Economic sanctions refer to a policy of withdrawing customary trade and financial relations in response to a diplomatic or foreign policy challenge. Governments may choose to enact comprehensive sanctions on an entire country, or direct sanctions on institutions, groups, and individuals in order to impact a government’s actions or decisions. In the case of its foreign policy with Russia, the United States has used targeted economic sanctions to deter and alter Moscow’s aggressive military actions in Ukraine.
Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 sparked initial sanction measures imposed on Russian individuals, entities, and financial institutions by the U.S. and E.U. The recent recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk breakaway regions as independent and the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine have also been met with a harsh international response, most notably in the form of economic sanctions. These policies are intended to deter Russia from further military escalation against Ukraine and to publicly indict violations of international law. However, the new sanctions introduced in 2022 have the potential to be far more economically damaging and isolating for Russia than any previous measure.
In December of 2021, as Russian forces continued to amass on the Ukrainian border, the United States warned of new measures if Russia invaded Ukraine. Prior to and in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. and its European allies implemented sweeping economic sanctions on multiple sectors of the Russian economy as well as Russian individuals. In response to Russia’s claims of de facto control over Ukraine, an initial round was announced from February 21-23 to deter further action. After Moscow launched an armed invasion on February 24, another round of sanctions was introduced. The most recent, and arguably the most damaging, sanctions were introduced from February 26-28 as active fighting continued.
Although sanctions are extensively used in American foreign policy, their actual impact on Russia has been widely debated. Sanctions generally fall into two categories: those that seek to encourage a change in Russian state behavior and those that seek to impose costs without necessarily having a specific policy goal. The success of these sanctions is measured by their ability to influence another state to change its behavior in accordance with U.S. foreign policy goals. As Russia gathered troops at its Ukrainian border in the lead-up to the invasion, sanctions were introduced as economic deterrents to further aggressive military action. A best-case scenario may have been to avoid war altogether. As armed conflict is underway, however, it seems that this objective was either impractical or not well addressed by threats of sanctions. Sanctions now are focused on economic isolation to encourage disengagement or ceasefire in the region.
The 2022 sanctions have been more expansive than previous rounds and focus on five areas: financial institutions, export controls, personal sanctions against individuals, investment prohibitions, and energy and gas. Three of these expanded measures—preventing Russia’s central banks from using foreign currency reserves, termination of certification for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and blocking Russian banks from the SWIFT system—are significant escalations from past rounds and may be the most impactful in changing Russia’s behavior.
Financial Institutions
Financial institutions and banks were targeted the most heavily during this round of sanctions, measures which the U.S. Treasury called “unprecedented.” The most critical of Russia’s financial institutions were targeted, including its largest, Sberbank. Sberbank holds about a third of all Russian bank assets, is Russia’s biggest lender, and is majority-owned by the Government of the Russian Federation (GoR). These sanctions require all U.S. institutions to close Sberbank accounts and reject future transactions with Sberbank or its subsidiaries. Under these new measures, Sberbank is also barred from purchasing and making transactions with U.S. dollars. The European branch of Sberbank now faces failure in Europe in the fallout from the U.S. and E.U. sanctions.
Additional financial institutions—such as VTB Bank, Otkritie, Novikom, and Sovcom—were identified in new sanction measures. These institutions have been identified as systemically important to the Russian financial system; these sanctions aim to undermine the Russian financial sector and export economy from participating in the global market and using the U.S. dollar. Significantly, the full blocking sanctions on VTB Bank, which holds 20% of Russian banking assets, freeze assets from being accessed by the GoR and mark a measure on one of the largest institutions the U.S. Treasury has ever targeted. About 80% of the $46 billion daily transactions conducted by Russian financial institutions are conducted in U.S. dollars. By barring Sberbank and VTB from processing payments through the United States’ financial system, the foreign exchange transactions normally conducted by these institutions will be greatly disrupted.
Additionally, Russian politicians and oligarchs connected to Moscow were sanctioned personally, including President Vladimir Putin, foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, 351 members of the Russian parliament, financial actors such as the head of Promsvyazbank, and senior executives at state-affiliated banks. Personal sanctions include freezing foreign-held assets and travel bans. While personal sanctions are not the most effective on a global scale, undermining Russian elites’ power and credibility could have lasting effects on the country’s domestic politics.
No continent is experiencing as much difficulty with COVID-19 vaccination roll-out as Africa. As of September 14, 2021, there were 8.06 million COVID-19 cases recorded in Africa. In the week of September 12, there were 125,000 new cases. Though this was a 27% drop from previous weeks, weekly new cases are still as high as they were during the peak of the first wave. Currently, 19 African countries continue to report high or fast-rising numbers while the highly transmissible Delta variant has been found in 31 countries.
The continent as a whole is currently standing at a low COVID-19 vaccination rate, with only 3.6% of its population fully vaccinated. COVID-19 vaccines are provided to Africa via the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) scheme. This scheme is a joint venture between the World Health Organization (WHO); Center for Epidemic Preparedness and Innovation (CEPI); Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; and UNICEF. COVAX has a bulk purchasing program that is meant to allow smaller nations to get vaccines at the same price as larger countries. 92 of the world’s poorest nations depend on COVAX to secure vaccines.
Worldwide Vaccine Shortage
COVAX’s main promise was that by the end of 2021, 20 percent of the world’s population would be vaccinated—620 million doses. Wealthy nations fund COVAX in return for secured vaccine shipments in the future. Many had signed deals with manufacturers as early as July 2020, while COVID-19 vaccines were still in development and undergoing trials. Buying up large quantities of the vaccine far in advance has dried up the supply, leaving nothing for poorer nations. Due to this lack of supply, COVAX has only been able to distribute 65 million vaccines to over 100 countries. The primary supplier of vaccines to COVAX, the Serum Institute of India, has exported more vaccines than it has given to the entire Indian population, and due to this discrepancy, they have halted delivering vaccine shipments to other countries.
Larger countries with poorer populations are falling behind in vaccine distribution compared to more wealthy nations with smaller populations. It’s estimated that poorer countries will not get broad access to vaccines until 2023 or 2024.
Africa has received just 276 million doses and administered 198 million. Currently, less than 10 percent of African nations are expected to meet the end-year goal of fully vaccinating 40 percent of their population.
WHO Regional Director for Africa, Matshidiso Moeti, warned about the consequences of not getting vaccines to places like Africa, saying “the staggering inequity and severe lag in shipments of vaccines threatens to turn areas in Africa with low vaccination rates into breeding grounds for vaccine-resistant variants. This could end up sending the whole world back to square one.” However, world leaders at the Global COVID-19 Summit in September announced that they would pledge hundreds of millions of doses to low- and lower-middle-income countries through COVAX in the next year.
Unusable Vaccines in Africa
Even when some vaccines are able to make their way to Africa, problems arise. Many African countries have had to either destroy or return thousands of vaccine doses because they had exceeded the expiration date. For example, Malawi destroyed 20,000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine and South Sudan announced that it would destroy 59,000 doses. These countries had both received vaccines from the African Union, which receives vaccines from other nations as well as manufacturers. Many of the vaccines donated through COVAX had already gone bad. The Democratic Republic of Congo said that it could not use most of the 1.7 million vaccines it received under the COVAX scheme for poorer countries. Also through COVAX, South Sudan received 132,000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine in March with an expiration date at the end of June. South Sudan did not have the ability to undergo a mass vaccination rollout in such a short period of time, so it handed back 72,000 of those doses.
