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Category: Foreign Policy region

  • Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia and the U.S. Response:

    Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia and the U.S. Response:

    Introduction:

    The BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) is a 2013 trade route plan aimed at improving China’s connectivity to the rest of the world. The plan seeks to stimulate China’s economy through investing in infrastructure projects including railways, bridges, and airports abroad. This project also strives to connect countries in the Global South and Eastern Europe to China via land and maritime networks in hopes of increasing trade and economic growth. It is estimated that over 150 countries are partnered with the BRI across six continents.

    The BRI in Southeast Asia

    Southeast Asia is a key region of the BRI. The plan’s extensive funding supports a range of urban development initiatives in Southeast Asian nations, making it difficult to pinpoint its specific effects on local policies. Projects under the BRI encompass everything from infrastructure development to special economic zones to cultural activities.

    In the Philippines, the BRI has led to many large-scale infrastructure projects, but has also been criticized for expanding illicit sectors and selectively benefiting economic elites. Indonesia plans to leverage the BRI to enhance connectivity between Java Island and its eastern regions, fostering cultural interconnectivity and economic opportunities. In Cambodia, BRI-funded transportation projects, like the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, have reduced travel time and improved safety between major cities. For landlocked Laos, the BRI presents a chance to boost its economy and global standing through enhanced transportation infrastructure. Malaysia has seen improvements in human resource development due to the BRI-funded Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) project.

    While the BRI has contributed to several developments across Southeast Asia, it also raises concerns about debt dependence and disregard for environmental health and safety. Countries borrowing from China for large infrastructure projects risk falling into “debt traps”, which can force them to favor the interests of their donor nation and hinder their ability to invest in local development. Forms of “debt trap diplomacy” such as the BRI have been found to spur long-term economic downturn in beneficiary nations. Environmental impacts are another major concern. In Thailand, a high-speed railway project threatens deforestation and community displacement, particularly near the culturally significant city of Ayutthaya. In Vietnam, the Vinh Tan 2 Thermal Power Plant is discharging excessively hot wastewater into the sea, negatively affecting marine life and local agriculture. There is also a coal ash dump site near Vinh Tan, and local households are complaining about nearby crops dying and withering as a result. In Indonesia, the rapid development at the Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) poses worker safety risks. These drawbacks have led critics to deem the BRI  “China’s belt and road to nowhere”.

    BRI’s Impact on US Foreign Policy

    Given ongoing criticism that the U.S. has struggled to match China’s vision for economic expansion, the U.S. plans to counter the BRI with a similar project. In 2022, President Joe Biden announced the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) at the G20 Summit. This project has similar goals to the BRI, such as increasing connectivity and economic integration with the rest of the world. While the IMEC is targeted at India, the Middle East, and Europe, China’s project extends mostly to countries in the Global South, especially Southeast Asia. 

    The split between Global North and Global South is relevant to the U.S. and China’s competing policies. While India and Saudi Arabia are the only countries in the IMEC that represent the Global South, China’s BRI puts special emphasis in expanding reach into Global South markets. While this marks a significant opportunity for China to expand its influence in developing nations, it also risks backlash from countries who feel the BRI is doing more harm than good to local economies. Since the IMEC emerged significantly after BRI, the U.S. aims to learn from its shortcomings as it launches a new strategy.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, the BRI has significantly impacted Southeast Asia, driving infrastructure development and economic growth while also raising concerns about debt dependency and environmental harm. The future of BRI in the region will depend on balancing development with local welfare and environmental considerations. As the U.S. responds with the IMEC, it will aim to learn from these challenges to foster sustainable partnerships in its target regions. 

  • U.S. Response to the Tigray Conflict in Ethiopia: Key Actions and Implications 

    U.S. Response to the Tigray Conflict in Ethiopia: Key Actions and Implications 

    Introduction 

    The Tigray War in Ethiopia demonstrates a complex and multifaceted conflict with various historical, political, and regional dimensions. Bordering Eritrea, Tigray is Ethiopia’s northernmost region and is home to an estimated 7 million ethnic Tigrayans. The region was governed by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a leftist and ethnic national political party that formerly ruled Ethiopia from 1991 to 2018. It came into power when the TPLF overthrew the government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia after mobilizing enough Tigrayans for its ethno-nationalist movement. 

    The civil war between the TPLF and Ethiopian government began on November 20th, 2020, when the newly appointed prime minister Mr. Abiy failed to uphold his promise to conduct national elections and extended his term as prime minister in June 2020. With the TPLF losing control of the national government and the belief that Abiy was attempting to centralize power, the Tigray State Council held local elections in defiance. The federal government, on the other hand, saw this as a declaration of war. The civil came to a resolution on November 3rd, 2022 through a peace agreement, with the United States (US) and other agents played a critical role. 

    US-Ethiopia Relations 

    The United States and Ethiopia have maintained diplomatic relations since 1903, fostering a long-standing and significant partnership based on shared interests in promoting peace, stability, and economic development. Ethiopia holds a unique position as the only African nation never colonized, maintaining its independence for over a millennium. The U.S. has regarded Ethiopia as a key guarantor of security in the Horn of Africa, contributing to the stabilization of countries like Somalia and South Sudan.

    As the largest bilateral donor in Ethiopia, the U.S. has provided substantial humanitarian assistance, totaling an estimated $3.16 billion, in response to conflicts and ongoing droughts. However, despite the positive government-to-government and people-to-people relations, recent mistrust has emerged due to concerns over the actions of the Abiy government. This mistrust escalated when the Biden administration declared in March 2023 that all sides involved in the Tigray conflict were guilty of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

    US Involvement in the Tigray War 

    The US, as a significant international player, has been involved in the Tigray War in Ethiopia through diplomatic means, humanitarian assistance, and has been pressuring parties involved to seek a peaceful resolution. The US was outspoken in its criticism of alleged atrocities by Ethiopian forces and their allies during the Tigray war, which resulted in tens of thousands of fatalities before a peace accord was reached. The Biden administration also implemented visa restrictions targeted at Ethiopian and Eritrean officials responsible for the conflict and suspended the country’s membership in the African Growth and Opportunities Act, a preferential trade pact. According to Cameron Hudson, a  former US diplomat and intelligence official, the implementation of visa restrictions is a “major strategic shift in the Horn Africa, to go from an anchor state for US interests to become a potential adversary to US interests.”

    Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently visited Ethiopia in March of 2023 to meet with government and Tigrayan officials as well as victims of the conflict.  He noted that Ethiopia “needs to make more progress implementing a peace agreement with the Tigray region before relations with the US are normalized.” While the peace agreement made at the end of 2022 between the two conflicting regions terminated the war, hundreds of thousands of people were killed and suffered massacres, gang rapes, and other abuses from both sides. Blinken made sure to explain in a gathering of Ethiopian civil society leaders that “justice and accountability would be an important part of building a durable peace.” 

    Involved Agents 

    • TPLFI: Originally formed in the 1970s as a small guerilla band in the northern region of Ethiopia, the TPLF eventually grew to provide the core of the Ethiopian government in 1991. Representing one side of the Tigray war, the TPLF succeeded in mobilizing enough troops to defend their values, territory, and people. 
    • Ethiopia: After the conflict began in November, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces quickly captured many of Tigray’s central cities, including the regional capital, Mekele, with approximately half a million people. Ethiopian Air Force also committed war crimes when it bombed a camp for internally displaced persons in Dedebit Town of Tigray with an armed drone in January 2021 and again in Tigray’s capital, killing hundreds of civilians in hospitals and schools. 
    • Eritrea: A country once part of Ethiopia, Eritrea fought and won a brutal, decades-long war of independence that ended in 1991. When the two countries went to war again in 1998 in a territorial conflict that cost an estimated 100,000 lives, Prime Minister Abiy reached out to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and forged a historic peace accord aimed at putting the countries’ mutual enmity in the past. Eritrean forces repeatedly aided Ethiopia in the Tigray war and demonstrated itself as a staunch ally. Eritrean troops were blamed for the mass killing at Axum, a central Tigray region in Ethiopia, in the early period of the war. 
    • United Nations (UN): The UN led a joint investigation in 2021 with Ethiopia’s state-appointed human rights commission and found that all sides fighting in the Tigray war- Ethiopian government forces, Tigray forces, and Eritrea’s military- had committed violations that amounted to war crimes. The commission also revealed that Ethiopian forces had resorted to “starvation of civilians” as a tool of war and that Ethiopia and Eritrea forces were found to be responsible for “sexual slavery”- while Tigray forces were not. 
    • African Union (AU): Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the African Union chief mediator, led the mediation talk in South Africa between the two parties. She said Ethiopia’s government and Tigrayan authorities have agreed on “orderly, smooth and coordinated disarmament” along with “restoration of law and order, restoration of services and unhindered access to humanitarian supplies.” While neither Eritrea nor regional forces allied with the Ethiopian army took part in the talks in South Africa, the agreement reached was praised by Obasanjo as an “African solution to an African problem” and would allow humanitarian supplies to Tigray to be restored. 

    Effects of the War 

    Refugees and others have said that forces on the ground are responsible for sexual violence, ethnic-based targeted attacks, and large-scale looting. The UN estimated that nearly three million Tigrayans urgently need assistance due to lack of access to water, food, and healthcare. The food and nutrition security issue is especially concerning, for USAID and the World Food Programme suspended aid after discovering that Ethiopian soldiers and officials were stealing massive amounts of food in May of 2023. 

    With the civil war concluding with a peace agreement, Ethiopia has a new duty to consolidate a political arrangement that accommodates its diverse population of 110 million people and ensure basic measures of security and justice. Without this new configurement, a critical voice for African interests on the global stage would be lost and external actors would be empowered to engage in conflict. 

    Conclusion

    While the Tigray War has concluded, the conflict highlights broader tensions between ethnic groups in Ethiopia and could ensure wider instability in East Africa’s most populous country. Furthermore, the war caused severe damage to essential social services, for it expanded to the neighboring regions of Afar and Amhara. This affected more than 20 million people, of which approximately three quarters were women and children, and 5.5 million people have been forced to flee their homes and take refuge in other regions within Ethiopia.

  • Failures and Successes of the BRICS Alliance

    Failures and Successes of the BRICS Alliance

    Background

    Officially founded in 2009, BRICS is an informal, multilateral economic alliance between Brazil, Russia, China, India, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. The acronym “BRIC” (later adapted to include South Africa) was originally coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in a 2001 paper wherein he highlighted the potential for Brazil, Russia, India, and China to eventually rival the G7 (U.S., Canada, France, U.K., Germany, Japan, and Italy) economically. Today, the alliance is sometimes referred to as BRICS+. The overarching goal of BRICS is to create a system of transnational governance wherein countries of the Global South share equal representation in economic and political institutions historically controlled by Western nations. This involves establishing an international financial network that rivals the current dollar-based system, and promoting development in the Global South. 

    Structure

    Presently, BRICS is not a formal institution such as the UN or OPEC. The group meets annually, with the chairmanship rotating between member states, and all policy decisions made by consensus. It is currently chaired by Russia, where the annual summit will be held in October 2024. According to the summit’s official website, the group plans to discuss the potential inclusion of 30 new countries in some capacity, as well as strategies for the development of a more coordinated foreign policy platform.

    Successes and Potential

    • Creation of Banks and Funds: The most ambitious programs enacted by the BRICS alliance thus far have been the creation of the New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Agreement. Founded in 2015 with an initial capital base of $50 billion, the New Development Bank (NDB) will fund infrastructure and development projects in BRICS countries and other nations in the Global South. The Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA) is a $100 billion fund established to provide liquidity for BRICS during economic crises. Both of these institutions were created to combat the influence of US-led economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
    • Addressing Development in the Global South: BRICS has successfully implemented policies pertaining to one of their slated goals: development in the Global South. Examples include: Improving access to clean water in Guwahati, India, river restoration and ecological protection projects in China, and establishing the BRICS Agriculture and Rural Development Forum, which aims to address poverty and food insecurity. 
    • Attracting New Member States: Membership in BRICS has proven attractive to developing nations worldwide, including several Asian countries. Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam have all taken the necessary steps to apply for membership, while other Asian nations such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka are openly considering applying. 
    • Potential for Peacebuilding: The inclusion of rival countries in the Middle East such as Iran and potentially Saudi Arabia indicates that BRICS membership may be used to facilitate peace and development in a region historically preoccupied with US sanctions and military involvement. The expansion of BRICS would challenge the heavy U.S. influence in developing countries, which BRICS member states see as a successful step towards equalizing power on an international scale. 

