likely to increase throughout the Levant. Agriculture productivity has and will continue to decrease because of droughts, desertification, and dust storms. The latter is particularly damaging to crops and can remove nutrient-rich topsoil further reducing food production. Food insecurity has serious public health consequences, especially for children, since malnutrition can stunt development physically and intellectually. Moreover, Syria’s food shortage prior to the civil war caused the mass displacement of farmers, who could not remain in their homes after they lost both their source of income and sustenance. Food insecurity in the country has only grown worse since 2011, as millions of Syrians continue to go hungry. 
    • Climate Migration: Another effect of climate change is an increase in forced internal and international migration throughout the Levant. Extreme weather events, like severe flooding, will at least temporarily displace tons of people and destroy tons of acres of crops, taking away people’s livelihoods in the long term. More slow-onset events like desertification will permanently displace people as more and more areas become uninhabitable. Climate change has already caused the mass migration of millions of people in the Levant alone. In Iraq, for example, water scarcity has led to a dramatic increase in forced migration and urbanization. 
    • More Disease and Illness: As the Earth warms, mosquitoes are able to travel outside of their normal regions, increasing the spread of infectious diseases and reaching new populations. Indeed, climate-related effects will result in more disease transmission in the Levant in multiple ways. Malnutrition from lack of access to nutritious food can increase the likelihood of contracting an infectious disease. According to the United Nations, change in land use is the “primary transmission pathway for emerging infectious diseases of humans, over 60% of which are zoonotic.” Other issues are the negative health outcomes that come from extreme temperatures, including dehydration, heat exhaustion, heatstroke, and death. Extreme heat also reduces health systems’ capabilities to address issues and increases the number of accidents and the transmission rate of illnesses. All of these climate factors are present in the Levant.
    • Worsening Economic Conditions: Climate change will exacerbate existing economic issues and deepen poverty in the Levant as well. It has and will continue to increase employment fragility as it threatens economic productivity and many industries like agriculture. It will also increase competition for low-skill jobs as displaced people search for work. The rising costs of climate change put additional pressure on national economies while constraining governments’ capabilities to implement sustainable policies and invest in sustainable infrastructure. On a macro and micro level, climate change poses a great risk to people’s economic fortunes. 
    • Social Strife: In addition to the economic and societal problems described above, global climate change drives social unrest and accelerates armed conflict in the Levant. As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and others have noted, “The climate crisis isn’t coming. It’s already here,” and it brings with it instability and conflict in Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere. Furthermore, resource mismanagement by governments in the Levant exacerbates the climate change effects, thereby worsening living conditions even more.

    Conclusion

    Climate change and its effects have already worsened living conditions in the Levant and will continue to exacerbate problems in the coming years. Furthermore, as the impacts of climate change worsen economic and social conditions, these bad social and economic conditions can cause further climate effects in a devastating feedback loop. For example, scientists believe that the Syrian civil war may have created the conditions for a deadly dust storm across the region. This terrible cycle will intensify as the temperature of the planet continues to rise and as these climate effects wreak more and more havoc on people throughout the Levant.

  • Overview of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests

    Overview of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests

    Hong Kong’s Relationship with China

    Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of China that operates under separate systems and a different constitution than mainland China (see One Country, Two Systems brief). Hong Kong’s constitutional document, called the Basic Law, defines the ‘four pillars’ of success in Hong Kong as a common law system with an independent judiciary, the free flow of information, a level playing field between businesses, and an uncorrupted, respected civil service. 

    Political Context

    Hong Kong has a strong democratic tradition. Following its transfer of sovereignty on July 1, 1997 from Great Britain to the People’s Republic of China , the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promised that the region could keep its liberal, democratic and capitalist systems for at least 50 years. However, in recent years, as China more aggressively pursues unification, many Hong Kongers and international governments, including the United States, have accused China of attempting to systematically erode Hong Kong’s autonomy. These efforts, perceived as resulting in the “mainlandization” of Hong Kong, have resulted in feverous protests from Hong Kong citizens exemplified by the 2014 Umbrella Movement. The Umbrella Movement was sparked by the CCP introducing education reforms such as compulsory Mandarin classes (Hong Kongers mainly speak Cantonese) and a new “patriotic” curriculum, as well as refusing to allow the native people to directly elect their chief executive as previously promised. These protests ultimately failed to garner concessions from the CCP or the Hong Kong government as they did not significantly damage Hong Kong’s economy. However, they succeeded in setting the stage for the more impactful 2019 protests.

