Introduction
Between 2009 and 2023, an average of 34,000 Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC) navigated deportation proceedings annually. 49 percent of these children received no legal guidance and had to represent themselves in court. Analyses of court outcomes reveal that 96 percent of immigrants who self-represent lose their cases, making them four times more likely to be deported than those with legal counsel.
During this time, apprehensions of UAC by Customs and Border Protection ranged from a high of 152,880 in 2022 to 28,679 in the first eleven months of 2025—the lowest since 2012. These fluctuations continue to trigger debate on U.S. policy towards UAC and the government’s role in procuring legal counsel for them.
Defining Unaccompanied Alien Children
An “unaccompanied alien child” refers to any individual under the age of 18 who arrives in the U.S. without lawful immigration status, like a visa or green card, and has no guardian to care for them. Roughly 80 percent of UAC come from Mexico and the Northern Triangle, the region containing Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
UAC’s cases in immigration court always determine whether they will be deported or not. While they often have various motivations for entering the U.S., a report by the Congressional Service Review finds the majority of UAC are “fleeing violent crime, gang violence, and severe economic insecurity.” Thus, many of their cases end up requiring verification of asylum claims.
Barriers to Legal Representation for UAC
While the Sixth Amendment’s right to an attorney applies to criminal trials, immigration procedures are civil trials. Consequently, the government is not obligated to provide UAC with an attorney. To fill this gap, various legal services emerged to represent them. Unfortunately, they can only do so much; despite their efforts, data regarding the 483,432 UAC in the legal system between 2009 and 2023 reveals that large gaps in access to legal representation for UAC remain an issue.
For example, UAC in rural areas or Republican-led states are less likely to obtain lawyers due to lower funding for UAC-oriented services in those areas. Additionally, the children’s country of origin severely affects their likelihood of securing an attorney. While UAC from China and India are represented 89 percent of the time, only about 53 percent of UAC from the Northern Triangle and Mexico manage to obtain legal representation despite comprising over 80 percent of all UAC.
To address these issues, the government has allocated funding to legal service providers and caregivers to assist UAC. In spite of these efforts, resources for UAC are highly scrutinized and fluctuate frequently. This fluctuation is exemplified by the legal battle that began on February 18, 2025 after the Trump Administration issued a stop-work order and refused to renew the annual 200 million budget for these services. While work was briefly interrupted, CLESPA v. HHS revoked the stop-work order and prevented the Administration from permanently defunding these programs.
Legal Framework
Given the lack of in-court representation for UAC, understanding the legal principles that uphold the current system is key to navigating the debate on whether the government should provide attorneys for UAC.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is part of an evolving chain of American immigration policies; its 1952 version solidified the precedent of not providing an attorney in immigration courts. The law explains that anyone in immigration court has the right to an attorney, but “at no expense to the Government.” This language is the primary reason the government does not pay for attorneys in immigration trials, including UAC.
Additionally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its subcomponents, such as the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). While DHS is tasked with handling immigration in general, the Act specifically assigns UAC to the care of the ORR, coordinates with UAC caregivers, and connects them to legal services. In conjunction, the Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2008 reinforced living standards for UAC in ORR facilities.
These Acts demonstrate how UAC are typically subsumed under broader immigration legislation. Since they exist complexly at an intersection between juvenile, immigration, and asylum court procedures, debate on the government’s involvement in providing attorneys for them continues. Supporters claim more should be done to prevent children from having to represent themselves in court, while critics claim the government should pursue other avenues to prevent UAC from entering the court system in the first place.
Support
Supporters point towards a study by the Institute for Defense Analysis which concluded that if every UAC had legal representation, their success rate in court would increase by at least 22 percent. This study also found that guaranteeing UAC attorneys would reduce the backlog of immigration courts by 6.7 percent by decreasing the number of hearings adjourned to find counsel.