    Failures and Critiques 

    • Intra-group Disagreements: Differing cultural values, contrasting political ideologies, and competing economies all pose obstacles for BRICS to strengthen cohesion and thus influence. The group’s two largest members in terms of population and GDP, India and China, disagree about whether or not the group should expand, and have also engaged in armed border disputes in recent years. 
    • Lack of Global Economic Influence: Despite efforts to “de-dollarize” by promoting trade between member states in local currencies, the USD still dominates international trade. The dollar was present on at least one side of nearly 90% of all international trade transactions in 2022. The dollar was on one side of 97% of all trades involving the Indian rupee, and 94% of all trades involving the Chinese renminbi. Furthermore, much of the world’s international commodity trading is priced by the dollar, and the dollar frequently comprises the foreign currency reserves of many countries’ central banks. Globally, 58% of foreign exchange reserves were held in dollars, including an estimated 50% in China and India. 
    • Risk of Unilateralism: While the growth of all BRICS members has slowed since its conception, China’s economy is larger than any other economy within the agreement, and trade within the alliance mostly flows through China. This runs the risk of BRICS becoming an exclusively China-led group as opposed to a mutual power-sharing alignment of non-Western nations. With China now being the United States’ major rival globally, China’s de-facto leadership within the agreement will necessitate a strong U.S. response. Whether U.S. foreign policy will take a continued adversarial approach, or a new, collaborative effort remains to be seen. 
  • Understanding US Relations with Switzerland: Key Insights into Trade, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests.

    Understanding US Relations with Switzerland: Key Insights into Trade, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests.

    Introduction

    Switzerland, known for its neutrality, abstains from military alliances and international conflicts, playing a significant role in global peace and diplomacy. It frequently hosts diplomatic conferences on international humanitarian law. Over time, shared characteristics in their political systems and joint efforts in international organizations have strengthened relations between the United States and Switzerland. Currently, the United States stands as Switzerland’s primary trading partner, accounting for 16.3% of its total exports. Therefore, the relationship between the U.S. and Switzerland is vital for the economic development, security, and maintenance of global peace for both nations.

    Quick Facts

    History of U.S.─Switzerland Relations

    Despite their history of close cooperation, certain factors have strained the relationship between the United States and Switzerland in the past. In the 1990s, tensions arose due to the World Jewish Congress lawsuit against Swiss banks regarding the handling of stolen Nazi gold during World War II. The U.S. argued that Switzerland, as a neutral country, had inadvertently aided the Nazi regime, thereby prolonging the war. Switzerland disputed this claim, leading to heightened tensions. Additionally, Swiss banking secrecy has been a contentious issue, with U.S. authorities alleging that it hampers oversight and facilitates money laundering schemes. To address these challenges, the United States and Switzerland established the U.S.-Swiss Joint Economic Commission (JEC) in 2000. This commission focuses on fostering trade relations, combating money laundering and terrorism, and protecting intellectual property rights. Subsequent agreements, such as the Enhanced Political Framework and Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum, have further enhanced the JEC’s mandate.

    In 2013, Switzerland signed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to ensure that Swiss banks operating in the U.S. comply with surveillance and accountability measures. This requires Swiss banks to report offshore accounts to the Internal Revenue Service.

    Furthermore, in 2019, the U.S. Senate approved the Double Taxation Treaty with Switzerland, aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and facilitating the creation of new businesses in both countries, thereby fostering employment and new industries.

    Despite past disagreements, both nations remain committed to spreading democratic values and institutions globally. Their cooperation extends to providing economic development assistance and humanitarian relief to developing nations.

    Strategic Interests

    • Trade: In 2021, Switzerland emerged as the seventh-largest foreign investor in the United States, injecting a total of $315 billion into the country. Trade between the two countries primarily takes the form of services, with the US exporting business services, financial services, and licenses, and importing licenses, information services, and insurance services.
    • Security: As a neutral nation, Switzerland plays a diplomatic role in mediating current international conflicts. Since 1980, Switzerland has served as the protecting power between the United States and Iran, facilitating open lines of communication and providing consular and diplomatic assistance to Iranian citizens in the U.S. and Americans in Iran. Presently, Switzerland has offered to assume a similar role in the Russo-Ukrainian War, although the Russian government declined this offer. Switzerland is a valued partner of NATO and engages in numerous operations mandated by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However, due to Swiss law prohibiting participation in combat operations for peace enforcement, all operations are manned by volunteers.

    Neutrality

    In 1920, the League of Nations formally acknowledged Switzerland’s state of neutrality, which prohibits the country from participating in international wars, supplying mercenary troops to belligerent states, and favoring any belligerent state in the exportation of war material. However, this neutrality law does not extend to internal conflicts and does not apply to military operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

    Currently, Switzerland’s neutrality is under scrutiny due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The nation is restricted from sending weapons and ammunition to Ukraine as per its neutrality law. However, given the urgency of the situation, Swiss authorities are reassessing the centuries-old declaration of neutrality. Many politicians are exploring avenues to support Ukraine without violating Swiss neutrality laws.

  • Understanding U.S. Relations with Germany: History, Trade, and Strategic Interests 

    Understanding U.S. Relations with Germany: History, Trade, and Strategic Interests 

    Introduction

    Germany is the largest economy in Europe by GDP. Its diplomatic ties with the United States play a significant role in ensuring political stability in Europe and fostering economic development between the two nations. Alongside the United States, the European Union stands as a key supporter of Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. Currently, Germany holds a prominent position in NATO, leading the Very High Readiness Joint Force (VJTF). Additionally, Germany ranks as the fifth-largest trading partner of the United States, with annual bilateral trade exceeding $260 billion in goods and services. Therefore, the relationship between the U.S. and Germany is vital for the economic growth, security, cultural exchange, and mutual interests of both nations.

    Quick Facts

    History of U.S.─Germany Relations

    Until the 20th century, commerce and immigration were the primary factors shaping the relationship between the U.S. and Germany. However, during WWI, Germany’s alignment with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, known as the Central Powers, and the U.S.’s support for the Allies, including the United Kingdom, Russia, Italy, and Japan, disrupted their relationship. Germany’s threats to the U.S., such as unrestricted submarine warfare and attempts to form a partnership with Mexico to invade the United States, turned them from rivals to enemies. Relations were later restored through peace and trade treaties signed in 1921 and 1923.

    In 1941, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor prompted the U.S. to declare war on Japan, thus becoming an enemy of the Axis powers, which included Germany, Italy, and Japan. Despite lacking a formal relationship, many German refugees found sanctuary in America, including notable figures such as Thomas Mann, Albert Einstein, Marlene Dietrich, and Kurt Weill.

    Following Germany’s defeat in WWII, the Potsdam Conference divided the country into Western and Eastern regions, dominated by the U.S., U.K., France, and the Soviet Union, respectively. The formation of NATO by the Western bloc and the Warsaw Pact by the Eastern bloc marked the onset of the Cold War. Post-WWII Germany symbolized democracy in the West and communism in the East, with West Germany emerging as a strong military and economic power. The reunification of Germany in 1990 solidified its relationship with the U.S.