    Lighting the Powder Keg

    While tensions have remained high between a democratic Hong Kong public and an authoritarian CCP over the years, tensions reached a boiling point in 2019 when the government, pressured by the CCP, proposed a new national security law that would allow for extraditions to mainland China. This law is seen as corrosive to Hong Kong’s sovereignty as it gives the CCP the ability to arrest activists, seize assets, fire Hong Kong government workers, detain members of the press, and rewrite school curriculums. These reforms also introduced a new electoral system that requires candidates to be vetted for patriotic character, effectively allowing Beijing to control who takes office. 

    Protests & Goals of the Protestors

    Beginning on June 9, 2019, tens of thousands of Hong Kongers took to the streets to protest what they perceived to be encroachments on their liberties. As the Hong Kong Legislative Council gathered to vote on the bill, protestors surrounded the building, cancelling the session and resulting in a major victory for the protestors. A week later, on June 16, approximately 2 million Hong Kongers marched in protests around the city and were met with violent opposition from the CCP-controlled Hong Kong police. Protestors were beaten, tear gassed, pepper sprayed and shot with water guns and rubber bullets, despite being largely peaceful. This garnered widespread condemnation from the international community, especially the United States, with many politicians voicing public support for the protestors. 

    Conflict peaked on July 1st as anti-government Hong Kong activists broke into the Legislative Council building, occupying it, and vandalizing it with anti-CCP slogans before exiting late that night. Nine days later, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Lam dropped the extradition bill. While the protestors were successful in getting the extradition bill dropped, they did not achieve their other goals:

    • Convincing the CCP and Hong Kong government to stop referring to the protests as riots; 
    • An independent investigation of the use of force on civilians by police; 
    • The unconditional release of everyone arrested at the protests; 
    • And political reform towards universal suffrage. 

    This last goal represents the main tension between Hong Kong and China in the 2010s, first brought to the national spotlight by the 2014 Umbrella Movement. Although China has claimed that democracy was the eventual goal for Hong Kong, actions leading up to the protests proved otherwise in the eyes of many Hong Kongers. 

    Aftermath 

    After pro-democracy landslide victories in Hong Kong’s District Council elections and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the protests began to lose steam. However, tensions mounted again in May 2020 when the CCP pushed the previously defeated National Security Law through Hong Kong’s legislature. Since this law’s passage, many prominent activists and journalists have been arrested, and there has been mass emigration out of the city. Approval ratings for the Hong Kong government are now at their lowest points since the region was transferred to Chinese control in 1997, with approval for Lam at a dismal 19%. Overall, Hong Kongers’ confidence in the impartiality and efficacy of their institutions has dropped substantially in the past ten years.

    Implications for US, China and the International Community The CCP and Hong Kong government have received widespread international condemnation for their actions surrounding the protests. Taiwan, which is in a similar position to Hong Kong, is on high alert for similar provocations from the CCP following the Hong Kong protests. In the United States, then-President Donald Trump and Congress passed a series of acts sanctioning the Hong Kong government and Hong Kong-based businesses, and declared the situation a national emergency. For now, Beijing sees this new security law as substantial enough to prevent national security threats from Hong Kong and is focusing on economic projects which it believes will alleviate the social unrest that spurred the protests. The United States, on the other hand, sees China as having significantly eroded Hong Kong’s sovereignty over the past decade and remains on alert to see just how far China’s ambitions in the region extend. Hong Kong promises to be a flash point in a budding Sino-American rivalry and is poised to be a litmus test for Chinese desire to project regional hegemony and the resolve of the U.S. to resist it.

  • Overview of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement

    Overview of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement

    The Korean War (1950-53) was the first and largest proxy war of the Cold War. The defeat of the Japanese empire after World War II gave the United States control of the southern portion of the Korean peninsula, below the 38th parallel, while the Soviet Union controlled the northern portion. This war never officially ended, with the imperfect solution known as the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA) struggling to keep peace on the peninsula to this day. 