In South Africa, one million doses were received from India in February, with an expiration date of April. The government, however, was concerned that those vaccines would not protect against the South African COVID variant, and so, in late March, the doses were passed on to other African countries such as South Sudan, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, and The Gambia. Although Togo and The Gambia were able to use all of their vaccines prior to the expiration date, larger nations were unable to use all theirs.
Vaccine Mobilization and Skepticism
Other than receiving almost-expired vaccines, many African countries were unprepared to undergo such a vast vaccine mobilization program. These nations know how to vaccinate, but many do not have sufficient financial resources and are plagued by an ineffective government, poor transportation networks, and poor health services. There has been trouble with training health care workers and convincing them to take the vaccine. Concerns over the safety and efficacy of vaccines, fueled by myths and false information, have long plagued many nations in Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan ones. These myths have created distrust among communities and generated a dangerous environment for increased COVID transmission rates.
The Africa CDC conducted a study on COVID-19 vaccine perceptions in 15 countries that indicated a significant proportion of those living on the African continent express concerns over vaccine safety. Respondents tended to view new COVID-19 vaccines as less safe than vaccinations in general. For example, while 94 percent of Ethiopian respondents said they would be willing to take the COVID-19 vaccine, other nations rated lower. The Democratic Republic of the Congo had only a 59 percent willingness to get vaccinated. More than half of respondents surveyed felt that the threat from coronavirus is exaggerated and that it does not pose the risk that others claim. Moreover, 41 percent of respondents mentioned online sources as their most trusted source for information about COVID-19, and respondents who demonstrated vaccine hesitancy were more inclined to consult online sources than those who were willing to take the vaccine. The problem seems to be a lack of education about the effects and transmissibility of the virus.
Impacts on International Development
There could be a greater force affecting people’s perceptions about the virus. In the same study by the Africa CDC, a survey was conducted to find out the exposure to general misinformation regarding COVID in Africa. Unsurprisingly, the most popular story heard on this continent, and other continents too, was that COVID-19 was created by China. The second most popular was that the virus was created by the United States, and the third was that people in Africa are being used as lab rats in vaccine trials.
These rumors reveal something deeper about how people in Africa perceive the West. Throughout history, Africa has been exploited by Western nations through the global slave trade and the Scramble for Africa, which saw European powers divide the continent for their own commercial and political interests. These two major historical events had direct consequences on the development of Africa, and the continent has not forgotten the injustices it had to endure. Anti-Western sentiment stems from centuries of colonization, occupation, and intervention. The reluctance to trust Western countries in providing vaccines for a novel virus is unsurprising given these facts.
From Burkina Faso’s Code of Persons and Family, stipulating equal inheritance for brothers and sisters, to Mali’s state-manded electoral gender quotas, requiring at least 30% of candidates on electoral lists to be women, eye-catching progressive policy is perceived as a beacon of change in regions like West Africa. However, statutory legislation often conflicts with lived experience for women in these areas where women’s rights have been stifled since colonization. Burkina Faso’s Family Code does not apply to women married under customary law and Mali’s electoral quotas coexist with customary laws that limit women’s autonomy, rendering them virtually ineffective in boosting female representation. While it is important to recognize progressive policy successes in West Africa, it is equally critical to avoid muting the voices of those still suffering despite legislation.
Definitions
For the purposes of this article, statutory law is defined as legislation passed by legislative bodies in West Africa, as well as international or continental treaties, conventions, and charters signed or ratified by West African nations. Conversely, customary law consists of traditional or religious rules and practices accepted as law by a specific culture. This article adopts the conceptualization of West Africa as defined by the African Union and African Development Bank; the 15 countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Women’s rights is a complex and multifaceted term, but this article focuses on the four core dimensions of women’s rights as outlined in the OPEC Social institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), a global measure of sociopolitical discrimination against women. These dimensions include family practices, physical integrity rights, access to financial resources, and civil liberties.
Statutory Law
Many statutory policies have been created and ratified by West African nations in the past three decades, spanning all four dimensions of the SIGI. Several examples for each dimension are outlined below.
Civil Liberties: The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women stipulates women’s right to vote and hold political office. The PACHPR also requires equal representation of women with men at all levels of electoral processes. National policy on this issue includes Togo’s Law on Electoral Campaign Funding, which necessitates fund allotment to each political party in proportion to the number of women from that party who have been previously elected.
Customary Law and Lived Realities
Statutory policies often conflict with customary law and social practices in West Africa. This leaves room for significant abuses of the four SIGI dimensions of women’s rights.
Given the clash between statutory laws and customary practices, efforts to promote women’s rights must be endogenous to local communities to be relevant and sustainable. West African women are not passive victims to policy; they are agents of change and critical actors in bridging the gap between their statutory and customary rights. Today, several West African grassroots organizations work to spread awareness about women’s rights in communities where customary law may tolerate abuse. One such organization is Ligue LIFE, a Beninese group whose awareness campaigns about child trafficking and domestic violence are being adapted and disseminated by the UN Democracy Fund. Another successful organization is Project Alert on Violence Against Women, created in 1999 by female activists in Nigeria. Project Alert administers school and church-based advocacy programs that partner with local schools and places of worship to train parents, teachers, and religious leaders how to recognize and respond to GBV. By taking a bottom-up approach to social norms change, these grassroots initiatives and others like them help to bridge the gap between women’s rights under customs and women’s rights under statutory law in West Africa.
Conclusion
While this article has illuminated the wide gap between West African women’s customary and statutory rights, it is important to note that not all statutory policies in West Africa are ineffective. Some laws have effected remarkable change, such as Senegal’s 2011 Gender Parity Law that increased female representation in the national government from 22.7% to 42.7% over one election cycle. Unfortunately, not all West African statutory policies have created such concrete change in the lives of women. Thus, it is critically important to consider how women’s rights as outlined by law and as experienced by women differ in everyday life. Moving forward, it seems that grassroots social norms change is a crucial tool in bridging this difference, especially when spearheaded by West African women who have the most to lose if the gap between customary and statutory rights remains.
The territory that the country of Georgia now occupies has seen human development since the Paleolithic period. Over the last few thousand years, the territory has been under the domain of Georgian, or Kartvelian, kingdoms and other regional empires. However, Georgia’s contemporary history began following the country’s absorption into the Russian Empire during the 19th century.
Following the Russian Revolution, Georgia became independent from the USSR and came to be known as the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) in 1918. However, in 1921, the DRG was forcibly integrated into the Soviet Union and would not regain its independence again until 1991. Georgia had an influential role in Soviet history. For example, the USSR was governed by Georgian-born Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili, better known as Joseph Stalin, from 1924 until his death in 1953.
The decade following Georgia’s independence, in 1991, was marked by significant political turmoil. Between 1995 and 2003, the country was led by President Eduard Shevardnadze. His eight-year rule as President was characterized by severe economic mismanagement and rampant institutional corruption. In response to Shevardnedze’s political failures, Georgians engaged in countrywide demonstrations demanding political transparency; these demonstrations were later termed the Rose Revolution. In the end, Shevardnadze vacated the presidency, and Mikheil Saakashvili was sworn in as President.