    In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Germany, as a NATO member, sent troops to Afghanistan to support the U.S., although it opposed the Iraq War in 2003 due to concerns over destabilizing the Middle East.

    Friction arose in the U.S.-Germany relationship in 2013 following mass surveillance disclosures, where the FBI and NSA illegally collected personal data of German citizens. This led to Germany canceling the 1968 UKUSA Agreement, an intelligence-sharing pact with the U.S. and U.K.

    The relationship between the two nations has been influenced by the stances of their respective presidents and chancellors. During the Trump and Merkel administrations, differences over trade, immigration, and relations with Russia strained ties. However, with the election of Joe Biden and Olaf Scholz, both countries’ relationship has strengthened, marked by shared political ideas and increased cooperation, particularly evident during the Ukraine War, which bolstered their economic and political ties.

    Understanding the Current Relationship

    In 2022, Germany took significant steps to support Ukraine in the Russo-Ukrainian War by donating 5,000 helmets and a complete field hospital. Initially, Germany refrained from providing military assistance to Ukraine, which strained its relationship with the United States. However, during a meeting between Chancellor Olaf Scholz and President Joe Biden in February 2021, Scholz reiterated Germany’s alignment with the United States in supporting Ukraine while expressing a cautious approach to avoid escalating tensions with Russia.

    Germany’s reluctance to engage militarily stemmed partly from the belief that economic integration could help deter further conflict, along with considerations of its reliance on the Nord Stream 1 pipeline for affordable natural gas.

    The Nord Stream 1 pipeline, a key source of natural gas from Russia, had been a major factor in Germany’s neutrality stance. However, in late August 2022, gas flow through the pipeline halted due to Western sanctions and equipment leaks. With Germany no longer dependent on Russian gas, the country shifted its position and began providing military support to Ukraine. This support includes armored fighting vehicles, air defense, artillery, and other resources to bolster Ukrainian sovereignty.

    In response to Germany’s shift, the United States became a significant supporter by agreeing to supply Germany’s demand for natural gas through a 20-year contract, supplying 2.25 million tonnes per year. This partnership reflects a strategic move to strengthen ties between the two nations while supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression.

    Strategic Interests

    • Trade: In 2023, Germany exported €14.1B and imported €8.46B from the United States. Main German exports to the US include automobiles, machinery, and pharmaceuticals. Main US exports to Germany include aircrafts, pharmaceuticals, oil and gas, and medical equipment.
    • Security: Since January 2023, Germany has assumed leadership of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Force (VJTF). This force serves as a crucial component and the primary responder for NATO’s territorial defense, with the capability to deploy and take action in any location within 48–72 hours. Germany has shouldered a significant portion of the responsibility for defending European territory against the threat posed by Russia, maintaining approximately 8,000 troops on standby for rapid deployment.
    • International cooperation mechanisms: Both nations are members of several international organizations dedicated to fostering alliances for global security, economic cooperation, and peace. They are part of prominent groups such as the G-7, G-20, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These memberships reflect their commitment to international cooperation and their roles as key players in addressing global challenges.
    • Sustainable development: The U.S.-Germany Climate and Energy Partnership, established in 2021, aims to foster long-term development in four key areas: hydrogen, offshore wind, zero-emission transport, and third-country cooperation. Through this partnership, the goal is to promote environmental sustainability and advocate for shared values, with the aspiration of inspiring other nations to adopt similar initiatives.

    Future DevelopmentsThe Just Energy Transition Partnership, comprising G7 members, is dedicated to assisting developing nations in expanding and transitioning to renewable energy sources. Recent commitments indicate that the United States will invest $8.5 billion and Germany €700 million in South Africa. This investment aims to prevent up to 1.5 gigatonnes of greenhouse gas emissions over the next two decades. Furthermore, both countries are committed to the Paris Agreement and are actively developing strategies to limit the global average temperature increase to 1.5°C.

  • Introduction to US Relations with Estonia

    Introduction to US Relations with Estonia

    Estonia, a small country at the northern end of the Baltic states, has received increased focus from Western media in light of the deepening divide between the West and Russia in Eastern Europe—exemplified by the war in Ukraine. Estonia, a NATO ally of the United States and member of the European Union, spent the Cold War under Soviet rule and two centuries as part of the Russian Empire. Today, Estonia is recognized for incorporating digital innovation with democratic governance and public services, leading some to refer to it as a “digital democracy”. 

    Estonia, located at the northern end of the Baltic states, has gained increased attention from Western media due to the growing divide between the West and Russia in Eastern Europe, particularly highlighted by the war in Ukraine. As a NATO ally of the United States and a member of the European Union, Estonia has a history of Soviet rule during the Cold War and centuries as part of the Russian Empire. Today, Estonia is known for blending digital innovation with democratic governance and public services, earning it the nickname of a “digital democracy.”

    Fact Sheet

    History of US-Estonia Relations

    Following the Russian Civil War and World War I, Estonia declared independence, leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Estonia and the United States in 1922. However, during World War II, Estonia faced occupation by both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, eventually falling under Soviet control. It wasn’t until the end of the Cold War in 1991 that Estonia regained its independence. Throughout the Cold War period, the United States never formally recognized Estonia as part of the Soviet Union. Instead, the U.S. maintained diplomatic relations with Estonia’s separate representatives, reflecting its continued support for Estonia’s independence.

    Estonia’s Tensions with Russia

    Since its independence, Estonia has grappled with tensions with Russia regarding the treatment of its sizable ethnic Russian minority. Many long-term Russian residents in Estonia, including those born there, were not automatically granted Estonian citizenship. Although some eventually obtained citizenship, those lacking proficiency in Estonian faced statelessness. Russia’s President Putin has cited discrimination against Russian minorities to justify actions in Ukraine, raising concerns of potential application of similar arguments against Estonia.

    Estonia’s admission to NATO in 2004, along with the other Baltic states, expanded the Western alliance up to Russia’s borders, contributing to increased tensions between Estonia and Russia. This westward shift is further evidenced by Estonia’s acceptance into the EU in the same year.