    The KAA is strictly a military document. It ensured a ceasefire long enough to answer the “Korea Question,” outlined in Paragraph 60, which asked how to reunite and bring lasting peace to the divided peninsula. Paragraph 60 called for a meeting to answer this question within three months, but, while the meeting took place, it was unsuccessful in establishing a framework to reunify the peninsula. Even though the armistice was signed on July 27th, 1953, it is considered a living document as Paragraph 62 allows for the KAA to be amended based on the current situation of the peninsula.

    The 1954 Geneva Conference addressed both the ongoing war in Indochina and the Korea Question. The US delegation was mainly focused on the Korea Question, and met with diplomats from the USSR, China, and North Korea. The main demand of North Korea and China was an “equal Korea,” and suggested an “all Korea commission be established.” South Korea declined this and countered with a 14-point plan that was seen as highly risky by the Americans. North Korea in turn declined the South Korean plan, to the relief of the US. The conference concluded with no solution and kept the KAA as the lone document keeping peace on the peninsula. 

    The KAA has seen its fair share of violations and incidents on both sides over the years.

    The fragility of the Korean Armistice Agreement is a critical issue for American foreign policy. South Korea remains a major ally of the U.S. politically, economically, militarily, and geographically given its close proximity to China and Russia. A significant amount of the U.S. military budget goes to maintaining troops and operating bases in South Korea. Between 2016 and 2019, U.S. military activity in South Korea cost $13.4 billion. The majority of this funding went to the U.S. army, with Camp Humphreys costing $9.2 billion alone. A military conflict between North and South Korea would potentially draw in China and Russia, in addition to the United States, creating a global conflict.

  • Intro to the Andean Region: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru

    Intro to the Andean Region: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru

    The Andean region is a geopolitical area encompassing the states through which the Andes mountain range runs–Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru–who share cultural characteristics initially spread by the Incan Empire in pre-colonial times. 

    The region is economically characterized by membership in the Andean Community Trading Group, which includes Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, in addition to the three countries. The group was created with the objective of developing a customs union and fostering industrial development. Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru’s economies are also characterized by reliance on trade with the US, which makes up around 40% of total trading. The Andean region has faced many of the same challenges as its neighbors, including supporting large populations of Venezuelan migrants and refugees as well as concerns about electoral fraud and government corruption. Peru and Ecuador have served as a major destination for Venezuelan migrants. Like much of Latin America, the Andean states have suffered substantially from government corruption and fraud. More recently, major government efforts have implemented anti-corruption programs. It is difficult to say whether these programs are in truth anti-corruption or simply attempts to jail political opponents on false charges, but anti-corruption and anti-fraud are of high public interest.

    US interests in the Andean region are diverse, but many come back to anti-drug production and trafficking efforts. Coca cultivation has been an indigenous practice in this region for many centuries for medicinal purposes and cultural practices; however, as the global market for cocaine has become more lucrative, this cultivation has increasingly shifted towards supplying the Global North with narcotics. US foreign policy in the Andean region has been characterized by efforts to reduce coca cultivation and eliminate drug trafficking.

    Republic of Bolivia

    • Capital: La Paz (government and executive capital), Sucre (constitutional capital)
    • Population: 11.85 million (2020)
    • Government type: Presidential Representative Republic 
    • GDP per Capita: $3,552
    • Official National Language/s: Spanish, several dozen indigenous languages (including: Aymara, Quechua, Chiquitano and Guaraní), Bolivian Sign Language
    • Majority Religion/s: Roman Catholicism (many practice a version blended with traditional indigenous practices)
    • Global Freedom Score: 66 (partly free)

    US History with Bolivia

    Bolivia has not always been a country of key diplomatic importance for US foreign policy because of its small economy and lack of raw materials of interest. However, relations with the US are essential for Bolivia due to its economic dependence on the United States. 

    The US offered Bolivia official diplomatic recognition in 1848, several decades after many other Latin American countries. After beginning an official relationship, the United States and Bolivia’s relations have been largely characterized by a US focus on extractive industries and primary products production in Bolivia, similar to the rest of the developing world. Late 19th century relations between the countries were also characterized by the Monroe Doctrine, which officially declared US protection for Latin American countries against European intervention. In practice however, actions taken under the Monroe Doctrine were more in line with specific US interests in the region, so smaller countries like Bolivia did not receive much protection or aid. Specifically, the country unsuccessfully campaigned for US assistance to gain access to the Pacific Coast. 