Saakashvili’s ascension to the presidency signaled that Georgia had chosen to resist Russian influence and fight corruption; however, Georgia’s position as a democratic state has become threatened in the last few months. After leaving office, Saakashvili moved to New York before ultimately moving to Ukraine, where he served as the Governor of Odessa, as well as other positions within the Ukrainian government. However, in 2018, he was tried and convicted in absentia for abuse of power. Saakashvili returned to Georgia in October 2021 and was subsequently arrested. After his arrest, Saakashvili went on a fifty-day hunger strike, which ended following his admittance to an intensive care ward after he fainted. Saakashvili asserts that his arrest and trial are purely political rather than based on any substantive issue. Regardless, the arrest of a former president does not bode well for democracy in Georgia.
Mikheil Saakashvili and George W. Bush—Image Courtesy of NATO
Background on Georgian Politics
Georgia’s capital is located in the central city of Tbilisi. Georgia’s government is a semi-presidential republic. Currently, the head of state is President Salome Zurabishvili, and the head of government is Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. Unlike the United States, which has two chambers in its legislature, Georgia has a unicameral legislature: the Parliament of Georgia. In total, one hundred and fifty members are elected to represent the nearly five million people living in Georgia. One hundred and twenty members are elected through proportional representation, while the remaining thirty are elected through a single-member district plurality system; that is, a representative is elected to a parliamentary seat after reaching a majority vote. Presently, the political party Georgian Dream—Democratic Georgia forms the government with eighty-four seats. The United National Movement party, initially founded by Mikheil Saakashvili, sits on the opposition side with thirty seats.
Labor-intensive occupations drive the Georgian economy, with the two most important sectors being agricultural production and manufacturing. Due to its smaller population, Georgia’s workforce includes roughly 686,000 citizens. Despite relying on agriculture and manufacturing, the Georgian economy is transitioning towards a service and tourism-based economy. Between 2016 and 2017, the country’s GDP grew 5%, indicating positive economic development. However, Georgia still deals with significant unemployment, 11.8% by 2016 figures, and poverty, as nearly 20% of all Georgians lived below the poverty line in 2019.
International Issues
Georgia mainly exports raw materials and manufacturing products. The country’s primary exports are copper, iron alloys, cars, packaged medicine, and wine. Despite them having a tense interstate relationship, Russia is the most common destination of Georgian exports. In 2019, 12% of Georgian exports went to Russia, followed by 12% to Azerbaijan and 9% to Armenia.
Although Georgia derives 65% of its electricity from hydroelectric sources, according to 2017 statistics, it still relies heavily on natural gas imports. Turkey is Georgia’s primary import partner, accounting for 17% of Georgian imports, followed by 11% for China’s, and 9% for Russia’s. The United States is a minor trade partner and only accounts for 5% of Georgian imports.
Georgia’s geographic position on the border of Europe and Asia yields some economic advantages. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline allow Georgia to play a significant role in the movement of oil and natural gasses from Central Asia to the Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad positions Georgia in the middle of the transcontinental movement of goods.
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline—Image courtesy of Silk Road Studies
Territorial Issues
Although Georgia has made significant economic and political gains following their emancipation from the Soviet Union, this sovereignty is not without problems. Two regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are breakaway regions, and multiple wars of independence have been fought over them.
Abkhazia is an autonomous region in northwestern Georgia. Apart from Russia, the breakaway region is only recognized by five UN-recognized states. Between 1992 and 1993, Georgian forces fought against Abkhaz separatists in a thirteen-month war. A ceasefire subsequently ended the conflict, but the political ramifications remain. Abkhazia eventually declared its independence in 1999.
South Ossetia is a breakaway state in North-Central Georgia, which makes up the southern half of the traditional homeland of the Ossetian people. The Russian republic of North Ossetia-Alania borders it to the north. Like Abkhazia, South Ossetia receives minimal recognition from the international community, outside of a few states. Russia recognizes South Ossetia and maintains a military presence in the region. In 2008, President George W. Bush campaigned for Georgia’s membership to the Membership Action Plan, designed to set Georgia on the track for NATO membership. In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin argued that any attempt to enlarge NATO was a national security threat and began preparing for an invasion. The Russo-Georgian war then took place once Russia invaded Georgia, where Georgian and Russian soldiers, as well as Russian-backed Ossetian separatists, fought against each other. This led to Russia occupying South Ossetia in an attempt to prevent Georgian ascension into NATO.
Cultural Dynamics
Many political dynamics serve as catalysts for conflict between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia; the different groups that live in the region being one of them. During the Soviet era, Abkhazia was populated by a mix of Abkhazians, Georgians, Russians, and Armenians; however, now the region is predominantly Abkhazian. Georgians are an isolated ethnolinguistic group, whereas Ossetians are an Eastern Iranian ethnolinguistic group, and Abkhazians are a Northwest Caucasian ethnolinguistic group. These groups, despite living together as part of the Soviet Union and being native to the Caucasus, are not related, and their ethnolinguistic differences became salient once the Union collapsed.
Georgian-American Relations
The United States and Georgia officially established diplomatic relations in 1992. Given the economic and political disparities between the two countries, Georgia certainly relies more on the United States. The United States has committed significant amounts of aid to Georgia, in order to advance democratic and economic growth within the country. However, the United States does rely on Georgia’s geographic position to advance its “competition” with Russia.
Multiple attempts to integrate Georgia into NATO have occurred, but none have been successful, especially after Russia’s 2008 invasion, whose likely goal was to prevent Georgian ascension into NATO. Georgia, although it lacks official membership, is a member state in the Partnership for Peace, which aims to build trust between NATO members and regional non-members.
Georgian and American soldiers in a joint training exercise, 2008—Image courtesy of NBC News
“Information has become a destructive weapon just like a bayonet, bullet or projectile.” – Vladimir Slipchenko, Russian military academic
Introduction
The accessibility of online information has allowed Russian state and nonstate actors to parasitically inject misleading and false information with the intention of manipulating a target audience. Disinformation is false information that is deliberately created and intentionally spread with the intention of causing harm. Russia weaponizes disinformation to achieve a key strategic objective: the subversion of the West. In the case of Russian Information Operations (IO), target audiences include the American population and the populations of other Russian adversaries.
When a democratic society no longer agrees upon a common set of facts, citizens begin to question firmly held truths and lose faith in their public institutions. Russian information operations administer damaging narratives against politicians, political parties, and/or hot-button issues like the COVID-19 vaccine into the American media space. By doing so, Russia provokes the American electorate. Russia has material weakness relative to the United States, the Kremlin has managed to stave off its waning global influence through its superior use of information as a tool of “asymmetric statecraft.”
The dissemination of deceptive content online has proved to be more advantageous than engaging in conventional kinetic warfare: it is cost effective, can be executed without casualty, can be finely targeted and can be achieved clandestinely. Information operations operate in the gray zone “short of declared war” and allow Russia to engage in asymmetric warfare in which it can inflict damage on the United States by sowing social discord and political fragmentation. Kremlin-based disinformation campaigns are carried out by Russian state and nonstate actors. Some are employed directly by Russian security services whereas others are carried out by non government entities such as the Internet Research Agency. Additionally, disinformation campaigns target states across the globe, not just the United States. These campaigns are not designed to change public opinion or convince a population of any one particular thing. They are meant to generate enough ‘noise’ in the online space to the point where societal divisions threaten the stability of a democracy ruled by a citizenry that no longer knows what is objectively true. In the words of a senior FBI official, “To put it simply, in this space, Russia wants to watch us tear ourselves apart.”