    US Strategic Interests

    • Strategy and conflict: Russia’s war in Ukraine has renewed America’s focus on its alliance with the Baltic states, including Estonia. As other Eastern European nations fear that they could be next to face Russian aggression, Estonia’s ambassador to the United States has remarked that the war represents “existential risks” to their nation and allies. The Baltic states are seen as the most strategically vulnerable part of NATO to a Russian invasion. Wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2014 and 2015 found that Russian forces could reach Tallinn and Riga in as few as 60 hours. Due to Estonia’s membership in NATO, a Russian attack on Estonia would likely compel its allies, including the United States, to respond.
    • NATO alliance: Estonia also has a unique role in NATO. Consistent with Estonia’s emphasis on digital innovation, the country hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence from which NATO’s cybersecurity operations are based. 
    • Aligned value system: Since the end of the Cold War, Estonia has exhibited increased alignment with America’s values on the world stage. Previously a communist republic, Estonia now has a free market and has made significant reforms towards liberal democracy, demonstrating a shift away from its historical ties with Russia and towards a Western alignment.
    • Economic ties: Over the same time, Estonia has developed closer economic ties to the United States, with the US moving from Estonia’s fourteenth largest trading partner to its fourth largest from 2017 to 2019. The two countries have also signed several economic agreements over the last few decades. 

    Future

    As concerns about the security of the Baltics increase, the addition of Finland and Sweden into NATO could contribute to enhanced security in the region. Since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Estonia has provided around $400 million in military aid to Ukraine. The Baltic states have been united in their support for Ukraine, and Estonia has called upon its NATO allies to increase their defence spending to 2.5% of their GDP to support Ukraine. The likely goal moving forward for Estonia and NATO is to deter further Russian aggression against its bordering states by preventing their success in Ukraine.

  • US-Brazil Relations Post-2022 Brazilian Presidential Election

    US-Brazil Relations Post-2022 Brazilian Presidential Election

    Brazil Before the Election, 2022 Presidential Election Results, & Aftermath

    From 2019 to 2022, Brazil was led by the popular conservative, President Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro publicly questioned Brazilian governmental institutions and drew upon religious and cultural identities in a way that many have criticized as weakening democracy in the country. Brazil’s foreign policy was also less predictable and less multilateral as Bolsonaro seemed skeptical of Western international institutions. Instead, Bolsonaro deepened Brazil’s economic and diplomatic relationships elsewhere, notably with like-minded conservative leaders such as China’s Xi Jingping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. U.S.-Brazil relations also strengthened during this time, with Bolsonaro and then-President Donald Trump sharing close political and personal alignment. 

    In the 2022 Brazilian presidential elections, Bolsonaro was challenged by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—a popular leftist who was president of Brazil from 2003-2011. In October, Lula beat Bolsonaro with 50.9% to 49.1% of the vote to win the presidency. Bolsonaro repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the election, despite Brazil’s Defense Ministry finding no evidence of manipulation in the votes. The political unrest culminated on January 8th, 2023, when his supporters stormed Brazil’s Congress. The attack was similar to, and arguably inspired by, the January 6th insurrection in the U.S..

    Recent reports reveal that President Biden’s administration was directly involved in protecting the peaceful transfer of power in Brazil. Senior U.S. officials formally and informally pressured Bolsonaro and his administration to accept the results in the months leading up to the election. Biden and his administration harshly condemned the January 8th attack and stated their support for Lula.

    A Changing Relationship with the U.S.

    Lula’s administration seems to be challenging the U.S.’s role in Latin America and the international sphere. He has publicly questioned the use of the U.S. dollar as the global currency of business and championed broader use of other currencies, specifically the Chinese Yuan. He has advocated for the strengthening of political power of the Latin American bloc in the international order while de-emphasizing the role of the UN Security Council countries (China, France, Russia, U.S., and U.K.). Lula also explicitly defied the U.S. by receiving Iranian warships over its objections. 

    Perhaps most notably, Lula has strengthened relations with the U.S.’s top rivals: Russia and China. Unlike the U.S. and most of its allies, Brazil has maintained a position of deliberate neutrality with regard to the war in Ukraine. While Lula condemned Russian president Vladimir Putin’s actions, he refused to enact sanctions and stated that some of the blame for the conflict falls on Ukraine and NATO. Instead, Lula has advocated for peace negotiations, suggesting that Brazil act as the lead negotiator. 

    At the same time, Brazil, like many countries, is increasing economic ties with China. Brazil is now the second-largest borrower of Chinese state loans and China has surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s biggest trading partner. During Lula’s high-profile visit to China in April, Xi stated that China-Brazil relations were “a high priority.” This is concerning to the U.S. as it attempts to curb China’s economic rise and maintain its own status as the world’s most important economy. 

    Along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa, Brazil is a founding member of the BRICS economic grouping. BRICS is widely seen as a rival to the U.S.-led group: the G7. Lula has been a strong advocate of expanding the influence of BRICS since he took office, and in August 2023, BRICS extended membership to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates, greatly expanding its reach and prestige. 

    Taken together, Lula’s actions since gaining the presidency seem to indicate a challenge to the U.S.-centric international status quo. Some experts argue that Lula is attempting to create a “multipolar world order” where Brazil is one of many countries that dictate international relations. 

    Promoting Democracy in Brazil

    Many countries are experiencing democratic backsliding, and Brazil is an especially important case. While it seemed that Brazil might become less democratic under Bolsonaro, Lula’s election might have reversed that trend. 

    The Biden administration considers promoting democracy a major goal. In 2021, Biden stated that safeguarding democracy is the most important challenge and initiated various actions to achieve this. During Lula’s 2023 visit to Biden, they mainly talked about democracy. They also covered topics like minority rights and safeguarding the Amazon Rainforest. Additionally, the State Department and USAID have started financially assisting “democratic bright spots” worldwide, including Brazil which was designated as one in 2022.

    Yet, the U.S. attempts to promote democracy often don’t yield desired results. For instance, in countries labeled as democratic bright spots, which the U.S. views as likely to stay democratic, there is no evident proof of this. Another criticism is that the U.S. should not meddle in other countries’ governments, particularly given its history of sometimes violent intervention in Latin American nations in the name of democracy. Some scholars additionally argue that focusing on promoting democracy is harmful to the U.S. as it draws attention away from the security concerns and economic competition that should dictate foreign policy. However, others say the opposite, arguing that democratic promotion is a critical aspect of this competition—especially in Latin America where the region has explicitly pledged to uphold democracy in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

    Security Concerns and Global Competition

    As an emerging global power, Brazil’s alignment with the U.S. or one of its rivals could alter the international balance of power. These states are termed by some academics as “global swing states,” and maintaining positive relations with such countries is important if the U.S. wants to maintain its influence in global politics.