    Despite initial disinterest in Bolivia, commercial importance of Bolivian markets increased at the end of the 19th century as US businessmen realized the potential of this market to sell their goods. This led to the US government beginning to take a more concrete foreign policy approach towards Bolivia starting in the early 20th century. The US aimed to reform Bolivia’s economic and political institutions to better facilitate US investment. However, these interests were challenged with the rise of economic nationalism in the 1930s which led to the nationalization of foreign oil holdings. 

    The Bolivian Revolution in the 1950s further distanced Bolivia from US commercial interests. The populist movement under the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement Party (MNR) pushed for better labor standards for miners and other workers and successfully advocated for further nationalization. These efforts were particularly focused on mining companies, many of which were at least partially owned by foreign firms. These actions led to large losses to US foreign investment in Bolivia. At the same time, the US government continued to push for US economic interests in the country. US aid flows to Bolivia gave the United States some leverage over Bolivia’s economic policies and economic advisors pushed for a cut to the Bolivian government’s budget and money supply. Ultimately these efforts were largely unsuccessful and the Bolivian government continued to implement populist economic policies, including nationalization of major industries. As a result, coca production increased as unemployment among lower classes increased. The bulk of this coca was used in cocaine production for US and European markets. Despite economic setbacks, the United States continued its support of Bolivia. In the early 1960s, the US Alliance for Progress resulted in an increase in US economic and military assistance to Latin America. However, the Bolivian government nationalized Gulf Oil, a major US oil company in 1969 and 2 years later forced the US Peace Corps out of the country.

    With the onset of the US’s War on Drugs policy in the 1980s that reached all throughout Latin America, including Bolivia, the US pushed for stronger coca production regulation, arguing that existing laws were too relaxed. 

    Key US Foreign Policy Considerations

    Major current US foreign policy considerations in Bolivia concern coca production and sale. The rise in cocaine sales and use in the United States led to the War on Drugs, which began in the 1980s. US policy makers continue to advocate for decreasing coca production throughout Central and South America and in Bolivia particularly. Due to coca’s importance both to local economies and indigenous practices, these efforts have not been as successful as US policy makers have hoped. The beginning of Evo Morales’ presidency in 2006 further moved coca policy away from US interests. Evo Morales was the first indigenous president and a former coca growers union leader. He relaxed policies appeasing the US War on Drugs and separately made efforts to decrease economic dependence and pressure from the US government. Unlike the United State’s desire to completely eliminate coca production (to control cocaine production and sales to the US), Morales also kept coca growing legal and addressed US concerns with regulatory measures. As a result, the United States has not supported Morales’ presidency. In 2008, the US ambassador was accused of conspiring against the acting government and expelled. At the same time, the US Drug Enforcement Administration in Bolivia was suspended due to disagreements about coca production policies within the country. 

    US concern about Morales’ leadership came to a head again in 2019 when the election result leading Morales to win his fourth term of office was scrutinized as fraudulent. When demonstrations ensued, Morales organized roadblocks preventing food from reaching major Bolivian cities. These actions relate to a different US interest in the region: promoting democracy and free and fair elections. Election fraud and corruption are common issues throughout Latin America. The prevalence and size of the US financial system means that the United States is often unintentionally involved in issues of money laundering and bribes. In May of 2021, the United States government charged former Bolivian Interior Minister Murillo with corruption for receiving bribes from a US businessman and using the US financial system to launder these bribes.

    REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR

    • Capital: Quito
    • Population: 17.64 million (2020)
    • Government type: Presidential, Unicameral Representative Democracy
    • GDP per Capita: 6,183 US dollars (2019)
    • Official National Language/s: Spanish (many people also speak Quechua)
    • Majority Religion/s: Roman Catholic
    • Global Freedom Score: 67 (partly free)

    US History with Ecuador

    US diplomatic relations with Ecuador first began when Ecuador was part of Gran Colombia (known at the time as the Republic of Colombia but encompassing present-day Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and parts of Peru and Brazil) and continued after Gran Colombia dissolved in 1831. Over the past two centuries, Ecuador-US relations have primarily centered around implementation of War on Drugs policies and economic interests.

    The War on Drugs began around the 1980s and Ecuador was a location of key interest for the United States. Ecuador contained the main drug route on which drugs were illicitly transported from Peru to Colombia. During the 1980s and 1990s, the US supported Ecuadorian authorities in increasing enforcement measures against criminal drug groups. Issues with criminal organizations in Ecuador continued into the 21st century and the United States has provided aid to train the Ecuadorian army and police as well as seal borders with neighboring countries.