The Goal of Russian Information Operations
The primary goal of Russian information-based warfare is to undermine the legitimacy of democratic governments by aggravating societal cleavages including racial, religious, political and ideological differences. By blurring the line between fact and fiction and intentionally fanning the flames of certain societal divisions, causes Americans to question their firmly held beliefs. This confusion and distrust across the U.S. population has threatened the stability of America’s democratic institutions.
For Russia, employing informational and propagandistic campaigns is nothing new. During the height of the Cold War, Soviet “dezinformatsiya” campaigns were at the forefront of the Soviet Union’s strategy for undermining and discrediting the United States. The Soviets funded communist newspaper outlets and radio stations that were broadcasted in the United States, along with publishing books written by authors paid by the Committee for State Security (also known as the KGB). KGB-funded publishing houses were even among the first to cast doubt on the Warren Commission’s findings that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in the assassination of President Kennedy. As technological capabilities have become more sophisticated in the digital age, so too have information warfare tactics used by Russia against the United States. Russia can no longer directly compete with Washington’s military might and world influence, but it can cost-effectively influence America’s democratic institutions by infusing distrust and confusion into the U.S. media space.
Russia can secure its strategic objectives against the West without having to invest in costly military operations or resort to physical force. The Kremlin can take advantage of the viral nature of internet platforms to exploit existing political fault lines and target specific subgroups of the American population with tailored messages that are designed to further polarize them. Steven Wilson, a political science professor at Brandeis University, eloquently describes the consequence of Russia’s information warfare:
In 2020, the U.S. Department of State characterized the Russian disinformation and propaganda ecosystem as having five key pillars: state-funded global messaging, cultivation of proxy sources, weaponization of social media, official government communications and cyber-enabled disinformation. The first three pillars listed above are the central means by which Russian sows discord in the United States. State-funded global messaging includes campaigns mounted by Russian intelligence agencies like the FSB, a security service that succeeded the KGB, that spreads falsehood with the intention of undermining confidence in American leaders, institutions and further polarizing debates around hot-button issues. Russian intelligence agencies have targeted Western vaccines like Pfizer by publishing exaggerated reports of the risks that COVID-19 vaccines pose and their long-term side-effects. This fear-mongering taps into vaccine skeptics by exploiting deep-seeded anxieties over the safety of the vaccine and promotes the success of Russia’s own vaccine, Sputnik V.
Another key element of Russian IO is the cultivation of proxy sources. Proxy sources are news outlets that are funded by the Kremlin, but attemptto maintain a veneer of separation to keep their connections to the Kremlin unclear, and thus dupe American readers into thinking that these sites publish independent work. They publish the works of fringe Western thinkers and make the outlets appear to be based in the United States or Europe. Sources like Global Research, The Strategic CultureFoundation, Geopolitica.ru, New Eastern Outlook and News Front are all publications that are heavily immersed in Russia’s disinformation ecosystem. The Strategic Culture Foundation, for example, is an online journal registered in Russia and directed by its Intelligence Service (SVR). These outlets publish conspiratorial content; recent examples include pieces blaming the U.S government for spreading COVID-19 or questioning Al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the 9/11 hijackings. According to the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), Global Research, a conspiracy site operating out of Canada, received an estimated 12.370 million page visits between February 1 and April 30 of 2020. The Strategic Culture Foundation received nearly 1 million in the same period. Russia’s disinformation ecosystem is diverse and the lack of a central avenue of disinformation for their deceptive dissemination lets the information appear more credible and widespread.
Russia’s weaponization of social media is also pervasive and cost-effective. It is important to note the connection between the business model underlying social media platforms and Russia’s disinformation campaigns, as the two go hand-in-hand. The underlying economic logic of platforms like YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter is the monetization of user engagement.These large technology firms rely on data collection in order to create detailed behavioral profiles on individuals and their preferences, interests, likes, dislikes and beliefs. Sophisticated algorithms use this information to provide users with dynamically optimized stimuli and curated content. User data is sold to advertisers to create targeted advertising regimes that are tailored to each individual. By keeping users engaged, this business model has proved highly profitable.
However, nefarious actors like Russia can use this regime of targeted advertising, user data collection, and sophisticated algorithms to identify pockets of the voting population that are susceptible to false information. Russian disinformation works on both sides of the aisle, inflaming both conservatives and liberal Americans. By using behavioral profiles of online users, Russian internet-agitators can find specific subgroups that share similar beliefs and target these groups with evocative social media posts or send them invitations to join Facebook groups centered on divisive topics like police brutality or immigration. For example, low-income populations were targeted with immigration and race-related advertisements, whereas middle-income populations were shown advertisements to join groups centered around nationalism. This demographic targeting stokes hyperpartisanship and furthers Russia’s strategic objective to weaken.
U.S. Department of State
Russian IO utilizes a variety of channels to manipulate American audiences via social media. The St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), for example, is financed by allies of Putin and engaged in online influence operations by spreading conspiracy theories and incendiary messages to stoke discord on issues like race or religion in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election. The Kremlin-backed group, often called a “troll farm” – a professionalized group that coordinates the posting of provocative content using fake identities– employed an army of trolls to inject extreme content into the American media space and create an illusion of support for radical ideas. Russian troll groups like the IRA bought and ran ads on Facebook and Instagram during the 2016 election, which according to MIT’s Tech Review, “was reaching 140 million US users per month – 75% of whom had never followed any of the pages. They were seeing the content because Facebook’s content-recommendation system had pushed it into their news feeds.” Social media algorithms tend to boost evocative and sensational information, and Kremlin-backed troll farms exploit this to proliferate disinformation in the American information space. Troll farms and online bots pump out social media posts that are slogan-dependent, include heavy visuals and often utilize memes and humor.
Known Russian Information Operation Example
Up until 2017, apopular Facebook account called ‘Blacktivist’ used racial issues – particularly police brutality – to stoke outrage online. The account collected over 350,000 followers – surpassing the number of followers on the verified Black Lives Matter account at the time. Posts included videos of violent police arrests and messages such as “Black people should wake up as soon as possible.” In late 2017, it was discovered that Blacktivist was actually operated by Russia and designed to stoke racial tensions in the United States.
House Intelligence Committee, Facebook
House Intelligence Committee, Facebook
Preventative Measures and the Road Ahead
Countering Russian information warfare is like a game of whack-a-mole: nobody knows when or where Russian disinformation will pop up, as it elusively resurfaces again and again. Online agitators can change their IP addresses and create new webs of bot accounts. Whereas Russian-sponsored posts were previously riddled with grammar and syntax errors that were specific to native Russian speakers – often omitting or misusing “a” or “the” because these indefinite articles are not used in the Russian language – Russian-sponsored posts have become more sophisticated in order to avoid detection. Russian troll farms will now copy and paste chunks of text directly from other sources, use fewer hashtags and remove watermarks on images that had been previously taken down. Future disinformation campaigns may employ deep fakes – fake video and audio that appears convincingly real – that make it far easier to mislead audiences and create new suspicions about everything we watch. The possibilities for asymmetric information warfare are clear, but there are measures that can be taken to mitigate the impact of disinformation.
