Negotiations between Iran and the United Nations Security Council have been ongoing since Iran was detected building uranium enriched centrifuges in 2002, in violation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, negotiations did not result in meaningful action until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed on July 14, 2015 by Iran, the European Union and the P5+1 (the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, which included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany). Iran aimed to relieve sanctions which hindered its economic growth, while the P5+1 wanted to delay Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon. The agreement was gradually fulfilled by both sides until the United States withdrew from the JCPOA under the leadership of President Trump. Under President Joe Biden, the JCPOA has been revived with new negotiations underway.
The journey towards the JCPOA was not entirely smooth. Initially, Iran had already signed onto the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1967 where it agreed to forgo becoming a nuclear armed state. So when Iran was discovered to have secret nuclear sites in 2003, the international community began to worry about what the discovery would mean for the rest of the world, and the Middle Eastern region in particular. If Iran were to attain a nuclear weapon, Israel, which has had a strained relationship with Iran ever since the Gulf War, promised military action would be a consequence. This would potentially trigger a war involving Hezbollah, a Shiite political party and militant group that opposes Israel, or serve as an example to other Arabian states, like Saudi Arabia, that they could also obtain a nuclear weapon without ramifications.
For almost ten years, the international community unsuccessfully tried to find different ways of reaching a deal with Iran. The first negotiations that took place were between Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). This agreement had Iran cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, sign the Additional Protocol and temporarily suspend conversion and enrichment activities but not stop enrichment entirely. The agreement between Iran and the E3 was only temporary and a start to a possible long-term solution that could benefit both sides. However, negotiations broke down in 2005 under the newly elected Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was viewed as a hardliner. Iran announced they would be resuming uranium conversion and rejected the EU3’s proposed Long Term Agreement. For Iran, the agreement was viewed as heavy on demands, light on incentives, and did not adequately compromise with Iran’s demands. Another agreement was proposed in 2008 between Iran and P5+1 which would give Iran access to light water reactor (LWR) technology and a nuclear fuel supply in exchange for Iran’s suspension of enrichment activity. As with the previous agreement, Ahmadinejad refused the offer and instead pushed for more enrichment. In 2011, a potential plan was proposed by the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. This new plan would involve the gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for Iran limiting enrichment. The eventual goal would be Iran suspending enrichment entirely and all sanctions being lifted. Iran agreed to the plan, but the United States, United Kingdom, and France refused. Negotiations remained at a stand-still, while the West continued to sanction Iran and Iran continued improving its enrichment capability.
Following a 2011 IAEA report which fully laid out Iran’s nuclear program, the rest of the world realized Iran was only a year or two away from attaining a nuclear weapon. This resulted in an increase in bilateral talks to reach a preferential agreement, one of which took place in 2012 between the P5+1 and Iran. The P5+1 proposal included Iran stopping uranium enrichment up to 20%, shipping out the enriched uranium they had already produced, and closing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, an uranium enrichment facility in Iran. Iran proposed their own plan which included the recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, sanctions relief, cooperation in nuclear energy and safety, and a possible cap on 20% uranium enrichment. Both sides disagreed with the proposals, resulting in further sanctions against Iran.
The situation evolved in 2013 when Iran elected a new president, Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned towards ending sanctions and stated in his inaugural address that his goals included “elevating Iran’s position based on national interest and lifting of the oppressive sanctions.” His statement was an indication of Iran becoming more receptive to negotiations regarding nuclear technology. Talks between Iran and the P5+1 were held in 2013, when the US stopped demanding that Iran completely cease enrichment activities. On November 24, an interim deal was struck which detailed the steps that would be taken until a more comprehensive solution could be agreed upon. The negotiations for a lasting agreement took until July 14, 2015.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action required Iran to suspend and concede several points:
- Eliminate all of its 20% enriched uranium and 98% of its 3.5% LEU
- At the Natanz Plant: remove 14,000 centrifuges and keep them in storage
- At the Fordow Plant: cease enrichment, but would have 1,044 centrifuges in non-enrichment function to produce stable isotopes
- Next 8 years: enrichment related research and development would be limited
- Enrichment with 5,060 inefficient and breakdown-prone first generation centrifuges for the next 15 years
- Could not construct any additional heavy water reactors or accumulate heavy water; excess heavy water would be available for export on international market
- Follow the rules laid out in the IAEA Additional Protocol which would allow the agency to access any site susceptible to have activity involving fissile material
- IAEA would be able to monitor Iran’s uranium mines and milling plants, centrifuge production and assembly sites, and procurement supply chains for 20-25 years
In return, most of the economic sanctions imposed by the EU, UN and the US would be lifted or suspended once the IAEA had certified that Iran had taken the required steps outlined in the agreement.
The JCPOA allowed for 90 days between the Finalization Day and Adoption Day for Iran and the US to begin review processes of the agreement domestically. On Adoption Day, October 18, 2015, Iran and the P5+1 took the steps necessary to meet the commitments listed out in the JCPOA. On Implementation Day, 2016, the IAEA certified that Iran had taken the steps necessary to restrict its nuclear program and allowed for increased IAEA monitoring, which resulted in the U.S., EU and UN relieving some sanctions. In 2023, eight years after adoption day, the UN would lift missile restrictions, Iran would ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol, the EU would terminate all nuclear sanctions, and the United States would remove entities from the sanctioned list and continue sanctions relief. The JCPOA would end in October 2025 in which Iran’s nuclear file would be closed.
When then U.S. President Donald Trump was elected, he unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed all U.S. sanctions on Iran. Trump cited the sunset clause in the agreement as one of the reasons for his withdrawal. The sunset clause provided an expiration date to the ceasing of Iran’s enrichment activity. Many critics, including the Trump administration, viewed this as a countdown clock that would still lead to the eventual development of nuclear weapons by Iran. In addition, IAEA inspections would only take place at sites where legitimate concern for nuclear activity could be demonstrated, which excluded many military sites. Many critics claimed military sites are potential places for nuclear activity. Lastly, Trump also claimed the deal failed to account Iran’s ballistic missile program as during JCPOA negotiations, this topic was excluded from talks. The US withdrawal from the deal meant a reinstatement of sanctions against Iran that were previously waived. The US also terminated sanction waivers for cooperative nuclear projects, including transfer of enriched uranium out of Iran, transfer and storage of heavy water outside of Iran, and construction of additional reactor units at the Bushehr nuclear reactor.
While the US withdrew from the JCPOA, the rest of the signatories—France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—reemphasized their support for the deal and the importance of nonproliferation. The United Nations and Russia’s Foreign Ministry also released a statement in continued support of the JCPOA.
In response to the renewed sanctions, Iran began to recede from their JCPOA commitments. Iran began to enrich uranium past 3.67% and invested in research and development of centrifuge technology that did not adhere to IAEA monitoring and safeguards. Iran also notified the IAEA that its stock of heavy water had exceeded 130 metric tons. Additionally, in 2020, Iran passed new legislation to increase nuclear activities by boosting enrichment, increasing monthly uranium output and conducting research and development on centrifuges. Still, Iran continues to allow IAEA inspectors onto sites related to the JCPOA for verification and monitoring. The Biden administration has been more willing to enter into negotiations with Iran on the future of the agreement. Biden has stated that the US would only rejoin the agreement if Iran returns to compliance, but also wants to further broaden the agreement topics to include Iran’s missile program. Iran is willing to return to compliance only to the original deal. Negotiations are currently still taking place between Iran and the P5+1.