    US-Ecuador relations worsened in the late 2000s as political parties to the left gained influence over the government and President Correa was elected in 2006. Correa’s politics leaned towards socialism and weren’t aligned with US interests. To the US’s dismay, he implemented policies to gain economic independence from the US and also made efforts to initiate closer relations with Russia, the EU and China. In 2007, the Ecuadorian government under Correa began passing new legislation to restrict US companies present in the country. Taxes for oil trading companies were increased and lawsuits were filed against Chevron and Texaco for over one billion dollars in damages (including pollution, health detriments, and environmental damage).

    In 2013, US-Ecuador relations were further complicated by a completely separate incident: the granting of asylum to US whistleblower Julian Assange. The Wikileaks founder lived in the London Ecuadorian embassy for a year and was granted Ecuadorian citizenship in 2017 which allowed him to avoid arrest by US authorities. His citizenship, however, was recently revoked because of alleged fraud in his naturalization documentation. 

    Relations have improved since President Lenín Moreno took office in 2017. President Moreno’s efforts to increase the trade relationship between the two countries and implement more bilateral agreements has elevated Ecuador’s diplomatic relationship with the United States. As a result, USAID’s mission in Ecuador re-opened in 2019.

    Key US Foreign Policy considerations

    US foreign policy interests in Ecuador reflect larger regional trends. As mentioned in the previous section, drug policies and rule of law are incredibly important to both Ecuador and the United States. 

    Another key policy consideration has been US aid to Ecuador for COVID-19 relief. The US Department of State/US Agency for International Development (USAID) has allocated $18 million to Ecuador for COVID assistance. This aid has gone to multiple avenues in Ecuador, not only providing relief to the medical services, but also trying to improve the rule of law, combat corruption, fund infrastructure development projects, provide increased economic opportunities, counter illicit trafficking and defend human rights.

    Another key interest to consider is Venezuelan instability and massive rates of emigration. Ecuador is a major destination for Venezuelan migrants. In June 2021, Ecuador announced the implementation of a new “normalization process” for 430,000 Venezuelan migrants living in the country. There is also a rising need for funding coming from outside of Ecuador to support this group. The United States provides funds to support Venezuelan migrants.

    REPUBLIC OF PERU

    • Capital: Lima
    • Population: 33.50 million (2021)
    • Government type: Presidential Republic
    • GDP per Capita: 6,977 US dollars (2019)
    • Official National Language/s: Spanish, Aymara, Quechua
    • Majority Religion/s: Roman Catholic (some blend catholicism with indigenous beliefs and practices)
    • Global Freedom Score: 71 (partly free)

    US History with Peru

    The United States established diplomatic relations with the newly independent nation in 1827 and the two countries have maintained a cooperative relationship ever since. 

    Like its neighbors, Peru has been a center for coca production and thus a subject of interest for the US’s War on Drugs in the 1980s. Peru was a priority location during this program due to its high rate of production of coca exports. The Peruvian government has largely been supportive of US counter-narcotics efforts in Peru. 

    The US has also supported programs in Peru to improve law enforcement and rule of law. Much of the relationship has been characterized by US support for further democratization and human rights promotion. Relations became strained in 2000 with the re-election of President Alberto Fujimori due to concerns of election fraud and corruption in Fujimori’s government. However, following the downfall of Fujimori in November 2000 and the changes in government, relations improved again.

    Peru and the US also have an important trade relationship. In 2006 they established the bilateral U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) which significantly increased trade between the two countries. Through this agreement the United States also works with Peru to combat wildlife trafficking and transnational crime.