Preventative Measures/Solutions
Artificial Intelligence (AI): Emerging AI capabilities and machine learning may be able to discern and flag fake news on a large scale across multiple platforms.
Education: The American education system needs to emphasize digital literacy. Citizens need to be able to discern the truth by navigating and evaluating an increasingly muddled online information space. Researchers at Stanford University recently published a study revealing that more than 80 percent of students had a hard time discerning the credibility of the news they read. A citizen capable of differentiating an ad from an article or real news from fake news will be less susceptible to disinformation.
Regulate Social Media Companies: The United States comes far behind the EU when it comes to its regulatory apparatus for social media companies. The General Data Protection Regulation is a regulation in EU law that is designed to protect data privacy and apply pressure on big tech companies like Google and Facebook with fines for privacy violations. In terms of developing a minimally invasive method for monitoring social media content, the Czech Republic has come up with a sustainable model. There, a small unit of 15 social media analysts actively monitor platforms like Facebook, Twitter and other proxy sources that circulate disinformation. The analysts simply flag the content as inauthentic – they don’t censor or remove it. This type of content moderation respects America’s veneration for freedom of the press and would not equate to content censorship.
Sources:
Alba, Davey. “How Russia’s Troll Farm Is Changing Tactics before the Fall Election.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 Mar. 2020.
Allen, T.S., and A.J. Moore. “Victory without Casualties: Russia’s Information Operations.” Parameters, vol. 48, no. 1, spring 2018, pp. 59+. Gale Academic OneFile.
Alvarez, German, et. al. “Good News, Bad News: A Sentiment Analysis of the 2016 Election Russian Facebook Ads.” International Journal of communications [online], May 2020, pp. 3027+. Gale Academic OneFile.
Domonoske, Camila. “Students Have ‘Dismaying’ Inability to Tell Fake News from Real, Study Finds.” NPR, NPR, 23 Nov. 2016.
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From the United States’ perspective, Russia and China represent competitors on the international stage. Experts argue that the relationship between Russia and China has strengthened in recent years due to their shared perceived threat of US power and influence. Russia and China signed the “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation” in 2001. In 2021, Russia and China signed a five-year extension of the treaty, symbolizing their close ties. The treaty initially allowed the two countries to develop a “strategic partnership” based on economic cooperation and strong military collaboration. Russian politicians have asserted that Western actors, such as those from the US and the EU, have made consistent efforts to disrupt competition stemming from Russia-China relations.
The two nations are also members of BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. This group includes the five major emerging economies in the world. It is unclear whether BRICS has viable political leverage as some contend that the nations differ too much in ideologies and economic growth to maintain robust cooperation. Although Russia is arguably not the most influential player in the alliance, some have debated that it has been able to uphold its interests despite China’s evident dominance.
In the Western view, Russia seeks to expand and maintain its influence on the former Soviet Union states through its political, military, and economic forces. This first became evident in 2008 when Russian troops invaded Georgia and sparked the Russo-Georgian War. The act of aggression left lasting consequences, including sustained Russian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia further exhibited aggression through the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent ongoing Ukrainian Conflict. In 2014, the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed and established the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The EAEU, which now includes Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, organized free trade agreements amongst member states. Although formed as an apolitical union, the EAEU has become politicized in recent years due to the rising tensions between the West and Russia, and Belarus. The border conflict between Russia-backed Belarus and NATO/EU member Poland has recreated East-West Cold War tensions. A host of migrants have fled into Belarus’ bordering countries following the reelection of Alexander Lukashenko and democratic backsliding. The relationship between Russia and Belarus is critical as they formed the Union State, an agreement between the two countries to commit to the integration of their economies, defense, and other policies.
Russia is also a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). CIS is an assembly of former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and Asia that collaborates on economic, military, and political policies. Likewise, CSTO is a military alliance between Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
The involvement in African politics began with the Soviet Union’s support of African independence and promotion of education as many African students fled to study in Soviet universities. In the contemporary world, Russia has made aims to regain and expand its influence in Africa, which is now one of its major military allies. Many argue that Africa is a political priority for Russia as it disrupts US interests that seek to champion the spread of democracy and stability in the region.
Following the Covid-19 pandemic, vaccine diplomacy—the use of vaccines to influence the diplomatic relations between nations— constitutes one tool Russia attempted to utilize in upholding its interests in Africa. However, experts argue that the rollout of the Sputnik V vaccine failed in its original purpose due to factors like delayed deliveries and high costs, which resulted in many concerns from African officials.
When the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2015, Russia provided military aid on the side of the Syrian government, showing support for the Assad regime. The Kremlin’s decision to interfere in the civil war stemmed from concerns that the fall of the Syrian government would threaten Russian interests and endanger global stability. Many argue that Russia’s military intervention in Syria and overall involvement in the Middle East demonstrate its efforts to assume a greater role on the global stage and disrupt US dominance in the region. As a result, experts fear Russia’s involvement in key countries in the Middle East can pose challenges to the American foreign policy agenda under the Biden Administration.
From 1979-1989, the Soviet Union waged a war with mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan to support the unpopular communist government. The Geneva Accords of 1988 later facilitated the end of the conflict and withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, the mujahideen became fragmented in the early 90s, which sparked a civil war that prompted the Taliban to gain control in the country. Consequently, regime changes led to decades of conflict and ongoing instability. In the summer of 2021, the Biden Administration began pulling troops to end the war in Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban to regain control at the fall of the government. As the world watched a humanitarian crisis emerge in the region, Russia and China’s expanding influence became evident; the flexible alliance leveraged potential new economic and political opportunities in the country. Recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has had success, unlike the US, in hosting talks with the Taliban.
Why is Russian Foreign Policy Relevant to Americans?
Understanding Russia’s general foreign policy strategy allows one to gain a deeper, more nuanced interpretation of the US’ own foreign policy goals. The two countries have a complicated history of both cooperation and conflict that continue to influence how they act on the international stage.
A country’s foreign policy refers to the general objectives that guide its activities and relationships with other nations. The concept often becomes a point of contention in political campaigns; candidates disagree over how to forge their nation’s image and interests on the international stage. In the Russian Federation, foreign policy is a major part of the Kremlin’s political agenda. Experts describe Putin’s foreign policy as a bulwark against the West, particularly through measured efforts to curtail US hegemony or global dominance. Through flexible alliances and involvement in the major geopolitical regions of the world, many argue Russia has taken steps to dismantle the status quo and change the international order to allow other world powers to emerge and govern.
Military intervention is just one way countries can implement their foreign policy initiatives. Countries now have other foreign policy tools at their disposal. In recent years, Russia has continually made headlines due to accusations of disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and interference in foreign elections. Moreover, Russia’s state-owned oil and gas companies provide the economic resources and influence to help shape and carry out foreign policy goals throughout Europe. This is most notably evidenced by the Russian company Gazprom’s ownership of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline, which runs from Russia to Germany. Many argue it will allow Russia to yield greater geopolitical power in Europe.