    After U.S.-Brazil ties weakened during Lula’s first presidency, both the Biden and Trump administrations pursued close relations with Brazil. Trump and Bolsonaro were close due to their political similarities. In 2019, the U.S. designated Brazil a “Major Non-Nato Ally,” further solidifying ties between the two countries. Biden has also attempted to keep close relations with Brazil, emphasizing his shared liberal values with Lula. However, Biden has criticized Brazil when its agenda does not align with the U.S.’s own, but has taken no further punitive steps. 
    Some have argued that this approach has made the U.S. look weak compared to Brazil, particularly with regards to Lula’s blatant defiance of U.S. goals regarding the Iranian warships. Others say that the focus on ideological cooperation with Brazil is leaving an economic vacuum, allowing China to strengthen trade relations with Brazil and gain more influence in the country and region. Some experts recommend a more nuanced approach where the Biden administration would focus on specific areas of concrete cooperation with Brazil, instead of expecting Lula to match Biden’s broader agenda.

  • 2022 Brazilian Presidential Election: Implications for US-Brazil Relations

    2022 Brazilian Presidential Election: Implications for US-Brazil Relations

    Brazil Before the Election, 2022 Presidential Election Results, & Aftermath

    From 2019 to 2022, Brazil was led by the popular conservative, President Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro publicly questioned Brazilian governmental institutions and drew upon religious and cultural identities in a way that many have criticized as weakening democracy in the country. Brazil’s foreign policy was also less predictable and less multilateral as Bolsonaro seemed skeptical of Western international institutions. Instead, Bolsonaro deepened Brazil’s economic and diplomatic relationships elsewhere, notably with like-minded conservative leaders such as China’s Xi Jingping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. U.S.-Brazil relations also strengthened during this time, with Bolsonaro and then-President Donald Trump sharing close political and personal alignment. 

    In the 2022 Brazilian presidential elections, Bolsonaro was challenged by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—a popular leftist who was president of Brazil from 2003-2011. In October, Lula beat Bolsonaro with 50.9% to 49.1% of the vote to win the presidency. Bolsonaro repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the election, despite Brazil’s Defense Ministry finding no evidence of manipulation in the votes. The political unrest culminated on January 8th, 2023, when his supporters stormed Brazil’s Congress. The attack was similar to, and arguably inspired by, the January 6th insurrection in the U.S..

    Recent reports reveal that President Biden’s administration was directly involved in protecting the peaceful transfer of power in Brazil. Senior U.S. officials formally and informally pressured Bolsonaro and his administration to accept the results in the months leading up to the election. Biden and his administration harshly condemned the January 8th attack and stated their support for Lula.

    A Changing Relationship with the U.S.

    Lula’s administration seems to be challenging the U.S.’s role in Latin America and the international sphere. He has publicly questioned the use of the U.S. dollar as the global currency of business and championed broader use of other currencies, specifically the Chinese Yuan. He has advocated for the strengthening of political power of the Latin American bloc in the international order while de-emphasizing the role of the UN Security Council countries (China, France, Russia, U.S., and U.K.). Lula also explicitly defied the U.S. by receiving Iranian warships over its objections. 

    Perhaps most notably, Lula has strengthened relations with the U.S.’s top rivals: Russia and China. Unlike the U.S. and most of its allies, Brazil has maintained a position of deliberate neutrality with regard to the war in Ukraine. While Lula condemned Russian president Vladimir Putin’s actions, he refused to enact sanctions and stated that some of the blame for the conflict falls on Ukraine and NATO. Instead, Lula has advocated for peace negotiations, suggesting that Brazil act as the lead negotiator. 

    At the same time, Brazil, like many countries, is increasing economic ties with China. Brazil is now the second-largest borrower of Chinese state loans and China has surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s biggest trading partner. During Lula’s high-profile visit to China in April, Xi stated that China-Brazil relations were “a high priority.” This is concerning to the U.S. as it attempts to curb China’s economic rise and maintain its own status as the world’s most important economy. 

    Along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa, Brazil is a founding member of the BRICS economic grouping. BRICS is widely seen as a rival to the U.S.-led group: the G7. Lula has been a strong advocate of expanding the influence of BRICS since he took office, and in August 2023, BRICS extended membership to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates, greatly expanding its reach and prestige. 

    Taken together, Lula’s actions since gaining the presidency seem to indicate a challenge to the U.S.-centric international status quo. Some experts argue that Lula is attempting to create a “multipolar world order” where Brazil is one of many countries that dictate international relations. 

    Promoting Democracy in Brazil

    Many countries are experiencing democratic backsliding, and Brazil is an especially important case. While it seemed that Brazil might become less democratic under Bolsonaro, Lula’s election might have reversed that trend. 

    The Biden administration considers promoting democracy a major goal. In 2021, Biden stated that safeguarding democracy is the most important challenge and initiated various actions to achieve this. During Lula’s 2023 visit to Biden, they mainly talked about democracy. They also covered topics like minority rights and safeguarding the Amazon Rainforest. Additionally, the State Department and USAID have started financially assisting “democratic bright spots” worldwide, including Brazil which was designated as one in 2022.

    Yet, the U.S. attempts to promote democracy often don’t yield desired results. For instance, in countries labeled as democratic bright spots, which the U.S. views as likely to stay democratic, there is no evident proof of this. Another criticism is that the U.S. should not meddle in other countries’ governments, particularly given its history of sometimes violent intervention in Latin American nations in the name of democracy. Some scholars additionally argue that focusing on promoting democracy is harmful to the U.S. as it draws attention away from the security concerns and economic competition that should dictate foreign policy. However, others say the opposite, arguing that democratic promotion is a critical aspect of this competition—especially in Latin America where the region has explicitly pledged to uphold democracy in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

    Security Concerns and Global Competition

    As an emerging global power, Brazil’s alignment with the U.S. or one of its rivals could alter the international balance of power. These states are termed by some academics as “global swing states,” and maintaining positive relations with such countries is important if the U.S. wants to maintain its influence in global politics.

    After U.S.-Brazil ties weakened during Lula’s first presidency, both the Biden and Trump administrations pursued close relations with Brazil. Trump and Bolsonaro were close due to their political similarities. In 2019, the U.S. designated Brazil a “Major Non-Nato Ally,” further solidifying ties between the two countries. Biden has also attempted to keep close relations with Brazil, emphasizing his shared liberal values with Lula. However, Biden has criticized Brazil when its agenda does not align with the U.S.’s own, but has taken no further punitive steps. 