    Key US Foreign Policy considerations

    Many of the US foreign policy considerations for Peru are similar to those in Ecuador and Bolivia. Similar to Ecuador, COVID-19 assistance has been a current key area of interest. Through June of 2021, Peru had the highest COVID death rate proportion of their population in the world, primarily because their large informal sector was unable to transition to remote work. Early June numbers estimated the official death toll as more than 180,000, a significant number for a population of 33 million. Peru also had a weak healthcare system and lacked sufficient funding for securing the resources required to address the pandemic. As a result, the United States provided $25.8 million in support to Peru to address COVID-19’s impact. The United States has also provided $16 million in humanitarian aid.
    Much like the rest of Latin America, Peru has also suffered from corruption and fraud in politics—a key interest in US foreign policy relating to goals of democratization and avoiding authoritarianism abroad. The June Peruvian presidential election saw much controversy regarding fraud and corruption as candidate Fujimori was arrested for fraud and challenged the election of her opponent Castillo. The United States is not directly involved in the investigations of corruption and fraud, but through foreign assistance, policy makers have attempted to improve government transparency and decrease corruption. In the 2019 fiscal year, the United States provided $75 million to Peru for a wide variety of causes, including countering narcotics production and trafficking, eliminating transnational criminal organizations, peacekeeping, implementing effective government and rule of law, and promoting defense cooperation.

  • An Introduction to Human Rights and Armed Conflict

    An Introduction to Human Rights and Armed Conflict

    There are two bodies of law that guarantee the protection of human rights for individuals and groups on a universal scale, international human right laws and international humanitarian law.

    Defining Laws that Protect Human Rights

    International human rights law (IHRL) is a set of international standards, enforced via treaty and customary law, that ensure that certain rights must be respected and protected by their states and state actors. Customary law are the legal norms that have been established via a historical pattern of behavior and expectations of states, and many expectations under IHRL fall under the category of being “customary”.  International humanitarian law (IHL) is a set of humanitarian protections put in place to help protect civilians in times of armed conflict. The ultimate goal of IHL is to limit the effects of armed conflict and protect individual human rights during war time. IHL is binding to all parties in an armed conflict and holds them to a standard of equality of rights and obligations to states involved in the conflict. IHL is integrated with jus in bello (law governing the conduct of war) and jus ad bellum (law allowing the use of armed force). These latin terms have been around since Medieval times when thinkers such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas began propagating theories surrounding “just war”. Some of these requirements for “just war” created the foundation for the modern laws governing when war and use of force is permitted. 

    According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN, it was historically held that the difference between international human rights law and international humanitarian law was that the former applied only in times of peace and the latter in situations of armed conflict. Contemporary international law now recognizes that this distinction is less clear than originally believed to be. It is widely recognized by the international community that since human rights obligations derive from the recognition of the inherent rights of all human beings under IHRL that these rights should come into play during both times of peace and war because of the fact that nothing in human rights treaties indicates that they should not be applicable in times of armed conflict. These two bodies of law are thus complementary in nature and at their core establish the same goal of securing the dignity and safety of all individuals.

    International Humanitarian Law

    IHL is also known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LAOC) and operates under two primary principles, which are defining legitimate means and legitimate targets during wartime. IHL, through international agreements such as The Geneva Conventions and the Hague Commissions, lays out ground rules that define what practices of war are acceptable to use during wartime. “Legitimate means” refers to the fact that certain types of weapons or military tactics are prohibited if they violate the principle of  unnecessary suffering and all acts of perfidy, defined as deceitful tactics or acts of deception,  are generally prohibited. When it comes to defining what a legitimate target is, protecting civilians and non-combatants is the priority. Any non-military objective should be protected, such as schools, hospitals, and places of worship. Customary law within the international community also implies that certain universal standards of armed conflict should be respected and not militarily targeted such as Prisoners of War (POWs), wounded soldiers, the white flag indicating surrender and anything marked with a red cross or a red crescent symbol indicating humanitarian aid. 

    It is widely accepted that war will inevitably take place and although the use of force is prohibited under the Charter of the United Nations, Article 51 allows for use of force in specific cases of self-defense when the threat is imminent, and Chapter VII spells out instances when use of force can be authorized via approval by the UN Security Council. These two exceptions are both cases in which IHL would come into full force and govern the conduct of the states engaging in armed conflict. 

    The laws of armed conflict have human rights standards at their core; the problems arise when enforceability is brought up. Because IHRL and IHL reside at the international level and there is no true international governing body, these laws of war rely on the fact that it is in each nation’s best interest to abide by these standards.

  • Treatment of POWs and Civilian Captures: Background on the Geneva Conventions

    Treatment of POWs and Civilian Captures: Background on the Geneva Conventions

    The Geneva Conventions are a series of international treaties whose development began in 1864 and culminated in 1949. The goal of the first convention was to protect and preserve the health and dignity of captured persons during armed conflict. After the events of WWII, the 1949 convention took on new humanitarian importance and managed to gain ratification by every UN member state. The standards set forth by the Geneva Conventions remain the preeminent guidelines for international human rights during war. Additional protocols were added to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 which have not been ratified by the United States.