Marred by a history of volatility, the relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation is critical to international security. Both nations maintain nuclear capabilities and powerful militaries. After deteriorating peaceful diplomatic relations following the fall of the Soviet Union, the dynamic between the countries has evolved with each administration. During the Clinton years, the US and Russia maintained a friendly relationship; President Clinton supported President Yeltsin’s policies and commitment to Russian democracy. Despite President George W. Bush’s preoccupation with the War on Terror, the Bush Administration sought to embrace a cautious but cooperative relationship when President Putin came into power. By the the end of Bush’s second term, however, relations became strained. In the Obama Era, US-Russia relations grew more tense. Furthermore, accusations of collusion with the Kremlin, which led to an official investigation, tainted the image of the Trump Administration. In recent years, the complicated relationship has continued to deteriorate, with some experts claiming that it mirrors Cold War tensions. The US has accused Russia of systematic efforts to disrupt American interests both domestically and abroad. Prompted by Russia’s role in the Ukrainian crisis and increased aggression, the US has reduced its political relationship with Russia. Alongside its EU partners, the US has also imposed economic sanctions and travel restrictions on Russia and key Russian policymakers.
Russia and the European Union Image Courtesy of Financial Times
Unlike US-Russia relations, the relationship between the Russian Federation and European Union is more nuanced. In geopolitical terms, Russia and its European neighbors consider each other potential threats, forcing key flexible working relationships. France and Germany–the two countries with the most economic influence in the EU–have made clear their intentions to “reset” their relationships with Russia to foster stability in the region and achieve mutual political goals. This has been met with stark criticism due to accusations of Russia’s efforts to induce democratic backsliding throughout eastern Europe and unchecked corruption. The Kremlin has claimed that the current EU-Russia relationship lacks aspects of a truly equal partnership and continues to be influenced by past actions during the Cold War. Thus, Russia and its European neighbors maintain an uncertain future in their diplomatic relationships.
The relationship between Russia and NATO, an international organization considered an extension of the West, has always been strained. Many argue that NATO views Russian aggression as a threat to its objectives of maintaining peace and democracy. On the other hand, Russia views NATO expansion into the post-Soviet space as a direct threat to its sovereignty with aims to curtail Russia’s sphere of influence.
As with many of Russia’s other current diplomatic relationships, the Soviet Union’s role in the Cold War continues to influence relations between Russia and strategic Latin American countries. Russia maintains its post-Cold War sphere of influence in Cuba, where the two have managed both an economic and military partnership. Recently, the US has imposed sanctions for the mishandling of demonstrators during protests. In contrast, Russia, united with the communist regime, has called for non-interference from outside actors. Russia has also sent aid to protect its influence with the shifting regime. Venezuela constitutes another Russian ally as Maduro depends on Cuban military forces backed by Russian aid and weaponry. Many argue that Russia has made a strategic alliance with Venezuela to create instability with the US in the region. Russia’s intervention in Latin America has benefited from political transitions, which some claim exhibit the Kremlin’s efforts to prove Russia as a global rather than a regional power. In the 2021 presidential election in Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega won his fourth consecutive term amid controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the results. In turn, the US announced sanctions against Nicaragua. Russia has condemned the US and others who have rejected Nicaragua’s election results as a Russia-Nicaragua partnership holds weight in Russia’s foreign policy ambitions in Latin America.
The United States has shared an extensive history with Haiti since the island, then called Saint-Domingue, was under French colonial rule. In the 18th century, Saint-Domingue was France’s most profitable colony due to its high levels of sugar, indigo, and coffee production, and the United States served as the island’s second largest trading partner (after France). Enslaved Africans, whose labor fueled Saint-Domingue’s agriculture industry, eventually grew tired of the abuses they suffered from the French. Consequently, the Haitian Revolution began in 1791 under the leadership of Toussaint L’Ouverture and Jean-Jacques Dessalines, culminating in 1804 with the formation of Haiti. With the former slaves in control of the island, Haiti became the first Caribbean nation to achieve independence and the first modern state to abolish slavery. Despite freeing themselves from direct French colonial rule, inhabitants of the island were obligated to pay reparations to France if they hoped their newfound nation would be granted diplomatic recognition.
The United States government did not acknowledge the Haitian Revolution out of fear that its own enslaved workers would revolt in the South. Despite the American refusal to acknowledge Haiti as a sovereign nation, the United States continued to import Haitian agricultural products and exported its own goods to Haiti. It was not until 1862, after the South seceded, that the United States officially recognized Haiti. In the following year, diplomatic relations and the American Legation in Port-au-Prince were established.
The following decades in Haiti were characterized by significant political turmoil, a high presidential turnover rate, and violence. These dynamics were widespread throughout Latin America at this time. In response, the U.S. enacted the Roosevelt Corollary, which enabled Washington to use military force in the Western Hemisphere to restore political stability. Such circumstances, along with the fear that German influence was encroaching on the Caribbean at the beginning of World War I, led President Woodrow Wilson to send U.S. Marines to the island in 1915. Wilson approved the invasion with the hope that the U.S. could reshape Haiti’s government, assist with the formation of a national army, and strengthen Haiti-U.S. economic ties. During its occupation, the United States assumed control of Haiti’s security and finances and imposed racial segregation, forced labor, and press censorship. In addition, U.S. forces deposed Haitian presidents and legislatures that opposed their presence. Consequently, rebellions against the U.S. administration in Haiti erupted, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Haitians. After 19 years of occupation, the U.S. Marines withdrew from the island in 1934, and Haiti regained its sovereignty. The American government’s decision to withdraw troops was linked to the Good Neighbor Policy, which reversed previous interventionist policies and declared that no state has the right to intervene in another’s affairs.
After the U.S. withdrawal, Haiti experienced a series of unstable governments, culminating in 1957 with a 29 year dictatorship under Francois Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude. During the reign of the Duvaliers, corruption and human rights violations ran rampant, resulting in the disappearances and/or deaths of approximately 30,000 people. Despite this, the United States continued to support the Duvalier regime out of fear that communism would spread to Haiti. In 1986, massive protests and international pressure forced Jean-Claude Duvalier to flee the nation. With the Duvaliers gone, Haiti had the opportunity to develop its own constitution and establish democratic institutions.
The nation’s first elections took place in December 1990, and were won by a Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In February 1991, he took office; later that year, he was overthrown. Aristide remained in exile for three years, returned to Haiti in 1994, and finished out his term in 1996. The United States occupied Haiti from 1994 to 1997 and claimed its goal was to restore peace and democracy in the island nation. In 2000, Aristide won a second presidential election, and Haiti was once more fraught with instability. In 2004, the American and Haitian militaries exiled Aristide to South Africa. Soon after, the United Nations began a peacekeeping mission in Haiti aimed at restoring order, which would last 13 years.
Since then, Haiti has continued to face political turmoil and corruption. Haitians have demanded their leaders resign and have participated in mass protests, often against alleged U.S. involvement. The role of the United States in Haiti has been further called into question following the July 2021 assassination of then-President Jovenel Moïse. Before his death, Moïse’s opponents claimed that his presidency should have ended in February 2021 because he won the 2015 election, though it was later nullified. Moïse’s supporters, on the other hand, argued that Moise’s five-year term started following the 2016 election, meaning that it was not supposed to end until February 2022. Despite these allegations of political illegitimacy, President Moïse was supported by the Trump administration. It has come to light that some of the perpetrators of the Haitian president’s assassination had received U.S. military training.