    Some have argued that this approach has made the U.S. look weak compared to Brazil, particularly with regards to Lula’s blatant defiance of U.S. goals regarding the Iranian warships. Others say that the focus on ideological cooperation with Brazil is leaving an economic vacuum, allowing China to strengthen trade relations with Brazil and gain more influence in the country and region. Some experts recommend a more nuanced approach where the Biden administration would focus on specific areas of concrete cooperation with Brazil, instead of expecting Lula to match Biden’s broader agenda.

  • Failures and Successes of the Phase One Trade Agreement with China

    Failures and Successes of the Phase One Trade Agreement with China

    Introduction

    In recent decades, trade between China and the US has significantly grown, with China being a major source of imports for the United States and a top market for American goods and services. Despite the economic interdependence, the relationship is complex. The trade war that initiated in 2018 exemplifies the complexities in this dynamic.

    Background Information Of Trade Between China and US

    For about three decades following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, trade between China and the United States was nearly nonexistent due to severed relations. The situation changed in 1979 when diplomatic ties were restored, leading to a significant surge in trade from a few billion to hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the late 1970s played a pivotal role, with the Chinese government, under his leadership, easing fiscal restrictions and promoting business expansion. As part of efforts to boost trade and investment, China applied to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor to the WTO, in 1986.

    As a condition of entry, Beijing pledged to execute a wide variety of economic reforms, including major import tariff reductions, IP protections, and improved law and order transparency. At this time, President Bill Clinton and his advisors argued that incorporating China in the international trading system would be advantageous for both the US and China, helping to foster economic and eventually democratic transition. However, American labor unions and many congressional Democrats rejected the idea, claiming that China’s inadequate environmental and worker standards would inspire similar behavior elsewhere and lead to a “race to the bottom.” 

    Even before China joined the WTO, trade between the two countries began to grow. WTO membership ensured “permanent normal trade relations,” providing further security for American and foreign companies to produce in China and export to the United States. Trade expanded significantly; the value of American goods bought from China increased from about $100 billion in 2001 to $500 billion in 2021. This rise in imports is partially explained by China’s significant contribution to global supply chains, since Chinese businesses assemble products for export to the United States using materials from all around the world.

    Trade War

    The trade war between China and the United States was launched nearly five years ago by then-President Donald Trump. The US levied duties on approximately $350 billion in Chinese imports, and China countered by imposing taxes on an additional $100 billion in imports, as permitted by WTO rules. President Trump’s goal was to put pressure on Beijing to change what was perceived by some as unfair trade policies and decouple the US economy from China’s economy. To avert a trade deficit, President Trump levied hefty tariffs on China. Following the tariffs, China’s access to high-tech US products was restricted, as were foreign investments with security concerns, as well as claims of unfair Chinese business practices.

    Summary and Results of the Phase One Trade Agreement

    The Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China: Phase One went into force on February 14, 2020. China committed to expand its purchases of particular US goods and services by $200 billion beyond baseline levels set in 2017 for 2020 and 2021. The impact can be summarized as follows:

    Positive Aspects

    • Between January 2020 and December 2021, China imported $235.3 billion in covered products from the US, while the US exported $210.1 billion to China. In the end, China bought 62% (for imports from China) or 60% (for exports from the US) of all the goods covered by the phase one agreement.
    • Goods made from Covered Manufacture Products went beyond the phase one commitment by 61 percent (for imports from China) or 59 percent (for exports from the US).
    • China’s phase one commitment was spent on purchases of covered agricultural products to the tune of 77 percent (for imports from China) or 83 percent (for exports from the US).
    • China’s purchases of covered energy products accounted for 47 percent (for imports from China) or 37 percent (for exports from the US) of the phase one commitment.
    • All uncovered products, which in 2017 made up 29% of China’s total imports from the US and 27% of the US’s total exports to China, were not expressly covered by the phase one agreement. In 2021, China imported unlimited goods worth $42.0 billion from the US, down 8% from 2017. The total value of all unreported US exports to China during that time was $35.0 billion, up 1% from the prior year.

    The Phase One transaction achieved some success despite notable restrictions and challenges. It contributed to crucial structural reforms in China’s intellectual property laws, facilitated easier access for U.S. agricultural exports, and improved market entry for U.S. financial services firms. Notably, goods made from Covered Manufacture Products surpassed the Phase One commitment by 61% for imports from China and 59% for exports from the United States. Although crude oil prices briefly turned negative in April 2020, impacting sales value, they had rebounded by the fall of 2021.

    Negative Aspects

    The Phase One deal is largely seen as unsuccessful, with China only fulfilling about 60% of the specified goods trade amount. The ambitious purchasing targets, perceived as unattainable by many, were further hindered by the Covid-19 pandemic disrupting trade flows.

    If U.S. services exports to China had expanded at the same rate as exports to the rest of the world from 2018 to 2021, and U.S. goods exports to China of Phase One products had increased at the same pace as China’s purchases of those products globally, the overall U.S. goods and services sent to China would have decreased by approximately 19% from 2018 to 2021 due to the trade conflict and the Phase One deal. These projections suggest that the U.S. could have avoided trade war export losses of $24 billion (16%) in 2018 and $30 billion (20%) in 2019. Under Phase One, exports would have increased by a combined $27 billion (18%) in 2020 and $40 billion (23%) in 2021. Without the export losses, American taxpayers would not have paid tens of billions of dollars in agricultural subsidies in 2018–19.

    Phase Two

    Although the details of phase two have not yet been finalized, it was said that the Phase One agreement only addressed the most straightforward issues in regard to US-China trade. If the agreement is to have any meaning, phase two will need to address more complex topics. During United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s confirmation hearing, Senator Ben Sasse stated that the Phase Two agreement should address “critical issues” like excess capacity, state-owned firms, state-sponsored cyber-enabled intellectual property theft, restrictions on cross-border data transfers, and regulatory transparency that weren’t adequately addressed or achieved in Phase One. Similar to this, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several business associations mentioned issues that should be addressed in a Phase Two agreement, including subsidies, cybersecurity, digital trade and data governance, and competition policy. 

    A Phase Two agreement has also been sought by business organizations. In accordance with a report from the American Chamber of Commerce in South China from the previous year, “Phase One will go down as one of the biggest political and economic failures in a generation unless the U.S. and China immediately return to the negotiating table to start Phase Two, a step that China has also indicated is not imminent.” The National Association of Manufacturers has additionally argued in favor of a Phase Two deal “to improve trade certainty.”

  • How the US can Help Refugees Displaced by the Global War on Terrorism in the Middle East

    How the US can Help Refugees Displaced by the Global War on Terrorism in the Middle East

    The Global War on Terrorism 

    The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is an ongoing, international counterterrorism campaign led by the United States in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. More than 170 nations have taken on the cause, which has included targeting state and non-state actors such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Saddam Hussein regime. The GWOT has succeeded in protecting the United States and its citizens from attacks, with only about 100 Americans dying in the US in attacks by Islamist extremists since 2001. Despite its benefit for America, the GWOT has left many people in the Middle East displaced, both within and across international borders.

