Introduction

The United States developed a diplomatic relationship with Somalia in 1960 following its independence from British and Italian rule. After a period of stagnation between the two countries throughout the 1990s, the United States formally recognized the new federal government of Somalia (FGS) in 2013. While the United States has worked with Somalia to maintain regional security and relieve humanitarian aid for decades, Somalia has continued to face a series of political upheavals and violence with the absence of a functioning central government. For almost two decades, al-Shabaab, a clan-based militant group, has conducted violent insurgencies in southern and central Somalia and officially became an al-Qa’ida affiliate in 2012. The United States officially designated al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2008. 

Historic and Present Threats 

Al-Shabaab’s primary goal has been to expel foreign forces and establish an Islamic state in Somalia based on its interpretation of Sharia law. Historically and currently, they exploit local grievances, carry out attacks, and enforce their strict interpretation of Islamic law in the regions they control, especially in southern and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab killed more than 500 people by detonating two truck bombings in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, in 2017, and killed 148 people at Garissa University College in central Kenya. They were able to gain strength by taking advantage of the lack of effective governance and security in Somalia. 

The United States has been involved in countering the militant group’s attacks since 2013. U.S. forces executed the former leader of al-Shabaab, Ahmed Godane, with an airstrike in 2014. Al-Shabaab’s successor, Ahmad Umar, has publicly communicated that his organization sees the U.S. as a key enemy and has aimed to dismantle U.S. operations in Somalia and other neighboring countries. According to the Pentagon, the U.S. has authorized over 275 strikes in Somalia during the Trump administration.

The African Union (AU) and United Nations agreed to terminate their multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia (AMISOM) by the end of December 2024. Due to the reduced military presence, al-Shabaab was able to capture a Somali military base in 2023. Several regional forces were also killed in an al-Shabaab suicide car bomb. Al-shabaab’s threat has pushed the AU to reevaluate its withdrawal and complicated U.S. counterterrorism operations. As a developing country, Somalia has dealt with severe internal political disputes between Mogadishu, AU leaders, and Somali federal state authorities, as well as state corruption. After involvement with Somalia since the early 2000s, the U.S. suspended support to the Somali army in 2017 due to corruption concerns related to the accountability of weapons, fuel, and other assistance provided through security aid programs. Although assistance was partially resumed in 2019, the Trump administration officially withdrew all U.S. troops from Somalia in 2020. 

Current U.S. Policy in Somalia

Current U.S. policy in Somalia focuses on two key areas: military intervention and capacity-building. Through its Africa Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. military conducts targeted airstrikes, drone operations, and ground raids to disrupt al-Shabaab’s leadership, training camps, and logistical networks. The U.S. also provides military and financial support to the Somali government and its security forces. For example, they provided training for Somali troops, advised and assisted counterterrorism operations, and enhanced the capacity of Somali security institutions. Since the early 2000s, Washington has partnered with several local and international partners, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, the African Union (AU), the UN, and various Somali forces. 

In 2022, President Biden authorized the redeployment of 450 Special Operations forces to Somalia. This replaced a system where U.S. troops periodically trained and advised Somali and AU forces. The new directive is for the U.S. troops to provide security and services for Somali officials rather than engaging in direct combat. This decision is based on research indicating that the American presence in Somalia before Trump’s withdrawal was effective in countering al-Shabaab. In the year following the U.S. pullout, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies estimated that the number of al-Shabaab attacks rose by 17%, from 1,771 to 2,072. U.S. security assistance to Somalia and peacekeeping operations in the country has amounted to approximately $3 billion since 2010. This makes Somalia one of the top recipients of security aid in sub-Saharan Africa.

Involved Agencies and their Roles 

• Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was a multinational force led by the U.S. in 1992. It was authorized by the Security Council to use “all necessary means” to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Although the initial peace-keeping efforts were successful, the lack of political transparency and absence of a disciplined national armed force in Somalia led UNITAF to transition to UNOSOM II. Under UNOSOM II, the new force was granted enforcement powers by the United Nations (UN) and assigned military tasks such as monitoring hostilities, controlling heavy weapons, and protecting UN personnel and agencies. However, in 1993, Somali militia carried out armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops, leading to the withdrawal and termination of the UN-sanctioned multinational force.
• The Department of Defense has been actively involved in targeting al-Shabaab militants, disrupting their activities, and weakening their capabilities through military operations. They collaborate with US AFRICOM, which leads these efforts by closely working with Somali forces and other international partners. In August 2022, Somali President Hassan Mohamud initiated a “total war” strategy, encouraging African nations to apply pressure on al-Shabaab extremists from all angles. Local clans are supporting Somali forces in driving out al-Shabaab militants from various parts of central Somalia and challenging their presence in southern strongholds.
• The CIA offers intelligence support by collecting information about al-Shabaab’s leadership, operations, and financing. They have uncovered that al-Shabaab finances its operations through piracy, kidnapping, and extortion from local businesses, farmers, aid groups, and others. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the militant group generates approximately $100 million per year through these activities.

Conclusion

U.S. troops are assisting in political reconciliation efforts among Somalia’s different groups and tribal factions. The reintroduction of American troops, along with military advances from Somali forces, will play a crucial role in determining how effectively al-Shabaab’s control over different regions in Somalia can be reduced in the future. Both sides’ leaders are grappling with the challenge of finding a balance between the costs of continuing the conflict and their interests in negotiating its end.