    Key Provisions

    The first exemplary component comes from article three, section one of the 1949 treaty. Regarding people who took no action in the hostilities, including soldiers who laid down their arms, were injured, or were detained, this clause prohibits acts such as:

    a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.

    As these restrictions show, the conventions prioritize the twin pillars of physical health and moral dignity. Another excerpt from article twenty-seven of the 1949 treaty asserts a similar goal in stating:

    Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

    Though well intentioned, these protections only apply during periods of armed conflict. This is just one of the many limitations that affect the ability of the Geneva Conventions to adequately protect the safety and dignity of people affected by violent conflict. 

    Weak Enforcement of Policies

    The main body of enforcement for the Geneva Conventions is the International Criminal Court (ICC) which was established in 2002. For more specific information on the ICC, check out the ACE brief here. The ICC’s creation was an important step towards enforcement, however its effectiveness in holding violators to account has been constrained by its ties to the United Nations. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) have used their veto power to constrain the ICC’s ability to investigate potential war crimes, even if the nations are not party to the ICC themselves. The UNSC influence has played a major permissive role in recent violations of the Geneva Conventions, as the following examples will highlight. 

    Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, British soldiers were accused of war crimes violations related to their treatment of Iraqi detainees. A report from ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda confirmed that “there is a reasonable basis to believe that members of the British armed forces committed the war crimes of wilful killing, torture, inhuman/cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape and/or other forms of sexual violence.” Nonetheless, Bensouda concedes that British authorities lacked the necessary forensic evidence needed to secure convictions for the offenses. The UK did not directly prevent the ICC from investigating the conduct of its armed forces. However, the geopolitical influence wielded by the UK exempted it from the level of international scrutiny often faced by other states. 

    UNSC veto power has allowed Geneva violations stemming from the Syrian civil war to go unpunished. The Russian-backed Assad regime has been accused of intentionally targeting civilians throughout the conflict. While this should have provided the basis to refer Syria to an ICC investigation, Russia and China have both used their veto power to prevent this from happening. The Syrian government benefits immensely from its alliance with Russia because the regime has been able to commit war crimes and atrocities with limited accountability. Therefore, the ICC’s affiliation with the UN restricts its ability to enforce the Geneva Conventions because the P5 nations seek to protect their respective alliance commitments.

    Since the state’s creation in 1948, Israel has beena accused of trying to solidify its physical and cultural security by displacing the Palestinian Arab population in order to permit the settlement of Jewish immigrants from around the world. This could represent a violation of article forty-nine of the fourth Geneva treaty, which states that an occupying power may not transfer its own civilian population into the occupied territory. The same article also prevents the forceful transfer or deportation of protected persons from the occupied territories, an offense of which Israel has also been accused of. It is important to note that these arguments are highly disputed. Earlier this year, the ICC stated its ambition to investigate war crimes committed in Israeli and Palestinian territories since 2014. Israel’s Prime Minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu, issued a statement that the nation would not cooperate with an ICC investigation because he viewed it as rooted in antisemitism. The investigation is planned to move forward with or without Israeli support. It is unclear whether Israel’s Western allies, namely the United States, would leverage their influence to prevent the imposition of major punishments. 

    ConclusionAs these examples have shown, the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions by the ICC has been limited substantially by UN associations and other geopolitical relationships among states. The result has been that not every instance of violation is treated the same. Investigations can proceed freely, as long as they do not interfere with the interests and alliances of influential nations, such as Russia, the United Kingdom, or the United States. It is this conflict between humanitarian justice and national interests that continues to stunt the effectiveness of the Conventions in dealing with modern conflict. The United States’ refusal to ratify the additional protocols and the ICC represents an effort to distance national interests from court proceedings. In other words, leaders tend to favor flexibility (and the ability to avoid accountability) over binding commitments in the name of abstract values. As a non-party, the US is able to avoid direct scrutiny of its wartime conduct by bodies like the ICC. In recent years, the US government has gone so far as to take up a confrontational posture towards the court. The Trump administration attempted to further limit the court’s ability to investigate US activity, and even imposed sanctions on ICC officials (these have since been ended by the Biden administration and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken). While the current administration has seemed more favorable towards the ICC, full endorsement and ratification remain unlikely. While the Geneva Conventions remain an important component of international law and global human rights, competing domestic and international commitments have undermined enforcement on numerous occasions.