Many proponents also argue that unaccompanied minors, due to their age and backgrounds, do not possess the expertise to navigate the legal system alone. Over 90 percent of UAC speak a primary language other than English, making competent self-representation near-impossible. Moreover, because of their young age, UAC are not psychologically developed enough to adequately understand the severity of the legal system. In tandem with high risks of psychological trauma among asylum seekers and mental challenges associated with parental separation, supporters suggest UAC deserve more accommodation in the justice system.
In addition to providing guidance throughout legal proceedings, Supporters argue that UAC need attorneys to advocate for them when their rights are infringed upon. They point to the poor treatment of UAC in government care and accuse the ORR of improperly protecting them. For instance, a lawsuit against the ORR revealed that between 2013 and 2015, 37,088 UAC were entrusted to an “unrelated sponsor,” heightening concerns of human trafficking and improper vetting of caregivers. Even more, whistleblowers in Arizona describe an incident from August 30, 2025, where 30 children in ORR facilities were driven to the airport in the middle of the night and loaded onto planes to take them back home despite the ORR’s knowledge that these children experienced death threats, gang violence, and human trafficking, and likely could have won their asylum case.
Finally, supporters criticize the fact that deportation hearings do not require representation since consequences of such hearings are often more severe than those for petty criminal offenses. Advocates explain that deporting migrants back to their home countries is “a punishment that many UACs consider far worse than being sent to a jail in the U.S.” The belief that “deportation is not a ‘punishment’” and distinct from criminal law is criticized as being an outdated legal standard, with many arguing that it is time to instead promote the welfare of UAC.
Opposition
Most opponents emphasize the language of the INA as a justification for excusing the government from guaranteeing any legal counsel. They further criticize the funding of UAC-oriented legal services as a roundabout way of violating the INA; they believe that guaranteeing UAC attorneys will facilitate guaranteed attorney access for all immigrants despite this being a clear violation of the INA.
Additionally, critics argue that providing attorneys in civil litigation would give immigrants more protection than American citizens–who also do not get representation in civil offenses. Moreover, they claim that developing more lenient policies regarding illegal immigration is unfair to the 3,432,519 legal immigrants awaiting their hearings as of August 2025. With the majority of cases being set for 2029, legal immigrants must often compete with UAC for access to the same limited resources.
Critics also claim that not guaranteeing counsel for UAC serves as deterrence towards human traffickers that take advantage of pro-immigration policy. They argue that relaxing treatment towards UAC may increase the number of children seeking to enter the U.S., thereby increasing their reliance on human traffickers who offer to help them do so. As more UAC enter the U.S., Border Patrol could become overwhelmed and begin quickly processing immigrants to manage the higher influx, leading to a less rigorous vetting process.
Additionally, critics argue that the success of adopting a stronger border policy is reflected in the 85.2 percent drop in arrivals at the Southern border between the last four months of the Biden Administration and the beginning of the second Trump Administration. They suggest stricter border regulation in place of UAC assistance, arguing that it would allow more resources to be allocated to legal immigrants and increase secure vetting at the border.
Finally, critics of universal counsel propose alternative paths to citizenship that mitigate concerns over economic burdens and fairness. For example, a plan by Representative Jim Jordan proposes a new system that requires $1,000 to seek asylum among other fees for work authorization and appeals. This plan also provides mechanisms to generate $77 billion and would allow Congress to increase investment in immigration enforcement. Alternatively, the Unaccompanied Alien Children Assistance Control Act suggests charging countries $15,000 for every UAC in federal custody—the assumed average cost of UAC.
Conclusion
Despite the adoption of staunch immigration policies or proposed immigration pathways, unaccompanied children continue to enter the United States. With no guaranteed attorney, many children who do not speak English, lack legal competence, and are separated from guardians continue to represent themselves in court. As debate on the responsibility of the government towards these children continues, any conclusions are likely to have significant implications for both civil representation, immigrant law, and children’s rights.