In addition to its political problems, Haiti has been struck numerous times by natural disasters, notably hurricanes, often worsening the country’s economy and pushing Haitian citizens to flee their homeland. The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have all been confronted with questions of how to restore order in Haiti, encourage development, and tackle migration issues.
U.S. Strategic Interests in Haiti
Political Instability
Since colonial times, Haiti has experienced bouts of political instability on its journey to sovereignty and democracy. These goals have been prevented by foreign intervention and corruption. The recent assassination of Moïse has exacerbated the nation’s downward spiral with violence and criminal activity exploding. Critics claim that the United States’ response to the assassination was underwhelming. The Biden administration decided against providing additional military assistance to Haiti in the midst of the chaos. Despite this, President Biden appointed a new special envoy to Haiti to coordinate the United States’ response to Haiti’s present situation. Some U.S. congressmen, on the other hand, have demanded that the U.S. intensify its efforts to provide support and assistance to Haitian security forces until elections take place. However, the Haitian elections have been postponed indefinitely, and it remains to be seen when and how the Haitian political conflict will be resolved.
Development
Once a thriving colony, Haiti has become the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, largely as a consequence of the reparations the island was forced to pay to the French along with numerous foreign interventions and corruption. Currently, the majority of the Haitian population lives below the poverty line. Much of the population is reliant on subsistence farming for survival, but such customs are threatened by the frequency of natural disasters, which destroy land, intensify worsening economic conditions, and exacerbate health crises. In efforts to improve conditions on the island, the United States has frequently provided humanitarian and development assistance. The amount of foreign aid often varies with the administration. For example, the Trump administration cut the amount of aid USAID could allot to Haiti, which has since changed under President Biden. In January 2021, the Biden administration announced that it was going to send an additional $75.5 million in development aid and health assistance to Haiti. Following a devastating hurricane in August 2021, Biden approved another $32 million devoted to disaster relief.
Migration
As a result of deteriorating economic and living conditions, numerous Haitians have fled to nearby Latin American and Caribbean nations as well as the United States. Though the number of migrants fluctuates year to year and often spikes after hurricanes strike the island, immigration continues to be a crucial aspect of the U.S.-Haiti relationship. In recent years, the United States government has extended Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitian nationals. TPS is often granted to migrants from nations suffering from political turmoil or natural disasters wishing to remain in the United States until the situation in their homeland improves. Following the 2010 earthquake, for example, the Obama administration extended TPS to Haitians who were living in the United States prior to January 12, 2010. To prevent mass migration, Haitians who arrived after the designated date were sent back. The Trump administration denied an extension of TPS for Haitians, leading to the deportation of thousands. Due to Haiti’s instability and political challenges, however, the nation’s TPS designation was extended multiple times, preventing Trump from completely terminating it.
Though President Biden has revived TPS for Haitians, he has also upheld Title 42, which permits the Director of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) to prohibit the introduction of individuals to the United States if it believes there is a considerable risk for the spread of a communicable disease. Title 42 was issued in March 2020 in response to the spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19). This decision has led to thousands being turned away at the southern border, including Haitian asylum seekers, who are often being expelled to Mexico.
From mission trips to Red Cross donations to foreign aid from the World Bank, international development is often perceived as flowing unilaterally from the Global North to the Global South. Arguably more than any other region on the planet, Africa is often conceptualized as the endpoint of this international development cycle. But considering how 40 years of so-called “development” aid from international lenders have only spurred more tumult, what if Africa was recognized for its own creation, not reception, of progress? This form of indigenously-generated progress in Africa is often called to mind with the phrase grassroots development.
Definitions and Terminology
Also known as community-led development, grassroots development is a bottom-up process by which a community defines its own socio-politico-economic needs and implements strategies to achieve them at the local, regional, national, or international level. Grassroots development can involve various sectors such as agriculture, education, infrastructure, and healthcare. However, the term “grassroots development” exists against a backdrop of controversy concerning the eurocentric implications of “development” as a concept. “Development” emerged as a common theory in Western foreign policy discourse in the mid-1900s, as a product of Modernization theory and the Truman Doctrine. Today, many scholars and activists see “development” as a culturally-imperialist conjecture. They believe it absolves the West of its role in creating the “underdevelopment” it sees as an inherent feature of the global south while suggesting that the success of nations could be accurately gauged by Western measures like GDP.
Because of this, there exists a push amongst some African grassroots activists to erase the word “development” from social progress discourse because it ignores the political nature of “underdevelopment.” The term obscures colonialism’s long history of forced impoverishment, political destabilization, and cultural erasure, expecting African nations to simply “develop” from it. For many grassroots changemakers in Africa, however, the challenge is not development but emancipation.
On the other hand, some African scholars divorce the term from Western imperialist concepts of modernity yet still use the term to describe the fight for socio-political progress. Whether it is referred to as emancipation, participatory development, grassroots development, or another name, the bottom-up paradigm remains the same. For Africa in particular, this bottom-up strategy represents a shift away from Western concepts of “modernity” and dependence on foreign aid to self-reliant, pluralistic, and Pan-Africanist strategies of progress.
History of Grassroots Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa
While grassroots development has become a buzzword in global affairs, it is not a novel concept in Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, popular activism has served as the foundation for successful independence movements and anti-corruption uprisings across the continent for more than a century.
Anti-colonial uprisings from the 1880s through the 1950s provide early examples of grassroots organizing in Africa. In the Matabeleland Rebellion of 1896, a local spiritual leader galvanized the people of Southern Rhodesia (presently Zimbabwe) to rise up against the British South Africa company. Over 50 years later, trade unionists, women, and students formed grassroots movements that pushed Guinea’s Sékou Touré to reject a constricting French constitution and instead declare independence in 1958.
As OPEC oil price hikes in the early 1970s exacerbated the financial crises of several Sub-Saharan nations, an era of national debt and structural adjustment emerged and continued until the early 1990s. This period saw an immense increase in grassroots activity for two reasons. First, the erosion of state power under structural adjustment programs (SAPs) decreased previous state suppression of grassroots movements. Second, the deleterious effects of SAPs on already-marginalized communities such as the rural poor, working-class, and women galvanized those populations to protest top-down development models that increased their poverty. This era marked the first time that local grassroots movements partnered with international NGOs.
The 1990s brought a process of “NGOization” to Sub-Saharan Africa, in which the number of registered formal nonprofit organizations skyrocketed. The wave of pro-democracy movements in the 1990s and 2000s led to a preference for highly professionalized and bureaucratized transnational agencies over less formal grassroots organizations. Thus, private donations and public funds flowed to the formal nonprofit sector.
While the 1990s and 2000s constricted space for grassroots activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 2010s have seen a reawakening of grassroots priorities. Younger generations born in post-independence Africa are actively protesting authoritarian national governments and Western imperialism without the influence of donor agendas. Students have organized notable grassroots movements for the decolonization of education in South Africa, against authoritarianism in Angola and Zimbabwe, and for gender equality in Namibia. Even corporate NGOs have adopted more grassroots-friendly stances, although some remark that the use of buzzwords like “grassroots,” “human-centered,” and “community partnerships” has done little to change the top-down approaches of large transnational NGOs.