  • A Brief Guide to the Domestic Politics of the Russian Federation

    A Brief Guide to the Domestic Politics of the Russian Federation

    The Russian political system is often described as being a “top-down” structure, meaning that power is centralized in the presidency. Occasionally, the Putin regime is described as a dictatorship, evoking associations with Stalin-era Soviet repression and a “cult of personality.” However, to simplify Russian politics down to these terms undercuts the complexities of Russian society, its institutions, and its active voting populace. Despite Putin’s authoritarian-leaning actions related to protest and LGBTQ+ people, he has enjoyed an approval rating consistently over 60%, with an average rating of 74% over the last twenty years. This is not to say Russia is a democracy or to deny the government’s repression of political dissent. However, to better understand US policy towards the Russian Federation, it is important to take into account the nuances of Russian domestic society. 

    Government institutions

    Adopted in December of 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federation established a semi-presidentialist political system. Executive power is shared between the president and a prime minister (premier) who is appointed “by the president with the consent of the State Duma,” the 450-member lower chamber of the Federal Assembly. If the Duma rejects the appointment three times, the president has the power to dissolve the Duma, call for new elections, and appoint the PM anyway. The upper chamber of the Federal Assembly is the Federation Council. Instead of being an elected position, its members are appointed by chief governmental officials in the region they represent, along with several appointed by the president.

    Source: AP Comparative Government Russia 

    1. United Russia Dominance: Russia’s political makeup

    For nearly 20 years, the dominant force in Russian legislative politics has been the big-tent party United Russia. The results of the most recent State Duma election reinforces their primacy. Further, while the Federation Council is officially restricted from joining together by political factions, an overwhelming portion of its members are affiliated with UR. Casting itself as a party of unity and pragmatism, UR has consistently supported the current administration. Thus, with a large swath of control over legislative politics, the Federal Assembly has worked to meet the positions of President Putin.

    President Putin and Russian National Identity

    Voter fraud in Russian elections has been alleged by a variety of sources, including nongovernmental organizations, domestic rivals, and international media. Still, popular support for President Putin and UR should not be understated. In order to retain domestic approval, the current regime remains focused on the restoration of Russian national identity. This restoration revolves around a return to great power status, ensuring the primacy of the Russian language within the nation’s borders, and emphasizing an ethnically diverse Russia.

    The 90s were a tumultuous period for Russia; the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ineffective and embarrassing leadership of Boris Yeltsin, and a financial downturn made citizens of the once great power feel humiliated and ignored in the international system. Recent polls have shown that about half of the Russian population feel ignored by the West, and a majority of Russians have perceived that “developed countries” treat Russia as either a rival or an enemy. Putin and United Russia have been sure to portray his time in power as stable, a sharp contrast to the Yeltsin era. Additionally, they emphasize a desire to restore Russia’s prominence in world affairs. Putin has also repeatedly lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union as a disaster. Appealing to the large percentage of Russians who desire a powerful, stable position on the world stage, as well as older citizens who may feel nostalgic for the Soviet era, bolsters the popularity of Putin and contributes to UR’s big tent. 

    Some political scientists consider language to be fundamental in forming a national identity. Putin has emphasized that “the unity of the country and the peoples of Russia directly depends on the knowledge of the Russian language by young people.” In 2015, the Ministry of Education began tracking the hours of instruction on the Russian language in all schools, ensuring that other regional or minority languages were not taught at the expense of the “state language.” Some have interpreted this as an encroachment on non-Russian ethnic groups, while others have seen this as a unifying idea intended to protect the Russian nation. 
    For President Putin, a fundamental component of Russia’s national identity is multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. On multiple occasions, he has condemned the ultra nationalist slogan “Rossiya dlya russkiy” (lit. “Russia for Russians”). Russkiy has an ethnic connotation, as in ethnic Russianness; Putin has often opted to use the adjective “rossiyskiy” when referring to Russians. This has the connotation of a citizen within the Russian Federation, regardless of ethnicity. This has also allowed Putin to cast a wider net of support for his presidency.