    Refugees Displaced by the GWOT 

    At least 37 million people have been displaced by the GWOT through eight post-9/11 wars in which the US has been crucially involved. During these wars, the US either had a clear responsibility for initiating combat, escalating combat, or for being a significant contributor to combat through drone strikes, logistical support, battlefield advising, and arms sales, among others. The 37 million people includes upwards of 8 million refugees and 29 million internally displaced people (IDPs). For the purpose of this brief, refugees will be defined as people who have been displaced across international borders. There have been over 2 million refugees each from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria as a direct and indirect result of the GWOT. The GWOT has expanded beyond the Middle East, leading to hundreds of thousands more refugees from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and the Philippines. While the plight of the 29 million IDPs is extremely important, this brief will focus on the 8 million refugees, as policy solutions for refugees and IDPs would be vastly different.

    How Host Countries Have Handled an Influx of Refugees

    Most refugees who have escaped violence from the GWOT in the Middle East have fled to neighboring countries, especially Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Turkey currently hosts around 3.7 million refugees, Jordan hosts around 3 million refugees, and Lebanon hosts around 1.3 million refugees. Those three countries also host the most displaced people per capita in the Middle East. It is of note that many of these refugees come from Syria as a result of the Syrian Civil War. However, for this policy brief, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan can still be focused on because they host the most refugees displaced by the GWOT.

    Turkey is home to the world’s highest population of refugees. Most of these refugees live outside camps under challenging circumstances, such as reduced food consumption or living in poor-quality housing. Turkey has made efforts to supply registered refugees with education and healthcare, among other rights and services. To help in those areas, the European Union (EU) has provided over six billion euros in aid through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, in which they focus on humanitarian assistance, education, health, and migration management, among others. 

    Turkey also has both international and national legislation pertaining to refugees. Turkey is a party to the United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Convention defined the term “refugee,” gave refugees protection from persecution, and established a principle of non-refoulement, which states that refugees cannot be sent back to their home countries if there are concerns of oppression.  The 1967 Protocol removed geographic and temporal limitations of the Convention. In terms of national legislation, Turkey implemented its first domestic asylum law in 2014, titled the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. This law established a legal framework for migration and asylum, stating that refugees will not be sent back to dangerous or discriminatory places. It created an institution to manage international protection, and gave refugees a way to apply for residence permits. The same year, Turkey adopted the Temporary Protection Regulation, which outlines rights of refugees and procedures for refugees granted temporary protection. However, it is of note that Turkey does not recognize Syrians seeking asylum as refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention.

    Unlike Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan both have not ratified the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. The governments of those two countries view asylum seekers from other countries as guests, not as refugees. A partial goal of this approach is to prevent the integration of refugees into society. Because Lebanon and Jordan are not party to the international treaties, they are not required to recognize the rights of refugees guaranteed by the Convention. Instead, it is their job as host countries, as well as the jobs of  international agencies, to promote the wellbeing of refugees, which can be problematic. In both countries, refugees face employment restrictions, poor housing, and inadequate access to services. On top of that, there are negative views from many citizens in Lebanon and Jordan towards refugees, and the same goes for the views of Turkish citizens towards refugees.

    Although many aspects of the refugee situation in Lebanon and Jordan are similar, both countries have also dealt with the influx of refugees using differing strategies. The Jordanian government has input a legal framework to address the refugee crisis. What seemed like progress for refugees actually turned out to be a liability, as the policies have become more restrictive. The Lebanese government has taken a different approach, allowing local institutions to handle many aspects of accommodations for refugees. Despite its downfalls, Jordan has made some recent progress. In 2021, Jordan issued 62,000 work permits to refugees, which is a record number.  

    US Policy Options

    There are policy options that can help improve the wellbeing of refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Since these countries have the most refugees displaced by the GWOT, it makes sense to focus on them for US policy options. It is notable that by listing policy solutions to help refugees, this brief only explores the view that the US should intervene to help refugees. Listed below are some of the options.

    The US could encourage Lebanon and Jordan to sign the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its accompanying 1967 Protocol. The US could do this through negotiations with Lebanon and Jordan, such as a deal to provide increased aid to support refugees in those countries in return for signing the Convention and Protocol.

    Pros 

    1. The US fulfills its strategic interest as a global peacekeeper.
    2. There are many benefits for refugees. Their quality of life could improve, and they would be granted many protected rights and freedoms outlined under the Convention and Protocol. In Lebanon and Jordan, legal aid actors spend too much time advocating for the right to legal stay for refugees. Since the Convention requires states to regularize the status of refugees within their borders, signing it would make legal stay in Lebanon and Jordan more accessible. 
    3. Promoting the Convention and Protocol would be less of an infringement on Lebanese and Jordanian national sovereignty than promoting domestic laws.
    4. Providing aid as a negotiation tactic would help lower Lebanon and Jordan’s out-of-pocket costs to help refugees. More money could then be spent to promote the refugees’ wellbeing.

    Cons 

    1. Since signing the Convention and Protocol would help refugees to gain legal stay in Lebanon and Jordan, it may exacerbate tensions between refugees and citizens of Lebanon and Jordan.
    2. Signing the Convention and Protocol may not actually do much, as there is already influence from both in Lebanon and Jordan today. That influence comes in the form of norms being spread to those countries. Therefore, the US may be wasting resources to pursue this option.

    The US could promote peace and positive relationships between refugees and the citizens of host nations. Refugees are not likely to leave Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan any time soon, so the US can try to improve their quality of life there so that they can more easily integrate into those societies. The US can do this through diplomatic talks with government leaders, which would ideally lead to a campaign supporting refugees trying to integrate into their societies. 

    Pros

    1. If the relationship between refugees and host citizens becomes more positive, there will subsequently be more support for programs, laws, and infrastructure that would promote the wellbeing of refugees. 
    2. Although an ultimate goal would be for refugees to safely return home, this is often not possible due to unsafe conditions. Therefore, improving quality of life may be the best option at the current moment. 

    Cons

    1. Turkish president Erdoğan suggests that he is not on good terms with President Biden. Because of this, diplomatic talks may be difficult.
    2. Citizens of the host nations may view the US attempt to integrate refugees into their societies as an infringement on their national sovereignty.
    3. Host citizens may not want refugees to integrate into their societies.