Relative Benefits of Grassroots Organizations
Despite their tumultuous history in Sub-Saharan Africa, grassroots development organizations offer several benefits relative to both state-led development programs and large transnational NGOs.
Compared to larger transnational NGOs,grassroots organizations feature several unique strengths. From the Red Cross to Oxfam, several large NGOs have come under fire for violence towards the local populations they purport to serve. The bureaucratized nature of many such organizations makes it difficult for local communities to have a say in their strategies, resulting in “band-aid” solutions that are divorced from local cultural and economic contexts. Even when local activists offer their input, many large nonprofits—even those who preach grassroots partnerships—end up predicating decisions on the opinions of major donors and elite political interests rather than the people they purport to serve. On top of this, there is a more philosophical drawback to transnational, Western-based NGOs with all-White boards purporting to save the Global South from problems that were largely created by Western colonialism. Grassroots movements remedy many of these drawbacks. As organizations created by members of a community for their community, they are inherently people-centered and thus more in tune with nuanced local dynamics. This is significant seeing as alignment with community goals is a predictor of nonprofit success.
While the international community is gradually becoming more aware of the important role that grassroots organizations play in African development, grassroots organizers still face myriad obstacles. Broadly, the biggest barrier for grassroots organizations is the dominance of large, corporatized NGOs that have turned charity into a lucrative industry. Both public and private donors are more likely to give funds to more familiar or formal organizations, leaving grassroots movements with few paths to substantive funding except being integrated into the business models of larger NGOs. When they do try to get involved with larger NGOs or departments of their national government, grassroots organizers are required to complete substantial legal paperwork. This makes it more likely for people with experience in the formal sector or with higher levels of education—predominantly men—to be able to partner with larger institutions when they want to, placing the most vulnerable at even more of a disadvantage when it comes to making their voices heard.
Conclusion
Grassroots organizations and community-led activism are embedded in the cultural and political history of Africa. They proved key in securing liberation from formal colonialism, and despite barriers to success, African grassroots movements are on the rise again. Overall, grassroots movements truly embody the struggle for emancipation. They resist the influence of Western elite donors while protesting the remnants of structural adjustment programs and other imperialist policies. They are grounded in the ideas and innovation of African people, subverting the sentiment that Africa is the recipient or “endpoint” of development initiatives. In this sense, grassroots participatory organizations are a true symbol of the oft-revered mantra “African solutions to African problems.”
The Gosudárstvennaya duma, or Gosduma, refers to the State Duma of Russia. The Gosduma is the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, while the Federation Council is the upper house. Since October 2016, Vyacheslav Volodin (UR) has served as chairman of the legislative body. The Gosduma consists of 450 members, referred to as “deputies,” who serve 5-year terms. To achieve an electoral majority in the Gosduma, a party must occupy 226 seats.
Comparison to U.S. Congress
Compared to the United States’ legislative system, the Gosduma shares more similarities to the House of Representatives. Both are the lower houses of their respective legislative bodies, and both consist of more members than the upper house. Additionally, the number of representatives each federal subject receives is not uniform. However, their differences are striking.
In the Gosduma, all 85 federal subjects are represented; this includes oblasts, republics, krais, autonomous okrugs, federal cities, and autonomous oblasts. However, while the number of representatives a U.S. state receives is contingent on its population, the number of representatives a federal subject receives is contingent on the number of constituencies, or sub-regions within it. For example, Adygea, a republic, has one constituency, while the Rostov Oblast has seven constituencies. Thus, the two federal subjects are represented by one and seven representatives in the Gosduma, respectively.
A second significant difference between the U.S. House and Russian Gosduma is how they behave politically. In the case of the U.S. House of Representatives, the House is a significant legislative body. The Gosduma is as well, but compared to the House, the Gosduma is more executive-focused. Rather than serving primarily as a legislative body, the Gosduma is a reliable ally of the executive and works to forward the policy goals of the Putin Administration.
United Russia (UR) is the largest and most influential political party in Russia. Former President Dmitry Medvedev has chaired the party since 2012, and the party is the legislative backbone for President Vladimir Putin. Although it is a centrist, big-tent party, UR is definitively conservative and promotes nationalist positions like building up Russia’s military, staunch Euroscepticism, and further ties between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church.
Of the parties that occupy seats in the Gosduma, the LDPR is unquestionably the most ultra-nationalist, right-wing party. Vladimir Zhirinovsky has led the party since the 1990s, but despite being far more hardline and conservative than UR, the LDPR poses virtually no threat to the Putin regime.
The Communist Party traces its roots back to the early revolutionary movement in imperial Russia and built upon Marxist-Leninist ideology. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the independent Russian Federation, communist parties were banned between 1991 and 1993. However, in 1993, the Communist Party officially registered as a legal political party with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.
Compared to UR, the LDPR, and the Communist Party, A Just Russia is relatively new, having been founded in 2006. The party is considered to be center-left while being a moderate supporter of the Putin regime. It backed him during the 2018 presidential election after opting not to nominate any of its members for election.
Of the four aforementioned political parties, “Yabloko” is perhaps the most unique. It is a social-liberal, center-left party with favorable views on the European Union and the United States. These views make it an outlier compared to most Russian parties, including liberal and left-wing parties.
Political Spectrum of Russian Political Parties
Election Results
Election Background
Between September 17th and 19th in 2021, Russians across the country turned out to vote for their constituency’s representative to the Gosduma. It is estimated that approximately 51.7% of eligible voters cast their ballots.
Results
In total, United Russia won just under 50% of the vote. This signaled that despite losing 19 seats, resulting in 324 seats, the pro-Putin United Russia party is still undoubtedly in control. The closest competitor to UR was the Communist Party which amassed just under 19% of the vote and gained 15 seats, increasing its total to 57. Although the LDPR won over 7.5% of the vote, the party experienced a net loss in seats resulting in only 21 seats occupied by its politicians. A Just Russia won 7.46% of the vote but experienced positive growth as the 4 additional seats won by the party resulted in a total of 27 occupied seats. Lastly, “Yabloko” won a mere 1.3% of the vote, resulting in the party occupying 0 seats in the Gosduma.
Although the election results were unsurprising, they indicate that the Putin regime is still squarely in power. Despite losing 19 seats, UR has retained a supermajority and controls the legislative process. Despite UR’s significant victory, the election has been marred by controversy. Communist Party officials, candidates, and supporters alleged that the government had committed significant election fraud, and allies of imprisoned dissident Alexei Navalny echoed the CP’s objections.
Anti-corruption demonstrators at the Communist Party rally following the preliminary results
Implications for the United States
For the United States, the results of the Gosduma election mean very little. United Russia remains the most powerful party with an anti-western stance, and its victory signals that this position will continue. Moreover, it indicates that anti-American sentiment is still prevalent in Russian society, at least to some extent. The response by the U.S. government was unsurprising. In a press statement, Ned Price, a U.S. State Department Spokesperson, condemned the election and said that it “took place under conditions not conducive to free and fair proceedings.” Moreover, the U.S. criticized the Russian government’s use of laws that designate opposition political groups and movements as “extremist organizations” and “foreign agents.”
U.S. Department of State
